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Dýþ Basýnda Türkiye /
Western Press Review / Arab Press Review / Israeli Press Review
American Press Review (Slate) / Western Press Review
|
Washington
Post Disarm Iraq Quickly, Bush to Urge U.N. Act Now The danger is immediate. Saddam Hussein must be removed.
By George P. Shultz The Economist – What has changes, what has not? US,
the Arab world, C. Asia, Europe… External link - Brookings September 11 event – Wolfowitz ... full
event video (Real Player) |
H2 Independent `Why do they hate us? The question is not
new and the answers are not hard to find'. By Noam Chomsky. Revealed: The Taliban minister, the US envoy and the warning of
September 11 that was ignored The New Republic THE NEW BUSH DOCTRINE.Son
Shine National Review - The European Dialogue - Are we friends, allies, or neither, by Victor David Hanson The other dividends of Iraqi regime change. Perspective - The other clash of civilisations -
Europe v US. |
H3 Washington Times -
Germans arrest Turks in terror attack plot
Kurdish KDP official on
ties with US, Turkey, Iraqi opposition.
Turkish nationalist wants Turkmen zone in N.Iraq Greece says
Turkey turmoil delays Cyprus EU talks. Tehran Times
Turkey for Expansion of Military Ties with Iran Die Zeit – Barzani interview |
||
H4 New York Times Bush Asks Leaders in 3 Key Nations for Iraq
Support
2 in Germany Accused of Plotting Anniversary Attack on U.S. Base Introspection as a Prerequisite for Peace By YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI
Bill Keller- Whether or not
Senator Kerry's Vietnam experience brought him wisdom is better judged by
examining his wisdom than his experience |
H5 Washington Post Disarm
Iraq Quickly, Bush to Urge U.N. Germany Foils Plot on U.S. Base
Act Now The danger is immediate. Saddam Hussein must be
removed. By
George P. Shultz Bush's Summer of Dissension
By E. J. Dionne Jr. Editorial
A Dialogue on Iraq |
H6 Guardian How profit urge
kept US ticking Leader - Keep the focus on Afghanistan not Iraq Bush calls for a coalition Saudis accuse British staff of destabilisation campaign |
||
|
H7 The Economist One year on Remember September 11th
changed the world. But not enough A look at the “different world” (in George Bush's words) that has
emerged from the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 Central Asia September 11th has brought
America back to a fragile region after a damaging decade of absence. Long may
it stay there The Arab world Revolution
delayed An American strike on Iraq will not ignite the
Arab street. On the contrary, it may nudge some societies towards the modern world Fear of America, and of being left out - Why Europe will probably
give in over Iraq |
H8 The New Republic THE
NEW BUSH DOCTRINE.Son Shine National Review - The European Dialogue The other dividends of Iraqi regime change. The Weekly Standard
Qatar - Could this
small Gulf state become America's most important Arab ally? Perspective - The other clash of civilisations - Europe v US.
|
H9 UPI Exclusive: The man who found al Qaida
Libya may be first Arab state with nukes, Sharon
warns Iran successfully test fires surface-to-surface missile A Look at Thwarted Terrorist Plots CBS - increased "chatter" or communications between known
al Qaeda operatives NORMAN MAILER
DECLARES: 'AMERICA IS SO VAIN' |
||
|
H10 Khaddam: Iraq is our
strategic depth; US cannot punish Syria Daily Star It is our turn to ask: Why does America
hate us? Arab Press Review Washington changing tactics over Iraq, but strategy remains the
same |
H11 Israeli Press
Review Israelis start the holiday season fearing a ‘mega-attack’ Ha'aretz U.S. agrees with Israeli assessments on Libya's
efforts to get nuclear weapons Jerusalem
Post 9/11 ONE YEAR
LATER: Force won't work, By Shlomo Ben-Ami |
H12 Wall Street Journal Johannesburg could signal
the end of multiparty, unworkable international agreements |
||
|
H13 Los
Angeles Times Hit
Saddam Hussein Hard, and Hit Him Right Now
International
Herald Tribune A
major U-turn in U.S. policy on peacekeeping NEWS ANALYSIS German position on Iraq
could be destabilizing for allies |
H14 Financial Times
Editorial The unsettling drumbeat of war Putin has 'serious doubts' over Iraq strike |
H15 Slate From: Robert
Wright - Subject: Poverty and the Middle-Class Terrorist This is the fifth in a nine-part series on how American should fight
the war against terrorism. |
||
|
H16 The Times leader - Aquinas and Iraq Blair's real special relationship is with us, not the US Blair and Bush face revolt over attack on Iraq |
H17 Daily Telegraph 'Send in troops with inspectors' Germans foil al-Qa'eda plot to bomb
US base Brown highlights the downside of
joining euro |
H18 Independent `Why do they hate
us? The question is not new and the answers are not hard to find'. By Noam
Chomsky.
|
||
H19 Morgan
Stanley Dean WitterGlobal: Global
Reverberations Stephen Roach
|
H20 Book reviews The Weekly
Standard Does the Democratic Party Have a Future? |
H21 StratforU.S. Forces Numbers May Not
Match Washington's Ambitions |
||
|
New York Times/ Washington Post |
Slate (American Press Review/ International Press
Review) |
Russia / Caucasus / Asia / Middle East / Arab Press Review / Israeli Press Review Ed.s from the Hebrew Press / Ha'aretz / Jerusalem Post / Debka Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) World Media Reaction (USIA) Periodicals / Think-tanks / Stratfor / Book reviews FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service) |
||
On Turkey
See also Turkey in Foreign Press by Basýn Yayýn, German
Press on Turkey, French Press on Turkey
Washington Times
Germans arrest Turks in terror attack plot
Melissa Eddy and Kim Gamel
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published 9/7/2002
STUTTGART,
Germany -- A Turkish man suspected of being a follower of Osama bin Laden and
the man's fiancee, an employee of the U.S. military, were arrested on suspicion
of planning an attack on a U.S. military base on the anniversary of the September
11 suicide hijackings, German authorities announced yesterday.
The couple was said to have had 287 pounds of
chemicals and five pipe bombs at the time of their arrest Thursday in an
apartment near Heidelberg, where the U.S. Army in Europe has headquarters.
The 25-year-old Turkish man had a picture of
Osama bin Laden at his apartment, in addition to Islamic literature and a book
about building bombs, said Thomas Schauble, the chief law enforcement officer
for Baden-Wuerttemberg state. There were indications that an attack was planned
for September 11, but he would not elaborate. "We suspect that they
intended to mount a bomb attack against military installations and the city of
Heidelberg," Mr. Schauble said, adding that the man was a strict Muslim
"who hates Americans and Jews."
His 23-year-old fiancee worked at a supermarket
at a U.S. installation in Heidelberg. The man worked at a chemical warehouse in
nearby Karlsruhe. They were arrested in their apartment in Walldorf, about 6
miles south of Heidelberg.
U.S. law enforcement officials in Washington said
the woman had dual American and German citizenship.
"Now we must examine whether he was acting
alone or whether there were structures behind this," Mr. Schauble said,
adding that the man was being questioned but was not cooperating. U.S. Army
Europe spokesman Sandy Goss said he had no details about a target. "All I
know is there were two people arrested, and we're monitoring the situation
closely because we take all these reports seriously," the spokesman said.
There were no signs of heightened alert at the
U.S. facility yesterday evening. Joggers ran past the fenced-in headquarters,
and children played outside at military housing across the street. If such a
plot was indeed under way, it would represent the largest planned terrorist
attack to become public since September 11. Hundreds of Army personnel and
their families live on the base.
German federal criminal authorities refused to
comment, saying the case was being handled by state investigators.
Earlier this week, federal Interior Minister Otto
Schily said German authorities had no information on any plans for attacks in
the country around the anniversary of the September 11 attacks. In a separate
incident, federal prosecutors said yesterday they are investigating whether a
39-year-old Afghan-born man who lived in Hamburg and holds a German passport
had terror links. The man was arrested in New York by U.S. authorities after he
traveled to the United States in mid-July, and he is in custody in Alexandria.
German federal investigators started their
investigation on Aug. 20, a spokesman for federal prosecutors, Hartmut
Schneider, said. He refused to give further details.
Three of the hijackers involved in the September
11 attacks belonged to a Hamburg terror cell. In Sweden yesterday, an appeals
court ruled that a man suspected of planning to hijack a London-bound airliner
must remain in custody.
Kerim Chatty, 29, had appealed a district court's
decision earlier this week keeping him in jail while prosecutors prepare formal
charges of planning to hijack a plane and illegal possession of a weapon.
Prosecutor Thomas Haeggstroem faces a Sept. 16
deadline to file formal charges, but he said he may seek an extension.
Mr. Chatty was arrested on Aug. 29 at Vaesteraas
airport in central Sweden after security officials found a gun in his carry-on
luggage. He was preparing to board a Ryanair flight on his way to an Islamic
conference in Birmingham, England.
Mr. Chatty admitted he had the gun but denied
planning to hijack the plane.
The plane took off several hours late without Mr.
Chatty and several other Muslims initially thought to be traveling with him.
The others were released after questioning.
His 32-year-old brother, who asked not to be
identified, said the weapon was an old gun from Mr. Chatty's criminal past and
that he probably found it after he rented out his apartment three weeks ago.
Mr. Chatty had been convicted previously of theft and assault charges,
including a clash with a group of U.S. Marines in a Swedish gym.
Mr. Chatty also attended flight schools in the
United States in the 1990s but did not complete the course and was not
licensed.
"He is not 100 percent innocent because he
had a gun, but he is not going to hijack a plane with 20 of his own religion
and with children and women," the brother said. "The police
[EnLeader] are going to show that this is all a big misunderstanding."
The brother described Mr. Chatty as an
open-minded pacifist who converted to Islam. He said Mr. Chatty was critical of
the September 11 attacks and felt that bin Laden had "made people think
bad about Islam."
Kim Gamel reported from Stockholm.
Kurdish KDP official on
ties with US, Turkey, Iraqi opposition.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party's,
KDP's, official in Charge of external relations held a news conference on 2
September following his return from Turkey and after
opposition talks in the US. He spoke about the present situation and future
expectations for the Kurdish region and Iraq. He also talked about his recent
visit to Washington DC where he attended a series of meetings as part of a
delegation of the Iraqi opposition with US officials. He also talked about the
"seriousness" of the US about a regime change in Baghdad. The
proposed opposition conference; tension between the KDP and Turkey
were also covered by the news conference. The following is an excerpt from
report on Hoshyar Zebari's news conference published by Iraqi Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) newspaper Brayati on 3 and 4 September. Subheadings as
received.
Yesterday, 2 September 2002, [Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP] political bureau
member and the official in charge of foreign relations, Hoshyar Zebari, held a
news conference for all the [Iraqi] Kurdistan media channels.
He shed light on the present situation and future expectations for [Iraqi]
Kurdistan region and Iraq. In a part of the conference, Zebari talked about the
recent visit to Washington DC by the Iraqi opposition delegation, which
comprised six main groups, and their meetings with senior US officials. He also
shed light on the US policy regarding the present Iraqi regime and its
seriousness about a regime change [in Iraq]. He pointed out the importance of a
political opposition conference to unify efforts.
He talked about the tensions between [Iraqi] Kurdistan Democratic Party and Turkey,
and that he visited Turkey in order to remove and ease the
tension and met senior Turkish officials in the hope of re-establishing normal
relations.
He clarified that Kurdistan Democratic Party and Turkey are
neighbours, and it is better for both sides to keep good neighbourly relations.
The following is a summery of Mr Zebari's news conference:
The visit of the [Iraqi] Opposition delegation to Washington DC
On the Iraqi opposition delegation's visit to Washington DC and the US policy
regarding Iraq, Zebari stressed that all the changes that are being mentioned
are directly related to us. In this context, he said: "The visit of the
[Iraqi] opposition delegation to Washington DC had precedents. The US
administration ha previously announced its policy; that the goal of the
administration is a regime change in Iraq. This is the goal and principle,
which they have conveyed to the Americans and the world. All US officials from
the president to the secretaries of defence and state stress this policy."
In this context, Zebari noted that meeting of the Iraqi opposition was a part
of the policy and strategy for a regime change in Iraq. He added that before
this meeting, the [Iraqi] opposition [groups] had visited Washington DC several
times.
Concerning the essence of the meetings, Zebari said; "The Pentagon and the
State Department invited to the meeting six Iraqi opposition groups, which
comprised Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP], Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK],
the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SCIRI], the Iraqi
National Accord [INA], the Iraqi National Congress [INC] and Constitutional
Monarchy Movement [CMM].
"If we take a look at the composition of these six groups, we would see
that it comprises the group of four, (which includes Kurdistan Democratic
Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq and the Iraqi National Accord), in addition to the [Iraqi
National Congress] INC and the Constitutional Monarchy Movement. This means
that they have identified the groups that represent the majority of the Iraqi
opposition."
Regarding the absence of [Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP] leader, [Mas'ud]
Barzani from this meeting, Zebari said that the US side really wanted [Mr.
Barzani] to be present at this [meeting], and that they exerted much effort to
ensure his attendance. But for some logistical and technical reasons, Mr
Barzani was unable to attend. Therefore, Zebari, attended the meeting
representing leader [Mas'ud] Barzani and the leadership of Kurdistan Democratic
Party.
Concerning the level of the meeting with the US officials, Zebari said at the
press conference: "As a first step, the meeting was organized at the level
of under-secretaries of state and defence. The first session was chaired by the
undersecretary of state, Marc Grossman, and the undersecretary of defence,
Douglas J. Feith. Representatives of the US government institutions were
present, such as the National Security Council, the army and other governmental
institutions.
The US message to the [Iraqi] opposition was reassuring them that the US
position is unified on Iraq. They want the Iraqi opposition to support each
other and consolidate unity among them, because the US government vision for
future Iraq is a democratic country in which all Iraqis participate. It has to
provide peace for its people and neighbouring countries and is not a source of
threat to any side.
Regarding the Kurdish stances at this meeting, he stressed that the Kurdish
stance was united. He said: "Our stances, as the Kurdistan Democratic
Party, and those of [Secretary-General of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan,
PUK] Mam [honorific] Jalal [Talabani]; namely, the stance of the Kurds
regarding most of the issues we have presented was united, especially on the
issue of protecting our people, which is a very important matter to guarantee
the continuation of the democratic experience in [Iraqi] Kurdistan region. As
for the future of Iraq, we, the Kurds, demand a federal system within a
democratic Iraq.
Mr Zebari then talked about the interference of regional countries in Iraq's
internal affairs, which would complicate the situation if it takes place,
because if one side interferes in Iraq's internal affairs, be it in Kurdistan
or elsewhere, another side will interfere too. Thus, we need support so that
regional countries would not interfere in any way.
Concerning the [Iraqi] opposition meeting in Washington DC, the official in
charge of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, [KDP] foreign relations bureau talked
about the understanding they had reached at the end of the meetings. In this
context, he said: "The essential and most important point at this meeting
was that we all reached an understanding that this group of six would take the
initiative to hold a political conference of all the Iraqi opposition [groups]
with local funds, and not US funds. Meanwhile, we will try to talk to all the
opposition sides. We have even told the Americans that these six groups do not
represent the whole opposition.
"Moreover what is significant for us as Kurds is that we had previously
agreed with the other opposition groups to submit a plan of action as a
statement to the US government, to be published in the world media. This
programme stresses that the opposition delegation demands a democratic,
pluralistic and federal Iraq in the future. The US side did not protest, and it
[the plan] was read out at the daily press briefing of the State Department as
a statement by the Iraqi opposition delegation. We believe that that briefing
was useful and timely."
Mr Zebari also talked about the video conference with the US Vice-President,
Dick Cheney, and explained that the absence of the vice-president at the
meeting did not mean that it was not important, and that video conferences had
become a normal means of communication within the US administration.
In this context, Zebari said: "At our video conference at the White House
with Vice-President Dick Cheney, and later with Defence Secretary Donald
Rumsfield and the chief of staff, Richard Myers, all the issues that were
mentioned earlier were discussed. They stressed that all [Iraqi] opposition
groups be brought together. The discussions were at the political level and
included the organization of the opposition and the future agenda. They never
discussed the military process or war plans with the [Iraqi] opposition".
America's policy regarding Iraq
On the US policy regarding Iraq, Zebari said: "We think that the American
government is determined on its policy of a regime change in Iraq. As far as we
are concerned, we should be aware that the US is a democratic country and once
the president or senior officials make a promise to their people they can not
simply retract their promise."...
On where the KDP and the Kurds fit in this complicated formula and what stance
to take, Hoshyar Zebari said: "As the KDP, we have informed the US and
other countries that our goal since the inception of the September revolution
(in 1961) was democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan. Therefore, we
still demand a federal system within a democratic federal Iraq; I mean a
democratic Iraq has been one of KDP's goals. We believe that when there is a
democratic system in Iraq, KDP and the Kurds will develop. We have experience,
whether during March 1970 or in the last 10 years of democratic experience in
the Kurdistan region; we find that KDP and the Kurds have gone forward. Taking
all this into consideration, the existing situation contains a lot of threats
to our future. Therefore, this change is not as easy as it is thought to be.
Therefore, we do not want to get ourselves involved in any adventures or
initiatives. What we mean to say and this was repeated several times by [KDP]
leader [Mas'ud] Barzani is: what is the alternative? We mean: what is the
alternative to the existing regime? We do not want one dictator to be replaced
by another. Meanwhile, as Kurds, we should be aware of our role in future Iraq.
Kurdistan Democratic Party and Turkey's Relations
For a while now the relations between [Iraqi] Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP]
and Turkey have been undergoing rising tension. Recently, the
official in charge of the international relations bureau Kurdistan Democratic
Party [KDP], Hoshyar Zebari, visited Turkey and held talks
with Turkish officials.
Regarding the recent tension and the diplomatic efforts, Zebari said: "For
a while now the relations between the [Kurdistan Democratic] Party and Turkey
have been undergoing tension and complications. This is related to some
fundamental elements in our relations with Turkey.
"The relations between Turkey and Kurdistan Democratic
Party are new and only go back to 10 to 12 years. Establishing these relations
was not an easy task, because we are aware of Turkey's views
and our situation. Since the September revolution, all the instructions by the
[late Mullah Mustafa] Barzani to the peshmerga were that the KDP should not
create any problems or interfere in Turkey's affairs, as our
problems are in Iraq and not Turkey. For us Turkey
is a friend and a neighbour. These facts are well known to the Turkish
officials as well.
"The other point is that we are Kurds from Iraqi Kurdistan and have been
struggling for a long time within a united Iraq, and we have never promoted the
slogan of an independent Kurdish state. Our goals are within the framework of
Iraq. We used to demand autonomy, and now we demand federalism within Iraq in
response to the will of the Kurdish people. We have suggested federalism as a
concept, but we have not identified which form of federalism would that be and
what shape would it take within Iraq." ...
"We told them that we would like to have bilateral relations because the
Turks have helped the Kurds on several occasions. For example, in 1988 the
first group of refugees fled from the last Anfal [campaign] fled towards Turkey
and Turkey accepted them and set up several camps for them.
The same happened In 1991 during the mass exodus; Turkey once
again was ready to help and offered humanitarian relief and opened the way to
international assistance, in addition to its well-known role in establishing a
safe haven in Iraqi Kurdistan.
"Turkey is also an important strategic ally of the United
States and plays an important role in protecting the region with the use of the
Incerlik military base, from where our people have been protected for more than
10 years. We realize all this, and, as Kurdistan Democratic Party, we have been
trying to continue our good relations with Turkey and other
neighbouring countries, because the Kurdish situation is extremely complicated
and any development has its own significance. We, should therefore take into
consideration some of Turkey's legitimate sensitivities.
Meanwhile, we have certain fundamental principles which we cannot abandon, not
only for Turkey, but also for the US, Europe and anyone else.
We are a political movement and have certain political demands and we are not
citizens of Turkey, but are the citizens of Iraq and it is our
right that to take the decisions that are good for us within the framework of
Iraq.
"This tension between the [KDP] and Turkey was the result
of many things; above all it was a misunderstanding - or the issues were not
discussed between us in a positive way.
"I would like to point out that within the KDP leadership, we have the
tradition of not accepting any threatening remarks and have not accepted this
for so many years, but we are ready to discuss many things when there is a
friendly, peaceful, and understanding tone. The KDP does not want this tension.
It wants it to be resolved as soon as possible...
" On my return, [KDP leader, Mas'ud] Barzani gave me instructions that it
would be in the interest of both sides to hold talks in order to ease the
tension. I could say that the Turkish side, at the political and diplomatic
level, showed a lot of respect at this meeting...
"Regarding the Brayati newspaper's reaction to the statements made by the
Turkish defence minister, we told them that the statement made by the Turkish
defence minister contained a lot of threats and was contrary to Turkey's
stance regarding Iraq's sovereignty. The statement caused us dismay and we were
forced to react.
"To follow up on this matter, a delegation from the Turkish Foreign
Ministry might visit Iraqi Kurdistan this month."...
In another pivot, he talked about the factors behind the strained relations
between Turkey and the KDP. In order to ease and put an end to
the tension, he visited Turkey, where he held many meetings
with senior officials in Turkey. He also clarified that the
KDP and Turkey are two neighbours and it is better for both to
observe and honour good neighbourhood relations. The following is the second
part of the press conference.
In his reply to questions asked by the journalists regarding the nature of the
talks with the Turkish side, particularly after Brayati newspaper's reply, Mr
Zebari said: "Indeed, the issue of the recent statements by the Turkish
defence minister was the pivot of our talks. We frankly told them that we were
obliged to answer them with a political speech in the Brayati newspaper.
This is because the defence minister's statements are in contrast with the
Turkish official policy. What was important to us was whether this statement
expressed the Turkish official policy or not.
"However, at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs they reaffirmed and
said: "Our policy has undergone no change regarding Iraq. We are adhering
to our policy of preserving the integrity of Iraqi soil." They stated this
in their media also and told us that this was the official Turkish
policy."
Regarding whether a third party attended in the talks, Mr Zebari said,
"The Kurdistan Democratic Party was represented by me and Mr Safin
Dizayee. We participated in the majority of the meetings. As to the Turkish
side, senior officials of several high levels joined the talks."
Federalism is for future Iraq and not for somewhere else
Another question the journalists asked was about the attitude of others abroad
in general and the Turkish government regarding the suggested federal
constitution of future Iraq that the KDP put forward as an initiative. Mr
Zebari replied, "The proposed federal constitution for future Iraq, which
the KDP put forward, has been received very positively abroad and has been
elaborately discussed. Actually this proposal has been put forward to be
discussed and for others to exchange viewpoints in this regard. It is not a
final project which is fixed and unchangeable. Any other side is free to state
and publish its own ideas regarding the future of Iraq. There are many people
who support the project initiated by the KDP and there are others who
disapprove of it. As to the issue of the disapproval of it by some, it is
attributed to the fact that the KDP is the only political side at the level of
Kurdistan and the Iraqi opposition that has been courageous enough to put
forward such a programme.
The KDP's objective from this initiative was to manifest that we are not a
secluded group and that our perspective and ideas for the future are very
extensive, not only for Kurdistan, but also for all Iraq.
"At the start of this initiative, we were glad to discuss it with our
brethren in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]. We raised the proposal to
Mam [honorific] Jalal [Talabani, PUK secretary-general] so that we would put it
forward in the name of the Kurds. I believe it is still early enough and we can
still cooperate. God willing, when the Parliament of Kurdistan assembles, we
shall put forward another project in the name of the Parliament of Kurdistan.
Another point regarding the issue of the constitution project is that people
ask us what type of federalism we want in our demand for federalism. We have pointed
out in that project that we want a federalism based on geographical
administration, that is, we mean that our Turkoman, Assyrian and Arab brethren
will participate in it. This is our demand, but we cannot impose it upon
others."
The project of federalism and Turkey's stance
Within the framework of his replies regarding the federalism issue, Mr Zebari
stated that the issue of the federal project has been openly discussed with Turkey.
In this respect he said: "We have discussed this issue frankly with Turkey
and have told them that the issue of federalism for Kurdistan is not a new
thing; that in 1992, Kurdistan National Assembly, which expresses the Kurds'
will, brought forward the issue of federalism to the whole world, that our
future relation with the Iraqi government will be based on federalism.
Federalism is a type of autonomy, it is not a confederate state, nor is it a
confederate administration of Kurdistan, such as the one we currently enjoy. We
do not have a federal status now because federalism requires bilateral
consensus.
"We also told them, `You mix between the issue of federalism and a Kurdish
state. We as Kurds do not have the slogan of dismembering Iraq. However, due to
the tragedy we have suffered and seeing the consequences of "autonomy"
which culminated in the Anfal campaign [in 1987 and 1988, which claimed the
lives of 182,000 Kurds] and the attack with chemical weapons we demand the
federal system to be applied."
The future federalism and the status quo in the Kurdistan region
Within the same framework, he added that they have told Turkey:
"While we discuss federalism, as the present status quo in Kurdistan we
lose a great deal." In this respect he said, "We have unequivocally
stated to Turkey that we now talk about a federal system. When
compared to the present status quo, we lose a great deal. We will have to
relinquish and forfeit the rights that we currently enjoy. For currently we are
almost independent. Then we will have to return to a unified Iraq. Therefore
you are not justified to have fears. We will not pose a threat for you. For we
are not going to interfere with your affairs. And this issue is especially an
Iraqi affair. We shall decide upon it as Iraqis and as a result of our talks we
are going to reach a reasonable settlement."
It is time we specified our demands
Concerning federalism as an internal Iraqi affair and as to the current rumours
that we should concentrate all our ideas and views on the issue of changing the
regime, Mr Hoshyar Zebari said, "The Kurds have put forward only their own
views. We still have a long distance to go till we get to the desired results.
In this respect some people wonder why we do not tackle the issue of Iraq.
Shall we ignore the issue of federalism tentatively or shall we put off this issue?
Indeed let people say whatever they want to say. We as Kurds, and based on the
bitter experience we have been subjected to, we have now reached the stage
where we specify our demands in a practical, feasible way. We have to specify
what type of federalism we demand and try to convince others of our demand.
"I have met no one to date, or let me say none of those whom I have met,
are opposed to or reject federalism. In principle they are in favour of
federalism. However, they request us not to ask them about its detail, because,
as they say, `We have not come to power and have not reached Baghdad yet.'
"On the other hand, there are others who accept federalism in principle.
However they say that the future parliament of Iraq will have to accept it. Others
say that we have to have a political accord and that the issue of federalism
should be based on ballots. And everybody knows that the ratio of the Kurds
comprises 20-25 per cent of the Iraqis. Therefore the issue, based on voting by
the whole of Iraq, will not result in favour of the Kurds.
This is an important issue. It is not as easy as some people consider it to be.
Actually we have to struggle for it."
The plenary meeting of the opposition and the workshop in London
In his reply to the question when the plenary meeting of the opposition will be
held and whether other meetings will be held in London, he said,
"Currently we are holding talks about the issue of a plenary meeting of
the opposition. For immediately after the Washington meeting was over, all the
opposition delegations held a meeting headed by Mam Jalal. A preparatory
committee was formed from the six main groups. This committee, as an executive
group, will embark on making preparations for that meeting. However, I do not
know whether the meeting will be held in September or October. In this respect
the meeting is believed to be limited and not too extensive; only about a
hundred participants will attend it.
"Apart from this extensive meeting, there will be another meeting
[workshop discussing the principles of democracy] held on the fourth and fifth
of this month in London. I reckon that there will be a mix between this meeting
and the plenary meeting of the opposition. Therefore I want to clarify that the
meeting held on the fourth and fifth of this month has nothing to do with the
committee that prepares for the plenary meeting of the Iraqi opposition,
because the meeting will be held under the auspices of the US State Department.
They have made up many acting committees from experts and specialized people.
They discuss the principle of democracy for the future Iraq. We, at the
Kurdistan Democratic Party, will participate in that meeting and our
representative will attend the meeting along with the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan and others."
Source: Brayati, Arbil, in Sorani Kurdish 3, 4 Sep 02.
Tehran Times
Turkey for Expansion of
Military Ties with Iran
ANKARA -- Turkish Minister of National Defense
Sabahattin Cakmakoglu here on Wednesday announced his country's readiness to
expand military ties with the Islamic Republic, the Iranian Embassy in Ankara
announced on Thursday.
Cakmakoglu told the Iranian Ambassador to
Turkey Firouz Dowlatabadi that expansion of bilateral ties and exchange of
military delegations between Iran and Turkey would be in the interest of both
sides.
Meanwhile, in another meeting, the General
Secretary of Turkey's National Security Council Tuncer Kilinc told Dowlatabadi
on Wednesday that Turkish military and political officials are ready to
cooperate with their Iranian counterparts.
Kilinc said promotion of bilateral ties
under present conditions would be based on new doctrines and relying on
strength. He added expansion of bilateral ties would serve as an important
factor for regional stability and security.
The Iranian ambassador, for his part, said that Iran is ready to expand relations with Turkey in all areas.
Guardian
Cyprus talks break down
Helena Smith in Athens
and Reuters in Paris
Saturday September 7, 2002
The Guardian
Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general, failed to obtain a breakthrough in talks
in Paris between the Greek and Turkish leaders of Cyprus yesterday, but said he
was confident a deal could be reached.
With Cyprus's expected
accession to the EU only months away, Mr Annan said the Turkish Cypriot leader,
Rauf Denk tash, and the Cypriot president, Glafcos Clerides, would have to
"get down to some real business". The next four months, he added,
would provide the last chance for the dispute to be settled amicably.
The lack of progress has
raised the possibility of Cyprus derailing EU enlargement in December and
Ankara making good its threat to annex the Turkish-occupied northern third of
the island.
Back to top
Reuters Turkish nationalist wants
Turkmen zone in N.Iraq.
By Steve Bryant
ISTANBUL, Sept 6 (Reuters) - A senior Turkish nationalist suggested on Friday
that Ankara should declare a zone for ethnic Turks in oil-rich areas of north
Iraq, a new move in exchanges between Turks and Kurds fearing U.S. action may
lead to turmoil.
Deputy Parliament Speaker Murat Sokmenoglu, a prominent member of the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) campaigning for November polls, also urged Turkey's
army and foreign ministry to act firmly to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish
state.
The MHP is the biggest party in parliament and a member of the three-party
coalition government. Sokmenoglu's views cannot be taken as government policy,
but reflect growing nationalist agitation as the November 3 election approaches
and fear of U.S. action in neighbouring Iraq rises.
"The cost of not raising a voice against the de facto (Kurdish) state that
has been formed in northern Iraq should not be paid by thousands of young
Turks... during a possible U.S. operation in Iraq," Sokmenoglu said in a
written statement.
The interests of the small ethnic Turkish Turkmen minority in Iraq meant Turkey
had a right to act, Sokmenoglu said.
"Has not the time come for a statement that will open the way for the
declaration of an autonomous Turkmen region that would...include Kirkuk?"
he asked.
The United States is likely to depend on Turkish air bases and cooperation from
northern Iraqi Kurds if it takes military action to depose Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein.
Washington's two prospective allies have been sparring for weeks, mainly over
what Turkey suspects are Kurdish plans to use any turmoil in
Iraq to declare an independent state in the north.
The Kurdish groups that have run northern Iraq since breaking away from Baghdad
after the 1991 Gulf War deny any such aims, saying they want only wide local
powers within a federal system.
TURKEY FEARS KURDISH STATE
Turkey suspects otherwise and fears a Kurdish state could
undermine its own security and add fuel to violent Kurdish separatism within
its own borders. Over 30,000 people died in separatist violence that eased
after the capture of rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan
in 1999.
Kurds live in a swathe of territory covering parts of Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria. Successive Kurdish uprisings have ended in bloody
failure.
Turkey's nationalists often hark back to the years when the
Ottoman Empire controlled much of Iraq, including oil-producing areas around
the northern city of Kirkuk.
Turkey has kept troops in northern Iraq over the last 10
years, pursuing PKK guerrillas who retreated there from southeast Turkey.
Local Kurds now suspect Ankara of wanting to broaden its influence in the area.
Sokmenoglu's statement followed a warning by Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud
Barzani that Turkey would suffer a massive defeat if it
invaded northern Iraq.
"Not only our soldiers, but also our women, our children and our old
people would fight," Barzani was quoted as saying in the newspaper Die
Zeit in Germany.
Sokmenoglu said Barzani had "exceeded his position by rising to threaten
the Turkish Republic".
"The answer to such an inconsiderate and thoughtless tribal leader should
come from two places: from parliament, and from the border, just as General
Atilla Ates did," he said.
General Ates stood on Turkey's border with Syria in 1998 and
threatened military action if Damascus did not withdraw support from Turkey's
Kurdish rebels.
Greece says Turkey turmoil delays Cyprus EU talks.
(Adds economic forecast, election
background paragraphs 12 onwards)
By George Georgiopoulos
THESSALONIKI, Greece, Sept 6 (Reuters) - Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis
said on Friday that political instability in Turkey was
holding up talks on Cyprus' bid to join the European Union.
Greece takes over the EU's rotating presidency next January 1 and says it will
delay the 15-nation bloc's expansion plans if Cyprus is excluded from the next
round of enlargement.
Turkey, facing elections in November, says it could
"annex" the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if the
EU includes the divided island on a list of 10 nations expected to join in 2004
or 2005.
Delivering his annual state of the nation speech in the northern city of
Thessaloniki, Simitis said EU enlargement would be Greece's top priority during
its presidency.
"In four months we assume the EU presidency. Our first goal is to complete
EU enlargement," Simitis said. "Cyprus cannot be a hostage of
(Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf) Denktash and Ankara."
"The pre-election climate...in Turkey may further
complicate its stance vis a vis the European Union," Simitis said.
Turkey, which is also pushing for a date to start negotiations
with Brussels on joining the EU, seems unwilling to make Cyprus an issue in the
November 3 election and risk raising the passions of Turkish nationalists.
Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded the
Mediterranean island after a short-lived Greek Cypriot coup engineered by the
military junta then in power in Athens.
U.N.-sponsored talks to try to break the deadlock in Cyprus failed to achieve a
breakthrough on Friday but U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said he was
confident a deal could be reached.
Sovereignty is a key issue. Greek Cypriots want the island reunited as a
bizonal bicommunal federation with as one sovereign state while Denktash wants
a loose union of two largely independent states.
Simitis said other Greek priorities during the presidency would be policies to
curb illegal immigration and promote stronger economic growth.
Simitis said the Greek economy would outperform all others in the EU this year
even though exports and tourism have been hurt by the world economic slowdown.
He forecast Gross Domestic Product to grow at "close to 4.0 percent"
this year.
"Our rate of econonmic growth is still more than twice the average
expansion rate in the European Union," Simitis said.
"The international crisis has affected our economy. The drop in incomes
abroad has naturally impacted tourism and demand for Greek products
overseas," he said.
Determined to keep expansion going, he said the government's main priorities
will be to control public spending and wage demands as well as contain
inflation and boost competitiveness.
Simitis' speech was made against a backdrop of growing anger at rising prices because
of the introduction of the euro this year.
Local elections are due next month and could give a signal to Simitis' chances
of remaining in power through 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.
The ruling Socialists are trailing the opposition conservative New Democracy
party in opinion polls but Simitis need not call a general election until the
spring of 2004.
Political analysts believe Simitis could call an early election if the
Socialists do well in at the local polls, to build on his government's success
against the November 17 urban guerrilla group.
Turkish Delegates Arrive in Iraq
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 11:30 a.m. ET
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) -- A large Turkish delegation arrived in Baghdad Friday, openly defying Washington's call for support to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
Turkish Health Minister Osman Durmus and about 100 officials, business executives and doctors were met at Baghdad airport by Durmas' Iraqi counterpart, Omed Mubarak.
The visit comes just a day after Arab states declared their allegiance to Iraq, saying at the end of a foreign ministers' meeting that U.S. threats against Baghdad were threats against the whole Arab world.
A close ally that hosts U.S. warplanes monitoring Iraq, Turkey is among many countries in the region that fear a war in Iraq could destabilize their neighborhood.
Germany has also said that it opposes military action against Iraq, as has Russia, Iraq's largest trading partner, which recently sent a trade delegation to Baghdad.
``At a time when Washington believes Baghdad is building chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, many pro-Turkish Americans see Turkey's enthusiasm to help Saddam's government as a slap in the face of America,'' said Michael Rubin, an Iraq expert at Washington's American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
The trip comes just two days after President Bush told allies that their ``credibility is at risk'' if they refuse to back action against Iraq. But Durmus said military action against Iraq is inappropriate.
``If there are such things,'' Durmus said of Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, ``then the United Nations must try every diplomatic tool to deal with them (and avoid war),''
``Iraq should be convinced to open for inspection the sites suspected of developing those weapons,'' Durmus told the Associated Press on the flight to Baghdad.
``We don't prefer the pressure of the gun. We prefer diplomatic pressure,'' the minister said.
The participation of Turkey in any alliance against Iraq would be crucial. Turkey, NATO's sole Muslim member, was a key base for U.S. warplanes during the 1991 Gulf War.
It is worried a war could devastate its lucrative tourism industry as the country struggles to recover from an economic crisis.
Turkey was one of Iraq's largest trading partners before the United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Trade has fallen from some $3 billion a year to about $1 billion, and includes oil smuggling from Iraq.
Turkey realizes that by reaching out to Iraq, it risks losing Washington's support, backing that is critical for a country that has borrowed $31 billion from the International Monetary Fund.
``Turkey is walking a tightrope,'' said Ilter Turan, a political scientist at Istanbul Bilgi University.
``Turkey does not want to take part in an operation, which in the long run, nobody knows what it will result in. It is unclear what kind of an administration will replace Saddam.''
That is an issue that scares many of Iraq's neighbors.
Saudi Arabia, for example, is afraid that Shiite Muslims, who dominate southern Iraq, will break away from the country and move closer to Iran, which is also Shiite. Most of Saudi Muslims are from the Sunni sect and the kingdom is concerned about strengthening a Shiite neighbor.
Turkey is extremely concerned that Iraqi Kurds, who already run an autonomous zone in northern Iraq could use a possible U.S. military strike to create a Kurdish state.
That, Turkey fears, could inspire autonomy-seeking Turkish Kurds.
Still, some observers point out that if there is a war, Turkey must be part of a coalition if it wants to participate in talks at the end of the fighting that determine Iraq's future.
``Turkey has been a reliable friend in the past, and the best way to guarantee Turkish interests in shaping the future of Iraq is for Turkey to join the coalition rather than resist it,'' Rubin said.
Iraq's Neighbors Oppose U.S. Attack
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 5:44 p.m. ET
CAIRO, Egypt (AP) -- Invasions, blazing oil fields and poison gas attacks blamed on Saddam Hussein are burned into his neighbors' memories. Yet most Mideast governments are united in opposing U.S. plans to topple him.
The Iraqi president has won fans among ordinary Arabs and Muslims by portraying himself as the champion of the Palestinian people against Israel and by convincing them that the Western sanctions imposed to disarm him are unjustified.
Beyond that, Mideast rulers fear a U.S. attack could create a precedent for their own removal; few can boast the kind of democracy and freedoms that U.S. officials say they want for Iraq.
Opposition to a U.S. military strike was solidified Thursday by a meeting in Cairo of Arab foreign ministers, who passed a resolution expressing ``total rejection of the threat of aggression on Arab nations, especially Iraq.''
Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa said a U.S. attack against Saddam Hussein would ``open the gates of hell in the Middle East.''
Arab armies joined the U.S.-led coalition that attacked Iraq in 1991, but then the goals were limited to getting Saddam out of Kuwait, and the coalition might well have collapsed if the war was broadened to oust him from power.
One of the 1991 allies was Egypt. But these days Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak speaks for leaders across the region when he says he feared Gulf War II will plunge the entire Arab world into political and economic ``chaos.''
Iraq's neighbors also worry that a beaten Iraq might fragment along ethnic and sectarian lines. Neighboring Turkey and Syria, which have their own restive Kurdish minorities, are particularly concerned that Iraqi Kurds would try to carve out their own state.
Washington accuses Saddam of rebuilding facilities to produce weapons of mass destruction in violation of U.N. resolutions calling for Iraq's disarmament.
But Arabs believe Saddam no longer poses the threat he once did, with his economy crippled by U.N. sanctions and U.S.-British air patrols boxing him in.
``Iraqis are weak. They are completely cut from the world,'' said Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, an analyst in the United Arab Emirates.
Perhaps most worrying for Arab leaders is the precedent a U.S. attack could create for countries judged insufficiently cooperative with Washington's war on terrorism.
``There is a consensus in the Arab world that Saudi Arabia will be next, followed by Egypt and Syria. Jordan will be scattered and divided,'' said another Gulf affairs analyst, Mohamed al-Misfer, in Qatar.
Saudi Arabia, which invited in the U.S. troops that attacked Iraq in 1991, opposes a second war.
A postwar Iraq with democracy and free media ``could make Saudi Arabia look like a feudal state, reactionary when it comes to advancing democracy in the region,'' said Jeremy Binnie, a Jane's intelligence specialist in London.
Also, American need for Saudi oil may diminish if Iraq's wells resume pumping full-blast.
Egypt, traditionally a voice of moderation in the Arab world, may feel excluded and isolated by the emergence of a democratic Iraq.
Mubarak says he has warned against attacking Iraq with U.S. credibility in the Arab world at an all-time low over its support for Israel and the widespread Muslim perception that its war on terrorism is anti-Islam and anti-Arab.
Meanwhile, Saddam also has forged trade ties with neighboring governments that will be reluctant to lose them. Syria and Jordan have been selling Iraq everything from pharmaceuticals to soaps in exchange for cheap oil. Iraq reportedly exports 150,000 to 200,000 barrels daily of illegal oil to Syria, and fills Jordan's entire oil needs.
In 1991, Jordan stayed out of the Gulf War coalition, and many Jordanians celebrated when Iraq fired Scud missiles on Israeli cities.
Iran, which fought a 1980-88 war with Iraq, is alarmed at the prospect of being sandwiched between pro-U.S. governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
``They know if the U.S. successfully deposes Saddam Hussein, one rogue state is taken off the `axis of evil' and Iran is next,'' Binnie said, referring to President George Bush's definition of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as threats to world peace.
Kuwait wants Saddam ousted, but, like fellow Arabs, doubts American credibility and motives, said political science professor Abdullah Sahar of Kuwait University.
``We believe there's a lack of transparency and ... a hidden U.S. agenda in wanting to remove Saddam now,'' he said.
``Maybe our officials don't want to say it, but any attempt to oust Saddam will be welcomed here. (But) we don't want to give Saddam justification for a chemical attack on Kuwait. We cannot protect ourselves.''
ÝÇÝNDEKÝLER
·
THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR: TÜRKÝYE'DEKÝ ÝKTÝDAR BOÞLUÐUNU DÝKKATE ALMAK
·
BASLER
ZEITUNG: SADDAM HÜSEYÝN'ÝN TÜRKÝYE'YLE KAÇAK PETROL TÝCARETÝ
·
FINANCIAL
TIMES DEUTSCHLAND: BM, ÝNGÝLTERE VE ABD ÝLE BÝRLÝKTE KIBRIS ÝÇÝN BÝR ÇÖZÜM
ARIYOR
·
LE SOIR: ANKARA, TÜRKLERÝN SABRININ SINIRLARINI ANLATIYOR
·
WIENER ZEITUNG: YÝNE KIBRIS GÖRÜÞMELERÝ... GÜREL AB'DE:
TÜRKÝYE'YÝ HAYAL KIRIKLIÐINA UÐRATMAYIN
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
TÜRKÝYE'DEKÝ ÝKTÝDAR BOÞLUÐUNU DÝKKATE ALMAK
ANKARA, 05/09(BYE)--- The Christian Science Monitor gazetesinin 05 Eylül 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Richard C. Hottelet imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda bir haber yer almýþtýr. Ýnternet’ten saðlanan haberin çevirisi þöyledir:
Türkiye, hak ettiði uluslararasý ilginin uzaðýnda bir Orta Doðu ülkesi. On yýllarca süren yoðun belirsizliðin ardýndan siyasi yapý þimdi birlikte harekete geçmeye çalýþýyor.
Türkiye'nin coðrafyasý bölgenin bu en güçlü devletini, ya Avrupa'yý Asya'ya baðlayan köprünün temel taþý ya da gelecek onyýllarda kurulabilecek bir birliðe engel haline getiriyor. Çalkantýlý politika, sosyal kargaþa ve din konusunda yaþanan gerginlikler, Türkiye'yi, herþeyin ötesinde istikrara ihtiyaç duyulan bir bölgede önceden tahmin edilemeyen bir duruma soktu.
Türkiye, çok önemli 3 Kasým yerel seçimlerine doðru giderken zaman zaman ikilemler yaþýyor.
Türkiye'nin kurucu lideri Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 75 yýl önce devleti, laik, demokratik bir cumhuriyet olarak tanýmlanmýþtý. Batý yanlýsý yenilikçi lider, sadece Osmanlý saltanatýný deðil, ayný zamanda halifeliði ve üstün dini otoriteyi de kaldýrdý. Atatürk, Arap alfabesini kaldýrdý ve Türkçe yavaþ yavaþ ibadet dili olarak Arapçanýn yerini almaya baþladý.
Ancak, nüfusunun yüzde 99'u Müslüman olan laik devlet, cami imamlarýnýn maaþlarýný devlet memuru maaþý olarak ödüyor (çoðunlukla onlarý kontrol altýnda tutmak için).
Ordu, laikliðin garantörü oldu. Ordu beðenmediði hükümetleri daha önce üç kez devirmiþti. Daha beþ yýl önce ordu, Ýslamcý bir baþbakaný istifa etmeye zorlamýþtý. Ordu ayný zamanda, kendini, -70 milyon nüfusa sahip olan ülkenin yaklaþýk 10 milyon Kürt azýnlýða ve diðer azýnlýklara sahip olmasýna raðmen- Türk ulusal birliðinin bir savunucusu olarak görüyor. Ordu, özerklik isteyen Kürt asilerle, 15 yýl süren ve yaklaþýk 30 bin kiþinin hayatýna mal olan bir iç savaþ yaþadý. Ordunun gücünün yaný sýra Kürt ve Müslüman tehlikelere olan takýntýsý, ülkenin en acil hedefine, yani Avrupa Birliði üyeliðine ulaþmasýný engelliyor.
Avrupa tarafýndan kabul edilmek, Türkiye'nin konumunu deðiþtirecek ve AB'nin muazzam fýrsatlarýný Türkiye'nin giriþimci becerilerine açacaktýr. AB, açýk bir þekilde, hukukun üstünlüðünü, idam cezasýnýn kaldýrýlmasýný, azýnlýk ve insan haklarýna saygý gösterilmesini, iþkencenin son bulmasýný ve mali kuruluþlarý kendi kumbaralarý olarak kullanan siyasi partilerin ve hükümetin dost kapitalizmine son vermelerini istiyor. AB, Türkiye'den, yoðun insan trafiðini -ekonomik göçmenler, kurbanlar ya da suçlular- daha sýký kontrol etmesini talep ediyor.
Meclis aðustos ayýnda, bu koþullarý yerine getirmek için somut adýmlar attý. Meclis daha önce de Hazine'yi yoluna koymak için daha önemli adýmlar atmýþtý. Kemal Derviþ geçen yýl, Türk parasýnýn deðerini kaybetmeye baþlamasýndan sonra, Dünya Bankasý'ndaki üst düzey görevini býrakmaya ikna edildi ve Türkiye'de ekonomiden sorumlu Devlet Bakaný olarak göreve baþladý. Derviþ, o tarihten itibaren yüzde 50'lik korkutucu enflasyon oranýný düþürdü ve 2003 yýlýnýn sonuna kadar bu oraný yüzde 10'a düþürmesi ümit ediliyor.
Derviþ, ayný zamanda, ABD'nin yardýmýyla, Uluslararasý Para Fonu'ndan büyük miktarda para talep etti ve çok ihtiyaç duyulan özel yatýrýmý destekleyebilecek yabancý bankacýlarýn güvenini kazandý. Yaklaþýk yüzde 30 oranýndaki iþsizlik oranýna raðmen, Kemal Derviþ bugün Türkiye'deki en popüler politikacý ve belki de kasým ayýnda, Atatürk'ün kurduðu bir merkez sol partinin, aþýrý milliyetçileri bertaraf etmesinde yardýmcý olabilir.
Ayný miktardaki oy, siyasi arenada hamlesi kestirilemeyen bir Ýslami muhalefet partisine gidebilir. Bazýlarý bu partiyi, ordunun sýký tedbirlerinden kaçýnmak üzere gerçek amaçlarýný gizleyen temel köktendinci bir güç olarak görüyor. Diðerleri ise filizlenmekte olan demokratik bir unsur olarak görüyor. Hangisi olursa olsun, istikrarlý bir siyasi sistem bu partiyi bünyesinde barýndýrabilmeli. Gözlemciler, Türkiye'nin Ýsrail ile artan sýký askeri ve ekonomik iliþkilerine karþý Müslümanlarýn neredeyse hiç gösteri yapmayýþlarýna iþaret ediyorlar.
ABD, Türkiye'nin Ýncirlik Hava Üssü'nü kullandýrmasý kadar, Orta Asya ve Kafkaslarda Rusya politikasýndan da oldukça memnun.
Ancak Ankara, kendi adýna, ABD'nin Irak'ý iþgaline açýkça muhalefet etmekte de bir sakýnca görmüyör. Fakat Türkiye'nin önündeki yolda sayýsýz mayýnlar bulunuyor. En büyüðü ise Kýbrýs. Bu yýlýn sonunda Kýbrýs'lý Rumlar, Kýbrýs'lý Rum ve Türkler arasýndaki sorun çözümlenmese bile, AB'ye katýlmaya davet edilecek. Ankara'da ordudan çýkan sesler, böyle bir durumda adanýn üçte birlik kesimini oluþturan kuzey bölgesini güvenlik önlemi olarak ilhak etmekle tehdit eder mahiyette. Bu, Yunanistan ile yavaþ yavaþ geliþen iliþkileri zehirleyecek. Bir AB üyesi olarak Yunanistan, Türkiye'nin baþvurusunu veto edebilir ve o zaman gerçekten kýyamet kopabilir.
Bir çok þey, belki de herþey, Türkiye'deki seçimlerden
çýkacak yeni güç dengelerine baðlý.
BASLER ZEITUNG
SADDAM HÜSEYÝN'ÝN TÜRKÝYE'YLE KAÇAK PETROL TÝCARETÝ
ANKARA, 05/09(BYE)--- Ýsviçre'de yayýmlanan Basler Zeitung'un 05 Eylül 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Jan Keetman imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda bir yazý yer almýþtýr. Ýnternet’ten saðlanan yazýnýn çevirisi þöyledir:
Huzursuz olan Türkiye'nin güneydoðusu, uzun yýllar, altýnda büyük depolarýn gizlendiði eski kamyonlardan geçimini saðlamaktaydý. Bu kamyonlar depolarýný Musul'un ucuz mazotuyla doldurmaktaydý. Þöförler sorun yaþamadan Kuzey Irak'tan dönebilmek için KDP militanlarýna 100 dolar veriyorlar ve Türkiye'ye girdiklerinde Türk Polisini Güçlendirme Vakfý'na resmi olarak baðýþta bulunuyorlardý. Buna karþýlýk 1.500 litreye kadar "yedek depoya" izin verilmekteydi.
Bu ticaret çeþitli nedenlerden ötürü sürekli kesintiye uðradý. Türkiye basýnýna göre aðustos ayý sonundan bu yana Türkiye tarafýndan artýk bu ticarete izin verilmemekte. Bunun nedenleri hakkýnda çeþitli spekülasyonlar mevcut. Sürekli olarak PKK'yla mücadelede artýk kendisine ihtiyaç duyulmayan KDP lideri Mesut Barzani'yle Türkiye'nin gergin iliþkisi öne çýkarýlmaktadýr. Ne olursa olsun bu önlemle bütün bir bölgenin en önemli gelir kaynaðý elinden alýndý.
Ancak bu olay Türk sýnýrýnýn Irak petrolüne kapalý olduðu anlamýna gelmemektedir. Gizli depolara sahip eski kamyonlar yerine sýnýrda artýk 16 ton taþýyabilen gerçek tanklar beklemekte. Kimyagerler taþýnan yükün kalitesini kontrol etmekte, çünkü bu ham petrol devlet kurumu TPAO için alýnmaktadýr. BM ambargosuna raðmen TPAO, bir yýl önce Irak'la dört milyon ton ham petrol ithali için anlaþma imzaladý. Ancak verdikleri bilgilere göre sadece 3.7 milyon ton ithal edilmekte, çünkü gerisi gümrük kapýsýndan geçirilmiyor.
Resmi olarak Irak'la petrol ticareti sadece, Türkiye'den geçen boru hattý ve Irak'taki Mina el Bakr limanýndan yapýlabilmektedir. Kamyonlarla taþýnan petrolün tamamý ambargonun ihlal edilmesi anlamýna gelmektedir.
Buradan saðlanan gelir Saddam Hüseyin'in kara para kasasýna akmaktadýr. Musul'da bir varil ham petrolün fiyatý baharda 16 dolar idi (piyasa fiyatýysa 24 dolar). Yani Saddam, Türkiye'deki sýnýrdan yapýlan ticaretle yýlda 350 milyon dolar kazanmaktadýr. Saddam'ýn Ürdün üzerinden yasadýþý ihracatý daha da fazla ve bir süredir Suriye boru hattý da bunun iki katý bir kapasiteye ulaþmýþ durumda. Ayrýca Irak petrolü küçük gemilerle Katar'a da getirilmekte ve oradan aktarýlmaktadýr.
Eðer Saddam Hüseyin, gerçekten kitle imha silahlarý geliþtiriyorsa, bunu ancak bu ticaretlerden saðladýðý gelirle yapabilir. Ancak galiba þu sýralar ABD, Saddam'ýn kara parasýný engelleme konusuyla pek ilgili deðil. Oysa bu, komþu ülkelere siyasi baský yapýlarak çok kolay bir þekilde engellenebilirdi.
FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND
BM, ÝNGÝLTERE VE ABD ÝLE BÝRLÝKTE KIBRIS ÝÇÝN BÝR ÇÖZÜM ARIYOR
BERLÝN, 05/09(BYE)--- Tirajý günde 80 bin 400 olan Financial Times Deutschland gazetesinin 05 Eylül 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Marina Zapf imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan Berlin çýkýþlý yorumun çevirisi þöyledir:
BM, ABD ve Ýngiltere, çýkmaza giren görüþmelerin önünü açmak ve bölgede bir kriz çýkmasýný engellemek için, Kýbrýs ihtilafýnýn muhataplarý üzerindeki baskýlarýný artýrdýlar. BM Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan, yarýn Kýbrýs Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaþkaný Glafkos Kleridis ve Kýbrýs Türk Toplumu Lideri Rauf Denktaþ ile Paris'te buluþacak.
Ýngiltere'nin Kýbrýs Özel Temsilcisi Lord Hannay'ýn Kýbrýs ve Ankara'ya gerçekleþtirdiði ziyaretler ise daha yeni sona erdi. Washington da Kýbrýs Özel Temsilcisi Thomas Weston'u bu hafta bölgeye gönderdi.
Yoðunlaþan diplomatik baský, Kýbrýs ihtilafýnýn giderek daha kritik bir noktaya doðru kaydýðýnýn bir iþareti. Türkiye'nin yeni Dýþiþleri Bakaný Þükrü Sina Gürel daha iki gün önce, AB'nin aralýk ayýnda Kopenhag Zirvesi'nde, çoðunluðu Rumlarýn oluþturduðu Kýbrýs Cumhuriyeti'ne, Türklerin itirazýna raðmen, üyelik sözü vermesi halinde, Türk iþgali altýndaki Kuzey kesiminin ilhak edileceði tehdidini bir kez daha tekrarlamýþtý.
"Þahinlerden" olan Gürel, gerçi görevi sona eren ve 3 Kasým'da yapýlacak seçimlere kadar günleri sayýlý olan Bülent Ecevit hükümetinin bir üyesi, fakat ayný zamanda Kýbrýs meselesinde kararý verecek olan Türk askeri ile yakýn iliþkileri olan biri. Kuzeyde baðýmsýz bir devlet oluþturulmasý konusunda ýsrarla direnen Denktaþ'ýn da Ankara'nýn onayýný almadan yön deðiþtirmesi söz konusu deðil.
Salý günü verdiði bir mülakatta, "Kýbrýs Rum kesiminin AB'ye girmesi, uluslararasý anlaþmalarýn ihlali olur" diyen Gürel, bu tür bir geliþmenin bölgedeki barýþ ve istikrarý tehlikeye düþüreceðini söyledi. "Kýbrýs, Türkiye'nin iradesi dýþýnda AB'nin üyesi olamaz" diyen Gürel, bunun bir devlet politikasý olduðu ekleyerek, Kýbrýs meselesinin, genel seçimin sonucu ne olursa olsun, Türkiye için hayati önem taþýdýðýna da iþaret etti.
Bölünmüþ Akdeniz adasýnda güvenlik durumunun týrmanmasýnýn önüne geçmek isteyen ABD, müzakerelerin baþarýlý bir þekilde sonuçlanmasýný istiyor. Kýbrýs'ta 30 bin asker konuþlandýran Türk ordusu, son aylarda adanýn kuzeyindeki askeri varlýðýný güçlendirdi. Türk tarafýyla uzlaþýlmadan Kýbrýs'ýn AB üyeliðine onay verilmesi durumunda ise, Güney kesiminde "Yeþil hat" boyunca sýnýr ihlalleri yaþanmasý mümkün.
Gerek Türk gerekse Rum diplomatlar, Paris'te yapýlacak üst düzey toplantýdan bir baþarýlý sonuç çýkmasýný beklemiyorlar. Türk gazetesi Radikal'ýn haberine göre Gürel, seçim mücadelesinin yaþandýðý bir ortamda yeni öneriler sunmamasý için Annan'ý uyardý. AB'nin dönem baþkaný Danimarka'nýn Kýbrýs Özel Temsilcisi Knud Johansen de "BM, yeni yazýlý önerilerin þu anda yararlý olacaðýna inanmýyor" diyor.
Johansen buna raðmen, Annan'ýn teþvikiyle ocak ayýndan bu yana BM'nin denetiminde yapýlan Denktaþ ile Kleridis arasýndaki doðrudan görüþmelerde çözüme yaklaþýlmasýný umuyor. Türkiye'nin eski Dýþiþleri Bakaný Ýsmail Cem ise bugünlerde, AB'nin aralýk ayýnda yapýlacak Kopenhag Zirvesi öncesinde, "son dakikada bir uzlaþmayý" mümkün gördüðü izlenimini veriyor.
Ankara, Kopenhag Zirvesi'nden, kendi üyelik müzakerelerinin baþlamasý için net bir yol haritasý bekliyor, çünkü aðustos ayý ortasýnda onaylanan reform paketiyle yeterince ön çalýþma yaptýðýný düþünüyor. Yunanistan'ýn, Kýbrýs meselesinde daha güçlü giriþimde bulunulmasý koþuluyla yol haritasýný onaylayabileceði bildiriliyor.
AB dönem baþkaný Danimarka, þimdilik tüm seçenekleri açýk tutuyor. Johansen, bölünmüþlüðün son anda aþýlamayacak olmasý durumunu da göz önünde bulundurarak, "Kýbrýs'ýn üyeliði þu an tamamen karara baðlanmýþ bir mesele deðil" diyor.
LE SOIR
ANKARA, TÜRKLERÝN SABRININ SINIRLARINI ANLATIYOR
BRÜKSEL, 05/09(BYE)--- Tirajý günde 143 bin olan Le Soir gazetesinin 05 Eylül 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Philippe Regnier imzasýyla ve yukardaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan haber-söyleþinin çevirisi þöyledir:
Türkiye'nin yeni Dýþiþleri Bakaný, AB'ye üyelik görüþmelerine baþlamak için bir tarih istiyor.
Türk yetkililer beklemekten býktýlar. Onlara göre, aday 12 Orta ve Doðu Avrupa ülkesi ile üyelik görüþmeleri sürdürülürken, Türkiye'nin AB'ye üyelik görüþmelerini geciktirmek için Avrupalýlarýn artýk hiç bir nedeni kalmadý. Türkiye Dýþiþleri Bakaný Þükrü Sina Gürel, "Le Soir" ile yaptýðý bir görüþmede, "Parlamento'nun (3 Aðustos'ta) onayladýðý devrimci reform paketi ile Türkiye, üyelik görüþmelerine baþlamaya hak kazandý" dedi.
Kasým ayýnda erken seçimlerin yapýlmasý kararýna neden olan siyasal bir bunalým sýrasýnda, "Avrupa yanlýsý" Ýsmail Cem'in istifa etmesiyle Dýþiþleri Bakanlýðýna getirilen Gürel, AB'nin geniþlemesinden sorumlu Komiseri Günter Verheugen ve AB'nin Dýþiliþkiler ve Ortak Savunma Politikasýndan sorumlu Yüksek Temsilci Javier Solana ile görüþmek için Brüksel'de bulunuyor. Avrupa parlamenterlerini ikna etmek için salý günü de Strasbourg'daydý.
Özellikle idam cezasýnýn kaldýrýlmasý (bu çerçevede Gürel, Belçika'nýn, aþýrý solcu militan Fehriye Erdal'ý Türkiye'ye iade etmesini bir kez daha istedi) ve Kürt azýnlýða kültürel haklar verilmesi gibi demokratik reformlara raðmen, geçen hafta sonu Elseneur'de biraraya gelen Onbeþler dýþiþleri bakanlarý, Ankara'ya hiçbir olumlu sinyal vermediler. Bülent Ecevit hükümeti, Onbeþlerin, en geç aralýk ayýnda, Kopenhag'da yapýlacak zirvede görüþmelere baþlamak üzere bir tarih belirlemesini umuyor. Ancak Verheugen'in Elseneur'de yaptýðý açýklama soðuk duþ etkisi yaptý. Verheugen, "Türkler, o tarihe kadar üyelik için gerekli siyasal kriterlerin uygulanmasý konusunda yeterli bir bilanço ortaya koyamayacaklar. Reformlarýn uygulamaya konulmasýný görmek istediðimizi saklamýyoruz" dedi. Bu "özel muamele", Dýþiþleri Bakaný Gürel'in boðazýndan geçmiyor. Gürel, "Türk halkýnýn yasalarý deðiþtirme isteðine" dikkat çekerek, "reformlarýn uygulanmasý konusunda þüphe duymak doðru olmaz. 1999 yýlýnda AB, söz konusu kriterleri yerine getirmeyen iki aday ülke ile görüþmelere baþlarken (Bulgaristan ve Romanya), Türkiye'ye bu þekilde muamele yapmak haksýzlýk olur" dedi. Kýsacasý Türkiye "hazýr." Oysa reformlar, Türkiye'de aþýrý milliyetçiler ve güvenlik güçleri gibi bazý kesimlerin desteðini görmüyor. Kasým ayýnda yapýlacak seçimlerde geriye doðru bir dönüþ olabilir mi? Bakan, "umarým olmaz" diyor, ancak uyarýyor: "Avrupa Birliði, Türklerin beklentisine yanýt vermezse, kamuoyu hayal kýrýklýðýna uðrayabilir ve bu da, seçim sonuçlarýný etkileyebilir." Ancak Gürel, söz konusu hayal kýrýklýðýnýn halký, "Avrupa Birliði'nin simgelediði yüksek seviyeye, yaþam seviyesini tüm yönleriyle yükseltme isteðinden vaz geçirmeyeceðini" belirterek, bu "tehdidi" yumuþatýyor. Bazan Avrupa karþýtý olduðu söylenen Gürel, -"nedenini bilmiyorum" diyor- üyelik, "Türk kimliðinden ve birliðinden vazgeçilmeden gerçekleþmeli" uyarýsýnda bulunuyor.
Avrupa'nýn görüþ açýsýna göre, görüþmelerin baþlamasýný
engelleyen bir konuyu da, üyeliðe aday olan, bölünmüþ Kýbrýs adasýna iliþkin
toplumlararasý görüþmelerdeki çýkmaz oluþturuyor. Dýþiþleri Bakaný Gürel'e
göre, "bu süreçte en yapýcý olan" Kýbrýslý Türk yönetici Denktaþ'týr.
Gürel, "Türkiye olumlu bir rol oynamayý sürdürecektir. Ancak baþkalarýnýn
da bir rol oynayacaðýný umuyoruz. AB, "adanýn Rum kesimini tek taraflý
olarak üye olmaya teþvik ederek, global bir çözüm arayýþýný engellemek
suretiyle, bu rolü üstlenemez" diyor. Türkiye için önemli olan, kurumsal
yapýnýn adý önemli olmaksýzýn "Rumlarla birlikte Türk tarafýnýn
egemenliðinin" garanti altýna alýnmasýdýr.
WIENER ZEITUNG
YÝNE KIBRIS GÖRÜÞMELERÝ... GÜREL AB'DE: TÜRKÝYE'YÝ HAYAL KIRIKLIÐINA UÐRATMAYIN
VÝYANA, 05/09(BYE)--- Tirajý günde 22 bin olan ve devlet tarafýndan çýkarýlan Wiener Zeitung'un 05 Eylül 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan haberin çevirisi þöyledir:
Dýþiþleri Bakaný ve Baþbakan Yardýmcýsý Þükrü Sina Gürel, ülkesinin AB ile üyelik müzakerelerine baþlamasý için gayret ediyor. AB-Türkiye iliþkileri, AB Parlamentosu'nun dünkü oturumunda da konu edildi.
Türkiye, aralýk ayýnda Kopenhag'da yapýlacak AB Zirvesi'nde üyelik müzakerelerine baþlama tarihinin saptanmasýný umut etmeye devam ediyor. Gürel, AB Parlamento Baþkaný Pat Cox ve Parlamento Grubu Baþkanýný ziyaretinden sonra yaptýðý açýklamada, þayet bir uzlaþma olmazsa, bunun Türk halkýnda ikili iliþkilerin her alanýnda hissedilecek büyük bir hayal kýrýklýðý yaratacaðýný söyledi. Buna karþýn AB, aralýk ayýnda Türkiye ile üyelik müzakereleri tarihi tesbit etmeyeceði konusunda kuþkuya yer býrakmýyor.
Gürel, Kýbrýs sorunu konusunda iki tarafýn da cuma günü Paris'te BM Genel Sekreteri Kofi Annan'la yapacaklarý buluþmaya iþaret etti. Türk tarafý, iki halk grubunun Belçika örneðindeki gibi "ortaklýk statüsü" teklifinde de bulunuyor. AB yýl sonunda üyelik adayý Kýbrýs'la müzakerelerini tamamlamayý planlýyor. Bu arada adanýn bölünmüþlüðünü bir engel olarak görmüyor.
New York Times Bush Asks Leaders in 3 Key Nations for Iraq Support
By DAVID E. SANGER
ASHINGTON,
Sept. 6 — President Bush called the leaders of Russia, China and France today
to seek their support as he tried to build an international coalition against
Saddam Hussein, but he appeared, in his initial approaches, to have made little
headway in convincing them that the need for action was urgent.
Soon after his talk with Russia's president, Vladimir V. Putin, the Kremlin spokesman said Mr. Putin had expressed "serious doubts that there are grounds for the use of force in connection with Iraq from the standpoint of international law or from a political standpoint."
France's president, Jacques Chirac, insisted anew that any military action had to come with the approval of the United Nations. Kofi Annan, the United Nations secretary general, said after meeting with Mr. Chirac that "it would be unwise to attack Iraq now."
But White House officials gave a different account, and cautioned against taking the public statements from Moscow and Paris too literally. A senior administration official insisted that all three leaders had indicated that they were open to hearing Mr. Bush's case for taking some kind of action to hold Iraq to the agreements it signed with the United Nations at the end of the Persian Gulf war in 1991. Those agreements call not only for inspections, but also for limits on the range of its missiles and for ending any program to develop weapons of mass destruction.
"They all agreed that Iraq posed a threat," said a White House official who was familiar with the three conversations. "They were all wrestling, however, about what to do about it, how far to go. So the president told each of them he would send a team over to make the case."
At the United Nations next week, Mr. Bush's aides have made clear that the president will say that the organization will have to enforce the 1991 cease-fire agreement. White House officials say they have not yet decided what means the president will suggest that the United Nations use, including whether he might call for highly intrusive inspections that are backed up by military force.
But, Mr. Bush has made clear in his public statements in Washington, and yesterday in Kentucky and Indiana, that if the international community failed to respond he would have the United States take whatever steps he determined were necessary to enforce that disarmament agreement and change the leadership of Iraqi.
Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain made parallel calls to world leaders today, as he prepared to fly to the United States to meet with Mr. Bush about Iraq on Saturday afternoon at Camp David. But Mr. Blair is walking a fine line between European reluctance and his own instincts to side with his greatest ally in what Mr. Bush insists is a necessary step to safeguard against terrorism.
It is clear that the two men have a lot of convincing to do, even among close allies. Today Prime Minister Jean Chrétien of Canada said he would dispute the need for an attack on Iraq when he meets with Mr. Bush in Detroit on Monday. He added that he would challenge Mr. Bush to show him proof that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and has the capacity and will to use them.
The White House gave no independent description of the conversation with President Jiang Zemin of China, and Beijing issued no statement.
Meanwhile, the White House pressed for Congress to vote for a resolution supporting action against Iraq before it leaves Washington in October. That timetable was thrown into doubt on Thursday when the Senate majority leader, Tom Daschle of South Dakota, said he was "more concerned about getting this done right than getting it done quickly."
Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, sidestepped a question about whether Mr. Bush believed that he reached an informal agreement with Congressional leaders on Wednesday to hold some kind of vote before they depart in October for the mid-term election campaign.
The issue arose in part because Senator Don Nickles, an Oklahoma Republican, said today that he had asked the president during a meeting at the White House, "Do you want to get it done before we leave?" and he said, `Yes.' "
"I think we should honor that request," Mr. Nickles said.
Some Democrats said they suspected that Mr. Bush was setting an artificial deadline to force debate of the issue before the November elections.
It is widely assumed here — though the political thesis is unproved — that a debate about Iraq before the elections works in favor of Republicans, while a focus on the economy would benefit Democrats.
In the White House, a debate is still under way about exactly what strategy Mr. Bush should pursue at the United Nations on Thursday, where he is planning to speak on Thursday. He will also be meeting the leaders of Japan, Pakistan and India, along with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt on Thursday.
One camp in the administration, led by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, has urged that the United States demand one more time that arms inspectors be let into Iraq, fully expecting that Mr. Hussein will delay or impede those inspections. Another camp, including Vice President Dick Cheney, has warned that over-involving the United Nations is a trap, and that Mr. Hussein would drag out the inspection process, playing a cat-and-mouse game while the West was paralyzed in inaction.
One of Mr. Bush's aides compared the current debate to last year's arguments over missile defense and Mr. Bush's resolve to pull out of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. "The president was told everyone will oppose you, you will damage important alliances," the aide said. "But little by little, the arguments melted away."
In this case, however, the objections to the president's approach go far beyond Europe. The Arab nations have expressed strong objections. Today President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea told foreign correspondents that the administration had ignored him in consultations and said "the most difficult question" was whether his government would support the United States in Iraq.
Mr. Kim's fear is that pre-emptive strike on Iraq would undercut his efforts to reach a peace accord with North Korea, which Mr. Bush has identified as part of the "axis of evil," along with Iran and Iraq.
2 in Germany Accused of Plotting Anniversary Attack on U.S. Base
By STEVEN ERLANGER
ERLIN,
Sept. 6 — A Turkish man and his American fiancée were arrested Thursday night
with explosive chemicals and five pipe bombs in their apartment, and they were
held on charges of planning a terrorist attack on a major American military
base in Heidelberg on or near Sept. 11, German authorities announced tonight.
The man, 25, had a picture of Osama bin Laden in the apartment, near Heidelberg, along with Islamic literature and a book about building bombs, said Thomas Schäuble, the chief prosecutor for the state of Baden-Württemberg. The arrested woman, a 23-year-old who held joint German and American citizenship, worked at a supermarket for American military personnel and dependents at the military base in Heidelberg, the prosecutor said.
"We suspect that they intended to mount a bomb attack against military installations and the city of Heidelberg," Mr. Schäuble said at an evening news conference in the state capital, Stuttgart. "We have evidence that an attack was planned for Sept. 11," the anniversary of the attacks in the United States.
But there was no information released tonight that indicated whether the couple were in communication with the Qaeda network or any other Qaeda cell, like the one in Hamburg that carried out the Sept. 11 attacks.
Heidelberg is the headquarters for the United States Army in Europe and for the Army's V Corps. About 16,000 American military personnel, their families and civilian employees live and work in the area — a significant portion of the roughly 62,000 American soldiers based in Europe, said Col. Carl Kropf, chief spokesman for the United States Army Forces, Europe.
Base employees, like the woman arrested, have special passes and can normally enter base facilities without extensive searches.
The plot, if the allegations are proved, would be one of the most serious efforts to attack American targets since the events of Sept. 11.
The names of the two suspects were not released. Mr. Schäuble said the man was a strict Muslim who "seems to be a follower of Osama bin Laden, who is deeply religious, and harbors a hatred for Americans and Jews." The woman had also shown a hatred of Jews, Mr. Schäuble said.
The two were arrested at their apartment in Walldorf. The apartment contained 287 pounds of what were described as explosive chemicals and five pipe bombs.
Mr. Schäuble said that American investigators produced information that led to the arrest of the couple. But Colonel Kropf and other American officials reached in Germany tonight refused to comment further on the case, saying that the suspects are under German jurisdiction.
German federal authorities working for the federal prosecutor, Kay Nehm, said tonight that they would not comment on the case, which is being handled by the state authorities. But they said they were following the investigation.
All American installations in Germany have been on a high state of alert for some time.
Senior European officials say they expect Al Qaeda to be planning new attacks on Americans and American targets, whether in the United States or around the world. As the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks approaches, they say, they also expect Qaeda sympathizers and cells cut off from central authority — with Osama bin Laden and some of his leading lieutenants missing — to try to operate on their own.
Intelligence officials say American sites abroad are likely to be easier targets than those in the United States.
In what appeared to be an arrest not related to the explosives case, an Afghan-born German citizen from Hamburg was taken into custody in New York and is now being held in Alexandria, Va., the German federal prosecutor's office announced today. It said that the man, 39, left Germany for the United States in mid-July and was arrested in mid-August.
American officials told the Germans that there was evidence that the man, who was not publicly identified, was planning terrorist attacks. The German authorities said they began an investigation of the man on Aug. 20 on possible charges of membership in a terrorist organization.
Earlier this week, Ulrich Kersten, chief of Germany's federal investigative agency, said officials were sure "that in Europe and in Germany there are people who are ready to commit violence in a jihad." He said he could not rule out the existence of other Qaeda cells in Germany and elsewhere.
German authorities have opened investigations into at least 100 Islamic militants who live in Germany and who are suspected of having fought in Afghanistan, Chechnya or Bosnia or having been trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan.
Some of the investigations are of Turkish groups that want to overthrow the secular Turkish government and that have no apparent connection to Al Qaeda. But investigators worry that Al Qaeda is infiltrating or using other groups or that other groups are putting their assets and networks at its service.
Germany has passed new laws to undercut some of its traditional protection of privacy to improve its ability to combat terrorist groups and sleeper cells, who often used mosques as cover. New laws allow the authorities to go after the finances of groups bent on terrorist attacks, to prosecute hate speech even if it takes place in a mosque, and to investigate people suspected of being members or supporters of terrorist groups.
Heidelberg itself, with a population of 130,000, is a beautiful tourist spot with a famous university and an exquisite old town often visited by American sightseers.
Tonight, ZDF television reported that an Islamic center in Heidelberg was thought to have helped to finance the Qaeda attacks against the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. According to the station, the German authorities were investigating possible links between the Islamic center and the Turkish man they have arrested.
Introspection as a Prerequisite for Peace
By YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI
ERUSALEM—
On this Rosh Hashana, a time of self-examination, I confess that my capacity as
an Israeli for self-criticism has been exhausted. The terrorist war that began
around Rosh Hashana two years ago and provoked official campaigns of Jew-hatred
throughout the Arab world has convinced Israelis like me who are ready to make
far-reaching compromises for peace that there will be no acceptance of a Jewish
state in the Middle East no matter how much territory we concede.
Once I was prepared to reach different conclusions. During the first intifada that began in the late 1980's, I served as a reservist in Gaza's refugee camps. For one month a year I became an occupier, entering family bedrooms in the middle of the night to arrest suspects for crimes ranging from terrorism to failure to pay taxes.
That experience taught me that both sides share ample rights and wrongs. I was hardly alone. The first intifada reduced to a minority those hardliners who believed that only the Jewish people had legitimate claims to the land. The majority of us learned to accommodate a competing narrative. We neutralized our attachment to the biblical territories and accepted the inevitability of uprooting most of the West Bank settlements. We offered to share our most precious possession, Jerusalem, with our bitter enemy, Yasir Arafat.
For me, that process of examination meant undertaking a journey into Islam and Christianity. As a religious Jew, I went on pilgrimages to mosques and holy places, seeking to experience something of the devotional life of my neighbors. I joined the Muslim prayer line and learned the power of its choreographed surrender. I prayed in a refugee camp that I had once patrolled as a soldier.
In turn, I sought from Palestinians an acknowledgement that I wasn't a crusader or a colonialist but an exiled son returning home. I waited for Palestinian leaders to tell their people what the late Yitzhak Rabin told us: that we must withdraw from our exclusive claim to the land. Those words never came.
Few Palestinians seem prepared even now to examine their own share of responsibility for the conflict. Instead, most remain barricaded in a self-righteous understanding of history, apportioning all innocence to themselves and all blame to us. Perhaps their inability to acknowledge the historical complexity of this conflict is understandable: The Palestinians, after all, were its losers. Yet that failure led them to commit their greatest blunder in a history of missed opportunities. By declaring war two years ago against an Israeli government that was as far left as any in history, they turned Israelis like me from supporters of Ehud Barak into supporters of Ariel Sharon.
What the first intifada was for Israelis, this intifada should be for Palestinians: a precious moment of self-examination. The Oslo process failed because of an asymmetry of self-criticism: Only one side came to the realization that this is a conflict between two legitimate national movements. The time has come for Palestinians to partition their sense of historical justice. They need to admit that much of their suffering, especially now, has been self-inflicted. And they need to confront the repeated moral failures of their leaders, from supporting Nazi Germany to backing Saddam Hussein.
Yet so far, there are few signs of moral unease. An ad placed earlier this summer by Palestinian intellectuals urging an end to suicide bombings because they are ineffective isn't good enough. Few Palestinians have challenged the historical revisionism now increasingly prevalent in Arab culture that denies the ancient roots of Jews in this land, the existence of the gas chambers and even Arab involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks.
In my journey into Palestinian Islam, I encountered the profound Muslim ability to live daily life with a constant awareness of mortality — an awareness that can create humility, a prerequisite for reconciliation between enemies. Peace will come only through mutual introspection and atonement. Many Israelis went far in trying to understand Palestinian claims and grievances. To resume that necessary process among Israelis now requires a self-critical moral dialogue among Palestinians.
Yossi Klein Halevi, Israel correspondent of The New Republic, is the author of "At the Entrance to the Garden of Eden: A Jew's Search for Hope with Christians and Muslims in the Holy Land."
Watching Movies With Senator Kerry
By BILL KELLER
ASHINGTON
A couple of columns ago, while plowing through a crowd of Democrats who want to be president, I threw an elbow at Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts. I suggested that his claim to be a global thinker leaned rather excessively on his 30-year-old heroism in Vietnam. And, relying on a report in the usually dependable Boston Globe, I mocked him for pulling out a movie camera after a shootout in the Mekong Delta and re-enacting the exploit, as if preening for campaign commercials to come.
Cheap shot, the senator's people said of the notion that he belabors his war record. And just plain wrong about those movies.
Which is how I came to be sitting in a wing chair in the senator's office the other day while he plugged in a videocassette and fumbled with a balky remote.
"It is so innocent," he said by way of introducing his youthful cinematic effort, adding a little defensively, "I have no intention of using it" for campaign purposes.
For the next 40 minutes, Mr. Kerry and I fast-forwarded through silent, washed-out-color footage of mangrove-choked rivers, sleepy villages and sailors skinny-dipping — disturbingly interrupted on occasion by a Vietcong corpse or one of Mr. Kerry's crewmen torching a thatched hut during a search-and-destroy mission.
The first thing to be said is that the senator's movies are not self-aggrandizing. Mr. Kerry is hardly in the film, and never strikes so much as a heroic pose. These are the souvenirs of a 25-year-old guy sent to an exotic place on an otherworldly mission, who bought an 8-millimeter camera in the PX and shot a few hours of travelogue, most of it pretty boring if you didn't live through it.
According to the Swift Boat Sailors Association, a group of veterans who manned those "Apocalypse Now" riverboats in Vietnam, lots of enlisted men did the same. Senator Max Cleland has hours of film from his service in the First Air Cavalry, which he has had edited into a three-minute meet-the-senator video.
The other question is more complicated, and acutely relevant at the moment, as the nation edges toward war under the command of a president who spent his war years at home in the National Guard and a vice president who has famously said he "had other priorities" during Vietnam. The question is, what value should we place on combat experience in our leaders? Mr. Kerry argues that his months in Vietnam gave him "insights," though from our conversation what it seems to have given him above all is a deep distrust of official pretexts for war, and a reverence for popular consent.
Does that mean that those of us who avoided combat, including the current White House warriors (and your astigmatic columnist), are less worthy of trust on the subject of war?
"I don't want to go there," Mr. Kerry demurs. He has, however, sometimes visited there. In his last re-election campaign, in 1996, he was inclined to say things about his opponent like, "If Bill Weld had any military experience whatsoever, he'd understand how ridiculous that is," and he has recently poked at the Republican leaders Trent Lott and Tom DeLay for sitting out Vietnam. On the other hand, he leapt to Bill Clinton's defense when, during his unpopular effort to stop atrocities in Haiti, Mr. Clinton was called a draft-dodging "chicken hawk."
Variations on that theme abound these days. Senator Chuck Hagel, another Vietnam vet, recently sneered that if Richard Perle, the gung-ho Pentagon adviser, was so feverish for an invasion of Iraq perhaps he should be part of the first wave into Baghdad. I wondered what Mr. Kerry thought of that remark. "I know where he was coming from," Mr. Kerry replied. "I might have thought it. I wouldn't have said it." Pause. Sly smile. Then again, "I might have said it."
You don't have to be a soulmate of Richard Perle to recognize that this is a
slippery slope. The logic slides down to the glib conclusion that only those
who have known combat, or are prepared to die in combat, are entitled to be
heard on the subject. So much for those famous chicken hawks Franklin D.
Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. Eliot Cohen, this season's ubiquitous military
historian, neatly filleted the chicken hawk argument in a Washington Post
commentary: "According to this view, to fill a senior policy position
during a war one would of course prefer a West Point graduate who had led a
regiment in combat, as opposed to a corporate lawyer turned politician with a
few weeks' experience in a militia unit that did not fight," he wrote.
"The former profile fits Jefferson Davis, and the latter Abraham Lincoln."
And, as Peter Beinart pointed out in The New Republic, this reasoning would automatically disqualify women and openly gay men from the discussion altogether, since they are legally barred from combat.
Whether or not Senator Kerry's Vietnam experience brought him wisdom is better judged by examining his wisdom than his experience. But one thing it clearly does give him is political cover to say things other Democrats cringe from saying. The same is true of some other veterans in office, notably the maverick John McCain; his valor as a former inmate of the Hanoi Hilton buys him a respectful listen and a little immunity from his party's conventional litmus tests on a wide range of issues.
That has to be counted a good thing, given how our least-common-denominator political system punishes you for speaking your mind, and given how craven most politicians have become as a result. The fact that we may overvalue combat credentials in our leaders says more about us than about Mr. Kerry; but if this dubious bias of ours emboldens him to question Mr. Bush's conduct of the war on terror, which no other Democrat among the presidential hopefuls has done so forthrightly, that is something to celebrate, even if you don't agree with all of his criticisms, even if you suspect an element of niche marketing.
Mr. Kerry does have a reputation as a man of calculating ambition. (Lately he has been calculating how to come across as less calculating, which is one reason he wanted to dispel the cynicism about his war movies.) On matters of war and peace, he has the advantage of being covered at both ends: against the hyperpatriots by his Silver Star and three Purple Hearts, and against the wrath of Massachusetts doves by the fact that he came home from the war to lead veterans in protest against the war, throwing his war ribbons (but not those cherished medals) onto the steps of the Capitol. This has freed him to compile a rather thoughtful, non-kneejerk record on foreign policy generally, and on foreign interventions in particular.
It is true that he voted with most other Democrats against the gulf war. He said he wanted to let diplomacy work longer while a consensus built up behind the war; never mind that by the time the Senate cast its votes diplomacy had been failing dismally for many months. But he has supported most American ventures since Vietnam: Bosnia (though, like President Clinton, he took his time getting there), Kosovo, Panama, Somalia (until it grew into a naïve nation-building exercise), Haiti (though it was an unpopular undertaking). He is not paralyzed by Vietnam syndrome.
This time, Iraq has set off his Vietnam alarms, especially the secretive, trust-us talk of an urgent danger. "I'm going to be suspicious," he says. "More than suspicious. It was the absence of some of those questions that put a lot of us in harm's way." Even so, he says he is prepared to support an invasion if the administration delivers the evidence it hints at having, and convinces him that other options won't work.
Perhaps the main question for Mr. Kerry's presidential prospects is whether his war decorations will trump his Massachusetts liberal voting record, especially in the South. Although he is more centrist on some issues — he is, for instance, a free trader — Mr. Kerry has favored gun controls, he has opposed the death penalty, and he favors lifting the embargo that insulates Fidel Castro from the competition of American values and ideas. Can he avoid the temptation to equivocate on issues like these that may not play so well outside of Massachusetts?
I hope so. The episode that won Mr. Kerry his Silver Star involved ordering his patrol boat straight into a Vietcong ambush, guns blazing, when most commanders would have beat a retreat. Some of his crewmen thought the maneuver foolhardy, but it worked, scattering the attackers in disarray. It would make for a refreshing campaign season if he felt he could stick to his guns through the constant ambush of a presidential election. And if showing his Vietnam home movies will make it easier to stand up for the risky things he believes in — I say, roll that film.
Disarm Iraq Quickly, Bush to Urge U.N.
Failure to Move May Lead to U.S. Action
By Karen DeYoung and Mike Allen
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, September 7, 2002; Page A01
President Bush plans to tell world leaders at the United Nations next week that unless they take quick, unequivocally strong action to disarm Iraq, the United States will be forced to act on its own, senior administration officials said yesterday.
The president's Thursday speech will open the door to a possible new round of U.N. inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical and other forms of weapons. The move is a step back from months of escalating Bush administration threats of unilateral military action and insistence that only the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein can ensure safety from the weapons of mass destruction he is believed to have or is trying to develop.
The dominant view within the administration is that the time for inspections has passed and that ultimately Hussein, who has barred inspectors since 1998, will have to be forcibly deposed. But White House officials have been persuaded that working through the United Nations, for the moment at least, is advisable and may ultimately facilitate military action.
Launching the international consultations he promised last week, Bush yesterday telephoned the leaders of China, Russia and France, who offered little but resistance. Bush's aides said he began the calls -- which lasted 30 minutes altogether, including the translations -- by saying that he wanted to talk to the leaders about world security. "We need to work together to make the world peaceful," he was quoted as saying. Bush told the leaders that he will send high-level officials to each of their capitals after his U.N. speech.
With the exception of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, major foreign leaders have said that they disapprove of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, stressing that the United Nations is the proper place to deal with Hussein. White House officials acknowledged that none of the leaders embraced Bush's intention to force a regime change.
A Kremlin official said Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed "serious doubts" about the validity of invading Iraq under international law. French President Jacques Chirac, who has been particularly outspoken in opposing a possible invasion, insisted that the United Nations must determine the response to Iraq, officials said. Chinese officials did not characterize the call.
Those three nations, along with Britain and the United States, make up the "Permanent 5" U.N. Security Council members with veto power. Bush will meet today with Blair at Camp David for what officials described as a "strategy session" on how to proceed at the United Nations.
The administration began privately briefing congressional leaders on the Iraqi threat this week, And will send its senior officials to testify at hearings in the expectation that Congress will pass a resolution of support before it recesses next month.
Last night, Rumsfeld's office withdrew a 2,300-word article he had written for the Outlook section of Sunday's Washington Post, making the case for preemptive military action to head off potential threats from weapons of mass destruction. The article, under discussion since mid-August, argued that deterrence, sanctions and diplomacy might be inadequate against threats from Iraq and other countries. It discussed weapons developments in the three countries Bush has called the "axis of evil" -- Iraq, Iran and North Korea -- plus Libya and Syria.
Defense officials had said the article would need to be cleared by the White House. The article was delivered Tuesday. Rumsfeld approved a final version shortly before leaving for Camp David at 4:30 p.m. yesterday. Around 6, a defense official said the White House decided the article could not run. But Victoria Clarke, the chief Pentagon spokeswoman, said that Rumsfeld himself had changed his mind because the timing "was not right."
The White House continued to contend that it never opposed seeking congressional authorization for an attack on Iraq. Mary Matalin, a senior adviser to Cheney, denied an assertion in yesterday's Washington Post that his chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, had expressed doubts about that course.
Senior White House officials and diplomats familiar with high-level administration thinking said Bush's announcement on Wednesday that he would seek congressional authorization, and would make his case to the United Nations, reflected a recognition that the administration cannot be seen as ignoring domestic and world opinion. "There is definitely a new focus on the U.N.," said one official.
While insisting that Bush remains open to alternatives to invasion, several senior officials said they could not envision a workable new inspection regime. Nor do they believe Hussein would accept new inspections.
Making room for such an option, however, is now seen by the White House as a necessary price for obtaining support for an invasion that many in the administration believe will be necessary. Bush's challenge to the United Nations is expected to include an explicit expectation of such an endorsement in the event other options fail.
In his U.N. speech, officials said, Bush plans to present the threat from Iraqi chemical, biological and eventually nuclear weapons in its starkest terms, and to try to shift the responsibility for dealing with Iraq from Washington to the world. He will say the time for dealing with the threat is limited. To those who have demanded a "smoking gun," said one senior official, "the answer is: 'By the time you see the evidence, it's too late.' "
The official said Bush will remind the Security Council that its enforcement track record in Iraq is abysmal, with Hussein having flouted 16 resolutions since 1990. Hussein regularly impeded the U.N. inspections required as part of the 1991 Persian Gulf War ceasefire agreement. It is widely agreed that, over the past four years, he has reconstituted and expanded Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and, according to some U.S. officials, has made progress toward nuclear weapons.
Bush, one senior official said, will make it clear that it is U.N., not U.S., credibility that's at stake.
Those outside the administration favoring a more muscular continuation of the existing inspection regime have proposed several alternatives. The European Union has proposed setting a deadline for Iraqi compliance, and a proposal by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calls for "coercive inspections" backed by an international military force. Still under internal administration discussion is whether Bush should support these or other options for "last chance" inspections.
At their Camp David session this afternoon, Bush and Blair will consider the options for ensuring that any Security Council resolution be as strong as possible -- perhaps by having Britain introduce it. Despite taking considerable public and political heat at home, Blair has continued to voice support for Bush's characterization of the Iraqi threat and the imminent need to deal with it. But even Blair, British sources said, strongly believes that Bush must go one more round with the United Nations before taking unilateral action.
Bush will continue his diplomacy on Monday in Detroit with Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, whose aides said this week that an attack on Iraq would be a dangerous international precedent.
The rebuffs Bush received in yesterday's phone calls were not a surprise. "The president heard messages of openness, a willingness to listen," White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said. He said Bush, while stressing the threat posed by Iraq, told the leaders that he values their opinions and "has not made any decision about the next course of action to take."
Some observers said that, despite the strong public positions staked out by world leaders, some room for compromise was beginning to emerge. Based on a series of recent conversations with European and U.S. officials, James B. Steinberg of the Brookings Institution said "the most that the Europeans could give, and the least we could take, would be unfettered inspections with a clear commitment that if inspections are not forthcoming, the U.N. would authorize the use of force."
"It's still a stretch," Steinberg said. "But if the U.S. were prepared to do that, the Europeans might be prepared to back it. Whether the Russians and the Chinese would do it is a more interesting question."
Germany Foils Plot on U.S. Base
Al Qaeda Follower, U.S. Fiancee Held; Bombs, Chemicals Found in Apartment
By Peter Finn
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, September 7, 2002; Page A01
BERLIN, Sept. 6 -- German police have arrested an al Qaeda sympathizer and his American fiancee on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Army's European headquarters and other targets in Heidelberg, Germany on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, a senior German law enforcement official said today.
The man, a 25-year-old Turk born in Germany, and the woman, also of Turkish heritage, were arrested Thursday near the city of Heidelberg, in southern Germany, authorities said. About 290 pounds of chemicals and five pipe bombs were said to have been found in their apartment.
"We suspect that they intended to mount a bomb attack against military installations and the city of Heidelberg," Thomas Schaeuble, chief law enforcement officer for Baden-Wuerttemberg state, said on television today, adding that the man is a Muslim "who hates Americans and Jews."
The alleged plot represents one of the most serious threats to U.S. personnel abroad since Sept. 11. German authorities said it was not clear if the pair had any formal link to al Qaeda or were acting on their own.
The woman was a civilian employee at the post exchange store, or PX, at the large U.S. military facility in Heidelberg. Her employment status would have allowed her access to many facilities on the post, U.S. sources said, which in addition to the Army headquarters, houses the Army's 5th Corps headquarters, a small NATO facility and hundreds of U.S. service members and their families.
According to U.S. officials, she holds joint U.S. and German citizenship, but German officials described her as an American.
The man worked at a chemical warehouse in nearby Karlsruhe, according to officials here. Neither suspect was identified by name. They are being held pending further investigation, according to German press reports.
They were arrested in their apartment in Walldorf, about six miles south of Heidelberg, where police found a picture of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Islamic literature and a book about building bombs, according to Schaeuble.
Since the attacks in the United States, authorities have reported thwarting a string of attempts against U.S. embassies in Singapore, Paris, Rome and Sarajevo, Bosnia. U.S. agents often work with local authorities to stop them; German officials said that a tip from U.S. authorities led to the arrests in Heidelberg. The city is a picturesque tourist destination, featuring a historic university and a castle overlooking an old quarter.
U.S. Army officials in Germany said today they were monitoring the situation closely, but had not taken many special steps to tighten security in the wake of the arrests. "What we have now is pretty darn good," said one officer in Heidelberg.
Campbell Barracks, the official name for the Army headquarters, is unusually vulnerable to attack because it is located along a busy city street. Most other major U.S. military installations in Germany, such as air bases and headquarters of units of the Army's 1st Armored and 1st Infantry divisions, are located outside cities.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, the Army asked German authorities to ban heavy trucks from using the road facing Campbell Barracks, and the German police have enforced that ban vigorously, an official said.
Investigators say they now believe that key planning for the Sept. 11 conspiracy took place in the German city of Hamburg, where suspected ringleader Mohammed Atta and two of the other hijackers lived.
After the attacks, German authorities intensified their surveillance and crackdown on Islamic militants in the country. German officials have recently opened cases against more that 100 suspected militants who are German residents and are believed to have undergone training at terrorist camps in Afghanistan or fought in the wars there.
Officials have said they believe some are affiliated with al Qaeda, while others are described as "unaligned mujaheddin," or holy warriors.
Under a new anti-terrorism law that came into effect on Sept. 1, police are allowed to target people suspected to be members or supporters of foreign terrorist groups. Previously, agencies were required to limit their scrutiny to people suspected of committing or planning to commit offenses on German soil.
Germany is home to about 2 million Turks, some of whom are citizens. To date, only very tentative links have been established between militant groups that sprang up in Germany's Turkish communities and bin Laden's organization.
The Heidelberg arrests, and the fact that one of the alleged plotters was American, are likely to lead to even more intensive security measures at U.S. military facilities, which were already on a heightened state of alert.
Suspected Islamic militants in Heidelberg have been the subject of scrutiny before. Following the simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, German authorities investigated an Islamic center in the city that was suspected of financing some of the participants in that plot.
Also, some leading al Qaeda figures, including Wadih el-Hage, sentenced by a U.S. court to life imprisonment for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, are reported to have spent time in the city, according to court transcripts.
In a separate development, German officials said they were looking into the background of a 39-year-old Afghan German man who was arrested in the United States and is now being held in Alexandria, Va., the Associated Press reported. A former resident of Hamburg, the man traveled to the United States in July.
Staff writer Thomas E. Ricks in Washington contributed to this report.
Chickenhawk Vs. Chicken Little
Many Iraq Hawks Have Never Seen Military Service
By Terry M. Neal
washingtonpost.com staff writer
Friday, September 6, 2002; 1:24 PM
Perhaps it was only a matter of time. Given the way the military service issue dogged Bill Clinton throughout his presidency, it was inevitable that similar criticisms would be raised about President Bush and others in his administration.
For months, liberal Web sites and blogs have been buzzing about "chickenhawks" in the Bush administration and among his supporters in Congress. The term, in this instance anyway, refers to hawkish politicians who push war but never actually served in one. It can refer to Republicans or Democrats. Numerous Web sites are devoting space to discussing the idea that the nation's most persistent voices in support of military attack on Iraq — Bush (who served with the Air National Guard in Houston during Vietnam,) Vice President Cheney, Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, among others — are people who never served in Vietnam or saw first hand the carnage that war produces.
Relegated to the fringes of the political debate for most of the year, this topic — fueled by escalating talk of war with Iraq — has picked up steam in recent weeks, with Newsweek, among others, examining the fissure within the GOP under the headline, "Hawks, Doves and Dubya."
The issue was not picked up by the mainstream press until some prominent GOP politicos began commenting on it.
In an interview with Newsweek, conservative Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) said, "It is interesting to me that many of those who want to rush this country into war and think it would be so quick and easy don't know anything about war."
"They come at it from an intellectual perspective versus having sat in jungles or foxholes and watched their friends get their heads blown off. I try to speak for those ghosts of the past a little bit," added Hagel, a Vietnam War Army infantryman with two Purple Hearts.
A few weeks ago, the Tampa Tribune reported on comments made by retired Gen. Anthony Zinni, the White House's special envoy to the Middle East, to the Economic Club of Florida in Tallahassee. Zinni noted that the voices most urging caution on Iraq were people who knew war first hand, former generals Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft and Norman Schwarzkopf.
"It's pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way," Zinni said. "And all the others who have never fired a shot and are hot to go to war see it another way."
Steve Fowle, the editor and publisher of the independent bimonthly New Hampshire Gazette, tracks the issue and keeps a compendium of hawkish politicians, media personalities and government bureaucrats called the "Chickenhawk Database". Fowle, a Vietnam veteran who said he is a registered independent, created the Web site earlier this year on a lark, after chatting with fellow veterans who developed a theory that war talk was being dominated in Washington by people who never served in the military.
"I sat down and did Google searches on people that I thought were conspicuously vocal on the subject, and I suspected didn't have military service," said Fowle, arguing that his theory proved true. The list he came up with includes people who "think war is the solution for whatever problem we've got. Yet there's a conspicuous absence there in the late 1960s, of service among a lot of middle-aged guys now who tend to think war is fact the answer to every problem we've got."
Fowle says he's received 120,000 visitors to the site since it went up on March 17. Daily visits to the Web page were less than 500 for much of the year, but in recent weeks, daily visits have spiked to between 6,000 and 7,000, "a big number for a Web site that doesn't have much else to offer." Fowle's database has received a lot of play also in far-flung places as Russia and Jordan, where reporters have been referencing it.
In an interview yesterday, Woody Powell, the national administrator of Veterans for Peace, echoed that point of view.
"I think if they had had the sobering experience of war — they don't even have to have been in combat, but if they had just walked around and looked at the bodies one time — they might have a little more perspective on the decisions that they are making," said Powell, a veteran of the Korean war, who said he wasn't particularly fond of President Clinton — who "fired missiles to distract" from his personal scandals. "If they haven't smelled the scent of napalm, if they haven't heard the bullets going by them, they just really aren't acquainted with what they're dealing with in a visceral sense. They need to smell it, and it doesn't smell good."
There are two sides to the argument, though. In an opinion column in The Washington Post Thursday, John Hopkins professor Eliot A. Cohen, cautions, among other things, against focusing more attention on generals than on policy makers and politicians elected to make decisions about war.
"The first variant is that the generals are all against war, and if they are, they must be right – particularly if their opponents are civilians who have not served. Does the same work in reverse? If the generals and admirals favored a preemptive attack on Cuba in 1962 – as many did – were they right then because they were flag officers? Of course not. The expertise of generals lies chiefly in the operational, not the strategic, sphere – how to wage war, not whether it should be fought."
Former Republican National Committee communications director Cliff May, who now works at the president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan anti-terrorism think tank, called the "chickenhawk" theory a "wrong and rather cheap argument. In the United States, we have civilian control of the military and that's probably a good idea. If you make the case that unless you have served you have no standing on this issue, then you could also argue that if you're not a police officer you have no standing no law enforcement issues. . . .
"Some of the best leaders we've had had little or no military experience: Abraham Lincoln comes to mind. If all the generals were in favor of a war does that mean we should necessarily engage? I don't think so. I think the debate over Iraq is not whether or not we should fight Saddam, but if we have to do it, are we better off doing it now or later. Or are we better off doing it before or after he has weapons of mass destruction. I don't think it's very fair argument to say stand down unless you have worn a uniform."
Of course, some will dismiss the chickenhawk argument as the braying of whiny peaceniks, liberals and wimps. On the flip side of the "Chickenhawk" debate is the "Chicken Little" discussion – a reference to those afraid to use military force even when there is a strong reason to do so.
Ken Adelman, former U.N. ambassador and arms control director under President Reagan, wrote recently on the Fox News Web site:
"Many critics now focus on the administration's plans to rid the world of its No. 1 threat — the vile regime of Saddam Hussein. Cries are now being made that liberating Iraq would infuriate our closest allies, ignite that volatile Arab street, prove militarily daunting (if not over-stretching), and spark worldwide resentment, if not universal condemnation. They instead advocate 'more responsible' diplomatic and economic moves — presumably a diplomatic demarche or address to the U.N. General Assembly that would sorely embarrass Saddam, a loosening of economic sanctions to bring out his long-hidden statesmanship, or international inspectors to assure his responsible behavior. Sometimes I wonder how many times such critics can resort to the same fear-mongering, which has proved wrong time and again, without losing their credibility. Yet learning curves in Washington, or on public policy generally, can be remarkably flat."
Remarkably, the real debate over Iraq has not been so much between conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats as it has been between factions of the GOP, the old school guys — like Scowcroft, James Baker and Henry Kissinger vs. the neoconservatives (Wolfowitz, Perle, Cheney, et al.)
Indeed until this week, Democrats have been mostly content to let Republicans fight it out among themselves.
In an interview this week, Sen John Kerry (D-Mass.), a highly decorated Naval officer in Vietnam, resisted the urge to take shots at decision makers who never served in the military. While he said it was "interesting" that many of those clamoring for War with Iraq had not served, he stopped short of endorsing Hagel's comments.
"Certainly my experience affects what I do and my thinking," Kerry said. "But I'm not going to run around and point fingers at people who didn't serve. I do think it's a value, it's important and it can help you be aware of the consequences that may come to bear. The consequences of your decisions of war are important, and having served helps you make that assessment." But at the same time, he said he was not eager to revive the divisive Vietnam-era debates about the value of fighting in wars.
Give Diplomacy More Time
The U.S. should at least try to get U.N. Security Council approval before going
after Iraq.
By Richard C. Holbrooke
Saturday, September 7, 2002; Page A17
Since I wrote on this page Aug. 27 that "the road to Baghdad runs through the United Nations Security Council," I have been repeatedly asked what would happen if Washington were unsuccessful in an effort to gain Security Council approval for an airtight weapons inspection regime and authority to use force if Iraq refused the inspectors or cheated again. Wouldn't a failed effort in the United Nations weaken the United States?
I continue to believe that the United States can achieve the necessary Security Council resolution. But what if that judgment is wrong? What if Russia, for example, refuses to support a strong resolution?
As it happens, there is an important precedent from recent history. The details of this virtually unreported incident, which took place during the 1998-99 Kosovo crisis, laid the basis for military action against Slobodan Milosevic and Serbia. This history could provide the Bush administration with a useful insight regarding the current argument over going back to the Security Council.
As Milosevic brutally cracked down on the Kosovar Albanians in the summer of 1998, the United States sought European support for concerted action. The Russians flatly objected, threatening a veto in the Security Council. Yet the Europeans, led by Tony Blair's government, demanded U.N. approval before any military action, much as they are now doing over Iraq. Meanwhile, more than 125,000 Albanians took refuge in the forests of central Kosovo; if they remained there into the bitter Balkan winter, many were certain to freeze to death.
In October 1998, President Clinton sent me to Belgrade with instructions to seek an agreement that would send international "monitors" to Kosovo, allow the refugees to return home, withdraw most of the Yugoslav security forces, and start a political dialogue between Belgrade and the Albanians.
By the fifth day of our negotiations it was clear that we needed a credible threat of military action; Milosevic, counting -- as Saddam Hussein probably does now -- on the protection of a Russian veto, was playing games.
With this background, I broke off the talks in Belgrade to join Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for a meeting with the foreign ministers of the so-called Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) in the VIP lounge at Heathrow Airport outside London. This dramatic four-hour meeting was to resolve the battle over a Security Council resolution in a manner with direct relevance to today's debate over Iraq.
As commercial jets roared overhead, the Europeans asked the Russian foreign minister -- then, as now, Igor Ivanov -- to agree to a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. Ivanov said he could not do so. The German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, almost begged Ivanov to give the Europeans something, anything, to justify collective action by NATO; it was needed, Kinkel explained, under German interpretation of international law. The British, French and Italian foreign ministers supported Kinkel, but Ivanov continued to state, politely but flatly, that he could never agree.
It was clear to Madeleine Albright and to me that Ivanov was saying that Moscow knew it could not stop collective military action (in this case by NATO) but that Russia could not formally endorse such action. Go ahead, Ivanov seemed to be saying, but not with Russia's explicit approval.
It took our European colleagues awhile to arrive at the same conclusion, but after several hours, even Kinkel understood that we now faced a simple choice: Act without the Security Council -- or don't act at all. The fact that we had made a serious effort to obtain Security Council approval but faced a certain Russian veto was vital; it allowed our European allies, led by Tony Blair, to support NATO action without prior Security Council approval.
Strengthened by a new solidarity from the Contact Group, I flew through the night back to Belgrade to tell Milosevic that NATO was prepared to proceed with or without Security Council approval. To make the point even clearer, we armed and positioned warplanes in both Italy and Britain, let the press observe our preparations for war and gave new authority to the NATO commander, Gen. Wesley Clark.
Milosevic got the message. The resulting agreement, in October 1998, allowed more than 100,000 refugees to return home and introduced as many as 2,000 unarmed international monitors into Kosovo. In early 1999 Yugoslav security forces took new repressive actions in Kosovo. In March, I delivered a final ultimatum to Milosevic, which he rejected. Within 36 hours NATO had begun its successful air war -- without Security Council approval.
Making allowances for the vast differences between Yugoslavia and Iraq, Washington confronts a somewhat similar structural situation today. In the end, I am confident that most of our key allies, led again by Tony Blair, will support us. But if the administration refuses to try the Security Council route, it will weaken its position and lose support unnecessarily. Even an unsuccessful effort to obtain an airtight resolution will strengthen international support for Washington, which could then be based on earlier U.N. resolutions that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated.
The writer was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President Clinton.
Act Now
The danger is immediate. Saddam Hussein must be removed.
By George P. Shultz
Friday, September 6, 2002; Page A25
Are we to be the Hamlet of nations, debating endlessly over when and how to act? Saddam Hussein's performance as ruler of Iraq is a matter of grave concern not just for the United States but for the international community as a whole. The major debate going on in the media, in Congress and with our friends and allies is necessary. But it is also necessary to move beyond debate and create the clarity that is the basis for action.
The world now has entered the third decade of crises and dangers to international peace and security created by Saddam Hussein. In 1980 he launched an eight-year war against Iran. Chemical weapons were used, and at least 1.5 million people were killed or severely wounded. In 1990 he invaded Kuwait in a war aimed at eradicating another state's legitimate sovereign existence. As he was forced out, he deliberately created environmental degradation of gigantic proportions. He has used chemical weapons against the Kurdish people in an attack on a genocidal scale, and he has sent his forces into Kurdistan to conduct widespread slaughter. He has relentlessly amassed weapons of mass destruction and continues their development. He has turned Iraq into a state that foments, supports and conducts terrorism. No other dictator today matches his record of war, oppression, use of weapons of mass destruction and continuing contemptuous violation of international law, as set out by unanimous actions of the U.N. Security Council.
Against this background, much of the current debate ignores the facts of the United Nations' long series of steps to rein in Saddam Hussein and authorize action against his regime. A strong foundation exists for immediate military action against Hussein and for a multilateral effort to rebuild Iraq after he is gone.
A remarkable series of U.N. Security Council resolutions in 1990 and 1991 authorized war to oust Hussein's forces from Kuwait. This was the basis for the Desert Storm campaign that won the Gulf War in 1991. With that military victory, a Security Council resolution declared the "suspension" of offensive operations, deliberately leaving intact the original authorization to use force. Then Security Council Resolution 687 imposed a series of demands upon Iraq with the objective of restoring peace and security in the area. This carried the case against Hussein beyond the matter of liberating Kuwait to focus on the elimination, under international inspection, of his weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the threat to the region and the world of a decisively armed Iraq was fully recognized and declared unacceptable.
In the first years after Desert Storm, U.N. inspectors uncovered Iraqi facilities used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. They dismantled uranium-enrichment and other nuclear weapons installations and destroyed a chemical weapons plant and hundreds of missile warheads armed with poison gas. Threats of Iraq's noncooperation were countered by U.S. airstrikes. But even limited Iraqi compliance decreased sharply over time.
The U.N. inspectors did what they could. They found a lot, but they missed even more. In 1995 Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, defected and revealed that Hussein was making biological weapons at a center where inspectors had found nothing. The center, which had produced 30,000 liters of biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxins, was destroyed, but the inadequacy of inspections in Iraq was demonstrated.
In 1997 Saddam Hussein escalated his campaign of harassment, obstruction and threats against the inspection effort. He activated ground-to-air missile systems to deter inspection flights. He expelled all American members of the inspection teams. In early 1998 Hussein refused access to "presidential sites" -- the numerous palaces he had built for himself around Iraq. The United States responded with a military buildup, including ground troops deployed to Kuwait. In a speech at the Pentagon in February 1998, President Clinton gave details of Iraq's violations and declared that Hussein must grant "full, free and unfettered" access to inspectors or the United States would launch attacks to compel his compliance.
In an attempt to defuse the crisis, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan negotiated that same month a Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the United Nations, which pledged "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access" for inspections. A Security Council resolution endorsed the Memorandum of Understanding and warned Iraq of the "severest consequences" if the memorandum was violated.
In September 1998, the chief U.N. inspector informed the Security Council that Iraq was again barring inspections, and the council, in yet another resolution, condemned Iraq for suspending its cooperation. A further U.N. effort to regain Iraq's cooperation failed as Iraq declared that it was suspending all cooperation with U.N. inspections. In an emergency session, the Security Council passed Resolution 1205 on Nov. 5, 1998, condemning Iraq's action as "a flagrant violation" of the original resolutions of 1990-91. Since then, nothing consequential has been done. The failure to take military action against Hussein after his flagrant violation in 1998 has given him nearly four years to continue unencumbered in his development and accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.
Iraq by its own actions has, in effect, terminated the cease-fire established in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War and reactivated the "suspended" authorization to use military force against Iraq. No longer can anyone plausibly claim that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction can be eliminated by an inspection program. The Security Council's judgment still stands: A Saddam Hussein armed with weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable. Military force against Hussein is both necessary and authorized to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction.
The full range of reasonable legal, diplomatic and other alternatives has been exhausted. All conceivable forms of leverage have been employed: sanctions; embargoes; massive military buildups to threaten him into compliance; limited military operations in the form of air and cruise missile strikes; the encouragement of internal opposition; positive inducement through the "oil for peace" program; and diplomacy in all forms -- unilateral, multilateral, private, public, direct and through intermediaries. Nothing has worked. Any further steps will only provide him with more time and heighten the danger.
Self-defense is a valid basis for preemptive action. The evidence is clear that Hussein continues to amass weapons of mass destruction. He has also demonstrated a willingness to use them against internal as well as external targets. By now, the risks of inaction clearly outweigh the risks of action. If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense.
The danger is immediate. The making of weapons of mass destruction grows increasingly difficult to counter with each passing day. When the risk is not hundreds of people killed in a conventional attack but tens or hundreds of thousands killed by chemical, biological or nuclear attack, the time factor is even more compelling.
The moment is racing toward us when Hussein's possession of nuclear weaponry could transform the regional and international situation into what, in the Cold War, we called the balance of terror. Some argue that to act now might trigger Hussein's use of his worst weapons. Such self-imposed blackmail presumes easier judgments when he is even better equipped than now. Time is his ally, not ours.
Concern over the future of Iraq is legitimate. Following the end of the current Iraqi regime, a new Iraq can emerge as a territorially integral sovereign state with a federal-style form that respects the Kurdish, Sunni and Shia communities. A set of phased transitional steps, including referendums and elections, can be carried out and involve the range of Iraqi political parties, factions and groups in exile and internally opposed to the Hussein regime over the years.
For the Middle East, a major source of and support for terror and instability will have ended. Those who argue that the Iraq crisis should be deferred until progress is achieved between Israelis and Palestinians are proposing an impossible task. For the Arab world as a whole, a new Iraq offers the opportunity to start a reversal of the stagnation detailed in the "Arab Human Development Report 2002" recently released by the United Nations. The report describes how Arab societies are being crippled by a lack of political freedom, repression of women and isolation from the world of ideas that stifles creativity.
The history of Iraq, the achievements of its peoples, its high civilization of the past, and its extensive natural resources all point to the possibility of a positive transformation once Hussein's yoke is lifted. In the process, a model can emerge that other Arab societies may look to and emulate for their own transformation and that of the entire region. The challenge of Iraq offers an opportunity for a historic turning point that can lead us in the direction of a more peaceful, free and prosperous future.
This is a defining moment in international affairs. Authorization for action is clear. We have made endless efforts to bring Saddam Hussein into line with the duly considered judgments of a unanimous U.N. Security Council. Let us go to the Security Council and assert this case with the care of a country determined to take decisive action. And this powerful case for acting now must be made promptly to Congress. Its members will have to stand up and be counted. Then let's get on with the job.
The writer was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. He is the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.
Bush's Summer of Dissension
By E. J. Dionne Jr.
Friday, September 6, 2002; Page A25
An Italian journalist recently proffered a theory popular among his colleagues. They believe that the highly public debate over Iraq within the Republican Party in the past few weeks was contrived for political purposes.
The goal was to shift American press and public attention away from the economy and business scandals (issues that might help Democrats) toward terrorism and foreign policy (issues that favor Republicans).
My naively American response was that this view was too Machiavellian, that the differences among Republicans were real and principled. In any event, the ploy, if that's what it was, backfired. Because of divisions within his party and his administration, President Bush is on the defensive in foreign affairs for the first time since Sept 11.
Only last month the administration's swaggering lawyers insisted that Bush didn't need a congressional vote to go to war with Iraq. But after his meeting with congressional leaders on Wednesday, Bush folded and promised that "this administration will go to the Congress to seek approval" for actions "necessary to deal with the threat."
And once again, Bush is relying on British Prime Minister Tony Blair to rally support in quarters Bush can't reach -- much as Blair provided eloquent arguments for the war on terror last fall. Blair has promised documentation of the threat posed by Iraq.
That's precisely what Americans would like to see, as loyal Republicans coming back from their districts after the summer congressional recess reported. The words they are hearing about the administration's Iraq policies: "concern" and "unease." They came up over and over.
"My sense from talking to people here is that the case hasn't been made," said Rep. Dave Camp, a Michigan Republican, who spoke from his district before returning to Washington this week. His constituents, Camp said, had seen the benefit of successful coalitions in both the first Iraq war and Afghanistan. "They're concerned about a go-it-alone strategy," he said, "and that includes going it alone without the American people."
Rep. Thomas Petri, a Wisconsin Republican, said his constituents expressed "concern about whether we know what we're doing or how we're going to do it."
Sen. Susan Collins, a Maine Republican, said her constituents were "stressing a lot of reservations. They want to support the president, they trust his judgment. But they're very uneasy -- they're very uneasy about invading another country unless the case is very strong."
Rep. Doug Bereuter, a Nebraska Republican who is one of his party's leading foreign policy voices, said that the "hard line" recently put forward by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld might yet have a positive effect -- "to soften up the Europeans" and push them to support tough weapons inspections in Iraq.
But Bush's silence in the face of Cheney's outspokenness -- exactly the opposite of the administration's approach before the Afghanistan war -- has had serious costs. "There are costs in terms of confidence in the Bush administration's foreign policy," Bereuter said. "It may have fractured support for actions against al Qaeda around the world." Bereuter underscored that the conflict in Afghanistan and the fight with al Qaeda are "far from finished" -- and he spoke before yesterday's assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Rep. Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican, was hearing the same thing. "The public doesn't want to say the president is wrong, but they're very uneasy," he said.
The queasiness all these Republicans report is reflected in recent polling. A Pew Research Center survey released yesterday found that only 22 percent of Americans thought the military effort against terrorism was going "very well," down from 45 percent last October and 38 percent in January. An ABC News poll released Wednesday found that just 52 percent of Americans approved of Bush's handling of Iraq. And while 56 percent favored military action to depose Saddam Hussein, a quarter of those supporters dropped away when asked whether they would still favor military action in the face of opposition from American allies.
Bush is a shrewd reader of polls, so he's making smart adjustments. He's reaching out to Congress and to our allies. Administration officials are signaling that they may seek tough inspections of Hussein's weapons facilities before they propose war.
But in this summer of administration dissension, something was lost. Support for this president's approach to foreign affairs is no longer automatic. Many Republicans think the president would be smart to force Democrats to vote on Iraq before November's elections. Maybe that's shrewd. But it's less shrewd than it would have been a month ago.
Editorial A Dialogue on Iraq
Friday, September 6, 2002; Page A24
THE PROCESS of consultation on Iraq that President Bush has now promised faces an obstacle at the beginning: the fact that many leaders of Congress and allied foreign governments perceive the administration as having all but committed itself to military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein before inviting other opinions. Mr. Bush said Wednesday that "the primary issue" he will raise is "disarmament" -- how Iraq can be compelled to comply with U.N. resolutions calling for it to give up weapons of mass destruction -- and he promised "an open dialogue about how to deal with this threat." But national security adviser Condoleezza Rice has already said that the only solution is "regime change," and Vice President Cheney has already dismissed the alternative to war that commands the most congressional and international support, which is seeking the return to Iraq of U.N. weapons inspectors. Mr. Bush's apparent determination to wrap up in a matter of weeks what ought to be a sober and momentous debate increases the chance that the process will be perfunctory and pro forma -- and deeply dissatisfying to those, especially in Europe and the Middle East, who wish to argue for a different course. Such an outcome could seriously damage the chances of success for the ambitious and demanding mission Mr. Bush is contemplating.
Some in Congress and abroad, of course, will not be persuaded to support action against Iraq, no matter how much evidence is laid out about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein; the administration cannot allow itself to be paralyzed by unreasonable demands for smoking guns. In fact, there is abundant evidence already in the public record that Saddam Hussein retains stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and delivery vehicles in violation of U.N. resolutions, that he seeks to acquire nuclear arms, and that he is willing to use these weapons to realize his long-standing ambition to establish dominion over the Middle East and its oil supplies. Those who insist on still more conclusive proof, especially of an Iraqi nuclear program, are essentially arguing that it would be better to take action only after Saddam Hussein conducts a nuclear test or a terrorist group uses a chemical or biological weapon acquired from him. In the post-9/11 world, such a strategy is self-defeating and dangerous.
Yet to succeed, any action against Iraq will require broad and sustained support from Americans and foreign allies. That would certainly be true of any effort to reintroduce a U.N. inspection regime, which even proponents describe as unlikely to succeed; but it would be even more true of the intervention many senior administration officials have in mind: a full-scale invasion of Iraq and the replacement of Saddam Hussein's regime by a democratic government. Such an enterprise would likely cost thousands of Iraqi or American casualties, tens of billions of dollars and years of U.S. effort to occupy and reconstruct a large and complex country; it would dwarf the Balkan interventions that Mr. Bush once portrayed as stretching the U.S. military too thin. Americans, and Congress, are more likely to accept such costs if they are forthrightly estimated and weighed before action is taken. Administration officials have so far ducked the question; it is vital that Congress press for answers in upcoming hearings.
Similarly, while the United States may be able to win a war against Iraq on its own, it is difficult to imagine how any project to remake Iraq after Saddam Hussein could succeed without major allied contributions of troops, funds and political goodwill. One key to winning such support is a plan for Iraq's future, including a commitment to the kind of forceful nation-building that the Bush administration has criticized in the Balkans and evaded in Afghanistan; the absence of any such plan is one of the principal worries of European and Arab leaders. Still more important would be a demonstration of U.S. willingness to build an international coalition, even if that meant accepting such dilatory steps as offering a last chance to inspections, or enduring a few rounds of negotiations in the Security Council. In the end such process, even if fruitless, would probably bring most of the necessary allies on board; by contrast, offering the world a precooked and nonnegotiable buildup to war could well doom an Iraq mission before it begins.
Remembrance And Resolve
By Charles Krauthammer
Friday, September 6, 2002; Page A25
Whenever I hear Sept. 11 referred to as just a tragedy, I wince. The San Francisco earthquake was a tragedy. The Johnstown flood was a tragedy. Hurricane Andrew was a tragedy. A tragedy is an act of God. Sept. 11 was no act of God. It was an act of man. An act of war.
Yes, Sept. 11 occasioned many tragedies -- many terrible deaths, many terrible injuries, many terrible sorrows. These tragedies elicit a deep compassion and a shared grief. Which is why this coming Sept. 11 will be a day of compassion and grief; of sorrow and remembrance; of celebration, too, of the courage and sacrifice of the heroes of that day.
But we would pay such homage had the World Trade Center and the Pentagon collapsed in an earthquake. They did not. And because they did not, more is required than mere homage and respect. Not just sorrow, but renewed anger. Not just consolation, but renewed determination. And not, God help us, "closure," that clarion call to passivity and resignation, but open-ended action against those who perpetrated Sept. 11 and those who would perpetrate the next Sept. 11.
The temptation on any anniversary is to just look back. But on Dec. 7, 1942, the country did not just look back on the sunken Arizona. It looked forward to the destruction of Japan.
Mourning alone cannot fully honor the murdered. Justice must be done as well. The dead of last Sept. 11 cannot be adequately honored unless we remember not just that they died but at whose hands they died. It means remembering that Sept. 11 was a declaration of war, a war we did not seek but one we cannot avoid.
We would like to avoid it. We are tempted to see the war on terrorism as, variously and alternately, won, unwinnable, tangled, indecisive, self-defeating -- anything that takes away its immediacy and its urgency.
It is a healthy instinct in the American soul. Despite the current braying of Europeans and Arabs, Americans are quite averse to war. We have a history of doing what we can to avoid it.
It took three years for the United States to enter World War I. It took a surprise attack to get us into World War II. As for the Cold War, we refused even to face its reality until it had been going on for two years. And after getting burned in Korea and Vietnam, America reverted to form. If Saddam Hussein had not invaded Kuwait in 1990 and if we had not been dragged kicking and screaming into Kosovo, we would now be celebrating the Thirty Years' Peace.
It stands to reason. A continental nation protected by vast oceans and friendly neighbors has no great desire to go abroad in search of monsters. This is why, when Osama bin Laden and radical Islam declared war on the United States in the 1990s, we ignored it. We ignored the declaration as we ignored the provocations -- the first attack on the World Trade Center, the embassy bombings in Africa, the attack on the USS Cole.
After each outrage, a grim president would declare himself aggrieved and pledge not to rest until those responsible were brought to justice. A few FBI agents would then be dispatched to Yemen or some such, a few cruise missiles would land in some desert, and soon he, and we, would return to our repose.
Sept. 11 was different. Yet so deep were these pacific habits of thought that in the first hours high administration officials reverted to the old language of crime, pledging to bring the killers to justice. It soon became clear, however, that the challenge of radical Islam was a matter not of law enforcement but of war. President Bush's address to Congress nine days later ratified that truth. This time we would not just "bring our enemies to justice." We would "bring justice to our enemies." This was war. We would engage it.
This proposition was too obvious for anyone serious to protest. No one serious did. The war in Afghanistan enjoyed breathtakingly broad national support. Yet here we are a year later, and things are different. It doesn't feel like war. The very suddenness and relative painlessness of the victory in Afghanistan, coupled with the fact that at home no second shoe dropped, has helped return us to a state of suspension, of confusion.
We feel the uncertainty. But our enemies do not. Which is why the challenge of this Sept. 11 is to remember the feeling of last Sept. 11. Not just the pain, but the danger. It endures. And so it will until we have destroyed those who did the deed, those who support them and those who would emulate them.
Los Angeles Times
Editorial Why They Say Nein to War
September 6 2002
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is causing heartburn at the White House
with declarations that his country is "not available for adventures"
in Iraq. But Schroeder, who is in the middle of a fiercely contested election
campaign, receives roars of approval from crowds whenever he declares that
Germany will not participate in or help pay for a war. Though there is an
element of election-campaign opportunism in Schroeder's insistence that a war
would be a huge blunder, his statements reflect widespread fears among
Europeans.
Schroeder, though he comes from the left wing of the Social Democratic Party,
is no anti-American firebrand. Over the decades, he has shed his doctrinaire
leftism to become a pragmatist standing by the U.S. against terrorism and for
democracy. Germany has stepped up its surveillance and penetration of Islamic
groups inside the country, and some 10,000 German troops are stationed in the
Balkans, Afghanistan and the Middle East. Indeed, Schroeder was unflinching on
Afghanistan, facing down critics in his own party and its coalition partner,
the Greens, to support deployment in that country.
Schroeder's arguments against a war are grounded not in dislike of the United
States but in realistic apprehensions. He notes that the Bush administration
has presented no compelling evidence that the threat posed by Iraq justifies a
full-scale war; that an assault could create a surge of hatred in the Arab
street that might allow Islamic militants to topple moderate governments
friendly to the U.S; and that the economic consequences of war, particularly
for oil supplies, could be catastrophic.
Schroeder argues that the goal of the U.S. and its allies shouldn't be war but
rather permitting weapons inspectors to aggressively return to Iraq.
The Nazi years created a deep and permanent wariness in Germany about the
consequences of going to war. Schroeder never met his father, who died serving
in the army. During the Cold War, West Germany, like Japan, drew the lesson
that it should avoid great-power politics and concentrate on economics. In
Germany, the memory of World War II and the economic and moral destruction of
the country also long tainted the idea of any military action apart from
defense.
However, since unification in 1990, American administrations have encouraged
Germany to shed its status as economic giant/political dwarf. Schroeder, by
taking the lead in Europe against joining a U.S. war against Iraq, is doing
just that.
German leadership in Europe does not have to be seen just as opposition to the
United States. Schroeder is right to fear that an attack on Saddam Hussein
would jeopardize the war on terrorism by tearing apart the NATO alliance.
Instead of becoming angry at Schroeder, the Bush administration should try
harder to hear his words of caution.
Hit Saddam Hussein Hard, and Hit Him Right Now
By RANAN R. LURIE
Ranan R. Lurie is a syndicated columnist and political cartoonist. He was an
Israeli combat major who trained and jumped with the U.S. 101st Airborne, the
paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion, th
September 6 2002
The world is keeping check on Saddam Hussein as if it were making sure that
Jack the Ripper paid his parking tickets on time.
The international community is doing what it does best: wait and see.
But President Bush, we know, soon will reveal detailed information that shows
Hussein for the evil that he is. This information will show that civilization
simply cannot afford to haggle with itself until it is too late.
Once Iraq, a country twice the size of Idaho, has a nuclear weapon, it won't be
considered small anymore.
Time is the only commodity Hussein needs to fulfill his terrible dream. Every
political rally warning against "the war," every editorial
recommending "patience," every running-for-office politician who
"condemns" an attack against Iraq has a death wish. The problems of
uprooting Hussein from his underground bunkers and laboratories are dwarfs in
comparison with the new Holocaust awaiting us if we don't do so.
That said, Iraq has a history of poor combat performance.
Hussein's army failed miserably against the U.S. coalition forces in 1991. It
could not even handle the inefficient Iranian foot soldiers for eight years
during the 1980s, and it lost the territories it gained when it attacked Iran.
In October 1973, it sent one armored division to help the Syrians on the Golan
Heights. That unit fell into an elementary but devastating trap set by the
Israelis.
Although it sent a huge army to help its Jordanian brethren just before the
Six-Day War, the Iraqi forces retreated to Baghdad as fast as they could once
the shooting started.
In 1948, Iraq sent to Palestine the biggest military force of all Arab
states--and failed to have any impact on the war results. The stories about
Iraqi officers deserting their trenches while locking their soldiers in chains
so that they could not join them became part of Israeli War of Independence
folklore.
The only two sources of real power that Hussein has today are his Gestapo-like
control of his people and his imminent nuclear threat capability.
Time is on his side. Therefore, he must be destroyed.
Iraq should be treated as an island state without a navy. The "ocean"
is a combination of the desert (almost half of the country) and Iraq's hostile
neighbors. The "navy" in this case is actually the air force because
in the desert, the one who has the more efficient air force is the winner
before the war even begins. In the desert there is no place to hide from
marauding planes or smart bombs.
The U.S. forces can land with a minimum force of no more than a couple of
battalions on the western tip of Iraq that borders Jordan, take over two old
airports named H-2 and H-3 and create an instant base of operations, probably
without suffering casualties.
This act alone would bring tremendous psychological relief to our fearful ally,
Jordan, which would then have a U.S. buffer between it and Iraq. Because of the
short range of Scuds, our control of west Iraq would eliminate the chances of
Iraqi Scuds being launched against Israel.
The destruction of military barracks and installations would be even more
devastating than in 1991.
The historical statistics lean heavily toward Iraq waving the white flag again.
We just have to get there in time.
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A major
U-turn in U.S. policy on peacekeeping |
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Afghanistan
WASHINGTON
Pentagon officials recently signaled a shift in U.S. policy on Afghanistan,
admitting that an expansion of international peacekeeping operations beyond
Kabul is necessary. The unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Hamid
Karzai on Thursday in Kandahar is intensifying calls for such a move. Some in
the Bush administration called it a "mid-course correction," but the
United States appears to be on the verge of a major U-turn.
.
For months,
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz have
resisted calls for an expansion of ISAF, the International Security Assistance
Force, composed of 4,500 troops from 19 states and headed by Turkey. But as
insecurity, factional fighting among warlords, and lawlessness have continued,
it has become clear that waiting years for the formation of a credible national
Afghan army and police force is not the answer.
.
"We do
not oppose ISAF expansion" beyond Kabul, Wolfowitz said Thursday, while
calling on the international community to take a greater role. General Tommy
Franks, head of the U.S. command in Afghanistan, said there were "a number
of places that would indicate the desirability of expanding the ISAF.” Karzai
himself, the United Nations secretary- general Kofi Annan, and members of the
U.S. Congress in both parties have been urging expansion of the peacekeeping
force.
.
As long as
security outside of Kabul is in the hands of warlords, Afghans will not be
secure. And as long as the Kabul government is dependent on regional warlords,
its legitimacy will be open to question. Greater security throughout the
country is a prerequisite for rebuilding devastated infrastructure, encouraging
the re-emergence of Afghan civil society, and establishing legal and
administrative institutions to protect the rights of all Afghans. A field
presence of international peacekeepers will encourage compliance with
disarmament and demilitarization agreements.
.
Factional rivalry
in northern Afghanistan has led to a rise in attacks on humanitarian aid
workers and Afghan civilians, threatening the delivery of urgently needed aid
and resettlement assistance. Ethnic Pashtuns, a minority in the north, have
been subject to targeted violence including rape, seizure of farmland, and
demands for money by local commanders.
.
Wolfowitz
visited Mazar-i-Sharif in July and expressed alarm over the violence as an
obstacle to development, but gave backing to the local warlords whose forces
are responsible for many of the abuses in the north. Ironically, by relying on
warlords and opposing an expansion of the peacekeeping force, the United States
has allowed the situation to become more, not less, unstable.
.
Other parts
of the country are also plagued by violence, affecting Afghan women, ethnic
minorities, and returning refugees. In several areas around Herat in the west,
and Kandahar in the south, minorities have been harassed by local forces. On
most roads between major cities, armed groups regularly extort money from
farmers, traders and anyone not under the "protection" of a regional
strongman.
.
The Bonn
agreement provided for an international peacekeeping force in Kabul, but also
indicated that such a force "could, as appropriate, be progressively
expanded to other urban centers and other areas." The UN Security Council,
which renewed the peacekeepers' mandate in May, will need to vote to redefine
its mandate, while seeking contributions - troops, funding, and logistical
support - from member states to gradually increase its scope.
.
The United
States should immediately take the lead in drafting a Security Council
resolution, seeking support from European governments and others on the
Council. President George W. Bush, when he speaks at the United Nations on
Sept. 12, should publicly endorse expansion of the peacekeeping force.
Secretary of State Colin Powell should consult closely with Afghan leaders and
UN officials to devise a workable strategy for increasing security.
.
Certainly, the
U.S. Congress can also help. The administration should support legislation
adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug.1, authorizing $1
billion over two years for more peacekeepers, then work with Congress to get
the necessary funds appropriated. During his visit to Afghanistan, Wolfowitz
said that Washington is committed to Afghanistan's reconstruction, declaring
that the U.S. had learned a lesson from 10 years of benign neglect.
.
It's now up
to the Bush administration to make good on that promise, not only by giving
aid, but also by doing more to create the security conditions needed for a
peaceful, stable Afghanistan to emerge.
.
The writer, Washington director for Asia at Human Right Watch,
contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
|
NEWS
ANALYSIS German position on Iraq could be destabilizing for allies |
|
|
|
John
Vinocur International Herald Tribune |
MUNICH
For the first time since 1945, Germany's leadership has moved to totally
separate its policy from that of the United States on an issue of war and
peace. The subject is Iraq and the decision is taking shape in the tense
context of national elections later this month.
.
Unlike any
of the United States' other NATO allies, the German government of Social
Democrats and Greens has chosen to reject any military participation, even with
United Nations and European Union mandates, in an American-led strike against
the regime of Saddam Hussein.
.
As the
campaign progresses, and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer reiterate daily their commitment to a position that isolates
Germany from the United States and its other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
allies. The German choice takes on the potential of becoming a profound and
destabilizing development for both the United States and Europe.
.
With Edmund
Stoiber, the Christian Democrat candidate, holding a similar but ultimately
less inflexible position, and Fischer claiming 80 percent backing within German
public opinion, the issue appears to be driven by domestic political
calculation. As such, it raises questions about Germany's capacity and stated
ambitions to become a leading international player while remaining a committed
ally of the United States.
.
Fischer
rejected this analysis in an interview this week, saying he saw no real damage
to Germany's international position or relations with the Americans. Rather
than an election tactic, he said, the German position reflected the intimate
convictions he and Schroeder hold about the great dangers of an invasion of
Iraq.
.
At the same
time though, during a bus tour of Bavaria, he appeared visibly uncomfortable
with the phrase - "the German way" - that Schroeder employed in his
explanation of why Germany was taking a position likely to unsettle, confound
or vex its friends. That phrase carries a historical echo of Kaiser Wilhelm and
the German Empire.
.
"Yes,"
Fischer replied when he was asked if "the German way" undercut the
idea of common European policy and decision-making. "It's not my language,
my terminology. It won't be used any more."
.
Apart from
the potentially altered view of Germany's allies on the country's reliability,
Fischer indirectly acknowledged that the Iraq question was now at the heart of
the election, and that this was not to his displeasure. He said the Iraq
"confidence question" would be a dominant element in the final two
weeks of the campaign, with Germans asking themselves "in whose hands do
they trust putting the country."
.
German
political analysts speculate that Schroeder and Fischer, who increasingly refer
to their partnership as a kind of left-wing ticket, made their decision to opt
out on Iraq early in August, before devastating floods in Eastern Germany, and
at a time when the Social Democrats and Greens showed polling scores
considerably behind Stoiber's CDU.
.
The choice,
it is said, was to plunge deeply into a last remaining reservoir of left-wing
votes and anti-American sentiment, those of the PDS, or former East German
Communist Party, whose charismatic chancellor candidate, Gregor Gysi, had quit
the race. Taking a maximalist position rejecting all involvement in an Iraq war
was expected to stir the activists in both the coalition parties, where,
according to an SPD cadre, mobilization was incomplete and enthusiasm limited.
.
In terms of
the vote in Germany, where Fisch-er says that 80 percent of the population is
now culturally allergic to war, the calculation may have been correct because
the gap in the polls has been closed. Stoiber has essentially repackaged as his
own the coalition's rejection of direct military support for an American
invasion, while leaving the circumstances vague in the event of a green light
from the United Nations and the EU. He also says, unlike Schroeder, that he
cannot imagine President George W. Bush getting involved in a military
adventure.
.
It was, in
effect, a new world for Germany's relationship with its old protector and
advocate. This time, distancing itself from the United States had none of the
circumscribed aspects of Cold War-era Germany's grievances with America when
the issues were the supply of a gas pipeline to the Soviet Union, participation
in the Moscow Olympics after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or even the
deployment of American cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany.
.
Clearly, for
Europe and the United States, the stakes go far beyond the political use of
German external relations as an election gambit. Rather, they involve how
Schroeder and Fischer, who postulated a new leadership role in Europe for their
country during their four years in office, took a position on an issue that
removes Germany from the largely skeptical but nonetheless wait-and-see zone on
Iraq where most of its European allies have encamped.
.
The
Schroeder-Fischer stance also raises the question of why these two politicians
decided, after a half-century of German dependence on the United States to hold
off the Soviet Union, to steer clear of a potential conflict in which American
lives may be lost fighting a dictator both German leaders have denounced.
.
More than
six months ago, according to a German newspaper account that has gone
unchallenged, Schroeder himself said that failure to commit a German
anti-nuclear and chemical warfare unit stationed in Kuwait to even a unilateral
American strike against Iraq might open a German-American crisis with
consequences that could last from 30 to 50 years. Exactly that choice not to
help the Americans has now been made.
.
The United
States has clearly expressed its concern and the American ambassador to
Germany, Dan Coats, was invited to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on Wednesday
after he criticized the government's position in an interview with the German
News Agency.
.
At the very
least, the circumstances were unaccustomed.
Boston Globe
America as lone ranger
By H.D.S. Greenway, 9/6/2002
ATIONAL
SECURITY adviser Condoleezza Rice told The New Yorker magazine that this
post-Sept. 11 year has been ''analogous to 1945 to 1947,'' the period that set
American foreign policy in its containment of the Soviet Union for the second
half of the 20th century.
As the anniversary of that fateful September day approaches, new doctrines, strategies, and tactics are emerging from a secretive and partisan Bush administration, often hotly contested. Fiery penumbras of confidential deliberations flare up from the hot surfaces of policy debates in the form of astonishing news leaks. But so far, the Bush administration's record on foreign policy has been mixed to poor.
Niccolo Machiavelli said: ''A war is just when it is necessary,'' but so far the US government has not adequately made its case for invading Iraq. Stung by the public criticism from some of his father's closest advisers and generals - notably Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Anthony Zinni - the president reversed course this week and promised to take his case to Congress.
It's not that anybody likes Saddam Hussein, but the worry is that President Bush has his priorities wrong. Attacking Iraq could distract from, and even harm, the war on terrorism, and some positive movement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is needed if the necessary allies in the region are to be won over.
As it is, with the single exception of Britain, virtually all our allies in Europe and in the Arab world, as well as Russia and China, are opposed to the Bush administration's we-can-go-it-alone approach. As the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, Karl Kaiser, told The Boston Globe: ''To not even try to use the Security Council, as (Vice President) Cheney appears to be arguing, is a total denial of what the US and Europe have stood for during the last half century.'' Bush needs to build a national and international consensus the way his father did.
A doctrine of preemptive strikes against terrorism, which the administration is pushing, makes sense against such an elusive target as Al Qaeda. Certainly mutually assured destruction, which served us well in the Cold War, is no deterrent against people who are willing to die in order to hurt us. But within a preemptive strike policy lie the seeds of real trouble. It is a doctrine that, if mishandled, could run roughshod over every rule of international law and norms that govern the intercourse of nations.
But most dangerous of all is what one might call the new belligerency in the administration's approach to foreign affairs. It is a stick-it-in-your-eye belligerency that is at best unnecessary and at worst destructive to our ultimate goals. It started well before Sept. 11, with a go-it-alone attitude that seemed to say that the last remaining superpower is a law unto itself and that the rest of the world must conform or else.
There was plenty wrong with the Kyoto Treaty on the environment, and many of our close friends had not ratified it. But the Bush administration went out of its way to be bellicose about rejecting it instead of working with others to improve it. There are also lots of problems with the new International Criminal Court, but again, the Bush administration has seemed hysterically opposed instead of working quietly to ensure that it will not be misused against Americans.
The ''axis of evil'' approach, especially with Iran, makes unnecessarily hostile our relations with a very prickly country with which we should be trying to improve relations, not make things worse. As for the North Koreans, better to talk to them instead of brushing them off as evil, which will do little to modify their behavior.
Leaks on a new nuclear strategy that would contemplate using nukes against China and Russia as well as the conventional ''rogue states'' cannot help our foreign policy in its quest against international terror. The leaking of war plans that envision using countries in an invasion of Iraq that have not yet been consulted shows a lack of discipline within the administration's ranks that is frightening.
As for the Middle East, it would be hard to contemplate a more confused and contradictory handling of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Bush allowed the hawks to cut the more sensible policies of Secretary of State Colin Powell off at the knees. Bush's capitulation to Ariel Sharon's view that only brute force can win the day will be seen in the future as one of the great wrong turns in a tragedy that has seen so many roads not taken.
The wily Sharon has obtained from the Bush administration a carte blanch to do whatever he likes to the Palestinians by making the false parallel between Palestinian national aspirations and Al Qaeda's nihilistic and messianic mission to remove American influence from the Muslim world.
The harbinger of this new belligerence was apparent in an internal Defense Department paper from the first Bush administration, when Dick Cheney was secretary of defense. It suggested that the role of the United States was not to persuade and lead the world towards constructive alliances and mutual benefits but to prevent any other country from becoming a great power - by force if necessary.
The new belligerence talks of ignoring the wishes and thoughts of allies thought feckless, timid, and irresponsible. This is sometimes called ''realism,'' but of course it is not. Realists know that if the war on terror is ever to be won it will depend on the good will and cooperation of every ally we can enlist - not the militantly unilateralist approach towards which the administration seems to be inexorably drifting.
H.D.S. Greenway's column appears regularly in the Globe.
A Bright Idea on Development.
By James K. Glassman.
JOHANNESBURG - As a veteran of too many United Nations environmental
mega-conferences, I arrived here a week ago for the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in dread of the usual - a festival of anti-U.S. vituperation
dominated by greens and global bureaucrats, with the shameful collusion of pandering
businesses. But surprisingly, Johannesburg turned out just fine. Indeed, it may
be looked back on as a watershed event, the place where world leaders penned
the epitaph to extravagant, unworkable and often damaging multilateral
agreements.
The radicals were sent packing. Their pet issue, global warming, was barely
mentioned. They were trounced on the most important provision in the
30,000-word concluding text - energy - and the notion of setting up a World
Environmental Organization to counter the WTO got no traction. "It seems
the world leaders are only playing a game, instead of taking the world's
problems seriously," said a statement released by the green organization
Energy and Climate Caucus when the conference ended. In reality, Johannesburg was
very, very serious, which is why the greens were routed.
On Monday, the day when European leaders like France's Jacques Chirac and
Germany's Gerhard Schroeder parachuted into the summit to blast the lack of
American leadership on the environment, the U.S. scored a stunning victory on
energy policy - with the help of developing nations. Negotiators agreed to a
provision that rejected specific targets for renewables like wind and solar
power, avidly sought by Europeans. Instead, poor countries said, in effect,
that windmills may be fine for the Danes, but what Africans and Asians need is
energy that's cheap and abundant, including coal and oil.
In fact, unlike other huge environmental meetings, Johannesburg became suffused
with the theme that wealth makes health - or, more specifically, that it is
economic growth that leads to a cleaner, safer environment. In the past,
radical greens and their U.N. camp followers had tried to promote a false
dichotomy: the concept that nations must strike a balance between economic
growth and care for the environment. The term "sustainable
development," the focus of the summit, was itself a byproduct of that
false choice. But perhaps specifically because the conference was held in
Africa, the notion that what developing nations need first is development - and
that environmental progress will follow - amazingly caught on.
For example, Claire Short, Britain's development minister, warned
environmentalists against "imposing rules that prevent poor countries from
development." Otherwise, she said, people in those countries can
justifiably say to developed nations, "You got your development, and now
you're setting rules that make sure we will never be able to develop."
Going into this summit, radical greens wanted to force poor countries to use
more wind and solar power, which are expensive and require large infusions of
capital. But, in Johannesburg, that approach was rejected in favor of the idea
that "energy policies are supportive to developing countries' efforts to
eradicate poverty." The conference gave a green light to "efficient,
affordable and cost-effective energy technologies, including fossil fuel
technologies." In other words, the summit endorsed the use of sources like
clean coal. India will get windmills in time, but for now, it needs to get rich
as quickly as it can.
You wouldn't have guessed it from the heckling of Colin Powell, but the truth
is that the majority of participants here conceded, through their final
document, that foolish targets and rules for renewables will only delay
economic growth in developing nations and keep their citizens poor. And,
naturally, people who live in poverty are far more concerned with the
day-to-day demands of food, shelter and clothing. Environmental health is a
luxury they can afford only after they have achieved these basic needs. Or, as
the late Indian leader Indira Ghandi put it, "Poverty is the worst
polluter." The idea is simple, and academic research proves it: Economic
progress leads to environmental progress. Once per-capita incomes get to about
$8,000 a year, nations start aggressively improving their environments. So,
with three-quarters of the world still poor, the best way to clean up air and
water is to help make them richer. Studies show that the U.S., Europe and Japan
have the cleanest environments while nations like Haiti, China and Bangladesh
have the dirtiest. Thirteen of the 15 worst-polluted cities in the world are in
developing Asia.
While Johannesburg reversed the trend toward what Steven Hayward and Christopher
DeMuth, my colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute, call "romantic
environmentalism" (the idea that environmental concerns trump everything
else), the steps the conference took toward boosting development in poor
countries were relatively small ones - mainly launching public-private
partnerships, vigorously promoted here by the U.S. More important would be
dismantling European and U.S. trade barriers to agriculture.
The other disappointment at Johannesburg was the behavior of large corporations.
When the meeting began, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development,
an organization of 160 multinational companies, from AOL Time Warner to BP to
Zurich Financial, held a joint press conference with Greenpeace to urge
governments to ratify and implement the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement the U.S.
rejected last year because it was based on shaky science and would almost
certainly plunge the world into a deep recession.
The fact is that Greenpeace and other greens view capitalism with contempt and
antagonism (though they are happy to accept corporate greenmail). Sure,
business executives should be civil to the radicals - more civil than the
radicals were to Mr. Powell - but they should also understand that appeasement
won't work. Instead, they should make it clear that corporations provide the
prosperity that is the foundation of environmental health. Judging from the
results at Johannesburg, the poor people of the world understand that basic
truth - even if many business leaders don't.
-
Mr. Glassman, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,
is host of TechCentral Station.com
Pentagon considers a hit before buildup
Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published 9/6/2002
The U.S.
military would need 60 to 90 days to put a full invasion force of troops,
tanks, ships and warplanes in position to attack Iraq, if President Bush
authorizes an assault to topple Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
But the president could authorize a different
kind of military buildup. Rather than following the World War II doctrine of
positioning forces for months before attacking, the United States could begin
an assault with forces now in the region, then bring in more troops.
About 100 U.S. and British aircraft yesterday
took part in an attack on a major Iraqi air-defense installation, in the
biggest single operation over the country in four years, the London Daily
Telegraph reported. Twelve warplanes dropped precision-guided bombs in the raid,
but scores of other support aircraft also took part in the attack in western
Iraq.
The aim of using assault forces in the region
before a full buildup would be to gain tactical advantage so that Saddam would
not have time to order retaliatory strikes using chemical and biological
weapons.
The Pentagon says it has an undisclosed amount of
war-fighting equipment and gear, including M1A1 main battle tanks,
pre-positioned in friendly Persian Gulf nations.
Army Secretary Thomas White said yesterday that
some of that materiel was moved in July from Qatar to Kuwait on the Iraqi
border. This is the area where any U.S. ground invasion is likely to begin.
"We have done a lot with pre-positioned
stocks in the Gulf, making sure they're accessible and that they're in the
right spot to support whatever the president wants to do," Mr. White told
a group of reporters, according to the Associated Press.
"But we have done nothing specifically
against any particular scenario," he said.
The Army secretary's remarks came the day after
Reuters news agency cited a commercial shipping document in reporting that the
U.S. Navy has booked a heavy transport ship to carry war-fighting gear to the
Gulf.
In a build-first approach, the U.S.
Transportation Command would need two months to move the tanks and armored
vehicles on which Army soldiers would invade Iraq from Kuwait. More quickly,
the Air Force would move fighter jets to bases in the Persian Gulf, including a
new sprawling airfield in Qatar. The Navy would have to rearrange carrier
commitments to ensure that Gen. Tommy Franks, who heads U.S. Central Command,
would have two or more carrier battle groups to launch warplanes and Tomahawk
cruise missiles.
The Air Force and Army maintain bases in Kuwait
to enforce a southern no-fly zone and to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait, as it
did in August 1990. The Army recently increased its troop strength and stepped
up exercises in the desert outside Kuwait City as a show of force, while the
United States wiped out Taliban and al Qaeda terrorist positions in
Afghanistan.
The U.S. Air Force runs four main bases in the
region: Prince Sultan in Saudi Arabia, the base in Kuwait, the airfield in
Qatar and a NATO base in Incirlik, Turkey.
During the 1990s, Saudi rulers refused to let
U.S. warplanes use Prince Sultan for strikes against Saddam's weapons
facilities. The royal family does, however, let U.S. fighters launch from the
base to enforce the southern no-fly zone over Iraq and for support aircraft, such
as Airborne Warning and Control System planes.
During Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 U.S.-led
offensive that liberated Kuwait from Saddam's invading army, the Saudis opened
their country to hundreds of thousands of allied ground forces and hundreds of
aircraft. But this time, the United States must find other nations to house an
invasion force.
For that reason, and other considerations, some
military experts are advocating three days of quick air strikes using forces
now stationed in the Gulf, bolstering them with other forces in stages on a
regular rotation.
"If we do a buildup of any sort, it's most
prudent to do so under the cover of what is already there for the war on
terrorism," said a Desert Storm combat veteran, who asked not to be named.
"If you do war buildup prior to any hostilities, the minute you start
building up, it's a spear at Saddam's heart. This time he knows it's about him
and not about Kuwait."
One big question being weighed by war planners is
whether Saddam, with nothing to lose, would respond to an invasion by
unleashing chemical weapons at Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Three days of lightning strikes using in-place
forces would be designed to isolate Saddam, knock out his command and control
facilities, and destroy any weapons of mass destruction he may have.
"If you sit around and wait for a
deployment, then in this war, which would be about destroying his weapons, you
are really asking for him to use them on you," the combat veteran said.
Senior Bush administration officials have
repeatedly said it is U.S. policy to seek a regime change in Iraq. In recent
public comments, Vice President Richard B. Cheney and Mr. Bush have made the
case for invading Iraq to ensure that Saddam never obtains nuclear weapons.
Saddam oversaw a comprehensive nuclear-weapons
development program before Desert Storm, when allied jets bombed a number of
key installations, according to a report this year by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies.
But the bombs did not kill his cadre of nuclear
scientists and engineers or destroy Baghdad's nuclear-weapons designs. Experts
say they believe Saddam has reconstituted much of his old program, moving it
underground to escape U.S. bombs.
Without fissile material, Baghdad would need five
years to build weapons, the center's report said. "Less time would be
needed if sufficient fissile material were acquired illicitly," the report
said.
Exclusive:
The man who found al Qaida
By Laura E. Chatfield
From the International
Desk
Published 9/6/2002 8:29
PM
View
printer-friendly version
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6 (UPI)
-- The road to Karachi, Pakistan, where two top al Qaida operatives waited for
the world, was a long one for Yosri Fouda.
A reporter for the
Arabic-language television news station al Jazeera, Fouda was the man to whom
they chose to deliver their anniversary message claiming responsibility for the
Sept. 11 attacks -- an international journalistic coup.
What was his first
impression of them?
"I thought they were
very well-trained and professional. ... More careful and more professional
(than other intelligence operatives) in trying to make me lose my sense of
direction," Fouda told United Press International in an exclusive
interview from London on Friday.
"The way they messed
about with me -- I didn't expect them to be so sophisticated. It sounded silly.
I felt silly about it," he said. "It took us a while. ... I noticed
at some points that hands -- those two hands (operatives) -- wouldn't know
about one another."
After a long and convoluted
journey, with al Qaida providing careful instructions, operatives brought the
interviewer blindfolded with eye patches to a Karachi apartment. The trip took
twists and turns through the streets of the city with al Qaida videotaping the
reporter in the car and his entrance to the apartment.
"All sorts of things
went through my mind. I didn't have a clue who I was going to meet. I had a
feeling I was going to meet some very important people since that very first
contact," he said. "Something worth taking the risk."
"The shocking surprise
was that in front of me was Hajji Mohammed," he said -- employing the term
of respect derived from the Islamic practice of Haj or pilgrimage to Mecca to
refer to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. "I (had) heard the door opening. ... A
hand was pulling my hand. I opened my eyes and found Hajji Mohammed face to
face. I always knew it was going to be something important," said Fouda.
Fouda had wondered whether
the face to greet him would be that of Osama bin Laden, but he was not
disappointed.
Mohammed took him down a
long hallway to Ramzi Binalshibh, who was ensconced on the floor of a small
room.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a
Kuwaiti citizen, who is on the FBI's most-wanted list and has a $25 million
bounty on his head, undertook a central planning role in the attacks, according
to U.S. officials. In addition, he was indicted in 1996 for allegedly plotting
the year before to use explosives on airliners flying to the United States from
Southeast Asia.
Ramzi Binalshibh, according
to an indictment from German authorities, was part of a Hamburg-based cell,
preparing the hijacking attacks. The United States sent out a worldwide alert
for Binalshibh after they unearthed a videotape of him that U.S. officials said
was found in an al Qaida leader's house in Afghanistan. He purportedly delivered
a martyrdom message on that tape. He is also on the FBI's most-wanted list.
In a statement distributed
in advance of the first part of the interview, aired Thursday, al Jazeera
identified the two men as the head of al Qaida's military committee and the
coordinator of the Sept. 11 hijackings.
The station said they had
described in detail how al Qaida planned and carried out the attacks on what
they call "Holy Tuesday" -- which, if true, ought to lay to rest
widespread doubts in the Islamic world about the responsibility of bin Laden's
group.
But, in the event,
Thursday's broadcast only aired very brief segments of the interview.
And even the man who heard
the confession with his own ears says he is still unsure who the real authors
of the attacks are. "Now I have no doubt that al Qaida actually did it.
... (But) was it a knife-edge someone else was holding? We have too many
coincidences now, and they are fact, not rumors."
While confirming that the
second part of the show next week will tell the world about al Qaida's part in
the attacks, Fouda would only discuss the segment that had already aired,
declining to reveal the contents of next week's broadcast or his impressions
related to the remainder of the interview.
"It's their style not
to take responsibility," he said of al Qaida. "Legally speaking they
(were) not liable -- until I met those two."
"They are telling you
... how they planned for it and how they executed it," Fouda said.
"American circles as well as the rest of the world will know about a few
of the facts for the first time."
"They were on the
planes, bin Laden was behind it," he said. "They are proud of it. In
the beginning, they tried to avoid an American backlash. They though that by
doing that, although the world would guess it would be bin Laden, bin Laden
wouldn't take responsibility."
Was he afraid he would end
up like Daniel Pearl, The Wall Street Journal's Jewish South Asia bureau chief
who was killed by Islamic militants in Pakistan while trying to obtain an
interview?
No, said Fouda, who is
Egyptian and takes calculated risks, but he knew they would not "target a
Muslim. It doesn't add to their goals."
The experience and the
aftermath of the publicity still have him stunned.
"It sounds like a
surreal experience until this moment," he said. "Sounds like I was
dreaming. They chose me."
As for journalistic ethics,
"My boss didn't know exactly what I was after. I just asked him to trust
me."
"I had a hunch they
would go through al Jazeera. These are the sort of people you really don't
track down (as a journalist). You can only dream of it."
But he still has questions
about intelligence agencies that Mohammed called "intelligence dogs"
in the interview. "If I was able as a journalist to get to them, why the
hell can't they?"
|
Libya may be first Arab state with nukes, Sharon warns |
Special to World Tribune.com
MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE
Friday, September 6, 2002
JERUSALEM — Israel has
warned the Libya could become the first Arab nation with nuclear weapons.
Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon said Libya is working with such countries as Iraq, North Korea and
Saudi Arabia to develop missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Sharon
indicated that Libya has obtained expertise to launch a project to develop
nuclear weapons.
"Libya is becoming
perhaps a more dangerous country than we thought," Sharon said on national
television on late Wednesday. "Libya may be the first [Arab] country to
have the worst kind of weapons of mass destruction."
Asleep at the switch?
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Sharon did not specify which type of weapons Libya would obtain. But he
indicated that he meant nuclear weapons. Libya already has chemical weapons.
"Probably the worst kind," Sharon said.
The
prime minister said Libya is obtaining missile and WMD help from Iraq, North
Korea and Pakistan. Sharon said some of the programs could have been financed
by Saudi Arabia.
Israeli
officials said Sharon went public with his accusations against Libya after
several consultations with U.S. officials and congressional leaders. They said
Sharon discussed his concerns over Libya last month during a meeting with
visiting U.S. Sen. Robert Toricelli.
The
officials said Washington largely shares the concerns of Israel regarding
Libya's intermediate-range missiles and WMD programs. Both countries are said
to share the assessment that Libya is rapidly developing a missile based on
North Korea's No-Dong, in a project that involves Iran.
But
the Israeli officials said the State Department and other agencies have
concluded that Libyan ruler Moammar Khaddafy is moving away from terrorism and
wants to reconcile with the United States and the West. They said this has
raised the prospect that the State Department could remove Libya from its list
of terrorist sponsors over the next year.
"This
is a new strategy [by Khaddafy]," a senior Israeli official said.
"They are in close contact with the Egyptians and they are telling
Khaddafy to behave nicely and do everything he has to do beneath the surface.
There is a significant [Libyan] effort regarding missiles and the start of
something in WMD.
On
Tuesday, Libya and Saudi Arabia signed a series of economic agreements that
include scientific and technological cooperation. Israeli officials said the
accords appear to be part of increasing strategic ties that are connected to
Libyan missile and WMD projects.
Hours
later, Libya denied Sharon's assertion. A Libyan government statement accused
the Israeli prime minister of hysteria.
For
his part, Khaddafy has asserted that he has abandoned what he termed
"revolutionary behavior" and now opposes Islamic insurgents,
including Al Qaida.
""In
the old days, they called us a rogue state," Khaddafy said in a speech on
national television last week. "They were right in accusing us of that. In
the old days, we had a revolutionary behavior."
Iran successfully test fires surface-to-surface missile
Fri Sep 6, 1:52 PM
ET
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writer
TEHRAN, Iran - Iran has successfully test fired a ballistic
missile potentially capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
|
|
|
State-run Tehran television reported on Friday that the Fateh 110
A missile had been successfully test fired, but did not say where or when the
test happened, nor the missile's range.
Tehran TV described the missile as "one the most accurate
surface-to-surface missiles manufactured in the world."
The Aerospace Industries Organization, which is affiliated with
Iran's Defense Ministry, developed the missile as "an effective initiative
to prevent threats by destabilizing units," Tehran TV reported without
elaborating.
Considerable enmity, however, lingers between Iran and neighboring
Iraq from their 1980-88 war, which left about a million people dead and
wounded. Iraq accuses Iran of harboring Iraqi rebels and Iran accuses Iraq of
doing the same for Iranian rebels.
Tehran-Baghdad relations soured further recently after each side
accused the other of serving Israeli interests in past regional conflicts.
The test firing also comes as Mideast tensions soar amid threats
of a U.S. attack against Iraq on grounds it is producing weapons of mass
destruction. U.S. President George W. Bush ( news
- web
sites) has also accused Iran of sponsoring terrorism and labeled Iran, Iraq
and North Korea ( news
- web
sites) as forming an "axis of evil."
Doug Richardson, editor of the authoritative Jane's Missiles and
Rockets, told The Associated Press the Fateh 110 A missile may be based on the
Chinese DF-11 A missile, "which has a range of 300 kilometers (186 miles)
to 400 kilometers (248 miles) and which is capable of carrying nuclear
warheads."
The Chinese missile possesses Global Positioning System ( news
- web
sites) technology, making it very accurate, said Duncan Lennox, editor of
Janes Strategic Weapon Systems.
An unidentified Aerospace Industries Organization official was
quoted as saying the use of "local technology in the design and
manufacturing sector of combined solid-fuelled missile" was the most
significant achievement of the test fire.
Iran has built a number of missiles, including the Shahab-3 which
was first tested in 1998, has a range of 1,300 kilometers (810 miles) and is
capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Iran is believed to have received missile technology from Russia,
China and North Korea, but Tehran has denied this. The Shahab-3 is believed to
be based on North Korea's No Dong ballistic missile.
Washington has also expressed concern that a planned 1,000
megawatt reactor in the Iranian city of Bushehr — being built with Russian
assistance — will help advance Iran's weapons program. Moscow insists the plant
would serve only civilian purposes.
ti-pg
A Look at Thwarted Terrorist Plots
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 4:43 p.m. ET
U.S. authorities and officials overseas say that since Sept. 11 they have prevented terrorist strikes against American targets or U.S. citizens in Lebanon, Turkey, Greece, Malaysia, Indonesia, France, Bosnia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, India, Australia and Singapore. A look at some of the foiled attacks:
-- Two days after Sept. 11, an Algerian, a Frenchman and a Dutchman are arrested in a European-wide sweep of groups suspected of links to al-Qaida, accused with several others of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in Paris. Prosecutors say the group also targeted the Kleine-Brogel base in northeast Belgium, where around 100 U.S. Air Force personnel are stationed.
-- On. Dec. 22, Richard Reid, a British citizen and convert to Islam was subdued by crew members and passengers aboard an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami after allegedly trying to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes.
-- In a December sweep, Singapore authorities arrested 13 men suspected of plotting to blow up Western embassies, U.S. Navy ships and American companies in the city-state. Some of the men, all from the Jemaah Islamiyah militant group, had trained in Afghanistan.
-- In October, the U.S. and British embassies in Bosnia were closed for several days after local police arrested six naturalized Bosnians, all of them Algerian natives, suspected of plotting attacks on U.S. interests in Bosnia and elsewhere.
CBS - New Terror Threat To U.S.?
WASHINGTON,
Sept. 6, 2002
U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement agencies have detected increased "chatter" or
communications between known al Qaeda operatives, senior officials have told CBS
News Correspondent Jim Stewart.
This official described the chatter as "terrorist electronic and internet
intercepts" some of which are in the form of morale booster messages like,
"Stay tuned. Good news is on the way." Some suggest "targets in
the United States;" others say "overseas."
Much of the increased chatter is taking place in Afghanistan and began to spike
in volume earlier this week. They suggest an impending attack against the U.S.
and its allies both in America and overseas but contain no specifics.
It may possibly be related to the Sept. 9 anniversary of the assasination in
Afghanistan of a Northern Alliance leader.
The threat is "non-specific" and officials say the increased
communications is "less intense" than a spike that occurred around July
4, but that it is still "intense."
"It is similar but not quite as serious" as the chatter picked up
around last July 4, said one official.
It was enough, however, for the Pentagon to immediately resume 24-hour a day
Combat Air Patrol over Washington and New York something they hadn't planned on
doing until next week's 9-11 anniversary. This detection has caused U.S.
officials to resume Combat Air Patrol (CAP) for an indefinite period.
As well, the U.S. embassy in Kabul has been "buttoned up."
In a related development, German authorities said Friday they arrested a
Turkish man and his fiancee, a civilian employee of the U.S. military, who are
suspected of planning an attack on a U.S. military installation.
The couple had 287 pounds of chemicals and five pipe bombs at the time of their
arrest Thursday in an apartment near Heidelberg, where the U.S. Army Europe is
headquartered.
"We suspect that they intended to mount a bomb attack against military
installations and the city of Heidelberg," the chief law enforcement
officer for Baden-Wuerttemberg state, Thomas Schauble told reporters.
The 25-year-old man appeared to be a follower of Osama bin Laden, and was a
strict Muslim "who hates Americans and Jews," Schauble said.
His 23-year-old fiancee worked at a supermarket at a U.S. installation in
Heidelberg and holds joint German-American citizenship. The man worked at a
chemical warehouse in nearby Karlsruhe. They were arrested in their apartment
in Walldorf, about six miles south of Heidelberg.
No official has made a connection between the German arrests and the increased
chatter within Al Qaeda but the timing is certainly suspicious.
Since the Sept. 11 attacks, law enforcement authorities have instituted a
plethora of tightened security measures, including more stringent inspections
at U.S. borders and increased screening at airports. A proposed Homeland
Security department which would reorganize the president's cabinet to tighten
security and information sharing is currently being debated by Congress.
For the one-year anniversary of Sept. 11, the government is imposing flight
restrictions over the airspace where planes went down last September. The
temporary rules will cover the three sites where hijacked planes crashed that
day. They'll coincide with public ceremonies in New York, Washington and the
Somerset County, Pennsylvania, field where Flight 93 went down.
Long-term security measures include:
· U.S. Customs officers are headed overseas to
check cargo containers as they're loaded in Singapore.
· Local police and the FBI are sharing more
information about threats and suspects.
· Hospitals and public health
departments are tracking diseases for potential bioterror attacks.
XXXXX
DRUDGE REPORT XXXXX FRIDAY SEPT 06, 2002 20:32:09 UTC XXXXX
[Filed
by Matt Drudge in Germany]
NORMAN
MAILER DECLARES: 'AMERICA IS SO VAIN'
**Exclusive**
In an
8,000-wordish polemic to be published in this weekend's London SUNDAY TIMES
[9/8/02], Norman Mailer sounds what he hopes to be a "wake up call for
America," the DRUDGE REPORT has learned.
The
legendary Mailer rips the United States in a shock Q & A, calling it
"so big, so powerful, and so vain..." and warns "every American
has to ask himself, 'Am I ready to die for my ideas?'"
DRUDGE
can reveal more of the coming rant, which is sure to ignite controversy on both
shores.
Mailer
claims:
"This
century is going to be the most awesome of all centuries to contemplate - there
is a real question whether human kind will get to the end of it... America's so
big, so powerful, and so vain, ... I get angry when I see it being less than it
can be.
"The
British have a love of their country that is profound. They can revile it, tell
dirty stories about it. But deep down their patriotism is deep. In America
we're playing musical chairs - don't get caught without a flag or you're out of
the game. Why do we need all this reaffirmation? It's as if we're a three
hundred pound man who's seven feet tall, superbly shaped, absolutely powerful,
and every three minutes he's got to reaffirm the fact that his arm pits have a
wonderful odor. We don't need compulsive, self-serving patriotism. It's
odious...
"When
you have a great country it's your duty to be critical of it so it can become
even greater...
"Culturally,
emotionally America is growing more loutish, arrogant, and vain.
"I
detest this totally promiscuous patriotism. Wave a little flag and become a
good person? Ugly.
"If
we have a depression or fall into desperate economic times, I don't know what's
going to hold the country together...
"There's
just too much anger here, too much ruptured vanity, too much shock, too much
identity crisis. And worst of all, too much patriotism. Patriotism in a country
that's failing has a logical tendency to turn fascistic...
"Let's
suppose ten people are killed by a small bomb on a street corner in some city
in America. The first thing to understand is that there are 280 million
Americans. So, there's one chance in 28 million you're going to be one of those
people. By such heartless means of calculation, the 3000 deaths in the Twin
Towers came approximately to one mortality for every 90,000 Americans. Your
chances of dying if you drive a car are one in 7,000 each year. We seem
perfectly ready to put up with automobile statistics. I fear I am ready to say
there is a tolerable level to terror...
"One
of the things I've always found least attractive about Tony Blair was his
toadyish attitude toward Clinton...
"Clinton
made a point of surrounding himself with people who might be 90% as intelligent
as himself, but never his equal. Bush is smart enough to know that he couldn't
possibly do the same, or the country would be run by morons."
Developing...
Sharon says U.S. will give
Israel warning before any strike against Iraq
By Associated
Press, 9/6/2002 09:14
JERUSALEM (AP) The United States will give Israel sufficient
warning before any attack on Iraq to allow the Jewish state time to prepare for
expected counterattacks against it by Baghdad, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said
Friday.
Sharon said he was notified by Washington two-and-a-half
days before U.S. war planes launched their attacks on Afghanistan last year.
''The strategic coordination between Israel and the United
States is at an unprecedented level,'' Sharon told Israel Army Radio in an
interview Friday.
Sharon said he could not estimate if or when a U.S. attack
on Iraq would take place, but that Israel would be given warning.
Asked how early Israel would be notified, Sharon said the
warning would give Israel ''the time that is required to complete our
preparations.''
He said U.S. officials ''know exactly how much time we
need.''
In the event of a U.S. attack on Iraq, it is expected that
Saddam Hussein will fire missiles at Israel as he did in the 1991 Gulf War when
39 Scuds hit the Jewish state. Israel has deployed Arrow and Patriot
anti-missile batteries, including near its nuclear reactor in Dimona in the
Negev Desert.
Asked about reports that Iraq had developed pilotless
planes, or drones, that could deliver chemical or biological weapons, Sharon
said: ''I think these things are very exaggerated. Israel is the most prepared
country ... for conventional, chemical or biological attacks.''
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
<>Global:
Global Reverberations
Stephen Roach (New York)
There’s a sinking feeling in the
global economy again. Country after country, region after region, growth risks
now appear to be tipping back to the downside. This comes as a serious
disappointment after the apparent cyclical revival earlier this year. Is this a
temporary relapse or a hint of more serious problems ahead for the world
economy?
There can be no mistaking the
recent downward spin to the global data flow. This time, Europe has led the
way. Purchasing managers’ sentiment deteriorated markedly in Euroland in August
-- both in manufacturing and in services. The employment component was
especially weak -- underscoring the possibility of renewed pressure on income
generation and consumer demand. Such weakness unmasks the Achilles’ heel of the
Euro-growth dynamic -- a seemingly chronic deficiency of domestic demand that
leaves the region overly exposed to the vicissitudes of external demand.
Needless to say, the recent strengthening of the euro compounds this problem,
undermining currency-adjusted price competitiveness at just the time when
foreign demand is softening. Lacking in pro-growth policy initiatives -- both
fiscal and monetary -- and encumbered by the weaker "base effect" of
a chronically slow-growth economy, the double-dip debate has suddenly reared
its ugly head in Euroland as well.
The case for an Asian relapse has
also gained credence this summer. Not surprisingly, the cyclical outlook has
deteriorated yet again in Japan. Recently released corporate statistics by the
Ministry of Finance point to a downward revision in 2Q02 capital spending and
GDP; the same data also underscored Japan’s reliance on export-led support to
boost manufacturers’ sales -- a worrisome point of vulnerability in a weakening
global trade climate. These statistics come on the heels of previously reported
declines in industrial production in June and July, along with a downward
revision to the recent Japanese GDP statistics. Elsewhere in Asia, the data
flow has also has largely taken a turn for the worse. Taiwan’s leading
indicators held steady in July off a downwardly revised June base. The
Singapore purchasing managers’ index fell sharply in August to its lowest level
in 11 months. And Korean retail sales growth is now decelerating after a sharp
run-up earlier this year; this follows a weaker-than-expected increase of
Korean industrial production in July. As has been the case for some time, the
offset continues to come in China, with the acceleration of growth in industrial
output and exports offsetting the mild deceleration in retail sales.
Notwithstanding the impressive performance in China, there can be little
mistaking the recent rise in Asian growth risks.
Nor has there been much of an
offset from the United States. The "ISMs" deteriorated in August in
the United States -- with purchasing managers’ sentiment weakening in
manufacturing and in services. And in both cases, the latest readings are close
to the "50 threshold" which is broadly consistent with zero-growth.
Meanwhile, the early read on back-to-school sales is disappointing --
underscoring the possibility of the long-awaited retrenchment of the
over-extended American consumer. At the same time, labor market conditions have
started to deteriorate again; jobless claims have moved back above the key
400,000 weekly threshold and layoff announcements rose sharply in August,
according to Challenger tabulations of publicly-announced job counts. America,
which led the world to the upside in early 2002, now seems to be playing a very
different role.
Nor are these seemingly disparate
developments around the world a coincidence. In my view, they are yet another
manifestation of the lopsided growth dynamic of a US-centric world. Since 1995,
our estimates suggest that the US economy has accounted for approximately 40%
of the cumulative growth in world GDP. That’s essentially double America’s 21%
share in the global economy (according to the PPP-based metrics of the IMF). At
work has been a striking dichotomy in the global mix of domestic demand. US
domestic demand growth averaged 5% per annum in the five years ending in
mid-2000. By contrast, domestic demand growth elsewhere in the world averaged a
scant 2% over the same period. This disparity is without precedent over any
five-year period in the global economy. Lacking in autonomous sources of
demand, the non-US world became heavily dependent on external demand as a major
source of economic growth. With America the swing factor in the global trade
cycle, economic activity in the rest of the world is now being driven
increasingly by a US-centric growth dynamic.
That’s exactly what appears to be
behind the sputtering global economy in the summer of 2002. America’s
double-dip scare of earlier this summer has quickly gone global. A powerful US
inventory dynamic in the first half of this year provided an equally powerful
uplift to the broader global economy. That was especially the case in Asia,
which is most levered to the US IT cycle. But as the US economy quickly
discovered, there was little final demand follow-through beyond the inventory
cycle. IT-led capital spending remained depressed and there was little lift to
non-auto consumption. With a relatively short lag, the world economy has made
the same discovery. Lacking in autonomous sources of domestic demand, the
non-US world has sputtered as America’s growth dynamic slowed in the aftermath
of an inventory pop. While the jury is out on whether the US demand pause turns
into a full-blown double dip as I continue to suspect, it’s a close enough call
to have already had profound global repercussions.
All this leaves the world economy
exceedingly vulnerable. The global growth engine is sputtering again, and no
new source of growth seems likely to immediately fill the void. As a result,
world growth is heading toward a dangerous "stall-speed" condition --
defined loosely a sluggish growth rate that is lacking the cyclical cushion
that normally enables any economy to withstand the pressures of all too
frequent shocks. Should such a shock occur when the world has slowed to its
stall speed, a global recession could quickly ensue. That’s the essence of the
recession-risk model I have long used to assess cyclical risks in the US
economy, and I see no reason why it wouldn’t be applicable for the broader
global economy.
That’s why the Iraq wildcard and
the related possibility of an oil shock -- however brief -- shouldn’t be taken
lightly. It could easily qualify as the proverbial straw that breaks the back
of a stalling global economy. That’s precisely what occurred in the summer of
1990 when a stalling US economy was hit with a brief oil shock. Recession was
quick to follow in a matter of months. I fear a similar outcome would be in the
cards in the event of another spike in oil prices. But there’s two key
differences between today and 1990: Today’s global economy is more trade
intensive and more US-centric. Should America suffer a recessionary relapse,
the rest of the world is lacking in the cyclical immunities that would prevent
renewed global recession. In my opinion, this summer’s rumblings in the global
economy are warning signs of just such a possibility. A double-dip in America
could easily turn into the world’s double dip.
Slate From: Robert Wright
Subject: Poverty and the Middle-Class Terrorist
Posted Friday,
September 6, 2002, at 3:16 PM PT
This is the fifth in a nine-part series on how American should fight the war against terrorism.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, various knee-jerk liberal columnists, including me, asserted that "poverty in the Islamic world" had nourished terrorism. Pesky observers highlighted an apparent problem with our theory: Many of the hijackers had come from the middle- or upper classes of their societies. When you pursue a graduate degree in urban planning, as Mohammed Atta did, it's safe to say that you're not desperately trying to pull yourself up by the bootstraps.
One fallback position for liberals was that, though the terrorists themselves weren't poor, their local constituents—the masses that exude moral support—were poor. This tactical retreat encountered complications when economists Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova published a paper on pro-terrorist sentiment. Using data from the Middle East, they found that not only were terrorists not likely to be especially poor; local supporters of terrorism were, if anything, more affluent and better-educated than average.
So, does this mean that poverty isn't a big part of the problem? No. It just means it's time for a second tactical retreat, to a more defensible position. Namely, Proposition No. 6: The problem isn't poor people; the problem—or at least part of the problem—is poor nations. Terrorists may not be the poorest people in their nations, and they may not draw most of their support from especially poor people in their nations—but the nations they come from tend to be at the bottom of the world's economic hierarchy.
Even the "poor nations" formulation is in a way misleading. Saudi Arabia, the world's leading supplier of murderous hijackers, has a GDP that, though far below Western standards, isn't down there with North Korea's. Still, like all other nations that 9/11 hijackers grew up in, it is not part of the web of global prosperity. Saudi Arabia has an ossified, statist, protectionist economy whose essential link with the larger world is selling it black goo; it isn't even a member of the World Trade Organization. Though it could once use oil to sustain a per capita GDP of $28,000, by September 2001, that number had fallen below $7,000, and the unemployment rate stood at 18 percent—higher for recent college graduates. Whether terrorists are middle class, like some of the hijackers, or lower class, like many al-Qaida foot soldiers, the ranks of the unemployed are prime turf for recruiting them.
Lack of opportunity is something Saudi Arabia shares with its poorer (in oil and hence GDP) neighbor Egypt, home of Mohammed Atta. In both nations, the private-sector outlet for creativity is so meager that a bright, ambitious young man might as well do graduate study in urban planning. In fact, by the time Atta the urban-planning-graduate-student turned to radical Islam in Hamburg, Germany, he had tried repeatedly, and failed, to get a good job in Egypt.
What does a smart, well-born guy like Atta do if he grows up in Western Europe or America or some other part of the globalized world? There's a good chance he'll wind up flying business class—doing deals with foreigners, and thus finding it hard to sustain the idea that any particular class of foreigners is evil. Even if he stays at some lower level of the business hierarchy, at least he's off the streets. What's more, he'll imbibe the cosmopolitan ethos that trickles down from the top; his nation's economy is richly interdependent with economies around the world, and it has a credo of intercultural tolerance that flows from this fact. So Proposition 6, in refined form, holds that Part of the problem is poor nations—or, at least, underglobalized nations.
A basic law of nature is that young males will seek status and recognition through locally available channels. The object of the game is to make those channels lead to contentment and, ideally, productive engagement with the world. Atta's Egyptian channels didn't. And things didn't work out in Germany, either. After he had been there a few years, an old friend from Egypt encountered him and, according to Time magazine, gathered that Atta "had made few German friends" and was "depressed about not having a career or a family back home."
To say that the economic backwardness of many Muslim nations helps feed radicalism is to endorse a part of Bernard Lewis' message. Resentment of Western superiority—economic, technological, military—is central to his explanation of Islamic discontent.
But Lewis is saying something more, and on this some of the policy implications hinge. He's saying that people who grow up in these relatively poor Muslim nations aren't just resentful, they are resentful on behalf of their religion. That's why, in Lewis' view, we face "a clash of civilizations." (Yes, he beat Samuel Huntington to that phrase—it's a subhead in his 1990 Atlantic Monthly piece.) And that's why there's little we can do about the problem—it's rooted in deepest cultural memory.
Is this true? It's true that the terrorists had come to identify deeply with Islam—and a particularly austere version of it—by the time they became terrorists. But it's equally clear that they didn't all start out with that intense identification. So far as anyone can tell, Atta, though already devout, didn't become radically Islamic until he went to Germany. What seems to have happened is that personal resentments and frustrations, themselves products of economic and political forces, latched on to radical Islam as a congenial, affirming ideology, one that made the West a useful scapegoat. Religious ideas aren't passed down through the generations inexorably, from one passive brain to another; in each generation they can be rejected, embraced, or amended, depending on how they mesh with people's socially conditioned needs.
This isn't to say that Islam isn't in any sense part of the terrorism problem. Obviously, had radical Islam not been in the air, Atta would have found some other, presumably less lethal, outlet for his frustrations; he might even have vented them productively, by assimilating into the West, rather than attack it. But for radical Islam, he might today be chairman of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce!
Still, it is wrong, and unduly depressing, to see the problem as being Islam in some large historical sense—to trace the origins of 9/11 all the way back to morally primitive Quranic passages that have supposedly poisoned the minds of men ever since the seventh century AD. The Holy Bible has passages every bit as morally primitive as anything in the Quran. (I've assembled a small sample.) The history of Islam, like the history of Christianity, is a history of people in some times and places focusing on morally primitive scriptures and people in other times and places focusing on loftier scriptures. Islam attained its economic and technological dominance during the Middle Ages in part by focusing on the loftier ones, extending a tolerance to Christians and Jews that, at the time, was on the cutting edge of intercultural understanding.
If we want to know why people's interpretations of their own religious doctrines vary so much from decade to decade, we have to look at what is going on in the world around them. In the case of modern radical Islam, we find no shortage of explanations, ranging from economic stagnation to political repression to an American foreign policy that over the past few decades has paid roughly zero attention to Muslim opinion (unless you count the opinion of Muslims who happened to be in charge of armies or oil wells). What we don't find is any sense in which religion is an exogenous variable, an autonomous force that floats above the social landscape and, generation after generation, mysteriously bends the minds of men to its will. (Is that last sentence a caricature of Bernard Lewis' opinion? Well, yes. Click here for my more nuanced characterization and a corresponding critique.)
The view I'm advancing is, broadly speaking, a Marxist view—that religious beliefs are largely a function of underlying economic and political circumstances, as mediated by psychology. It's also a hopeful view. Because it means we don't have to figure out how to "change Islam"—a disconcertingly amorphous task, and one that would probably backfire. Lewis is right about the hopelessness of intervening at that level. We can instead intervene at the level of economics and politics, and if we're successful, then the radical variants of Islam will lose support; radical "memes" will find fewer brains willing to host them. Hence, for example, Policy Prescription No. 6: Draw Islamic nations—and for that matter all nations—into the web of global capitalism.
This would have several benefits: 1) It would give young men an outlet for economic ambition, diverting them from radical pursuits. 2) It would give young men an outlet for political ambition by abetting pluralism; after all, global capitalism brings modern information technologies that are powerful tools of political expression and of interest-group formation. 3) It would expand person-to-person contact with the West in a natural, enduring way; when it comes to nurturing multicultural tolerance, there's nothing like doing a mutually profitable deal with a foreigner. 4) It would expand the number of affluent Muslims who, by virtue of dependence on trade, have a stake in preserving world order against terrorist disruption, and in nourishing their country's reputation as a stable place for foreign investment.
This last benefit is especially important. Ultimately, the war against Islamic terrorism has to be conducted within Islamic nations in order to be lastingly successful, and it has to be conducted in an organic, virtually unconscious way. Though there is short-term value in America's using carrots and sticks to get rulers to fight the obvious kind of war—with wiretaps and arrests and shared intelligence—in the long run the war must be one of ideas, fought via the evolution of political, moral, and religious beliefs. A large chunk of the population has to see its interests aligned with order and international concord.
Even if this analysis is in some ways Marxist, and even if it rejects the implication of "benign neglect" that makes Lewis' analysis so popular on the right, it will disappoint many leftists. Because one of its implications is Policy Prescription No. 7: Emphasize trade at least as heavily as aid in fighting the kind of economic deprivation that breeds terrorism.
Foreign aid is good for lots of things—like keeping people from starving, and fighting disease, both of which, as Gregg Easterbrook has noted, are their own reward. But one thing aid has generally not done, as the economist William Easterly showed in The Elusive Quest for Growth, is make a clear contribution to lasting economic development—to the market-driven modernization that tends to be lacking in terrorism-exporting countries.
Nor has aid dramatically contributed to the freedom and democracy that are also lacking in terrorism-exporting countries. In fact, when aid passes through the hands of dictators, a large chunk has a way of winding up in the hands of their cronies, consolidating autocratic rule. According to calculations reported by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root in The National Interest, "every dollar of per capita foreign aid improves an incumbent autocrat's chance of surviving in office another year by about 4 percent."
This doesn't mean aid will have no role in the war on terrorism. For one thing, some people, such as economist Joseph Stiglitz, contend that we're learning more and more about how to make aid more conducive to growth and less conducive to kleptocracy. For another, one can imagine forms of aid that, regardless of their effect on GDP, specifically help fight terrorism. Those madrassas, the often-radical schools that are the only educational option for many poor parents in Pakistan, are begging for a subsidized alternative—schools that entice parents with free hot meals and medical care and don't teach hatred (though here American funding, as opposed to funding from non-governmental organizations or multilateral institutions, might carry a counterproductive taint).
Still, if economic modernization is your goal, trade works more reliably than aid. As economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner showed years ago, developing nations with the most open, least protectionist economies—the nations most plugged in to the global economy—grow the fastest.
Yet the West makes it hard for poor nations to fully plug in. Heavily subsidized agriculture in the United States and Europe stifles what is an important sector in virtually every developing country. (Egypt pretty much invented cotton farming, but the world won't give its cotton farmers a fair shake.) Heavily protected textile markets also hurt lots of poor nations. In general, according to the World Bank, economically advanced nations levy tariffs against developing nations that are four times as high as the tariffs they levy against other advanced countries.
In this light, American policy after 9/11 was a study in how not to conduct a long-term war on terrorism. The United States denied General Pervez Musharraf's pleas to open its textile markets to Pakistan as a reward for his vital support in the Afghanistan war. Instead, we handed him $1 billion in aid—aid that may help an ally maintain control in the short run but that probably won't help Pakistan become less hospitable to terrorism in the long run and could even do the opposite, by slowing progress toward pluralism and ultimately democracy. Then, in June, Congress passed, and President Bush signed, a $100 billion subsidy to American farmers that a New York Times reporter called "one of the biggest reversals to free trade in decades."
Now that Bush has been given "fast-track" trade authority, there's a chance that the United States, and the West more broadly, will lower trade barriers to developing countries. Still, the administration's focus is on trade deals with Latin America, a worthy goal, but certainly not worthier or more urgent than doing deals with Muslim countries.
Trade is no cure-all. Many Latin American countries that embraced market economics, while seeing real growth, have also seen rising income inequality (though the commonly repeated claim that, as nations globalize, "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer," seems to be, strictly speaking, a myth). We have a lot to learn about easing developing nations along the path to modernity, as do the developing nations themselves.
Still, whatever the shortcomings of capitalist development, you didn't see any Brazilian hijackers on Sept. 11. Latin American economies by and large provide economic opportunities for a would-be Mohammed Atta. And if they fail, and enough people get economically frustrated, there are democratic outlets for rage; their leaders are held in power by the ballot box, not by repression and an unholy alliance with the United States.
Of course, there's always the possibility that the key difference between Brazil and Saudi Arabia is religion, not economics or politics. This explanation might be favored by those who put a Lewisesque emphasis on the power of religious doctrine. But if the problem is Islam per se, then how do you explain Turkey? It's a Muslim nation, but in terms of exporting terrorists it ranks down around Brazil. Maybe the explanation is that in terms of economic vibrancy and political freedom Turkey also ranks closer to Brazil than to Saudi Arabia (though Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who nearly a century ago put Turkey on the path to modernity and showed that the character of a nation's religion can change sharply within a generation, used a top-down, statist approach to get the ball rolling). This explanation could also apply to the 150 million Muslims in India, who by and large are much less sympathetic to radical Islam than nearby Pakistani Muslims; India is a paradise of economic and political liberty compared to Pakistan.
In light of such examples, it isn't really necessary to finally resolve the debate about what role Islamic doctrine plays in inspiring terrorism. After Sept. 11, I argued in these pages against the "Islam is the problem" position held by many Lewis admirers (even if that phrase oversimplifies his own position). But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we stipulated that "Islamic doctrine" is a pre-condition for a certain species of anti-American terrorism. Examples such as Turkey and India would still show that, even if Islam is a necessary condition, it's not a sufficient condition. And the point of these most recent two installments in this series is that, judging by the 9/11 hijackers, there are at least two other conditions that appear to be necessary—a lack of political freedom and a lack of economic opportunity. And by definition, if we successfully address any necessary condition, it won't matter what other necessary conditions may or may not exist. Focusing on politics and economics will get the job done—and the moderation of radical Islamic doctrine, I maintain, will then take care of itself.
All this suggests that abetting globalization, and its natural concomitants of economic and political liberty, is a big part of any successful war on terrorism. Unfortunately, globalization also has some terrorism-abetting properties, a subject we'll address in the next installment.
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The reasons are: 1) Even from the ranks of non-rich Muslims, financial and other forms of support for terrorists can bubble up. One thing that has made it hard to figure out where Osama Bin Laden is hiding (assuming he's not dead) is the large number of households in which he'd be a welcome guest. 2) Pro-terrorist sympathies make it politically hard for governments of some Islamic states to fully join the war on terrorism. And new information technologies that defy centralized control mean that authoritarian governments can less and less control the opinions of their people and less and less afford to ignore them. 3) Indeed, such is the pluralizing power of this technology that, as we'll see in a future installment of this series, there is reason to believe that authoritarian regimes in Islamic states are doomed, so that sooner or later governments in the Islamic world will be more direct expressions of popular sentiment. In moderating today's popular sentiment in the Islamic world, we may be moderating the policies of tomorrow's governments in the Islamic world.
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One example is the administration's intense aversion to American military casualties. This is what led it to do almost all the killing in Afghanistan remotely, from high above the battlefield—which not only leads to mistakes but, in the eyes of Muslims, gives the mistakes an infuriatingly casual, arrogant air and reinforces the stereotype of Americans as contemptible cowards. In one highly publicized incident, American bombs killed Afghans who, according to the unanimous insistence of locals, had just been out collecting scrap metal. Among the evidence used to authorize the strike was that one of the Afghans, viewed by distant airborne camera, appeared to be tall—like Osama Bin Laden!—and to be getting deferential treatment from the other men. Obviously, mistakes such as this would be less likely if ground troops were used to approach suspicious parties. Would these ground troops be exposed to risk? Yes. But war is by definition the sacrifice of military lives to keep civilians safe. When, in a war on terrorism, we get fetishistic about avoiding military casualties, we're inverting this logic, sacrificing future American civilians for the sake of present-day American soldiers. And bear in mind Policy Prescription No. 1: Take your bitter medicine early. The logic behind it suggests that the lives of a few American soldiers today could save many more civilian lives a decade or two from now. (This logic applies also to the question of whether we should now risk the lives of American soldiers in a policing capacity, to impose peace and order on Afghanistan—a question the administration has so far answered with a resounding and ill-advised "no.")
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Just repeating what worked during the Cold War won't do. Back then we used Voice of America and Radio Free Europe to reach people who were naturally suspicious of alternative information sources, such as Pravda. Today, Middle Eastern Muslims already have trusted information sources—Al Jazeera, in particular—and we are the source they naturally and deeply mistrust.
As a recent Council on Foreign Relations report suggested, broadcasts funded by European allies may have more credibility than broadcasts funded by the United States. That report usefully conceived public relations per se as but one part of a larger mission of "public diplomacy." Public diplomacy includes student exchange programs, interfaith dialogues, international academic conferences, and the like. These programs—not part of the standard repertoire of the Madison Avenue executives that the Bush administration has favored in its new public relations push—will probably do more good than self-conscious attempts to "re-brand America." The CFR report is a good map of the landscape of public diplomacy and of the sort of government reorganization that could facilitate it.
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Here is a passage from the book of Deuteronomy.
When you draw near to a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace to it. And if its answer to you is peace and it opens to you, then all the people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall serve you. But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God gives it into your hand you shall put all its males to the sword, but the women and the little ones, the cattle, and everything else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourselves.
Granted, the Judeo-Christian God—unlike the 9/11 hijackers—here seems to favor sparing women and children. But this treatment is reserved for "cities which are very far from you." In nearer cities,
the cities of these peoples that the Lord your God gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive nothing that breathes, but you shall utterly destroy them, the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites and the Jebusites, as the Lord your God has commanded; that they may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices which they have done in the service of their gods, and so to sin against the Lord your God.
In contrast, the Quran—as interpreted by Mohamed—counsels sparing women and children, even in a holy war.
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Lewis of course doesn't consider religious beliefs impervious to social, economic, or political influence. However, he does consider them pretty darn stubborn; he traces the attitudes of contemporary Islamic extremists all the way back to doctrines forged in Mohammed's time. Lewis writes, for example,
If the fighters in the war for Islam, the holy war "in the path of God," are fighting for God, it follows that their opponents are fighting against God. And since God is in principle the sovereign, the supreme head of the Islamic state—and the Prophet and, after the Prophet, the caliphs are his vicegerents—then God as sovereign commands the army. The army is God's army and the enemy is God's enemy.
Now, you can find passages in the Bible, too, which imply that "the army is God's army and the enemy is God's enemy," that God's people "are fighting for God [and] their opponents are fighting against God." You can also find plenty of Jews and Christians since the Bible was written—including no small or inconsequential number who are alive at this moment—who have persisted in that attitude. So, what is Lewis' point? In what sense is Islamic terrorism distinctively Islamic in its causality?
Lewis certainly isn't unaware of the Judeo-Christian parallels to Islamic doctrine. He acknowledges that a) Islam isn't the only monotheism with such chauvinistic scriptural themes; b) some Christians inspired by scripture have (e.g., during the Crusades) behaved about as badly as some Muslims inspired by scripture; c) various Muslims at various times in history have been quite progressive and humane; d) more generally, religious belief and behavior are shaped by contemporary social forces; and so on. That's the trouble: Lewis acknowledges everything, including lots of things that sit awkwardly alongside his concluding emphasis. His Atlantic essay contains such an ample list of to-be-sure paragraphs that you start wondering why they're not his central thesis.
In fact, if you ask why Lewis has become the darling of conservatives, the answer is "the order in which his paragraphs are arranged." He starts out asking why so many Muslims seem so angry and then launches a series of to-be-sure paragraphs. Yes, it's partly America's support of Israel; but, he stresses, that alone can't explain all the rage, so we must look further. Yes, it's partly America's support of Arab regimes; but that alone can't explain all the rage, so we must look further. And so on. … Then, having shown that none of the usual suspects alone can explain Muslim rage, he brings on stage his own favored explanation: some combination of Islamic doctrine and the triumphant encroachment of Western culture. And that explanation is the one that all readers remember as the winner!
But of course, this "winning" explanation can't alone explain Muslim rage any more than any of the to-be-sure explanations could. After all, there have at various times and places been large Muslim populations that, though poorer than their relatively modern, relatively secular, non-Muslim neighbors, were nonetheless not inclined toward terrorism. Indeed, Lewis' many to-be-sure paragraphs amount to a concession that his favored explanation can't alone account for Muslim rage. So, logically speaking, Lewis could just as easily have trotted out his favored explanation first, stressed that it can't alone explain all the rage, and proceeded on down the list of usual-suspect explanations. Then whichever explanation he resoundingly ended on would be the one readers remembered as the winner, even though what he'd actually said was that Islamic terrorism has lots of causes, and no single explanation alone suffices. In other words: The "conservative" take-home lesson of Lewis' famous essay is essentially a result not of its analytical content (i.e., that no explanation alone suffices), but of its rhetorical framing.
Having said that, I should add that Lewis' vast knowledge and literary fluency make his writing both useful and enjoyable. So read him. But when deciding what the take-home lesson is, carefully distinguish between what he says and how he says it.
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Income inequality does often grow in developing nations. However, that's usually not because "the poor are getting poorer," but because either a) the poor are staying put while the rich get richer, or b) the poor are getting less poor, but they're not doing so as fast as the rich are getting richer. According to a report published in 2000 by the United Nations, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, et. al., the number of people on the planet who live on less than a dollar a day dropped by 100 million between 1990 and 1998. The number remained astoundingly high—1.2 billion—but bear in mind that the drop came even as the population of poor nations grew by hundreds of millions.
Of course, growing income inequality within a nation—whether or not it is caused by the poor getting poorer—may cause social strains and be regrettable for various other reasons. Enlightened national governments may choose to reduce it by income redistribution or other means. Still, it is not necessarily a bad thing when income inequality is the price paid for a rising standard of living.
Moreover, to suggest—as many have—that globalization is particularly responsible for the growth in income inequality may be the opposite of the truth. Two years ago two World Bank economists, David Dollar and Aart Kraay, released a study that looked not just at the effects of economic growth, but specifically at the effects of globalization. Tracking nations with the most open, most globalized, economies over the last several decades, they found that, as national income grew, the fraction of the economic pie going to the bottom fifth of the income scale didn't shrink. The rising tide indeed seemed to lift all boats.
American press review (previous day)
Guardian How profit urge kept US ticking
Collective defiance has
proved to be a great healer after September 11
Edmond Warner
Saturday September 7, 2002
The Guardian
I doubt that I will read any 9/11 anniversary supplements this week. I've
convinced myself that there is nothing new to say on the subject, which makes
it especially difficult to write this financial perspective on the horrors of a
year ago. I'm not sure whether this might mark me out as callous or as a
coward. Certainly I've taken comfort in the collective
"business-as-usual" spirit of the investment crowd these past 12
months.
Days after the terrorist
attacks I argued in this newspaper that "everything has changed, but it
must be business as usual" and that "as the weeks turn into months,
thoughts of profit will become more frequent and more acceptable." Looking
back now, it seems to me that nothing has changed and that it was only a matter
of days before profit was re-established as the system's principal motive
force. I guess that's a good thing. But I'm not sure.
The institutions that
comprise the infrastructure of the markets proved far more robust than the
buildings that housed them. The money market's settlement systems held firm,
aided by a massive injection of liquidity from the federal reserve and enormous
collective tolerance and goodwill. The US stock market shut for a few days,
which was considered extraordinary at the time, but constitutes a mere footnote
now. Asset prices adjusted in time-honoured fashion (although a little more
quietly than usual) reflected perceptions of the new reality.
There have been financial
dramas a plenty over the past year, many of which have been laid in part at the
door of the terrorists. Cool contemplation, however, suggests that America's
recent economic and financial difficulties have origins that long pre-date
September 11 2001. They may have been exacerbated by the crunch to economic
confidence that the attacks generated. Their burst into the public domain may
have been accelerated. But they were always going to appear (and bite) at some
point.
The US is suffering from
the painful combination of a cyclical downturn and the aftermath of an
investment bubble. It has no one but itself to blame for this. If it has become
more insular socially, then the terrorist conflict is doubtless to blame. But
its increased economic insularity is more likely to be a natural function of
its financial predicament.
For now, ultra-low
interest rates continue to focus American minds on American investment opportunities.
The dollar has had better years, but it has not been so weak as to encourage
any flight of domestic capital across borders. Cheap money focuses the mind,
but cannot guarantee that the economy or investment projects within it will
succeed. Fingers remained crossed.
They remain crossed, too,
on the geopolitical front. The bellicosity of President Bush will keep the
nerves of America's economic agents jangling, slowing or even postponing the
eventual economic recovery. The campaign in Afghanistan had no apparent effect
on economic activity, but conflict on a greater scale may yet do so. This is
one respect in which 9/11 may have an economic legacy, but it rests on a choice
that is America's own.
The financial industry is
in great turmoil, again the consequence of a host of decisions and actions
unrelated to last September's trauma. In striking directly at the core of
America's investment engine, however, the terrorists palpably cast doubt into
the hearts of financiers renowned for their icy temperaments and
self-confidence. But only briefly. On trading floors across the world it is
impossible to sense any fundamental change in the demeanour and values of
brokers, traders and fund managers, although this may merely signify their
ability to separate the personal from the professional.
Unedifying
The most unedifying
evidence of the reassertion of the traditional order was the case brought to a
British courtroom by one of the firms hardest hit on September 11, Cantor
Fitzgerald. Cantor alleged rival Icap had sought to exploit its vulnerability
by poaching staff illegally. The result of the case and the attendant publicity
might best be described as a score draw littered with own goals.
So what of the primacy of
the profit motive? It felt a slightly unsavoury forecast at the time, but it
has indeed been one of the healing agents over the past year. The urge to do
business in spite of impediments can be viewed as an act of collective
defiance, or a deeply ingrained characteristic that it is impossible to shake
from the system. Either way, it has helped keep America ticking.
Whatever one's view of the
capitalist structure, its continued rude health represents a victory over
terrorists whose aim was to bring it to the ground. Indeed, in adversity its
edges may have hardened. Which can only continue to bring America into economic
as well as political conflict with others in the years to come.
· Edmond Warner is chief executive
of Old Mutual Financial Services
Priority threats
Keep the focus on Afghanistan
not Iraq
Leader
Saturday September 7, 2002
The Guardian
Hamid Karzai is a man with a lot of enemies. They include adherents of the
Taliban regime he helped depose last year, fellow Pashtuns who oppose his
Tajik-dominated transitional government, anti-American renegades such as former
prime minister and mojahedin leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and a host of other
malcontents. Any one of them may have been behind the latest attempt to
assassinate Mr Karzai in Kandahar and an almost simultaneous car bombing in
Kabul. But most likely, as suggested by the Afghan foreign minister Abdullah
Abdullah, the culprits were members of al-Qaida or its local offshoots.
This is no great surprise.
Last autumn's US-led military action dispersed al-Qaida but sadly failed to
destroy it. For whatever reason, Osama bin Laden has disappeared and al-Qaida
has signally failed so far to mount the feared follow-up to September 11. But
it has not been defanged, as shown by the actual or thwarted attacks in North
Africa and Italy this year. Its support base in the Muslim world may actually
have expanded as anti-American sentiment, particularly over Palestine, has
grown. And its finances remain considerable. According to a UN report,
"al-Qaida is by all accounts 'fit and well' and poised to strike again at
its leisure". From Europe too comes evidence that al-Qaida's comeback has
commenced. In Britain, MI5 keeps silent watch over sleepers. In Germany,
anti-terror chief Manfred Klink warns that "the network is fundamentally
ready for action".
But the focal point of
this reviving activity is to be found, as prior to September 11, along the
Kabul-Karachi axis. Here in recent months al-Qaida's hand has been detected in
a gradually accelerating series of direct or proxy attacks inside both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. An attempt to assassinate Pakistan's leader, Pervez
Musharraf, was foiled but western civilians and Christian churchgoers have not
been as lucky as he and Mr Karzai.
Clearly, lest the same
mistake be repeated, these stirrings along the faultlines of al-Qaida terror
must be stifled before they again reach out to strike across the world. To this
end, the US should spend less time abusing Iraq and far more underwriting
long-term Afghan and Pakistani security and democracy. That in part means
expanded multinational peacekeeping, much more aid, and an all-out attempt at
nation-building in both these most unstable of states.
Bush calls for a coalition
Julian Borger in
Washington, Patrick Wintour and Nick Paton Walsh in Moscow
Saturday September 7, 2002
The Guardian
Concerted efforts by George Bush and Tony Blair to round up international
support for a military confrontation with Saddam Hussein hit a snag yesterday
when President Vladimir Putin insisted there were "no grounds for
attack."
Mr Blair and Mr Bush made
consecutive telephone calls to the Russian leader at his holiday resort in
Sochi, on the Black sea, in an attempt to agree on a unified stand in the UN
security council on Iraq, but Mr Putin quickly put out a press statement to say
he had "deep doubts" over the justification for military action.
But he left the door open
to a possible security council ultimatum for Iraq to allow the return of
weapons inspectors, underscoring "the need to implement existing UN
security council resolutions on Iraq."
The US and British leaders
also put in a call to the French president, Jacques Chirac, and Mr Bush
telephoned the Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin.
White House officials said
Mr Bush's calls were designed only to explain to the other security council
members the US view on the Iraqi threat and the president's intention to
consult the international community before taking any military action.
Today, Mr Blair will fly
to the president's country retreat at Camp David, Maryland, to hammer out a
common position in advance of Mr Bush's pivotal address to the UN general
assembly on Thursday.
According to US and
British officials, the Camp David talks will focus on the possibility of
rallying security council support for imposing a deadline on Iraq for the
readmission of UN weapons inspectors, in a resolution that would also authorise
the use of force if President Saddam refuses.
Britain supports an
ultimatum as a means of ensuring there is an international debate on the issue,
and of rallying more support at the UN for eventual military action.
President Bush has
signalled that he is prepared to accept such an ultimatum on condition it does
not offer President Saddam any loopholes to escape intrusive inspections and
delay punitive military action.
But hawks in his
administration led by the vice-president, Dick Cheney, and the defence secretary,
Donald Rumsfeld, are opposed to giving the Baghdad regime another chance to
comply with UN disarmament resolutions.
France, Russia and China
are reluctant to approve a resolution that could ultimately provide the US with
a UN seal of approval for an invasion.
According to the Kremlin,
Mr Putin told Mr Blair that the use of force could have "serious, negative
consequences for the situation in the Gulf region, the Middle East and for the
future of the US-led anti-terrorism coalition".
The Russian leader
stressed the "real potential" for reaching a political solution on
Iraq.
US attempts to draw
attention to the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were given
a boost by the International Atomic Energy Agency. An IAEA team of experts
studying satellite photographs of sites linked to Iraq's nuclear weapons
programme have spotted signs of construction and other activity since UN
inspectors left the country in 1998.
"We are very curious
to see what is under the roof," Jacques Baute, the team leader, told the
New York Times, referring to new buildings at the sites, which he did not
identify. "There are some activities that could be part of prohibited
activities, but we have nothing now that allows us to draw a conclusion."
Both President Bush and
the prime minister have promised to publish dossiers of evidence to back up
their claims that Iraq poses a serious and imminent threat, in an attempt to
confront deep ambivalence about a possible war in US and British public
opinion.
In one test of Labour
backbench mood, the BBC found that 88 out of 100 MPs surveyed believed there
were at present no grounds for war, and 86 thought there should be a
parliamentary debate before any decision.
In the US, Mr Cheney, Mr
Rumsfeld and the CIA director, George Tenet, have given Congress secret
briefings on Iraq, but the response has so far been mixed, with several leading
Democrats declaring themselves unimpressed.
In a New York Times
commentary, John Kerry, a Democrat senator and a likely presidential candidate,
argued that the administration had yet to prove "that all other avenues of
protecting our nation's security interests have been exhausted".
Embassy blamed for bombings
Saudis accuse British staff
of destabilisation campaign
Paul Kelso and David Pallister
Saturday September 7, 2002
The Guardian
British embassy staff in Riyadh have been accused by the Saudi Arabian
authorities of coordinating a campaign of anti-western terrorist bombings in
the kingdom, the Guardian has learned.
The accusation that the
British embassy in Riyadh coordinated the bombings to destabilise the Saudi
regime is the latest and most bizarre piece of information to escape the pall
of secrecy behind which the Saudis have been conducting legal proceedings
against seven westerners who say they have been tortured into making false
confessions.
Two Britons have been
killed and several other westerners maimed or injured since November 2000 in a
bombing campaign widely believed to be the work of anti-western extremists.
The allegation against the
British mission in Riyadh, confirmed yesterday by the Foreign Office, was at
the heart of the prosecution case against five Britons, a Canadian and a
Belgian detained in the kingdom.
In televised "confessions"
broadcast last year, six of the men said they had been "ordered" to
carry out the attacks but did not say by whom.
A Guardian investigation
this year discredited the case against the men and uncovered evidence of
systematic torture by ministry of interior officials.
In a prosecution document
presented to a panel of Saudi judges last year, ministry investigators claimed
the men were acting on orders from British embassy officials. The men were
subsequently convicted and received sentences ranging from eight years in
prison to the death penalty.
The allegation that the
British embassy was accused of involvement in the terrorist campaign will
embarrass the Foreign Office, which is wary of being seen to criticise its
closest Arab ally.
Yesterday the Foreign
Office denied the allegations against its officials: "We have been aware
of the allegations against embassy staff for some time. The allegations were
investigated by members of the Metropolitan police [visiting Riyadh] and their
firm conclusion was that they were groundless."
According to defence
papers submitted by way of appeal to the Saudi supreme court last month and
seen by the Guardian the men were systematically tortured until they confessed.
They were subjected to
sleep deprivation for up to 10 days at a time, suspended from chains hanging
from hooks above their cell doors and repeatedly beaten. They were told their
relatives would be harmed if they did not cooperate and were offered early
release in exchange for confessions.
The document also reveals
that:
· The officer in charge of the
investigation and prosecution did not speak a foreign language, and the
translator had only a rudimentary knowledge of English.
· Despite being appointed in October
2000 the men's lawyers were not permitted to present their defence until last
month.
· The lawyers have been denied
access to the investigation reports or any other related documents.
· The detainees were not told they
were standing trial when they first appeared before judges last year. They
still have not been told that they have been found guilty and sentenced.
· Lawyers were unable to get
statements from the men because they were denied access to pencils and paper in
prison. Notes the men took during interviews with the lawyers were confiscated.
· There are "striking
resemblances" between the phrases used in the "confessions".
· The men were kept in solitary
confinement for up to a year after their "confessions".
The men's lawyers expect
the supreme court to make an initial ruling by the end of month.
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Daily Telegraph
Leader Karzai needs US
(Filed: 07/09/2002)
Jack Straw has described Thursday's attempted assassination of Hamid Karzai as "wholly senseless". Mr Straw doubtless intended merely to show disapproval, but as Foreign Secretary he should choose his words more carefully. To regard such a daring and well-prepared plot as "senseless" is to underestimate the Afghan president's enemies, who knew exactly what they were doing.
By simultaneously ambushing Mr Karzai's motorcade in Kandahar and detonating two bombs in Kabul, they intended to destabilise the fragile ruling coalition. These enemies include not only surviving elements of al-Qa'eda and the Taliban, but also discontented Pathan nationalists who resent what they see as the domination of the Karzai government by their Tajik rivals.
Yesterday Mr Karzai was defiant, insisting that Afghanistan is not slipping into chaos. "These things are independent acts. They do not translate into violence all over the country." But this week's violence is sufficiently serious to persuade the outside world that the country could easily disintegrate and revert to its previous role as a stronghold of international terrorism. And if the West were to leave Mr Karzai to the tender mercies of al-Qa'eda, his Pakistani neighbour General Pervez Musharraf would be their next target.
What is the United States doing to avert such a descent into civil war? After the assassinations of the tourism minister and vice-president, the Americans provided Mr Karzai with highly trained bodyguards, who undoubtedly saved his life. American forces have stepped up anti-terrorist operations and are now sweeping into hitherto inaccessible bandit country along the Afghan-Iranian border.
Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defence, has assured this newspaper that the Bush Administration now intends to extend peacekeeping forces to other cities besides Kabul. There will also be more aid for reconstruction.
This sounds promising, but it is not enough. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Washington was reluctant to become involved in "nation-building", preferring to leave such mundane tasks to its allies. This was understandable, given the fact that American forces did almost all the fighting, but it was a mistake. Nation building in Afghanistan is an American responsibility, though not only an American one.
Britain has done its share. Others could do more to recreate the administration, physical infrastructure and economy of a country that has been ravaged for a generation by war, tribalism and bigotry. Only the United States, however, has the means to create the secure environment without which the writ of the Karzai government will not run far beyond Kabul.
Even a prospective war against Iraq ought not to prejudice the need, reiterated by Mr Karzai, for a long-term American military presence across Afghanistan. Thanks to their far-sighted rearmament programme, Americans can honestly claim today (as the British once did) that "we've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money, too". For President George Bush, it is not a question of Iraq or Afghanistan, but Iraq and Afghanistan.
'Send in
troops with inspectors'
By Anton La Guardia, Diplomatic Editor
(Filed: 07/09/2002)
Tony Blair will urge President George W Bush today to deploy tens of thousands of troops on Iraq's borders, ready to help United Nations inspectors to force their way into suspected weapons sites.
As the Prime Minister prepared to fly to Camp David, Whitehall sources said he believed that only UN backing for "coercive inspections" would convince Washington hawks to build an international coalition rather than go it alone against Iraq.
The two leaders will also discuss whether the UN Security Council should deliver a four-week ultimatum for Iraq to admit weapons inspectors after an absence of four years.
Mr Blair is expected to urge Mr Bush to promise to "knock heads together" to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The US-British call for tough action will be strengthened by the latest revelations that Iraq has carried out suspicious new construction at its nuclear facilities.
The International Atomic Energy Agency said that commercial satellite pictures showed the presence of several new buildings at one site, which it did not identify.
The proposal for "coercive inspections" was put forward yesterday by an American think-tank, the Carnegie Endowment for the Advancement of Peace.
The 60-page document, drawn up by retired American generals, former weapons inspectors and others, urges the Security Council to set up a powerful multi-national force to back its inspectors.
The force, perhaps between 20,000 and 50,000, would be deployed in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Kuwait. It would be equipped with helicopters, armoured vehicles, fighter jets and bombers, as well as Awacs electronic surveillance aircraft.
It could provide an escort for monitors or be called on at short notice to fight its way into suspect sites if the inspectors were obstructed.
The UN label for such a force would make its presence more acceptable in neighbouring host countries and establish an acceptable legal basis for a war if Saddam failed to comply.
Proponents of the plan described it as a middle way between "the enormous costs and risks of an invasion" and doing nothing. Critics dismissed it as "pie in the sky". The initiative follows a powerful American and British raid against air defence facilities in western Iraq, as disclosed in The Telegraph yesterday. That attack was seen as a likely prelude to ground action in western Iraq to suppress Scud missiles aimed at Israel.
Predicting that a war could break out any time from November, officials admitted that Mr Blair would be involved in a complex juggling act in the coming weeks.
Even if he manages to persuade Mr Bush to deal with Saddam through the UN, he will struggle to convince Security Council members to set such a "high bar" for Iraqi compliance.
Given that Iraq is likely to reject such conditions, America and Britain would effectively be asking the UN to create a legal pretext for the removal of Saddam. At the very least, an invasion force would be set on a hair trigger, and could be sent into action at the smallest Iraqi violation.
In an intense round of telephone diplomacy yesterday, Mr Bush and Mr Blair rang the leaders of Russia, China, France and Saudi Arabia. But there was no immediate sign of a common strategy.
The Kremlin said that President Vladimir Putin had expressed serious doubts about using force.
But the White House insisted that "they all expressed an openness to listen to the president's ideas". Mr Bush will send envoys to Moscow, Beijing and Paris before addressing the UN General Assembly on Thursday.
British officials said the envoys' message would be blunt: "We will go to war in the coming months and Saddam will be removed, whatever you say. You should support the US if you want any chance of influencing events."
A senior British official said: "Saddam is history. The question is only when he checks out."
He predicted: "Russia and China will not stand in the way; they are not going to hang for the sake of Saddam. France will join in if it has an appropriate UN resolution.
"We fought the Kosovo war without UN approval. People seem to forget that these days.
"There was a lot of nervousness that we were creating an independent Kosovo, which could create dangerous precedents for Chechnya or Tibet. In the case of Iraq there will be no question of the Kurds getting their own state."
Germans
foil al-Qa'eda plot to bomb US base
By Toby Helm in Berlin
(Filed: 07/09/2002)
German police appeared last night to have foiled an al-Qa'eda attack on an American target timed for next week's anniversary of the September 11 attacks when they arrested a Turkish man and a woman in a flat full of bomb making equipment.
The 25-year-old Turk and his 23-year-old American fiancee, a civilian employee of the US military, were found in possession 287lbs of chemicals used to make explosives and five pipe bombs.
The German authorities said pictures of Osama bin Laden, as well as manuals on how to make bombs, were also found in the flat.
"We have evidence that an attack was planned for September 11," said Thomas Schauble, interior minister for the south west German state of Baden-Wurttemberg.
"He seems to be a follower of Osama bin Laden. He is deeply religious and harbours a hatred for Americans and Jews." The minister added: "According to our information the woman hated Jews as well.
"We suspect that they were intending to mount bomb attacks against military installations and the city of Heidelberg."
The Turkish man worked at a chemical warehouse in nearby Karlsruhe while his fiancee was employed at a supermarket on an American military base in Heidelberg. They were arrested in a flat in Walldorf, six miles south of Heidelberg.
The Heidelberg area is home to 16,000 American soldiers, their families and support staff for the US Army Europe headquarters.
A spokesman for the base said the woman would have had an identification card to gain access to area.
German police have been on full alert in the run up to the anniversary of the September 11 attacks and have stated in the past few weeks that they believe al-Qa'eda is still active in Europe and is probably in the process of plotting new atrocities.
Brown
highlights the downside of joining euro
By Andrew Sparrow and George Trefgarne
(Filed: 07/09/2002)
Gordon Brown adopted a sceptical view of Britain joining the euro yesterday in a paper to the Treasury select committee, which is assessing the way his five economic tests will be applied.
The Chancellor said each test could be divided into a series of mini tests, meaning that the Treasury economists will have to consider and publish reports on at least 14 separate issues.
The most eurosceptic part of the document was the conclusion, which put a heavy emphasis on the disadvantages of joining.
"As the Chancellor said in his 2002 Mansion House speech, to join the European Monetary Union without a proper, full assessment of the five tests could prejudice Britain's stability, risk repeating past failures and return Britain to the days of stop-go at the expense of the Government's ambitions for high investment, full employment and high and sustained levels of growth," it said.
"A long-term approach to these vital questions is necessary because of the distinctive nature of the economy - a large economy in the European Union, with strong trading and investment links with the United States and institutions which have traditionally been more global in outlook - and because of the stop-go nature of Britain's economic policy history."
The first test is economic convergence. The Treasury would assess monetary transmission mechanisms, the housing market, national business cycles and sustainable real exchange rate.
The second test is flexibility, covering labour markets, adjustment mechanisms and fiscal policy as an economic stabiliser.
The third test is the impact on investment, which now includes the cost of capital and the impact of joining on different economic sectors.
The fourth test is the impact on financial services, which will include a study of why financial services companies are located in cities like London and Edinburgh.
The fifth test is about jobs. It will include the euro's impact on external trade, lessons from American monetary union, the stability and growth pact and price differentials in the euro zone.
George Eustice, director of the No campaign, said: "The Treasury has highlighted all of the most difficult obstacles to euro entry which seems to suggest that they are going cool on the idea."
Events this week in Greece, where consumers boycotted the shops because they thought the euro had been used as an excuse to raise prices, showed that the new tests, which include prices, would strengthen the argument for not joining.
Analysing the value of using fiscal policy as an economic stabiliser would also highlight the advantage of not losing control of national interest rates, he said.
A spokesman for Britain in Europe, the pro-euro group, said Mr Brown's document "finally nails the anti-euro myth that the Treasury's assessment will be anything other than a thorough examination of the economic pros and cons for becoming part of the euro".
Assessments on trade and the differences between prices in Britain and in the euro zone would boost the pro-euro case, he said.
Earlier this week Bill Morris, a union leader close to the Chancellor, urged the Government to rule out a referendum on the euro before the next election.
There have also been reports that pro-euro members of the Cabinet now think it would be better to postpone a referendum. At his press conference this week, the Prime Minister, when asked about the euro, made no effort to talk up the advantages of joining.
Independent `Why do they hate us? The question is not new and the
answers are not hard to find'.
By Noam Chomsky.
Noam Chomsky (below) on the new world morality
THERE IS no doubt that the 11 September atrocities were an event of historic
importance: not - regrettably - because of their scale, but because of the
choice of innocent victims. It had been recognised for some time that with new
technology, the industrial powers would probably lose their virtual monopoly of
violence, retaining only an enormous preponderance. No one could have
anticipated the specific way in which the expectations were fulfilled, but they
were. For the first time in modern history, Europe and its offshoots were
subjected, on home soil, to the kind of atrocity that they routinely have
carried out elsewhere. The history should be too familiar to review, and though
the West may choose to disregard it, the victims do not. The sharp break in the
traditional pattern surely qualifies 11 September as a historic event, and the
repercussions are sure to be significant.
Several crucial questions arose at once. Who is responsible? What are the
reasons? What is the proper reaction? What are the longer-term consequences?
As far as the first is concerned, it was assumed, plausibly, that the guilty
parties were bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida network. No one knows more about them
than the CIA, which, together with its counterparts among US allies, recruited
radical Islamists from many countries and organised them into a military and
terrorist force, not to help Afghans resist Russian aggression, which would
have been a legitimate objective, but for normal reasons of state, with grim
consequences for Afghans after the Mujahedin took control. US intelligence has
surely been following the other exploits of these networks closely ever since
they assassinated President Sadat of Egypt 20 years ago, and more intensively
since the attempt to blow up the World Trade Centre and many other targets in a
highly ambitious terrorist operation in 1993. Nevertheless, despite what must
be the most intensive international intelligence investigation in history,
evidence about the perpetrators of 11 September has been hard to find. Eight
months after the bombing, FBI director Robert Mueller, testifying to Congress,
could say only that US intelligence now "believes" the plot was
hatched in Afghanistan, though planned and implemented elsewhere. And long
after the source of the anthrax attack was localised to US Government weapons
laboratories, it has still not been identified. These are indications of how
hard it may be to counter acts of terror targeting the rich and powerful in the
future. Nevertheless, despite the thin evidence, the initial conclusion about
11 September is presumably correct.
On the second question, scholarship is virtually unanimous in taking the
terrorists at their word, which matches their deeds for the past 20 years:
their goal, in their terms, is to drive the infidels from Muslim lands, to
overthrow the corrupt governments they impose and sustain, and to institute an
extremist version of Islam.
More significant, at least for those who hope to reduce the likelihood of
further crimes of a similar nature, are the background conditions from which
the terrorist organisations arose, and that provide a mass reservoir of
sympathetic understanding for at least parts of their message, even among those
who despise and fear them. In George Bush's plaintive words, "Why do they
hate us?" The question is not new, and answers are not hard to find. Forty-five
years ago President Eisenhower and his staff discussed what he called the
"campaign of hatred against us" in the Arab world, "not by the
governments but by the people". The basic reason, the National Security
Council advised, is the recognition that the US supports corrupt and brutal
governments that block democracy and development, and that it does so because
of its concern "to protect its interest in Near East oil". The Wall
Street Journal found much the same when it investigated attitudes of wealthy
westernised Muslims after 11 September.
Commentators generally prefer a more comforting answer: their anger is rooted
in resentment of our freedom and democracy, their cultural failings, their
inability to take part in "globalisation" (in which they happily
participate), and other such deficiencies. More comforting, perhaps, but not
wise.
Third, what about proper reaction? The answers are doubtless contentious, but
at least the reaction should meet the most elementary moral standards:
specifically, if an action is right for us, it is right for others; and if
wrong for others, it is wrong for us. Those who reject that standard simply
declare that acts are justified by power; they can therefore be ignored in any
discussion of appropriateness of action, of right or wrong. One might ask what
remains of the flood of commentary on this question (eg, debates about a
"just war", etc) if this simple criterion is adopted.
To illustrate with a few uncontroversial cases, 40 years have passed since
President Kennedy ordered that "the terrors of the earth" must be
visited upon Cuba until their leadership is eliminated, having violated good
form by successful resistance to US-run invasion. The terrors were extremely
serious, continuing into the Nineties. Twenty years have passed since President
Reagan launched a terrorist war against Nicaragua, conducted with barbaric
atrocities and vast destruction, leaving tens of thousands dead and the country
ruined perhaps beyond recovery - and also leading to condemnation of the US for
international terrorism by the World Court and the UN Security Council (in a
resolution the US vetoed). But no one believes that Cuba or Nicaragua had the
right to set off bombs in Washington or New York or to assassinate US leaders.
And it is all too easy to add many more severe cases, up to the present.
Accordingly, those who accept elementary moral standards have some work to do
to show that the US and Britain were justified in bombing Afghans in order to
compel them to turn over people whom the US suspected of criminal atrocities
(the official war aim, announced by the President as the bombing began); or to
overthrow their rulers (the war aim announced several weeks later).
The same moral standard holds of more nuanced proposals about an appropriate response
to terrorist atrocities. The respected Anglo-American military historian
Michael Howard proposed "a police operation conducted under the auspices
of the UN ... against a criminal conspiracy whose members should be hunted down
and brought before an international court, where they would receive a fair
trial and, if found guilty, be awarded an appropriate sentence". That
seems reasonable; but the suggestion that the proposal should be applied
universally would arouse outrage and horror.
Similar questions arise with regard to the "Bush doctrine" of
"pre-emptive strike" against suspected threats. It should be noted
that the doctrine is not new. High-level planners are mostly hold-overs from
the Reagan administration, which argued that the bombing of Libya was justified
under the UN Charter as "self-defence against future attack". Clinton
planners advised "pre-emptive response" (including nuclear first
strike). And the doctrine has earlier precedents. Nevertheless, the bold
assertion of such a right is novel, and there is no secret as to whom the
threat is addressed. The government and commentators are stressing loud and
clear that they intend to apply the doctrine to Iraq. The elementary standard
of universality, therefore, would appear to justify Iraqi pre-emptive terror
against the US. Of course, no one accepts this conclusion. Again, if we are
willing to adopt elementary moral principles, obvious questions arise, and must
be faced by those who advocate or tolerate the selective version of the
doctrine of "pre-emptive response" that grants the right to those
powerful enough to exercise it with little concern for what the world may
think. And the burden of proof is not light, as is always true when the threat
or use of violence is advocated or tolerated.
There is, of course, an easy counter to such simple arguments: we are good, and
they are evil. That useful principle - which is not argued but asserted -
trumps virtually any argument. Occasionally, but rarely, some irritating
creatures attempt to confront the core principle with the record of recent and
contemporary history. We learn more about prevailing cultural norms by
observing the reaction, and the interesting array of barriers erected to deter
any lapse into this heresy. None of this, of course, is an invention of
contemporary power centres and dominant intellectual culture. Nonetheless, it
merits attention, at least among those who have some interest in understanding
where we stand and what may lie ahead.
Let us turn briefly to the last of these considerations: the longer-term
implications. In the longer term, I suspect that the crimes of 11 September
will accelerate tendencies that were already underway: the Bush doctrine, just
mentioned, is an illustration. As was predicted at once, governments throughout
the world seized upon 11 September as a window of opportunity to institute or
escalate harsh and repressive programmes. Russia eagerly joined the
"coalition against terror", expecting to receive authorisation for
its terrible atrocities in Chechnya, and was not disappointed. China happily
joined for similar reasons. Turkey was the first country to
offer troops for the new phase of the US "war on terror", in
gratitude, as the Prime Minister explained, for the US contribution to Turkey's
campaign against its miserably repressed Kurdish population. Turkey
is highly praised for its achievements in these campaigns of state terror,
including some of the worst atrocities of the grisly Nineties, and was rewarded
by grant of authority to protect Kabul from terror. Israel recognised that it
would be able to crush Palestinians even more brutally, with even firmer US
support. And so on throughout much of the world.
More democratic societies, including the US, instituted measures to impose
discipline on the domestic population and to institute unpopular measures under
the guise of "combating terror", exploiting the atmosphere of fear
and the demand for "patriotism" - which in practice means: "You
shut up and I'll pursue my own agenda relentlessly." The Bush administration
used the opportunity to advance its assault against most of the population, and
future generations, in service to the narrow corporate interests that dominate
the administration. In brief, initial predictions were amply confirmed.
One major outcome is that the US, for the first time, has major military bases
in Central Asia. These are important to position US multinationals favourably
in the current "great game" to control the considerable resources of
the region, but also to complete the encirclement of the world's major energy
resources, in the Gulf region. The US base system targeting the Gulf extends
from the Pacific to the Azores, but the closest reliable base before the Afghan
war was Diego Garcia. Now that situation is much improved, and forceful intervention,
if deemed appropriate, will be greatly facilitated.
The Bush administration perceives the new phase of the "war on
terror" (which in many ways replicates the "war on terror"
declared by the Reagan administration 20 years earlier) as an opportunity to
expand its already overwhelming military advantages over the rest of the world,
and to move on to other methods to ensure global dominance. Government thinking
was articulated clearly by high officials when Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
visited the US in April to urge the administration to pay more attention to the
reaction in the Arab world to its strong support for Israeli terror and
repression. He was told, in effect, that the US did not care what he or other
Arabs thought. As The New York Times reported, a high official explained that
"if he thought we were strong in Desert Storm, we're 10 times as strong
today. This was to give him some idea what Afghanistan demonstrated about our
capabilities." A senior defence analyst gave a simple gloss: others will
"respect us for our toughness and won't mess with us". That stand,
too, has many historical precedents; but in the post-11 September world it
gains new force.
We do not have internal documents, but it is reasonable to speculate that such
consequences were one primary goal of the bombing of Afghanistan: to warn the
world of what the US can do if someone steps out of line. The bombing of Serbia
was undertaken for similar reasons. Its primary goal was to "ensure Nato's
credibility", as Blair and Clinton explained - referring to the
credibility not of Norway or Italy, but of the United States and its prime
military client. That is a common theme of statecraft and the literature of
international relations; and with some reason, as history amply reveals.
Without continuing, the basic issues of international society seem to me to
remain much as they were; but 11 September has induced changes, in some cases
with not very attractive implications.
Noam Chomsky 2002. This essay is taken from `Noam Chomsky, 9-11', second
edition, to be published later this autumn (New York: Seven Stories Press,
2002). It was first published by `Aftonbladet', Sweden.
Revealed: The Taliban minister, the US envoy and the
warning of September 11 that was ignored
By Kate Clark in Kabul
07 September 2002
Weeks before the terrorist attacks on 11 September, the United States and the United Nations ignored warnings from a secret Taliban emissary that Osama bin Laden was planning a huge attack on American soil.
The warnings were delivered by an aide of Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the Taliban Foreign Minister at the time, who was known to be deeply unhappy with the foreign militants in Afghan-istan, including Arabs.
Mr Muttawakil, now in American custody, believed the Taliban's protection of Mr bin Laden and the other al-Qa'ida militants would lead to nothing less than the destruction of Afghanistan by the US military. He told his aide: "The guests are going to destroy the guesthouse."
The minister then ordered him to alert the US and the UN about what was going to happen. But in a massive failure of intelligence, the message was disregarded because of what sources describe as "warning fatigue". At the same time, the FBI and the CIA failed to take seriously warnings that Islamic fundamentalist students had enrolled in flight schools across the US.
Mr Muttawakil's aide, who has stayed on in Kabul and who has to remain anonymous for his security, described in detail to The Independent how he alerted first the Americans and then the United Nations of the coming calamity of 11 September.
The minister learnt in July last year that Mr bin Laden was planning a "huge attack" on targets inside America, the aide said. The attacks were imminent and would be so deadly the United States would react with destructive rage.
Mr bin Laden had been in Afghanistan since May 1996, bringing his three wives, 13 children and Arab fighters. Over time he became a close ally of the obscurantist Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar.
Mr Muttawakil learnt of the coming attacks on America not from other members of the Taliban leadership, but from the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Tahir Yildash. The organisation was one of the fundamentalist groups that had found refuge on Afghan soil, lending fighters for the Taliban's war on the Northern Alliance and benefiting from good relations with al-Qa'ida in its fight against the Uzbek government.
According to the emissary, Mr Muttawakil emerged from a one-to-one meeting with Mr Yildash looking shocked and troubled. Until then, the Foreign Minister, who had disapproved of the destruction of the Buddhist statues in Bamian earlier in the year, had no inkling from others in the Taliban leadership of what Mr bin Laden was planning.
"At first Muttawakil wouldn't say why he was so upset," said the aide. "Then it all came out. Yildash had revealed that Osama bin Laden was going to launch an attack on the United States. It would take place on American soil and it was imminent. Yildash said Osama hoped to kill thousands of Americans."
At the time, 19 members of al-Qa'ida were in situ in the US waiting to launch what would be the deadliest foreign attack on the American mainland.
The emissary went first to the Americans, travelling across the border to meet the consul general, David Katz, in the Pakistani border town of Peshawar, in the third week of July 2001. They met in a safehouse belonging to an old mujahedin leader who has confirmed to The Independent that the meeting took place.
Another US official was also present possibly from the intelligence services. Mr Katz, who now works at the American embassy in Eritrea, declined to talk about the meeting. But other US sources said the warning was not passed on.
A diplomatic source said: "We were hearing a lot of that kind of stuff. When people keep saying the sky's going to fall in and it doesn't, a kind of warning fatigue sets in. I actually thought it was all an attempt to rattle us in an attempt to please their funders in the Gulf, to try to get more donations for the cause."
The Afghan aide did not reveal that the warning was from Mr Muttawakil, a factor that might have led the Americans to down-grade it. "As I recall, I thought he was speaking from his own personal perspective," one source said. "It was interesting that he was from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but he gave no indication this was a message he was carrying."
Interviewed by The Independent in Kabul, the Afghan emissary said: "I told Mr Katz they should launch a new Desert Storm like the campaign to drive Iraq out of Kuwait but this time they should call it Mountain Storm and they should drive the foreigners out of Afghanistan. They also had to stop the Pakistanis supporting the Taliban."
The Taliban emissary said Mr Katz replied that neither action was possible. Nor did Mr Katz pass the warning on to the State Department, according to senior US diplomatic sources.
When Mr Muttawakil's emissary returned to Kabul, the Foreign Minister told him to see UN officials. He took the warning to the Kabul offices of UNSMA, the political wing of the UN. These officials heard him out, but again did not report the secret Taliban warning to UN headquarters. A UN official familiar with the warnings said: "He appeared to be speaking in total desperation, asking for a Mountain Storm, he wanted a sort of deus ex machina to solve his country's problems. But before 9/11, there was just not much hope that Washington would become that engaged in Afghanistan."
Officials in the State Department and in UN headquarters in New York said they knew nothing about a Taliban warning. But they said they would now be looking into the matter.
Mr Muttawakil is now unavailable for comment he handed himself in to the Afghan authorities in the former Taliban stronghold of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan last February. He is reported to be in American custody there, one of the few senior members of the Taliban regime the US has managed to arrest.
As America steadily broke the Taliban's military machine last autumn, there were no Taliban defections. Apart from Mr Mutawakil's one vain attempt to warn the world, the Taliban remained absolutely loyal to their leader's vision.
Bush will have to
shock the American people into war
The crisis in 'liberated' Afghanistan should tell Bush that the line between confidence and hubris can be perilously close
Fergal Keane
07 September 2002
Over the last year I've made a couple of firm predictions. The first was that sooner or later George Bush would launch a war to topple Saddam Hussein; the second was that the American people would regain their sense of balance in the aftermath of the 11 September bombings – ie the country of the middle ground would reassert itself. The question now is whether the latter development – for it has come to pass – will cancel out the possibility of the first. Will the return to the centre ground of the majority of American public opinion make it impossible for George Bush to rally domestic support for his plans to oust Saddam?
A headline in yesterday's Washington Post spoke the truth when it declared: "Bush Faces Daunting Task in Building Public Support." It did not say "impossible task", but merely pointed to the danger of attacking Saddam when only 37 per cent of poll respondents believe Bush has clearly explained his rationale for a war with Iraq. If you are about to commit vast numbers of troops with a risk of mass casualties and the wholesale destabilisation of the Middle East, then the least people deserve is an explanation.
Thus has the doctrine of pre-emptive action, so passionately urged by the locker-room tendency on the right, come unstuck. The likes of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz have been shown to be fearfully out of touch with public sentiment. Not so the worried congressmen and senators who have been besieged with letters, e-mails and calls from constituents. Across America there is an audible shout of "wait a minute". Set aside the so-called Vietnam syndrome, foreign wars have never been intrinsically popular in the US.
Over the last decade the real crisis in international affairs has not been domineering Yankee power but the struggle to make America engage with the rest of the world. In Bill Clinton we saw an instinctively internationalist president who needed to be continually wary of any public perception that he was too busy with "abroad". There is big irony here; it was the Republican right in particular that encouraged isolationist drift but that now finds itself unable, for the time, to convince Americans that it should send their children to fight in the Middle East.
Messrs Perle and Wolfowitz would argue that this time it is very different. This is no Bosnia or Rwanda or Somalia, no appeal to humanitarian instincts, but a situation in which the national interests of the US are directly threatened. Why then do a majority of Americans seem unconvinced of the urgency of the situation? Part of the truth is that President Bush has made little attempt to make a compelling case for war. More specifically he has failed to link 11 September and the horror it represented with Saddam Hussein. People want to know just how Iraq threatens their home town.
There was an assumption that in the climate of moral outrage that followed 11 September, Mr Bush's long-standing desire to get rid of Saddam would have wide support. Also what appeared to be a relatively uncomplicated victory in Afghanistan emboldened the hawks in the White House. The current crisis in "liberated" Afghanistan should tell Mr Bush that the line between confidence and hubris can be perilously close.
I expect that when Mr Bush does present his evidence it will lay out much that we already know. We will be given details of Saddam's chemical and biological weapons capacity. There will be evidence, too, of his attempt to re-launch a nuclear weapons programme, and finally – but critically in terms of public opinion – there will be a dossier on Saddam's links to al-Qa'ida. What none of us can tell until we see the information is whether the intelligence is speculative or solid. Even if the intelligence is less than overwhelming in relation to al-Qa'ida, Mr Bush may win grudging backing for his war. But grudging backing is as bad as no backing if the war starts go wrong.
The assumption that Saddam's army will simply fold as it did during the last Gulf War may turn out to be wrong-headed. The Iraqi leader never committed his best troops to battle, and when the Allied forces stormed into Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Desert Storm they faced waves of miserable conscripts. The real fighting forces were held back to deal with the internal war against the Shia and the Kurds, who, as Saddam anticipated, rose in rebellion when the regime seemed threatened.
During the last Gulf War, Saddam continually underestimated the determination of the Allies to launch an invasion. He did so largely on the basis that he believed the coalition would fall apart as evidence grew of civilian casualties from the air campaign. This time around he will calculate that public opinion in the US and Britain will either forestall an attack, or revolt when the military and civilian cost becomes too high. Saddam may well be willing to allow a war to start in the belief that it will collapse from political pressures well before US armour ever reaches the gates of Baghdad. Thus he has little incentive to cave in now to what are likely to be very tough demands on weapons inspections. If Saddam is convinced that the rest of the world is opposed to war and that the US and Britain are isolated, he will play tough and hope to humiliate Bush before a shot is fired. But it is at this point that American public opinion could swing in behind the President and the countdown to war will have begun.
The list of what-ifs that attend any war scenario is scary. Mr Blair senses this more acutely than his American counterpart, if only because he is more inclined to hear the advice of his own diplomats and intelligence people. Thus when he arrives in Camp David today he will surely be asking how Mr Bush proposes to deal with the prospect of large-scale casualties if Saddam's élite forces make a stand in the cities. How will the US respond if Saddam deploys chemical and biological weapons against Allied forces and against the Israelis? And what does he plan to do for Iraq after Saddam is ousted? Iraq is a country of different nations – Sunni, Shia and Kurd – and could easily slide into Yugoslavia-style anarchy. Mr Bush needs to say whether he plans to turn Iraq into an international protectorate with thousands of Allied troops patrolling the area for years into the future.
But most of all Mr Bush needs to make a compelling case to his own people, and the rest of the world, for going to war in the first place. So expect to see a big public relations campaign to shock the American people into supporting war, with or without wide international support, and expect a sudden increase in the tempo of American efforts to try and win Arab support by pressing Ariel Sharon to talk to the Palestinians. It's hard to believe there will be any meaningful dialogue, and the best Bush can expect is a lowering of anti-war rhetoric from Arab leaders. Also expect Saddam to give a little but not enough and... expect war this winter.
The writer is a BBC special correspondent
Leader
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The unsettling drumbeat of war |
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Published: September 7 2002 5:00 | Last Updated: September 7
2002 5:00 |
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With
Wednesday's pledge to "call upon the world to recognise that [Saddam
Hussein] is stiffing the world", President George W. Bush raised the
stakes against Iraq. A certain clarity has replaced the confused wrangling of
the US administration during the summer. The US,
with the UK by its side, will now seek a tough new United Nations Security
Council resolution demanding Iraqi compliance with intrusive weapons
inspections and the elimination of the country's chemical, biological and
nuclear capability. A military strike would quickly follow any breach of the
resolution, or a failure of the UN to act. Mr Bush is preparing for war. But with
greater clarity over the US political stance has come a new uncertainty. What
would be the economic effect of war in the Gulf? That question helped to
unnerve financial markets this week. War rhetoric
pushed oil prices to their highest level since last September: Brent crude
jumped by more than $2 to $28.75 a barrel after the president's comments on
Wednesday. In other markets, economic uncertainty increased by the prospect
of war has also taken its toll. Notwithstanding a rally on Friday, stock
markets have given up much of their late-summer rally. In the US the Standard
& Poor's 500 has fallen more than 7 per cent since its mid-August peak
and European markets, measured by the FTSE Eurotop 300, have suffered even
worse. Bond investors have continued their move away from the risky to the
safe, driving down the yield on both short- and long-dated US government
paper. These negative
market reactions are to be expected. In the absence of knowing the outcome of
any conflict, war increases the risks associated with private investment,
generates uncertainty about future prosperity and reduces consumer
confidence. Higher security spending leads to worsening government deficits.
Wars in the Middle East create the added problem of rising energy prices,
hitting corporate profitability and real incomes. Economic pain But none of
these outcomes is preordained. The only conclusion that can be drawn on the
economic effect of recent conflicts is that no two wars are the same. Last year, the
first phase in the war against terrorism generated many expectations of deep
economic pain and in the autumn of 2001 this view seemed to be borne out in
official statistics. A worsening US recession accompanied the fighting in
Afghanistan. But revisions to the data show that the US economy was in fact
recovering at the time US aircraft were dropping bombs over Kabul. Now,
evidence of any economic effect of US action in Afghanistan is conspicuously
absent. If Afghanistan
provides encouragement not to worry too much about the economic costs of
conflict, Vietnam provides the counter-example. Prolonged and expensive, the
war and its financing were an important contributory factor to the growing US
budget and current account deficits of the 1960s and early 1970s. Inflation
rose rapidly, confidence plummeted and by 1971 the US was forced to abandon
the convertibility of the dollar to gold. The Bretton Woods era of stability
and rapid global economic progress was over. Consumer
retrenchment But perhaps
the best comparison is with the last Gulf war in 1990-91. The war was by no
means the only economic concern of the day. Inflation had again taken root in
the US and the UK, after the Reagan and Thatcher boom of the late 1980s.
Monetary policy was restrictive, helping to expose the savings and loan
crisis in the US and an equally damaging property bubble in Britain. But the
spike in oil prices caused by Mr Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was enough to
tip both countries into recession. Though the war was short and sharp, its
economic effects, when combined with existing domestic fragility, lasted
longer. This year the
parallels with 1990 are striking. The US private sector, laden with debts
taken on in the euphoria of the late 1990s, remains vulnerable to consumer
retrenchment. If an urge to save replaces consumers' unsustainable
willingness to splash out, the US recovery will be sunk. The UK is similarly
exposed. And this year, neither Japan nor the euro zone is growing rapidly,
unlike the early 1990s. Were Mr
Hussein to knock out significant proportions of Kuwait's or Saudi Arabia's
oil fields, or if conflict were protracted, another global economic downturn
would be all but certain. Economics, of
course, should not swing any decision to take action over Iraq. Concern at
the potential human devastation from any use of weapons of mass destruction
must override worry over the short-term economic consequences. But investors
should expect an unsettling autumn if the clamour for war and "regime
change" in Iraq becomes unstoppable. |
|
Putin has 'serious doubts' over Iraq strike |
|
By Andrew Jack in Moscow, Victor Mallet in France and James
Harding in Washington |
|
Published: September 6 2002 20:25 | Last Updated: September 6
2002 20:25 |
Russia on Friday
expressed "serious doubts" about the justification for a strike on
Iraq, posing an early obstacle to George W. Bush's effort to build
international support to oust Saddam Hussein.
In
telephone conversations with the US president and Tony Blair, the British prime
minister, Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, stopped short of explicit
opposition to a regime change.
But the Kremlin
said Mr Putin expressed "serious doubts" over the legal basis for
military strikes and warned of the risks of destabilising the Middle East, the
Persian Gulf and the international coalition against terrorism.
Adding to the
diplomatic hurdles facing Mr Bush, Jacques Chirac, French president, insisted
in his telephone call with the US president that the United Nations should play
a central role in deciding what action to take.
Mr Chirac is
keen to show himself a loyal ally of the Americans a year after the September
11 terrorist attacks. But he is still more concerned not to offend French
public opinion, which is opposed to a war against Iraq.
"It's for
the UN Security Council to take the appropriate measures," the Elysée
presidential palace said. France, Russia and China, three of the targets of Mr
Bush's charm offensive this week, are members of the Security Council.
The White House
said this week it would seek congressional approval to topple Mr Hussein, but
has been elusive about the need for a mandate or a statement of support from
the UN.
Mr Bush also
called Jiang Zemin, China's president, ahead of the US president's speech to
the UN General Assembly next Thursday.
The White House
said Mr Bush talked in general terms about the perceived Iraqi threat and did
not go into details about the best means of disarmament. He also reiterated
that he has not yet made a decision on the use of military force.
But the US
administration kept up its efforts to convince the American public of the
security threat posed by Mr Hussein's regime.
Referring to
reports of satellite imagery showing unexplained construction at several sites
of interest to UN inspectors looking for evidence that Baghdad is developing
nuclear weapons, Ari Fleischer, the White House press secretary, said the
information was "deeply troubling".
German Press
Review (previous day)
European Press
Review (previous day)
Le Monde
Khaddam: Iraq is our strategic depth; US
cannot punish Syria
Syria-Regional, Politics, 9/6/2002
The Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam stressed that the French
President Jacque Chirac with whom he met on Thursday at the Elysee palace,
shares Syria's concern over the possibility that the US will embark on the
political option against Baghdad.
Khaddam said that Iraq is "the strategic depth for Syria." Later in
the day, Khaddam held a press conference at the headquarters of the new Syrian
ambassador in Paris, Mrs Siba Nasser, during which he explained the atmospheres
of talks with Chirac, the Syrian position and the Arab and international issues
regarding Iraq.
Replying to a question on Syria's position regarding certain international
demands on changing the Iraqi regime as a solution for Iraq, Khaddam said
"this matter relates to Iraq, rather than Syria or Turkey, Egypt, Iran or
any other Arab country. The Iraqis are the ones who decide the fate of their
country. We question, why the regime in Iraq has become now dangerous and was
not so during the 1980s during the Iraqi- Iranian war? The heart of the matter
relates to greater interests in the region. The question of the Iraqi regime is
but a pretest for those who are planning to launch an aggression against Iraq
and its people." On contacts between Syria and Iraq, Khaddam said that
"contacts are usually made through governments and contacts are underway
with Iraq. It is an Arab country, whose fate is linked with that of the Arabs.
Iraq is Syria's strategic depth in her struggle and confrontation with
Israel."
Replying to a question that Syria stood against Iraq in the past, Khaddam said
"When Iraq committed a mistake by invading Kuwait we stood against it, and
now it has been exposed to aggression and therefore we stand with it."
Khaddam considered that Bush's determination to take a decision not approving a
Congressional decision to capitulate Syria reveals that the US President
"made the decision in the interests of the US, in that Syria is not a
marginal country in the region and the world, and Washington has no interests
in that decision (ie to capitulate Syria) before the Congress as it is rather a
decision in the interests of Israel, and therefore why Bush holds the American
society responsible for the consequences of a decision that his country has no
interests in it. Secondly Syria is not just a country that exists on the margin
of the Earth. The Americans know Syria's role and we do not put our principles
in one scale and our interests in another."
It is our turn to ask: Why does America hate us?
After the Israelis crushed the Arab armies in June 1967, Arab intellectuals
criticized Egypt’s Gamal Abdel-Nasser for referring to the rout as a naksah, or
setback.
The term was coined by Al-Ahram editor in chief Mohammed Heikal, Nasser’s
confidante and sometime minister of information, who wrote most of the
president’s speeches (including his famous resignation address).
Thirty-five years later, it is possible to reassess the situation. While the
Arabs certainly did lose the war militarily, and politically later on, did
Israel really succeed in achieving all its military and political goals?
The short answer is no. Israel was much better off (in terms of home front
security and regional stability) before June 5, 1967 than later. Israel’s 1967
walkover was, in a way, a curse rather than a blessing.
For after the 1967 war, Israel became an occupying power, with all the dangers
and threats to its domestic security that entails. In the first six months of
2002 alone, more than a thousand Israelis have been killed or injured; Israeli
society has been disrupted, and instead of the security they long for they have
been getting terror and bombs.
Before June 1967, Israel was perceived by the Western world as a modern
youthful state built by a persecuted people who deserved to live in freedom and
security. All this changed after the war, however, when Israel decided to hold
on to the territories it conquered.
Overnight, Israel began to be perceived as an outlaw state that violates
international law; a state led by bloody-handed generals whose natural place
was behind bars.
The Arab territories that Israel was so happy to conquer soon turned into
economic, security and moral liabilities so much so that the Israelis often
wished that the Gaza Strip and its pesky inhabitants would be engulfed by the
Mediterranean.
Soon after the defeat of 1967, Nasser called for “erasing the consequences of
aggression,” ending Israeli occupation. It seems at the moment that it will
not be long before Israel itself starts calling for the same, if only to return
to the sense of security it enjoyed before it embarked on its conquests.
When the Palestinians first began to resist Israeli occupation, the Jewish
state pursued a tough policy, the “Iron Fist,” to punish and deter the occupied
people from hurling stones at Israeli troops.
But the Palestinians moved on to a new form of resistance that of suicide
bombings.
It was at this point that Israel’s generals became confused. Suicide bombers,
after all, died together with their victims. In other words, they chose to die
and therefore there was no way to punish them. How can you intimidate someone
who was fixing to die? What can you scare him with?
Fascinated with these suicide attacks, some Israelis blamed them on religious
fanaticism and hatred. The fact that secular Palestinian men and women took
part in such missions proved that religion was not a great influence.
Hatred is something else. Arabs never hated Jews as such, only because they are
occupiers. Palestinians who blow themselves up hate occupation and want their
people to live free. Suicide bombers sacrifice themselves because they believe
that their people’s freedom is more precious than their own lives.
On the other hand, Palestinians are justified in asking why the Israelis hate
them when they see the assassinations, blockades, house demolitions, and other
forms of collective punishment meted out by the army.
Notwithstanding which side is the aggressor, mutual hatred between Israelis and
Palestinians is now a fact of life that can only be dealt with by separating
the two peoples from each other by the founding of an independent Palestinian
state on the territories Israel occupied in 1967.
Mutual hatred between Arabs and America, however, is something else. After
young men sacrificed their lives in order to kill 3,000 Americans last
September, President George W. Bush was justified in asking: “Why do they hate
us so much that they were willing to sacrifice their lives in order to harm
us?”
At the time, many Arabs tried to answer this question by mentioning America’s
unquestioning support for Israel, its stubborn insistence to starve the Iraqis
and the sanctions it imposes on many an Arab country.
It does not appear that the American president understood this explanation, nor
tried to deal with the roots of hatred. But there is a question (posed by Arabs
this time) that he has to answer: “Why do the hawks in the US administration
hate us so much that they are willing to risk the lives of American young men
and women in order to visit destruction on the Arab world by attacking Iraq
even if that meant the collapse of the “anti-terror alliance” and giving
terrorists the opportunity to recruit thousands of new volunteers ready to give
up their lives in the cause of revenge?”
When Bush administration officials speak about Iraq, we can sense their hatred.
They want to destroy Iraq at any cost. Their plans don’t stop at Iraq, either.
They have other targets in mind: Damascus, Tehran, Khartoum, perhaps even
Riyadh.
Is it in America’s interest to act like a bully just because it is strong
militarily? Or is this behavior a manifestation of a clash of civilizations a
new Crusade that will last many, many years?
When Bush asked why the Arabs hate America, he received a constructive reply.
Had he been wise enough to act on that reply, he would have taken effective
steps to eradicate this hatred.
But would Bush be kind enough to tell us why they hate us? Perhaps we might be
able to do something about it. Maybe we can convince the US that Arabs and
Muslims are human beings too, and have the right to enjoy freedom in their own
lands.
Fahed Fanek is Jordanian writer and columnist. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star
Arab Press Review (Daily
Star)
Washington changing tactics over Iraq, but strategy remains the same
As the administration of President George W. Bush signals it may seek
congressional approval and consult with the United States’ foreign allies
before taking military action against Iraq, Saudi-run pan-Arab daily Asharq
al-Awsat detects a glimmer of hope.
“After weeks of abstruseness and media escalation,” Washington’s willingness to
adopt a more “consultative approach” is an important development, the paper
says.
It could create badly needed “breathing space” for more diplomatic efforts
aimed at avoiding war, for Baghdad to make good on its declared willingness to
cooperate with the UN over arms inspections, and for Washington to both clarify
its objectives and ponder the “future complications” that war on Iraq would
cause in the region, it says in its main editorial.
But the key thing about “President Bush’s tilt toward consultation” is that it
implies he is no longer listening solely to the advice of the hawks who have
been goading him to take unilateral military action without heeding the views
of the rest of the world.
“But these consultations will remain deficient if they do not include Iraq’s
immediate neighbors, i.e. the Arab states who would face the first fallout from
any military operation targeting any fellow Arab state,” Asharq al-Awsat
writes.
In the Beirut daily As-Safir, editor in chief Joseph Samaha says while
the US may have decided to strike a less unilateralist public posture over
Iraq, this is only a “pro forma concession.”
“The goal is still the same, changing the regime in Baghdad, but the road to it
now passes through the US Congress first and perhaps also the UN Security
Council,” he remarks. “And one can be certain from now that the Security
Council way-station will only be used to impose conditions tailored for Iraq to
reject or evade, thus securing the necessary conditions for launching the war.”
The worldwide opposition to war has prompted the Bush administration to “adopt
the Leninist tactic of taking one step back in order to take two steps
forward,” according to Samaha.
The principal aim is to overcome European objections, but they have more to do
with America’s unilateralism than its aims, or the fate of Iraq or the region.
With the US feigning a more multilateral approach while starting the actual
countdown to war, “one can wager that there will soon be changes in the
policies” of most European Union members, Samaha writes.
The only European politician who behaves as though he genuinely opposes
American policy is German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who could assume a
“Charles de Gaulle-like stature” if he sticks to his policy of reconciling his
country’s “Atlanticist” leanings with its national interests. He favors
pressure on Iraq to force it to readmit the arms inspectors, but underscores
the irrationality of the American position by noting that “you can’t put pressure
on someone by telling him that if you comply with our demands w