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browser Dýþ Basýnda Türkiye / Western
Press Review / Arab
Press Review / Israeli
Press Review
American Press Review (Slate) / Western Press Review
|
The
Times - Put a war with Iraq in the diary for January tim
hames Financial
Times The hard
road to Baghdad, by Michael O’Hanlon New
York Times U.S. Considers Wary Jordan as
Base for an Attack on Iraq Guardian
- Dissident
blueprint gathers support - Rebel Kurds at
heart of plan to split country into two regions Rebel
groups reject CIA overtures down on the farm Arab
Press Review When will the Arabs realize that the US
has declared war on them? External link – CSIS – If we Fight
Iraq, by Anthony Cordesman |
The
Times - Frailty and conflict at
heart of Ankara's coalition Government By Andrew
Mango EU
-Reforms have to come before talks Power
of wife provoked MPs to desert Prime Minister Daily
Star Turkey gripped by
turmoil Dow Jones Political Woes In Turkey's Shifts Focus To Debt Dynamics Reuters
Analysis- Bid for power as political fog
enshrouds Turkey.
Dýþ Basýnda Türkiye Debka
File - US Promises Iraq’s Turkomans Autonomy
|
H3
The Economist A
government on the brink Wall
Street JournalEcevit Must Go By
ASLA AYDINTASBAS Stratfor
Despite Resignations, Turkey Not Yet Ready for New
Elections Financial
Times Turkey pins hopes on
reformist alliance Daily Telegraph - Ecevit faces calls to quit as more ministers resign Independent Ailing Ecevit defies pressure from
resigning ministers RFE/RL
Turkey: Defections Rock
Ruling Party, Increase Pressure On Ecevit | ||
|
H4 New York
Times U.S. Considers Wary Jordan as Base for an Attack on
Iraq Senate Panel to Ask
Bush Aides to Give Details on His Iraq Policy Editorial
The Corporate Scandals: Cleaning Up – Coming
Clean
Another Attempt to
Legislate Corporate Honesty |
H5 Washington
Post Editorial Capitalism and
Conscience Bush Urges Crackdown
On Business Corruption |
H6 Guardian - Mr Bush's basic
credibility problem is that he is the leader of a laissez faire political
movement. He was nominated and elected by people who want fewer
constraints on business, not more We've had smart
sanctions; now make way for dumb boycotts Dissident
blueprint gathers support - Rebel Kurds at
heart of plan to split country into two regions Rebel
groups reject CIA overtures down on the farm
Jordan refuses to
allow launchpad for invasion | ||
|
H7 Arab Press Review
When will the Arabs
realize that the US has declared war on them? Knesset
vote on ‘Jews-only’ land bill postponed |
H8 Ha'aretz Intelligence to tell Ya'alon that Arafat is
'dead man walking' Senate Cmte. chair:
U.S. should tackle Mideast terror camps Gideon Samet on
Israeli politics Jerusalem
Post LOUIS
RENE BERES'S Seeking serious strategists |
|||
|
H10 The Economist – IMF - Calling the wrong
shots? |
H11 AFP Al-Qaeda member says bin Laden, Omar alive and well:
report CNN
Newspaper
says Iraq will defend Persian Gulf World
Tribune.com Arafat told U.S. will
never deal with him again UPI
Palestinians plan for
post-Arafat regime |
H12 RFE/RL Russia: Are Oil Exports To U.S. A New Strategic
Trade? NATO: Analyst
Considers Role Of Expanded Alliance Leaked Document Shows
White House Rift Over War With Iraq Planners Weigh
Military Campaigns For Best Way To Oust Iraqi Leader | ||
|
H13 Christian Science Monitor After
21 months of intifada, a wall is born - Israeli fortifications along the West Bank recall
other historic barriers. Central
Asia: the next front in the terror war?
After
fighting alongside the Taliban last fall, Uzbek insurgents on Bush's
terrorist list are now regrouping |
H14 Los
Angeles Times U.S. Seeks 29 Who Gained Visas in Scheme - Manhunt:
Officials say two men who roomed with Sept. 11 hijacking suspects are
among 71 people who received permits in Qatar.
Palestinians
Must Accept Accountability -
The key to reform is oversight and U.S. involvement. By DENNIS ROSS
Don't Dither as
Hussein Builds Nuclear Devices By RANAN R. LURIE |
H15 International Herald Tribune – Balkans - An
unreal peace process, by Carl Bildt Afghanistan
- The welcome is going sour | ||
|
H16 The Times - Put
a war with Iraq in the diary for January Leader- Bush
and big business - Time
to penalise the fraudsters but not the
markets |
H17 Independent
George Bush's past makes him the ideal person to clean up corporate
America
Change
must come from the top; it is in the self-interest of the fat cats to
leave more of the cream for the rest of society
Hamish
McRae
Leader
Europe's farmers should not be allowed to go on harvesting
subsidies
Israel
accused of 'racist ideology' with plan to prevent Arabs buying
homes
|
H18 Financial
Times The hard
road to Baghdad, by Michael O’Hanlon Editorial
– Bush’s anger Pakistan's
generals appear to embody the dictum that those who do not remember the
past are condemned to relive it. | ||
|
H19 RFE/RL Iran report |
External link – CSIS – If we Fight
Iraq, by Anthony Cordesman |
H21 Washington Post on Kusadasý and
Istanbul | ||
|
New York Times/ Washington Post |
Slate (American Press Review/
International Press Review) |
Russia / Caucasus / Asia / Middle East / Arab Press Review / Israeli Press Review Ed.s
from the Hebrew Press / Ha'aretz
/ Jerusalem Post / Debka
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
(RFE/RL)
World Media Reaction (USIA) Periodicals / Think-tanks / Stratfor / Book reviews FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service) | ||
On Turkey
See also Turkey
in Foreign Press by Basýn Yayýn, German
Press on Turkey, French
Press on Turkey
The Economist
A government on the
brink
Jul 9th 2002
From The Economist Global Agenda
Turkey is the International Monetary Fund’s biggest
borrower, an applicant to join the European Union, the only Muslim country in
the NATO defence pact and a key strategic partner of the United States. Now its
government is collapsing
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Ecevit the unwell |
THE three-party coalition government of Bulent Ecevit, the ailing Turkish prime minister, has been thrown into chaos by the resignations this week of a number of important ministers and members of parliament. There are few palatable political options facing Turkey. Early elections might let a pro-Islamic party, currently the country’s most popular party, into government. But this is a prospect which dismays not only Turkey’s western allies, but also its secular generals. With the existing government coalition falling apart, delaying elections promises only continuing paralysis and endless squabbling at a time when the government faces pressing economic and political decisions. The resignations dealt a blow to Turkey’s struggling economy, with the value of the Turkish currency falling by nearly 5% on July 8th to a record low against the American dollar.
Turkey’s current mess stems from the refusal of 77-year-old Mr Ecevit to name a successor and to step aside. He has spent more than two months in bed under the care of his autocratic wife, Rahsan, and his afflictions range from a spinal disorder via cracked ribs and a thrombosis to loss of appetite. Despite this, he has clung mulishly to power, refusing repeated calls for him to step down and insisting instead that he must remain in charge until April 2004, when parliamentary elections are due. In so doing, he is putting at risk not only a crucial economic-recovery programme being overseen by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but the very future of Turkey, a strategic pivot between Europe and the Middle East.
Mr Ecevit’s stubbornness has now proved too much even for his closest political allies. Husamettin Ozkan, a deputy prime minister from Mr Ecevit’s party, who is widely credited with bridging differences within the coalition, resigned on Monday July 8th, followed by two other ministers and the deputy parliamentary speaker. All are members of Mr Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP). Other members of the DSP have now begun to defect in droves. The defectors issued a statement claiming that their resignations had been sparked by the “disloyalty” which Mr Ecevit had displayed towards Mr Ozkan, an apparent reference to an earlier agreement to step aside in his favour.
What happens next is difficult to see. The ruling coalition has been an awkward one: Mr Ecevit’s DSP, the centre-right Motherland party and the far-right Nationalist Action Party. Yet until recently it has been among the more stable governments in Turkey’s modern history, pushing through sweeping financial reforms endorsed by the IMF, which lent it $16 billion earlier this year to help it roll over its $200 billion in public debt. The government also seemed ready to face up to a series of tough political decisions. But this success has been threatened by Mr Ecevit’s prolonged ill health and refusal to hand over to a successor.
If early elections are held, polls suggest that none of the parties in the ruling coalition would even get the 10% of votes needed to win seats at all and that Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamic-minded White party would grab the biggest share. That would upset Turkey’s American allies, who distrust his attitude to the West and to Israel. It would also upset Turkey’s fiercely secular generals. Most probably they would block Mr Erdogan’s road to power, and in so doing further tarnish Turkey’s democratic credentials.
On the other hand, patching together a new government will not be easy, and may take time that Turkey can ill afford. Some Turkish newspapers are speculating that Mr Ozkan will now form a new parliamentary party and bring the coalition back together again. Another possible government leader is the foreign minister, Ismail Cem, also a member of Mr Ecevit’s party and a committed Europhile. He is well liked by the public, though less so within his own party. But the best choice, for many Turks and western governments, would be Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, who was brought in last year from a job at the World Bank. He is hardworking, honest, personable and a firm backer of the sorts of changes sought both by the European Union (EU) and the IMF. The snag is that he is not now a member of any party, let alone Mr Ecevit’s. And with an American wife and German mother, he may well seem too foreign to Turkey’s conservative rural masses. Some analysts say that Mr Ozkan and Mr Dervis might now be able to unite to form a party which could command enough support to head a new coalition.
But there may be a snag to that as well: Devlet Bahceli, the Nationalist leader and also deputy prime minister. His party was the second-largest in parliament. He helped spark the current crisis when he threatened to pull out of the ruling coalition. He has refused to agree to any deal which the government might strike with the opposition to end the death penalty, something that has been demanded by the EU as the price of membership. It would also spare the neck of Abdullah Ocalan, the captured Kurdish rebel leader. Mr Bahceli, who has aspirations to lead the government himself, is now head of the largest party in parliament. If Turkey’s non-executive president, Necdet Sezer, now asked Mr Bahceli to head a new coalition, the IMF and EU would be appalled. Mr Bahceli’s party is ultra-nationalist (some call it neo-fascist) and its forebear, in the 1970s and 1980s, was engaged in street violence and racketeering. Mr Bahceli is still inclined to make populist promises that would scupper the IMF’s efforts to put Turkey’s budget back into shape and inveighs against easing bans on Kurdish-language education and broadcasting.
These, along with abolition of the death penalty and ending torture in police cells and prisons, are among the demands made by the EU before it will name a date for starting negotiations on Turkish membership. The government last month decided to lift the state of emergency in two mainly Kurdish provinces in the south-east, leaving only Diyarbakir and Sirnak, which is on the Iraqi border, under such rule. But parents across Turkey are still being prosecuted for giving their children Kurdish names, and publications fined for using the letter W, part of the Kurdish alphabet but not the Turkish one, on the ground that such things encourage ethnic separatism.
An accord in Cyprus remains out of reach, which increases the risk that the EU will admit what would, in practice, be only the Greek-run bit of the island on its own—and that Turkey’s own hopes of EU membership would be swamped by nationalist and Islamist sentiment. Turkey, as one EU diplomat puts it, might then go down “the Uzbek road”, becoming nothing more than “an aircraft-carrier for the Americans” from which to harry Iraq and Iran. That need not happen. The great majority of Turks, and indeed Turkish Cypriots, want to join the EU. That may mean some arm-twisting of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish-Cypriot leader but that, in turn, requires a Turkish government confident that it can remain in power.
All members of the ruling, and now crumbling, coalition have reasons to avoid an early election, which could bring electoral ruin to each of them. But whether they can agree a new government, and one that can continue to push through painful economic and political changes, remains to be seen. One thing seems certain: they do not have much time left. Turkey needs to keep borrowing to finance its debt, and if there are two things that lenders hate, they are a collapsing currency and endless uncertainty.
Ecevit Must Go
By ASLA AYDINTASBAS
What we're witnessing in Turkey is the slow-motion dissolution of a government. The deputy prime minister, five other cabinet ministers and over 30 lawmakers have resigned this week. The only one not getting the message is the ailing prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, who refuses to speed things up and put an end to his dysfunctional government. Everyone else seems resigned to the fact that there will be early elections this fall or early next year.
The polls will not be a minute too soon. A shaky union of the far right, the center and the left, the ruling coalition has been wasting much of the past year fighting over Europe, the economy, political reform and Mr. Ecevit's poor health. The 77-year old social democrat's damaged vertebra, leg infection, weakening bones, frequent gaffes and recent 10-week sick leave from office have harmed the beleaguered lira and the country's political fortunes. Turkey's politically active generals and its Western allies have propped up the coalition for the sake of stability. But critical decisions on reforms needed to bring Turkey closer to the EU, on the Kurdish issue, and on possible U.S. military action on Iraq, require a strong national will, not merely an arithmetic majority. The best way forward for Turkey is to renew national confidence at the ballot box.
Turkey (and Israel) seems determined to prove that when a Middle Eastern country is a democracy, it is doomed to insufferable coalition governments. The military coup in 1980 left the Turkish political scene fragmented, with numerous parties on the right and left led by people who'd rather run their parties into the ground than relinquish control. Mr. Ecevit is but one example.
The determination of the staunchly secular Turkish military to keep Islamists out of power added a new dimension in the late 1990s. The armed forces only had to flex their muscles to force an Islamist-led cabinet out in 1996, in what could be called a "post-modern coup." Since then, "anyone-but-the-Islamists" has been the untold creed of Turkish political life. But cordons sanitaire rarely produce strong governments.
Mr. Ecevit started off well enough. A Sanskrit scholar and intellectual, he emerged from the 1999 elections as a national consensus figure. He had been the leader of a nationalist faction of the left for decades, oversaw Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus and spent time in prison following the 1980 coup. Despite internal opposition from its junior partner, the euroskeptic Nationalist Action Party, the coalition backed critical political and economic reforms, eventually winning a long-awaited candidacy status from a half-willing European Union.
Then things began to go badly. A temper tantrum during a cabinet meeting two years ago brought about the worst economic meltdown of the modern republic. During a high-level national security council meeting, Mr. Ecevit and his deputy Husamettin Ozkan grew uncontrollably emotional in a quarrel with Turkey's new president, accusing him of disloyalty for refusing to sign a constitutional decree. The ensuing fiscal crisis devastated the banking industry and led to an austerity program backed by the International Monetary Fund. With the government too weak to protest, and with no regard for the social cost of its "balanced-budget" motto, the IMF wanted to raise taxes. Fixated on lowering Turkey's double-digit inflation, the Fund prescription destroyed Turkey's dynamic business environment.
Not surprisingly, the economy has shrunk by 9.4% this year; unemployment is at an all time high; small-and-medium sized businesses are disappearing. The IMF opposes tax breaks of any kind, recently even suggesting taxing a planned free-trade zone.
In all of this, perhaps no one paid a higher personal price than Mr. Ecevit himself. With the slogan, "There is no alternative government" (that would appease the military, meet the EU demands, and continue the economic program), the ailing PM was kept going by a team of doctors. As public pressure for resignation has built, each hospital visit, each broken bone, sent shockwaves through markets, with the lira plunging almost 20% in the last few weeks to reach the incredible rate of 1,690,000 to the dollar. The nationalists have blocked the abolishment of the death penalty and the legalization of Kurdish-language education -- two key EU demands.
Polls show the overwhelming majority of Turks say Mr. Ecevit should go -- as does the business community. The upcoming elections will likely turn into an unofficial plebiscite on Europe and the death penalty, which many would like to see applied to captured Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. The elections, however, will be meaningful only if they allow the current political leaders to pass the torch to a new generation of leaders. In Turkey these days, there is no more popular theme than "change" -- everyone everywhere is chattering about "transforming the system," with aspirations ranging from more democratization and transparency to Europeanization.
Several potential leaders have emerged and are waiting for the old guard to hand over power. Among these are former World Bank official Kemal Dervis, currently the economics minister, and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. Both are enormously popular. They could help unite the centrist voter who feels betrayed by the endless bickering between existing party leaders.
The raison d'etre of the Ecevit-led coalition was largely to create a workable solution that would keep government secular. Next time, there has to be a vision other than fear of Islamists. Even if a strong leader cannot emerge, Turkey's next coalition can at least be a partnership of like-minded parties.
Ms. Aydintasbas is a Turkish writer based in New York.
Updated July 10, 2002
Political Turmoil In Turkey Weighs On IMF
Program.
By Hugh Pope.
Political Turmoil
In Turkey Weighs On IMF Program - Ministers' Resignations
Threaten to Stall Progress On Economic Recovery.
ISTANBUL,
Turkey - Three government ministers resigned their posts
yesterday in Turkey, deepening political uncertainty at a time
when the country is nurturing a fragile economic recovery and struggling to
implement the world's largest International Monetary Fund
package.
Resigning were Deputy Prime Minister Husamettin Ozkan, the
long-serving No. 2 for Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, and two
other ministers from Mr. Ecevit's Democratic Left Party.
Following their lead, 18 Democratic Left lawmakers resigned from the party's
parliamentary group. More parliamentarians were expected to follow.
A
government shuffle is inevitable, possibly followed by early parliamentary
elections. Both scenarios would paralyze decision making in this pivotal country
of 65 million people between Europe and the Middle East. But major change in
state policy looks unlikely, since Turkey's weak and feuding
political parties have been dominated for the past five years by the powerful,
pro-Western Turkish Armed Forces.
"It's a crisis of confidence [in Mr.
Ecevit]," said Istemihan Talay, after resigning as minister of
culture.
The crisis, which is expected to significantly weaken the
Democratic Left Party, has been gathering force since early May, when the
77-year-old Mr. Ecevit became sick and unable to work. Despite
insisting that he is fit to rule, his halting appearances on television sent
Turkish markets plummeting. The Turkish lira has dropped 18% since May 1 and
fell 3% yesterday to 1,650,000 lira to the dollar. It briefly touched a record
low of 1,680,000 lira to the dollar in trading during the day.
As Mr.
Ecevit has weakened, his wife, Rahsan Ecevit,
78, moved to isolate Mr. Ozkan and seize control of the party she had created in
the 1980s with her husband.
The instability in Mr.
Ecevit's party comes at a delicate moment for the government,
which is under attack by a group of pro-Europe politicians. They are pushing for
a new coalition government without the far-right-wing National Action Party,
which is headed by another deputy prime minister, Devlet Bahceli. They believe
only a new government can push political changes through parliament by October
in order to advance Turkey's struggling application for European Union membership.
Since the coalition government came to power
in 1999, Mr. Bahceli has resisted democratic changes required for EU membership,
such as lifting the death penalty, as well as painful economic reforms required
by the IMF program.
Mr. Bahceli won't give up easily. His National Action
Party is now the biggest party in parliament, with 127 of 550 seats. On Sunday,
he called for parliamentary elections in November, ahead of their due date in
April 2004.
The political turbulence will slow changes needed to keep on
track the $16 billion IMF program, a symbol of the
IMF's ability to help
developing countries. After suffering years of unemployment, high inflation and
a 9.4% contraction of the economy last year, Turkey recently
began to show signs of rising production and slower inflation. Annual consumer
inflation fell to 42.6% at the end of June, from 68.5% at the end of 2001.
Stratfor Despite
Resignations, Turkey Not Yet Ready for New Elections
9 July 2002
Summary
Mass
defections from Turkey's ruling coalition over the refusal of ailing Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit to step down have raised the likelihood of early
elections. However, none of the steps needed for such an action have yet been
taken, indicating that the country's political parties have more maneuvering to
do before they are ready to go to the polls.
Analysis
Turkish
Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit defied calls for his resignation July 9 and instead
replaced three ministers who quit the government the previous day to protest his
refusal to step down in the face of chronic health problems. So far 26
parliament members -- including four of Ecevit's own ministers -- have left his
governing coalition.
The political crisis has cost Ecevit's ruling
Democratic Left Party (DSP) its position as the single-largest party in
parliament, and it could set the stage for snap elections. But although many
legislators have demanded such polls, the steps needed to call a vote have yet
to be taken. This delay is due to internal wrangling in the government,
including among members of the ruling coalition who may hope to maintain the
current parliament rather than face elections.
If early elections do
take place, they would give Islamist group Justice and Development -- the most
popular political party in Turkey -- a chance to take power in the government.
This would trigger an intervention from Turkey's military, which has shown a
willingness in the past to involve itself in the government's affairs if it
feels the country's secular status is threatened. The crisis has also triggered
uncertainty in Turkey's already troubled economy, causing the lira to sink to an
all-time low against the dollar.
However, the government is still far
from collapsing, and there are several political maneuverings that could occur
in the meantime. Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer could ask Ecevit to remain
in power for the short term and pick a prime minister designate. This would give
Ecevit's party leverage in trying to rebuild the coalition.
Should the
prime minister decide to step down voluntarily, the party with the largest
number of seats would be asked to try and form a government. Ruling coalition
partner National Movement Party (MHP) now has the largest number of seats in
parliament with 129 and would become the new government leader. However, Ecevit
has shown he is in no hurry to give up his post.
If neither of these
scenarios bears fruit, then early elections become increasingly likely. The
members of Ecevit's own party, including former deputy prime minister and
right-hand man Husamettin Ozkan, who have quit may try to form their own party
in order to run in new elections or design their own coalition. The formation of
a new party led by Ozkan could change the balance of power in parliament and
possibly even create opportunity for the formation of an alternative coalition
government.
Other parties are also pushing for early polls. Deputy Prime
Minister Mesut Yilmaz, leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), the third ruling
coalition partner, also supports early polls, reported the Turkish daily Hurriyet. Yilmaz called for an extraordinary parliament session next week where
a vote to call new elections can be held.
Signatures from 110 lawmakers
are necessary in order to convene such a session, but getting them will be easy.
The question, however, is whether the opposition parties and the now dissident
factions of the ruling coalition can round up the number of votes needed to win
a new poll. There are 550 seats in the National Assembly, and a simple majority
-- or 226 votes -- is required.
Ecevit's party is now down to 110 seats
while the MHP holds 129 seats. Even together these two factions could not
prevent new elections if the third coalition partner, ANAP, uses its 86 votes to
side with opposition parties.
Ecevit is scheduled to meet with MHP
leader Devlet Bahceli in an attempt to rebuild his fracturing coalition, Reuters
reported July 9. But there's no guarantee that the party will play along, as
Bahceli called this week for early elections as a means of pressuring Ecevit to
resign.
At the moment, none of the three ruling coalition partners are
petitioning for the extraordinary parliament session. And the opposition will
not push for it until it's sure it can get the simple majority needed. Both
sides are holding out, trying to negotiate agreements with other parties and
form alliances.
Opinion polls indicate that the popular pro-Islamist
Justice and Development party might sweep early elections if held. This in turn
could prompt the military to step in and either cancel the polls, dissolve
parliament or even repeat its actions of 1997, when it forced a recently elected
pro-Islamist prime minister to crack down on his own party and then pushed him
to resign a month later.
Few among Turkey's current political leaders
want to risk losing to the Islamists, which could endanger the country's chances
for gaining entry to the European Union and receiving debt relief from the
International Monetary Fund. A possible Islamist victory is also a concern to
Washington, which is counting on Turkey's cooperation for a possible attack on
Iraq.
Having started the ball rolling, the former members of Ecevit's
party -- especially Ozkan -- will be eager to form an alliance that will put
them into the driver's seat in parliament. That however may not be possible, as
it will be difficult to convince enough legislators to join their side to give
any possible new coalition that is formed a parliamentary majority. The next few
days will be telling, as the amount of effort made to gather signatures for an
extraordinary parliament session will signal the desire for new
elections.
Financial Times
|
Turkey pins
hopes on reformist alliance |
|
By Leyla
Boulton in Ankara and FT.com staff |
|
Published: July
9 2002 14:48 | Last Updated: July 9 2002 21:05 |
Turkish
financial markets and reformist politicians on Tuesday clung to hopes that a new
reformist alliance led by Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, could yet emerge
to help the country out of its political and financial
turmoil.
The resignation
of another cabinet minister, bringing the total to five in three days; the fall
of the lira to another record low against the dollar; and a revision from
Standard & Poors rating agency, all conspired against Bulent Ecevit
(pictured), prime minister, who is already under pressure to resign
or call early elections.
However, Mr
Ecevit, 77, whose ill health sparked the current political ructions, gave no
signs that he was ready to stand down.
Amid a flurry
of meetings by all of the major political players on Tuesday, Mr Ecevit began
replacing some of the ministers who have resigned. "I had the opportunity to ask
him whether he would resign and he told me that he saw the difficulty in the
continuation of the government but that he had not yet come to the point of
resignation," said Tansu Ciller, leader of the True Path opposition
party.
Mr Dervis, a
respected technocrat who is credited with rescuing Turkey from financial crisis
last year on Tuesday met Ismail Cem, the foreign minister and a key figure in Mr
Ecevit's Democratic Left party. He was also expected to meet Husamettin Ozkan,
whose resignation as deputy prime minister on Monday triggered the departure of
at least a quarter of Mr Ecevit's DSP parliamentary party. Mr Ozkan is said by
Turkish media to be planning a new political group.
Despite no
formal political base, Mr Dervis gave few clues as to how he would fulfil a
promise he made late last week to play "a more active role in seeking a
political solution" to the financial turmoil.
The political
deliberations in Ankara will determine prospects both for an economic rescue
programme backed by the International Monetary Fund, as well as Turkey's bid to
persuade the European Union to set a date for starting accession talks at its
Copenhagen summit in December.
The IMF on
Tuesday began its latest inspection of Turkey's progress with a hitherto successful IMF-backed stabilisation programme.
Tempering
market nervousness, which on Tuesday forced the debt-ridden government to pay
unsustainably high interest rates on a $2.5bn bond auction, was hope that a more
promising landscape could emerge after two months of political deadlock. "The
determining factor of everything will be how Cem and Dervis react," said one
reformist member of Mr Ecevit's DSP. "They occupy a common front that carries a
lot of weight."
As if to
acknowledge such sentiments, Mr Dervis emerged from a meeting with Mr Cem to
declare that "in coming months it's very important to speed up the EU process
and align Turkey with Europe irrevocably".
Much depends
on what Mr Ecevit does. It is unclear how much longer Mr Ecevit can resist
pressure to step down.
The Times
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Daily Telegraph
Ecevit faces
calls to quit as more ministers resign
By
Amberin Zaman in Istanbul
(Filed: 10/07/2002)
Turkey's prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, was facing mounting pressure to step down yesterday as two more cabinet ministers and several MPs joined the exodus from his Left-wing party.
The chance of his three-party coalition surviving appeared increasingly slim in the face of the defections, which began on Monday after the deputy prime minister, Husammettin Ozkan, a key Ecevit aide, said he was leaving the government.
The turmoil engulfing Turkey has cast doubt over reforms being demanded by the European Union as a pre-condition for membership talks with the Turks.
The more immediate worry is that it will derail a recovery programme backed by the International Monetary Fund that is trying to drag the country out of its worst recession since 1945.
The rebellion within Mr Ecevit's Democratic Left party was triggered by his refusal to name a successor to take over as prime minister.
After a range of illnesses, Mr Ecevit has stayed away from his office for the past two months and is widely seen as unfit to govern Turkey.
Should the number of MPs leaving Mr Ecevit's party surpass 59, the coalition would lose its parliamentary majority, triggering the government's collapse.
The political crisis is being anxiously followed by the Bush administration. Turkey is a strategic pivot between Europe and Asia, a Nato member and Israel's closest regional ally.
Kemal Dervis, the economy minister, is seen by many as the best man to lead Turkey. However, he is not an MP, which bars him from being prime minister.
Another contender is Ismail Cem, the pro-European foreign minister, who is from Mr Ecevit's wing of the coalition.
With the defections, ultra-nationalists have overtaken Mr Ecevit's party to become the largest group in the 550-member chamber, with 127 seats. They are likely to pay a pivotal role in shaping any future government.
According to recent opinion polls, Istanbul's former Islamist mayor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his Ak or White party would garner the largest number of votes.
The fiery Mr Erdogan has sought to re-invent himself as a moderate who does not believe in mixing religion with politics. But he has failed to sway the generals, who remain at the forefront of a vigorous campaign to snuff out political Islam.
Independent
Ailing Ecevit defies pressure from resigning ministers
By Pelin Turgut in Istanbul
10 July 2002
The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, ailing and alone, defied pressure to step down yesterday despite further top-level resignations and the prospect of early elections.
Three more cabinet ministers – the Education minister, Metin Bostancioglu, and State ministers Hasan Gemici and Mustafa Yilmaz – and nine other MPs from Mr Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) resigned yesterday. One legislator, however, quickly returned to the party.
The departures raised to 32 the number of MPs who have deserted Mr Ecevit from a party that had only 128 members in the 550-seat parliament. Five cabinet ministers have quit Mr Ecevit's DSP in two days in protest at the 77-year-old premier's refusal to heed public pressure to relinquish power due to protracted ill health that has left him unable to work.
Mr Ecevit named replacements for three of the posts but steadfastly refused to make any comment on the government's future or appear in public. The opposition leader Tansu Ciller said Mr Ecevit had told her yesterday that he "had not yet come to the point of resignation".
But early elections now seem inevitable. The junior coalition partner and Motherland Party leader, Mesut Yilmaz, called for a new government. Mr Ecevit's major coalition partner, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), is already lobbying for polls on 3 November. The group is expected to have collected the 110 signatures needed to recall parliament from summer recess by today.
Polls held any later than September would almost certainly crush Turkey's hopes of passing legislation necessary to start accession talks with the European Union after the Copenhagen summit in December. "It's back to square one with the EU," ran the headline in the Radikal daily newspaper.
Mr Yilmaz said: "We should form a new government in order to pass the EU reforms before December. I think we owe this to next generations. If we can't make it until December, it will cost the happiness and welfare of at least one generation."
The odd left-right coalition which took power in 1999 has come to loggerheads a number of times over human rights reforms demanded by the EU, including measures to allow broadcasting and education in Kurdish, and to abolish the death penalty.
The right-wing MHP, Mr Ecevit's hardline coalition supporters, are deeply suspicious of Europe and have opposed abolishing the death penalty until Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish separatist leader who is under death sentence on an island jail, is hanged.
The MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli, signalled the end of the alliance on Sunday by calling for polls in November – a year and a half ahead of schedule.
But it is uncertain whom voters might return at the ballot box. Opinion polls suggest all three coalition parties now in power might have trouble even crossing the 10 per cent threshold needed to qualify for seats in parliament. In Ankara, the staunchly secularist generals are worried by surveys that suggest that were elections held today, the big winner would be the Islamist Justice and Development Party and its youthful and widely popular leader, Tayyip Erdogan. Any such victory could prompt a confrontation with the military.
The prospect of going to the polls with an ailing Mr Ecevit at the helm has spurred desertions. Centre-left candidates likely to muster enough appeal to challenge Mr Erdogan at the ballot box include Ismail Cem, the Foreign minister, and Kemal Dervis, Turkey's Economy minister, but neither have commented yet.
Early polls could disrupt a £10.7bn International Monetary Fund rescue plan to help Turkey recover from its worst post-1945 recession. The political chaos comes as Turkey has taken over leadership of the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan and Washington is considering military action against Iraq. Turkey borders Iraq and hosted aircraft in the Gulf War.
RFE/RL Turkey: Defections Rock Ruling Party,
Increase Pressure On Ecevit
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
Turkey's political crisis deepened over the past two days with the resignation of several cabinet ministers of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party, or DSP. In addition, a string of DSP deputies also left the party, significantly affecting the balance of forces in parliament. DSP officials say they are expecting more resignations today after conservative Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz joined his voice to that of far-right leader Devlet Bahceli and called for early legislative elections.
Prague, 9 July 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's coalition cabinet is teetering on the verge of collapse, less than 24 hours after three of its members -- all of them members of his Democratic Left Party, or DSP -- handed in their resignations and as new resignations followed today.
In remarks broadcast on state television this morning, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said Turkey has entered a "political crisis," leaving him and other political leaders with the task of getting over it "with the least-possible damage for Turkey."
Using even stronger imagery, Turkish media described the latest events as an "earthquake" set to seriously affect the country's political landscape.
Adding to the overall sense of urgency, the International Monetary Fund yesterday urged Ankara, its biggest debtor, to implement a three-year, $16 billion emergency aid package meant to help Turkey out of its worst economic crisis since the end of World War II.
The latest political turmoil was prompted by the surprise resignation of Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister Husamettin Ozkan, a man believed to have been Ecevit's closest aid for the past 11 years.
In a statement issued yesterday after a meeting with Ecevit, Ozkan said he was stepping down on Ecevit's request, suggesting a rift over Turkey's economic and political situation.
Shortly thereafter, DSP State Minister Recep Onal and DSP Culture Minister Istemihan Talay said they, too, were stepping down and relinquishing their DSP parliamentary seats. Under the constitution, the prime minister and all cabinet members are chosen from among parliamentarians.
Addressing a crowd of supporters in his hometown of Zonguldak, State Minister Hasan Gemici today said he is also resigning from both the government and the DSP. He explained that his decision was caused by disenchantment with Ecevit's leadership. "A lack of confidence in the Turkish people and a lack of hope are making our country's problems even more difficult. Up until today, I was expecting that DSP secretary-general and prime minister, Mr. Ecevit, would take new steps to clear the way for the party, the government, and for Turkey. Yet, this has not happened," Gemici said.
In addition to these cabinet resignations, more than 20 other DSP parliamentarians, including parliamentary Deputy Chairman Ali Iliksoy, left the ranks of Ecevit's party, which, up until yesterday, had only a one-seat majority in the 550-member parliament, the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
As a result of the ongoing shake-up, the DSP has already dropped to second position with fewer than 100 seats, far behind Deputy Prime Minister Devlet Bahceli's far-right Nationalist Action Party, or MHP, which has 127 seats.
DSP officials say they are expecting more resignations in the near future, but claim that the overall number of defectors should not exceed 30.
Ecevit, who is seen as the man responsible for the current crisis, has not commented on the latest political developments. Today, he appointed DSP State Minister Sukru Sina Gurel to replace Ozkan. Other vacant ministerial posts were also filled.
The present turmoil follows weeks of speculation over the coalition cabinet's future, prompted by concerns about the prime minister's health. The 77-year-old Ecevit has been absent from office for most of the past two months amid a long series of ailments, including intestinal troubles, a muscular nervous disorder, and blood clots in one leg.
Ecevit has been facing increasing pressure in recent weeks -- from the media, the business community, and his own party -- to step down before his term expires in April 2004. Yet, the three-time prime minister has persistently rejected calls for his resignation, arguing his early departure would plunge the country into greater chaos.
At stake is not only the future of Turkey's economy but also key reforms needed to qualify for entry into the European Union.
Ankara, which applied for EU membership in 1987 but stands last among 13 candidates, wants Brussels to set a date for the start of accession talks by the end of this year. But the EU insists that Turkey first proceed with steps to abolish the death penalty and bestow greater cultural rights to its 12-million-strong Kurdish minority. The EU also wants Turkey to show more flexibility on the issue of the divided Mediterranean island of Cyprus.
In tune with the military, which wields considerable influence over Turkish politics, far-right leader and senior coalition partner Bahceli is opposed to such changes, which, he argues, pose a threat to the country's national interests.
Addressing an MHP meeting in the western city of Bursa on 7 July, Bahceli said early legislative elections should be organized in on 3 November. It was the first time a cabinet member had made such a suggestion.
In a statement read to the press the next day, MHP senior official Koray Aydin said Bahceli would take steps to convene an emergency parliamentary session to debate the possibility of an early poll while leaving the present cabinet untouched. "The chairman of the MHP parliamentary group [Bahceli] summoned me to the prime minister's office and instructed me to start collecting the required number of signatures from MHP deputies to call an emergency session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 1 September," Aydin said.
The constitution requires the signatures of only 110 deputies for the convention of emergency sessions of parliament. Should the National Assembly decide to move ahead with early polls, a simple majority of votes would be required.
Bahceli's motives suddenly to call for early elections are not clear. He had repeatedly rejected the possibility before, saying no election should be held before the mandate of the present legislature expires in April 2004.
On 7 July, the MHP leader told his supporters he was prompted by an urgent need to end political uncertainty. Yet, critics point out that should elections be organized in November, it would not leave the new legislature enough time to vote in more democratic laws before the EU decides in December on a time frame for its enlargement process.
Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, who oversees relations with Brussels in Ecevit's cabinet and heads the third coalition party (the Motherland Party), described Bahceli's proposed timetable as "totally unacceptable from the viewpoint of Turkey's relations with the EU." Therefore, Yilmaz said, should an early poll be organized, it should take place no later than late September.
Political analysts also believe Bahceli's proposal is aimed at preventing alleged plans to oust the MHP from the current coalition and replace it with former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True Path Party (DYP), the largest opposition group in parliament.
Experts argue that such a scenario would allow Turkey to proceed rapidly with EU-oriented reforms, since Ciller is seen as generally more favorable to the legal changes demanded by Brussels than Bahceli. Such plans also envisage that a new prime minister would be appointed to replace Ecevit.
Among possible contenders to succeed the veteran leader, Turkish media cite outgoing Deputy Prime Minister Ozkan, State Minister Kemal Dervis, and Foreign Minister Ismail Cem.
Reuters quoted financial analysts as saying that Turkish markets, which registered a nearly 5 percent drop yesterday in the morning session amid renewed concerns over political instability, would welcome any coalition cabinet that would include Dervis or Cem.
Cem, a heavyweight in Ecevit's DSP and a prominent advocate of EU-related reforms, cut short his vacation to return to Ankara and hold consultations with Dervis today.
A former World Bank director, Dervis returned to his native country in March of last year at Ecevit's request to take over the reins of the economy and spearhead the government's efforts to extirpate Turkey from financial turmoil. Dervis, who is not affiliated with any existing party, has repeatedly said in recent months that he was considering entering politics.
In an interview with CNN-Turk on 7 July, Ecevit responded to media speculation regarding Dervis's alleged political ambitions by saying a government of technocrats would not be suitable for Turkey.
The prime minister once again rejected calls for his resignation, a stance reiterated by the DSP parliamentary group's deputy chairman, Emrehan Halici, on 8 July. "We are not considering early elections. We believe it is necessary that elections should be held as scheduled," Halici said.
Political analysts believe, however, that recent defections within the ruling party have left Ecevit with few alternatives.
"With the DSP in such a bad shape, the only option left for Ecevit is to accept early elections and try to lead the country to the polls," journalist Ilnur Cevik wrote in today's "Turkish Daily News."
"The genie is out of the bottle, and you can't put it back in," echoed columnist Ertugrul Ozkok in "Hurriyet" daily, also commenting on the prospect of early polls.
Daily
Star Turkey gripped by
turmoil
Turkey will remain in the grip of a political crisis
that is referred to as “political uncertainty” until the current government is
changed, or early legislative elections are held.
“Political uncertainty” is
a phrase that politicians and the media use frequently. But no one is trying to
pinpoint the meaning of such uncertainty. Is it the prolongation of the
government’s “sickness” along with the continued illness of Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit? Can simply changing the government end the uncertainty, or are
legislative elections needed? Or, does the uncertainty stem from the blocked
passage to the EU as Parliament begins its summer recess, postponing till the
autumn a decision on capital punishment, Kurdish language broadcasts and Kurdish
education? Or does uncertainty refer to the negative economic signals that are
pointing toward the outbreak of a third, huge economic crisis?
No one
can answer these questions and many others. Just as most politicians will not
give Ecevit a break from his suffering, they do not want the regime to renew
itself simply by relying on the mechanisms of democracy.
Ecevit continues to
head the government and sticks to the position that he fears a vacuum if he
withdraws. He is also unwilling to take responsibility for a bigger crisis that
could ensue if he were to quit the government.
Mesut Yilmaz, the deputy
premier and leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), would prefer to see the
government survive in its present form, or in a revived form so that it
continues to implement the reforms pertaining to Turkey’s pending membership of
the EU.
The government’s survival or demise hinges on Deputy Premier and
National Action Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli. He is exploiting this to
impose his own conditions on the government and to hinder Turkey from meeting
the EU membership requirements.
With Ecevit in ill health, Bahceli is
turning into a de facto prime minister, and has taken to chairing Cabinet
meetings in Ecevit’s absence. He has planted his supporters in various government departments, and casts himself before public opinion as the
nationalist who is trying to protect the “Turkish identity.”
So the “three
musketeers” are benefiting from the government’s survival. They agreed when they
met on July 4 that legislative elections should not be held before their scheduled date in 2004, because opinion polls show they would be trounced.
However, there are several indications that the current political map will not
retain its present shape for long.
Firstly, the government will not
remain unchanged if Ecevit withdraws. The leftist secular camp will not agree to
hand over the reins of power to a hard-line rightist prime minister such as
Bahceli. All indicators point to Ecevit’s inevitable departure. Government
leaders are therefore simply delaying the crunch.
Secondly, the campaign
against the government is widening. All economic bodies have joined the Society
of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists in demanding the government’s demise.
And the Union of Turkish Bourses and Chambers has called on Ecevit to
resign. Minister of State for the Economy Kemal Dervis has joined the campaign
by saying that the government has “completed its task.”
Thirdly,
influential external forces have joined those calling for a new government. One
prominent call was made by Britain’s Financial Times newspaper. It urged the
coalition parties to begin talks on forming a new government headed by an
acceptable figure if they wished to avoid the catastrophe of early elections and
wanted to carry on with the reforms that would open the way to EU membership.
Fourthly, there has been a sudden campaign against Ecevit by some of the
media that had previously supported him, led by prominent newspapers such as
Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah.
Hurriyet editor in chief Ertugrul Ozkok wrote
an article “begging” Ecevit to follow the example of former Russian leader Boris
Yeltsin, who stepped aside in favor of Vladimir Putin. Then came another very
harsh article in Hurriyet by Emin Colasan, who is known for his connections with
Turkey’s economic and military establishments, escalating the campaign against
Ecevit to a level that some described at “unethical.” Colasan accused Rahsan
Ecevit of neglecting her husband, his personal cleanliness and his food and of
preventing a nurse from entering the house to care for him.
Some attribute this sudden campaign to the situation within his own leftist
Democratic Left Party (DSP). Rahsan Ecevit is considered to be the party’s
“strongman,” and does not want to cede the party, when Bulent goes, to either
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem or to Deputy Premier Husamettin Ozkan. Hence, the
recent slander campaign has focused on her, and is aimed at weakening her
position within the party to the advantage of Cem and Ozkan.
Fifthly,
Bahceli’s call on July 7 for early legislative elections on Nov. 3 if this would
end the “political uncertainty” came as a surprise. That statement is most
certainly the biggest bombshell to date from any major figure within the government, and its repercussions will have many implications.
There have
been several differing opinions on how to interpret Bahceli’s step. One school
of thought holds that he was acting in the context of the widely publicized
findings of an opinion poll showing that the majority opposes making concessions
“under pressure” regarding capital punishment and the Kurdish language. This
enhances Bahceli’s own position, which opposes making such concessions.
Moreover, Bahceli is trying to prevent the government from surviving
until the autumn, when the issues of capital punishment and the Kurdish language
are supposed to be resolved. Such a step would allow him to dodge those issues,
not only by blowing the government apart, but by putting those issues directly
to the people.
But another school of thought holds that Bahecli knows that
he will not score a victory in such elections, because the electorate will not
hold him accountable over capital punishment or the Kurdish language, but over
the livelihoods that most people have lost because of the government’s economic
policies. Hence, his call for early elections is “insincere,” and is a way of
blackmailing his coalition partners, enhancing his own position in the
government that will be formed once Ecevit goes. That government will not hold
early elections before 2004.
Sixthly, adding to the list of surprise
developments was the “earthquake” that struck Ecevit’s DSP on July 8, after he
opted to expel Ozkan — his closest aide and possible successor both as party
leader and head of government. Three Cabinet ministers and 18 members of Parliament proceeded to resign from the DSP in solidarity with Ozkan. Ecevit had
suspected Ozkan of planning to oust him from office by putting together a new
governing coalition under his own leadership. His purge rules out any prospect
of that, and leaves Ecevit presiding over a weakened DSP in partnership with the
MHP and ANAP.
Faced with this succession of shocks to the government, the
political parties, and the country in general, with economic deterioration, and
with looming challenges over European Union accession and Cyprus, Turkey appears
to be in a state of near-total political and economic paralysis.
Partial and
temporary remedies are no longer of any avail. Early parliamentary elections,
this coming autumn or early next year, are imperative if Turkey is to recover a
modicum of political health.
Mohammad Noureddine is an expert on Turkish affairs. He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star
Dow Jones Political Woes In
Turkey's Shifts Focus To Debt Dynamics.
By Angela Pruitt.
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
NEW YORK
-(Dow Jones)-Political mayhem in Turkey has refocused Wall Street's
attention on the country's shaky debt dynamics.
Analysts say investors should
keep Turkish debt at arms length amid expectations of additional downside as
ailing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit saw his ruling coalition
crumble around him as a quarter of his party legislators defected following
Sunday's call for early elections by allied coalition members.
The political
chaos exacerbated concerns about the government's ability to remain on task with
reforms required in an economic program sponsored by the International Monetary
Fund, whose financial support has spared Turkey from a full-blown domestic
debt crisis.
The risk is the government will "take their eye off the ball,"
and the reform measures will come to a grinding halt, said Philip Poole, an
economist at ING Barings in London. He added that major missteps by the
government could compel the IMF to suspend future funding.
The prospect of
such a bearish scenario prompted Standard & Poor's Tuesday to downgrade its
outlook on Turkey to
negative from stable citing concerns that "political instability could persist
and jeopardize the IMF-supported economic program."
The IMF has provided
Turkey with some $31
billion in aid to help the country recover from a financial meltdown early last
year that forced a devaluation of the lira and caused 2 million workers to lose
their jobs.
Fitch Ratings sovereign analyst Nick Eisinger said the agency
will probably downgrade Turkey from its single-B rating if
in the next three months the political problems aren't resolved and interest
rates remain staggeringly high.
Amid the political noise, Turkey's bond spreads on J.P.
Morgan's Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus ballooned almost 130 basis points
since Friday's closing to 1,073 basis points over U.S. Treasurys.
The declines extended a depreciating streak seen in recent weeks triggered by
mounting concerns that Ecevit's poor health status would
prevent him from finishing out his term. The uncertainty pushed spread levels on
the EMBI+ subindex up some 500 basis points since tightening to their narrowest
level this year in late April. At the same time, the country's 2030 dollar bond
has declined about 26 points to its current 78 bid price.
"Downside risk for
bond prices remains very substantial," said Credit Suisse First Boston in a
report Tuesday, calling for investors slice their Turkish positions to
underweight from marketweight.
The investment bank said the political uncertainty is likely to dampen investors' confidence, thus likely making it
harder for the country to roll over its domestic debt.
Though the Turkish
Treasury managed to sell a total of TRL2,856 trillion ($1=TRL1,670,000) of
Treasury bills Tuesday, it paid through its nose as yields surged over 75% from
52% in early May.
Observers say without continued IMF support, Turkey won't be able to sustain for
long its domestic debt load at such exorbitant rates.
At the end of 2001, the
country's overall ratio of debt to gross domestic product surged to 98.5% from
53% the previous year, according to Fitch. The lira-denominated debt accounted
for some 65% of this stock.
Before Turkey's geopolitical importance to
the U.S. increased following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, investors took
comfort in the fact the U.S. Treasury and the IMF would stand behind the government financially even if it fell off the wagon at times on key
reforms.
"I don't see the IMF pulling the plugs," said ING's Poole, adding
the U.S. wants to see Turkey as an island of stability in
a broadly unstable region.
Therefore, it would be good for the IMF "to remain
engaged with Turkey
even if the government doesn't come up with goods with (meeting) targets," Poole
added.
But at the moment that might not provide much solace to investors who
have a weak stomach for volatility following Argentina's $141 billion bond
default in December and amid concerns that a debt crisis may erupt in
Brazil.
"The early elections would make Turkish risks very similar to the
current Brazilian risks," said Credit Suisse.
"The similarities between these
two countries would be many - high level of debt, domestic debt rollover risk,
high political risk for a few more months - however spreads are still quite
different," said the investment bank, noting the spread on the country's 2030
bond was 681 basis points tighter than Brazil's 2030 global.
Some analysts,
however, say that early elections in Turkey may actually be a blessing in
disguise as it gives the government a chance to recreate a more harmonious
government.
"I wouldn't buy the argument that a fresh election makes all bets
off for Turkey," said
Fitch's Eisinger, adding the government still has some flexibility in terms of
Treasury finance.
&P revises Turkey
outlook to negative on politics.
(Adds comments from Fitch, Moody's,
further background, byline)
By Susan Schneider
NEW YORK, July 9 (Reuters)
- Ratings agency Standard & Poor's revised its outlook on
Turkey to negative from stable on Tuesday because of mounting
political turmoil, one day after a string of political resignations put the
nation's three-party coalition government on a path to collapse.
More than 20
ministers and lawmakers deserted Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit's
Democratic Left Party (DSP) on Monday, raising concerns about the fate of an
IMF-backed recovery plan and Turkey's massive domestic debt
load.
"The outlook reflects concerns that political instability could persist
and jeopardize the IMF-supported economic program," said S&P Sovereign
Ratings Analyst Ala'a Al-Yousuf.
S&P also affirmed
Turkey's long-term sovereign debt rating of B-minus, or six
notches below investment grade.
Turkey's markets have taken
a turbulent turn since Ecevit, 77, fell ill two months ago.
With investors fretting that the prime minister's poor health would unravel his
coalition and jeopardize a $16 billion IMF program aimed at lifting the economy
from recession, interest rates have soared and debt payments have become more
costly.
The rightist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), another partner in
Ecevit's government, added to the political uncertainty with
its weekend calls for early elections. The move, along with the resignations in
Ecevit's DSP party, helped sink the lira currency and trample
the country's sovereign bonds on Monday.
NOT NECESSARILY A DISASTER
While
the outlook revision signals that a cut in Turkey's rating was
now more likely than before, rival ratings agency Fitch said it had no plans for
ratings action in the immediate term.
"We believe at this stage - certainly
for the next several weeks at least - the government continues to have a window
of opportunity and some maneuverability in terms of its financing," said Nick
Eisinger, a director in the sovereign ratings group at Fitch in
London.
Eisinger said that the collapse of the government in
Turkey would not automatically lead to financing problems, but
he said the ratings will hinge significantly on a resolution of the political
situation in the next 10 to 12 weeks.
"If that has not happened, and as a
result of that interest rates remain high and market confidence remains low, we
would probably have to bring the rating down," said Eisinger.
Fitch affirmed
Turkey's foreign currency rating earlier this month at single-B
- five notches into speculative territory - with a stable outlook.
Moody's
Investors Service, meanwhile, said it would not comment on whether or not it
planned to change Turkey's outlook or rating, but said it was
analyzing the impact of recent events. Moody's rates Turkey B1,
four notches below investment grade, with a stable outlook.
"We're looking at
the situation very carefully at the moment to determine whether or not it's
appropriate to make any changes in the ratings structure," said Kristin Lindow,
lead Moody's analyst for Turkey's sovereign rating.
"What
we're trying to determine is whether or not we think this is a temporary or more
long-lived problem for them in terms of their refinancing risks," Lindow said.
Lindow added that some of Turkey's debt is
"non-market," or held by state-owned banks and other institutions that could
roll over the liabilities, so there was some wiggle room.
"This does not have
to be a devastating event," said Lindow.
-By Angela Pruitt,
Dow Jones Newswires, 201-938-2269, angela.pruitt@dowjones.com.
Back
to top
Reuters Analysis-
Bid for power as political fog
enshrouds Turkey.
By Ralph Boulton
ANKARA, July 9
(Reuters) - Ailing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit clings grimly
to office as foes and former allies alike scramble to stake a claim to power if
he resigns now or if early elections in November are called as
expected.
"There is a thick fog engulfing Turkish politics at the moment,"
said Bulent Akarcali, deputy head of Motherland, the junior party in
Ecevit's three-party coalition.
"There's no panic. But
no-one can see more than a few metres ahead for now," he told Reuters.
The
activity amid the fog has been truly frantic since the rightist Nationalist
Action Party (MHP), Ecevit's other partner in government,
called for early elections.
Ecevit's own Democratic Left
(DSP) party has mutinied, exasperated by his political and physical frailty,
with two dozen deputies, including four ministers, resigning.
Opposition True
Path Party (DYP) leader Tansu Ciller, a former prime minister, said
Ecevit showed no signs of leaving.
"I had the opportunity to
ask him whether he would resign and he told me he saw the difficulty in the
continuation of the government but he had not yet come to the point of
resignation," Ciller said after meeting the prime minister.
ARMY WATCHING
EVENTS
While most major parties seem now, at least publicly, to have accepted
the notion of early polls, few really desire them. The coalition parties and the
opposition DYP and Saadet could all fail to clear a 10 percent threshold to get
into parliament.
The military, a firm hand in Turkish politics, would also
eschew them, disturbed by surveys suggesting the victor would be the opposition
AK Party - a grouping generals view with suspicion because of its Islamist
roots. The General Staff, however, has given no public signal it is influencing
events.
Talk is of elections and of a possible interim post-Ecevit government
to see through a vital $16 billion crisis programme backed by the International
Monetary Fund.
Western allies watch with deep concern the uncertainty in a
key NATO ally, financially the IMF's biggest debtor and politically on the edge
of the volatile Middle East.
"Someone has to get a grip on things," said one
diplomat. "There has to be someone there who at the very least can manage the
markets and the economy properly.
"There may be a fog now alright, but I
think we'll see a few holes punched in it in the next 48 hours or
so."
MARKETS SUFFERING
Interest rates have soared in the last two
months, since Ecevit, 77, fell ill. This puts a further burden
on Turkey's heavy debt repayments and throttles the first signs
of recovery from Turkey's worst recession since 1945.
For
Turkey, it is a familiar story. Political chaos undermining
hopes for economic progress.
While Ecevit meets his party's
allies, the sound of moving political furniture echoes around Ankara.
Ecevit's Democratic Left itself appears to be crumbling as
other party leaders seek common ground in public statements.
Newspapers link
Husamettin Ozkan, Ecevit's erstwhile chief ally who resigned
from the government and DSP on Monday, with non-party Economy Minister Kemal
Dervis - the man who sealed Turkey's last IMF rescue package -
and with DSP Foreign Minister Ismail Cem.
Motherland leader Mesut Yilmaz has
also directed kindly words towards Dervis.
"It's important to know what Ozkan
is thinking now," said Akarcali. "His resignation was not an impulse reaction.
It was something prepared."
If Ecevit resigns, President
Ahmet Necdet Sezer may ask him to stay on as caretaker until a new government is
formed. A prime minister-designate, named by the president, would then seek
support in parliament for a government.
Dervis, the darling of the markets,
could not qualify for this since he is not a deputy. Ozkan is a man who has
commanded respect across the political spectrum and could fulfil the
role.
Possible participants could be Yilmaz's Motherland, with 79 seats, the
True Path Party, with 85 seats and DSP defectors. A government formed in this
way is unlikely to have a long life. It would be a minority in the 550-seat
parliament. It could only take Turkey to elections, perhaps
finding a consensus which eludes the present coalition to press EU-inspired
reforms.
Turkey has little time to sort out its political
shambles.
Markets urgently need reassurance. Moreover, the European Union
will soon be making its assessment of Turkey's progress towards
meeting criteria for membership talks. Encouraging words could help attract
foreign funds Turkey needs.
Legislation should be passed by
parliament by September easing restrictions on the Kurdish language, perhaps
lifting the death penalty. More important would be the success of currently
deadlocked talks to reunite the Mediterranean island of Cyprus.
All these
vital issues require the flush of dynamism currently absent in the political fog
of Ankara.
Embattled Turk PM stands
ground, summons cabinet.
By Claudia Parsons
ANKARA, July
10 (Reuters) - Ailing Turkish premier Bulent Ecevit summoned
his cabinet on Wednesday as he struggled to fight off calls for his resignation
in a mutiny that has spread even to his closest aides.
The 77-year-old
veteran premier showed a defiant streak on Tuesday, telling the head of an
opposition party he had not yet reached the point of quitting and quickly naming
new ministers to replace those, including his closest aide, who had
left.
Newspapers, however, were busy drawing up the political map of a
post-Ecevit Turkey.
"All Eyes On The Two Joker Cards", read
the headline in Sabah daily. Beneath was a picture of non-party Economy Minister
Kemal Dervis, the man who negotiated Turkey's $16 billion IMF
rescue package after a devastating financial crisis last year, talking with
Foreign Minister Ismail Cem.
Over 30 members of Ecevit's
Democratic Left Party (DSP), including five ministers, have resigned, upsetting
the balance of power in Ecevit's three-party coalition and
raising the prospect of early elections that even coalition partners
seek.
Cem remains in the DSP but has yet to make any public statement on the
power struggle around Ecevit. His departure might force the
prime minister's hand.
Radikal newspaper said plans were afoot for a union of
centre-left and centre-right politicians including Dervis, Cem, Husamettin
Ozkan, who resigned on Monday from government and DSP, and Mehmet Ali Bayar, a
new arrival on the political scene who commands wide respect in the commercial
capital, Istanbul.
The latest crisis to strike Turkey, which
has run up the highest debt ever with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
started in early May, when Ecevit was admitted to hospital for
the first of two stays. He has yet to make a full recovery.
Markets fear
prolonged uncertainty or early elections could jeopardise a recovery plan backed
by a $16 billion loan pact with the IMF. The lira hit a record low early on
Tuesday and stocks also fell.
"The coalition is breaking up, its leading
member the DSP is fragmenting and Turkey appears to be heading
towards early elections that threaten the implementation of the IMF programme,"
said Philip Poole, head of emerging markets at investment bank ING.
An IMF
inspection team was due to hold talks in Turkey on Wednesday at
the start of the latest review of the programme linked to a disbursement from
the IMF of the latest $1.1 billion, to take place possibly after an IMF board
meeting in early August.
BILLIONS IN LOANS
The IMF said on July 4 that
loan disbursements under the programme had totalled about $11 billion by then.
Turkey signed the $16 billion loan package in February, taking
total loans paid or committed by the IMF to over $30
billion.
Turkey is the IMF's biggest ever debtor, its loans
topped up after crises in November 2000 and February 2001 triggered by an
unstable banking system.
Markets will be seeking more immediate relief after
a cabinet meeting on Wednesday morning to be attended by the new ministers
Ecevit appointed on Tuesday.
Notable by his absence will be
the premier's long-time ally Husamettin Ozkan - a figure so closely associated
with Ecevit that a popular joke had had the premier's wife
Rahsan in bed asking Ecevit to roll over, and him answering
that he couldn't because he might push Ozkan out of
bed.
Ecevit held a round of meetings with allies and opposition on Tuesday as key political players jostled for position.
If
Ecevit were to resign, the way forward would be unclear but
markets and media are speculating that Ozkan, Economy Minister Kemal Dervis and
Foreign Minister Cem may be key figures in a new political
landscape.
Ecevit's coalition partners in the Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) will meanwhile be making the most of their new position as
the largest party in parliament, and MHP leader Devlet Bahceli could
theoretically be asked to form a new government.
The prime minister has so
far maintained a public silence since Ozkan and others resigned, his intention
of staying on reported second-hand by a visiting opposition party
leader.
Turkey is holding its breath for what he may have to
say on Wednesday.
Turkish Leader Hangs On as Ministers Quit
By THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS
NKARA,
Turkey, July 9 (AP) — Three more cabinet ministers resigned today as Turkey's
coalition government crumbled further, but Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit filled
some of the vacant posts, resisting pressure to step down.
Still, after being deserted by more than a quarter of his party's legislators, there appears little chance the ailing Mr. Ecevit will be able to hold on to power for much longer.
Analysts say the disintegration of Mr. Ecevit's government could open the door to economic and political reforms that have been blocked by a coalition government more concerned with survival than policy.
The resignations also bring up the possibility of weeks or even months of political infighting. Two of Mr. Ecevit's coalition allies are already demanding early elections, with one suggesting a September date. Elections are not scheduled before 2004 and Mr. Ecevit, 77, has vowed to serve out his full term.
"It is time Ecevit and his followers started seeing the realities in Turkey," wrote Ilnur Cevik, the editor of The Turkish Daily News. "You simply cannot stand against the tide."
The political chaos comes at a crucial time for Turkey, NATO's only Muslim member, which took over command of the peacekeeping force in Afghanistan last month. The United States has viewed Turkey as a role model of a secular Muslim country that sees its future with the West.
The United States also is considering military action against Iraq and is hoping that Turkey will be willing to provide bases and other support.
Economically, the International Monetary Fund has provided Turkey with about $31 billion in loans to help the country recover from a crisis that has led to more than two million layoffs, and it is looking for economic reforms.
The lira hit a record low today and stocks fell.
European leaders have suggested that formal negotiations over Turkey's membership in the European Union could begin by year's end but they are waiting for Turkey to carry out reforms, like abolishing the death penalty and expanding rights for minority Kurds.
"We should form a new government in order to realize E.U. reforms before December," Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said today.
If such a government could not be formed, Mr. Yilmaz said, Parliament should be called from its summer recess to vote for elections in September. Mr. Ecevit's nationalist allies are calling for elections by November.
The resignations follow two months in which Mr. Ecevit has been either in the hospital or recovering at home from a series of ailments. As he recuperated, his government appeared virtually paralyzed, with cracks emerging between the nationalist wing, which opposes Europe-oriented reforms, and his center-right allies pushing for closer ties.
"We had locked ourselves into a situation in which nothing was being done and the primary concern of government was staying in power," said Ilter Turan, a political scientist at Bilgi University in Istanbul. "It also became clear that in major policy areas nothing was going to happen. Now there is an opportunity to bring about change."
The resignations began Monday when Mr. Ecevit ordered Deputy Prime Minister Husamettin Ozkan to quit after rumors that Mr. Ozkan was negotiating with coalition partners to replace the prime minister.
Mr. Ozkan's departure triggered an exodus of party legislators who believed the government was slowly falling apart under a leader in poor health who was unwilling to surrender power.
Today, Education Minister Metin Bostancioglu resigned, as did two state ministers, Hasan Gemici and Mustafa Yilmaz, and nine other lawmakers from Mr. Ecevit's Democratic Left Party. One legislator quickly returned, but the total departures numbered 32. Mr. Ecevit's party now has only 96 seats in the 550-seat Parliament, fewer than the seats held by his nationalist allies in the three-party coalition. The coalition agreement calls for Mr. Ecevit to remain prime minister even if his party loses members.
ÝÇÝNDEKÝLER
· THE NEW YORK TIMES : KUZEY IRAK'TA GÜVENDE OLAN KÜRTLER, BÝR ABD SALDIRISINA SOÐUK BAKIYORLAR
· THE GUARDIAN: ABD 'IRAK'I ÜRDÜN ÜZERÝNDEN VURACAK'
· DER SPIEGEL: SADDAM'A HAVADAN MI SALDIRILACAK?
· IRAN DAILY: ABD'NÝN IRAK GÜNDEMÝ
· EL KUDS EL ARABÝ: ABD IRAK'I KARADAN ÝÞGAL ETMEYE YÖNELÝK PLANINI BELÝRGÝNLEÞTÝRÝYOR
· DER TAGESSPIEGEL: TÜRK HÜKÜMETÝ, ALMANLARIN BAÞÖRTÜSÜYLE ÝLGÝLÝ KARARINI OLUMLU KARÞILADI
· WASHINGTON POST: TÜRKÝYE'DE TEK BAÞINA MI? ÝMKANSIZ
· KLEINE ZEITUNG GRAZ: YUNANÝSTAN BAÞI ÇEKÝYOR, TÜRKÝYE ARAYI KAPATIYOR
THE
NEW YORK TIMES :
KUZEY IRAK'TA GÜVENDE OLAN KÜRTLER, BÝR ABD SALDIRISINA
SOÐUK BAKIYORLAR
ANKARA, 08/07(BYE)--- The New York Times gazetesinin 08 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda John F.Burns imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda Erbil çýkýþlý bir yorum yer almýþtýr. Internet'ten saðlanan yazýnýn özet çevirisi þöyledir:
Amerika Birleþik Devletleri, Baþkan Bush'un Saddam Hüseyin'in Irak'taki egemenliðine bir son verilmesi yönündeki çaðrýsýný baþarýya ulaþtýrmanýn yollarýný ararken, herhangi bir askeri harekat sýrasýnda önemli rol oynayacak olan Iraklý Kürt liderler, Washington'un Baðdat'ta "bir rejim deðiþikliði" gerçekleþtirme amacýna þüpheyle bakýyorlar.
Kuzey Irak'taki kalelerinde geçen hafta yapýlan mülakatlarda, liderler, Kürtleri, Irak askerlerinin 1991 Körfez Savaþý'nýn ardýndan gerçekleþtirdikleri türden þiddetli bir saldýrý riski ile karþý karþýya býrakacak bir Amerikan askeri harekatýna katýlmaya isteksiz olduklarýný söylediler. Baba Bush'un cesaretlendirdiði bir Kürt ayaklanmasý, Saddam Hüseyin tarafýndan acýmasýzca bastýrýlmýþ ve Amerikan kuvvetleri binlerce Kürt öldürülürken müdahalede bulunmamýþtý.
Hüseyin'in 23 yýllýk egemenliði süresince hiçbir grup, 1980 ve 1990'larda on binlerce kayýp veren Kürtlerin çektiðini çekmedi. Þimdiki Baþkan Bush son açýklamalarýnda, Irak liderinin devrilmesinin gerekçesinin bir parçasý olarak, Irak'ýn, 1988 yýlýnda sona eren Irak-Ýran savaþý sýrasýnda Kuzey'deki Kürt bölgelerinde bulunan Halepçe ve diðer onlarca köy ve þehre zehirli gazlarla gerçekleþtirdiði en acýmasýz saldýrýlara deðindi.
Bütün bunlara raðmen hiçbir Iraklý, son on yýl içinde Kürtler kadar Batý yardýmýndan faydalanmadý. BM tarafýndan ilan edilen "güvenlik bölgesi" ve Amerikan ve Ýngiliz savaþ uçaklarýnýn devriye gezdiði "uçuþa kapalý bölge" ile korunan Kürtler, Suriye, Türkiye ve Ýran'a sýnýrý bulunan Irak topraklarýnda mini bir devlet kurdular.
Kürt kontrolündeki bu bölgede muhalefet partileri ve gazeteler, uydu televizyonu ve uluslararasý konuþmalara açýk telefonlar var. Hüseyin'in devrilmesine yönelik Amerikan önderliðindeki bir askeri harekat, bu özgürlüklerini yaþama imkanýný güçlendirme ihtimali taþýsa da, konuya iliþkin yorum yapan hemen her Kürdün desteklediði Kürt liderler, Washington'un, on yýl süren özerklikleri sýrasýndaki tüm kazanýmlarýný yeni bir Irak saldýrýsý ile riske atmalarýný istediðini söylediler.
Ýki önemli Kürt siyasi grubundan biri olan KDP lideri Mesut Barzani, "Risk almaya hazýr deðiliz ve herhangi bir adýmýn sonuçlarý konusunda emin deðilsek o zaman o adýmý atmayýz. Çünkü þartlarýmýzý iyileþtireceðinden emin deðiliz" dedi. Barzani, Türklerin, Araplarýn ve Perslerin asýrlar süren baskýsýný ima ederek, "Bu, Iraklý Kürtlerin altýn çaðýdýr" dedi.
Kürtlerin endiþeleri o kadar derindi ki, Hüseyin'e yönelik olasý bir Amerikan askeri harekatýna karþý ortak söylem dile getirmek için aralarýndaki siyasi farklýlýklarý bir kenara býraktýlar.
Amerika liderliðindeki bir harekatta, Kürt bölgesi kara saldýrýsý için çok önemli bir platform olacaktýr. Washington'da tartýþýlan bir planda, Amerikan güçlerinin, Kürt ve diðer Irak muhalif savaþçýlarý ile birlikte, Afganistan'da Taliban karþýsýnda yürüttüðü savaþý takrarlamayý istediðine deðiniliyor.
Ancak Kürt liderler, Washington'un peþin bir garanti vermemesi halinde herhangi bir Amerikan harekatýna karþý çýkacaklarýný ve bu garantilerin, kuzeyde geniþ çaplý bir Kürt özerkliðini öngören federal bir yapýsý olan ve demokratik bir siyasi sistemi benimseyen bir Irak hükümeti taahhütünü içerdiðini söylediler.
Gerçekte, bu, Washington'un, Kürtlere halihazýrda egemenliklerini sürdürdükleri bölgedeki kontrollerinin süreceði garantisini vermesini içeriyor. Ancak ülkenin Araplarýnýn desteðini alan diðer Iraklý muhalif gruplarýn, Baðdat'ýn kýsmen kuzeydeki petrol bölgelerinin gelirine baðýmlý olmasýndan dolayý, bu konuda ayný fikirde olacaklarý kesinlikten çok uzakta.
THE
GUARDIAN:
ABD 'IRAK'I ÜRDÜN ÜZERÝNDEN VURACAK'
ANKARA, 08/07(BYE)--- The Guardian gazetesinin 07 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Jason Burke, Martin Bright ve Nicolas Pelham imzalarýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda bir makale yer almýþtýr. Internet'ten saðlanan makalenin çevirisi þöyledir:
The Observer gazetesinin elde ettiði bilgilere göre, Amerikan askeri yetkilileri, Irak'a bu yýlýn sonunda ya da 2003'ün baþýnda düzenlenecek askeri bir operasyon için Ürdün'ü üs olarak kullanmaya hazýrlanýyorlar.
Pentagon'dan sýzdýrýlan belgelerde Türkiye, Kuveyt ve küçük Körfez ülkesi Katar'ýn kilit unsur olarak kullanýlacaðýna dair bilgilerin ortaya konmasýna raðmen, Ürdün'ün, Amerika ve Ýngiltere ile diðer ABD müttefiki ülkelerden gelecek 250 bin askeri gücü kapsayacak saldýrý için "atlama tahtasý" olarak kullanýlacaðýna inanýlýyor.
Askeri analistler, iyi yollara ve iletiþim sistemlerine sahip olan Ürdün'ün Amerikan silahlý kuvvetlerinin konuþlandýrýlmasý için mükemmel bir yer olacaðýný söylüyorlar. Ürdün'ün baþkenti Amman'ýn, -Amerikan tank ve askeri mühimmatý için mükemmel bir arazi olan- neredeyse tamamen engebesiz, çölü kesen 600 kilometrelik otoyol üzerinden Baðdat ile baðlantýsý var.
Amman'daki Iraklý muhalifler, Observer'e, geçen birkaç ayda Ürdün'e yüzlerce Amerikalý danýþmanýn geldiðini söylediler.
Amman'da üslenen ve birçok önemli Iraklý askeri muhalifi içeren Irak Ulusal Mutabakatý (INA), Washington'da Irak'a düzenlenmesi planlanan saldýrý üzerine görüþmelerde bulundu. INA, ABD'nin Saddam Hüseyin'in elit Cumhuriyet Muhafýzlarý'nýn içinde askeri bir ayaklanma çýkmasýna önderlik ederek yoðun bombalama ve füze saldýrýlarýna Körfez ve Türkiye üzerinden baþlayacaðýný tahmin ediyor.
INA, Ürdün üzerinden askeri operasyona katýlabileceklerini bildirdi. INA üyeleri geçici askeri yönetime yol açacak bir askeri darbe gerçekleþtirmeyi düþünüyor.
Görgü tanýklarý, Amman'ýn -Baðdat yönünde- 50 mil doðusunda yer alan Azrak'daki Muafak Salti hava üssünde hazýrlýklara baþlandýðýný iddia ettiler.
On gün önce Ürdün Haber Ajansý Petra, ABD Genelkurmay Baþkaný General Tommy Franks'ýn Ürdün'ün Müþterek Kurmay Baþkanlarý kurumunun Baþkaný Teðmen General Halid Cemil Surayrih ile görüþtüðünü bildirdi.
Petra "iki tarafýn, bölgedeki genel durum ile Ürdün ve Amerikan silahlý kuvvetlerinin iþbirliðinde bulunacaklarý alanlarý gözden geçirdiðini" açýkladý. Resmi olarak Ürdün, Irak'ta savaþa karþý, ancak konuya yakýn kaynaklar, Irak'a savaþ düzenlenmesi konusunda Ürdün ve Washington'un gizli bir anlaþmaya vardýðýný söylediler.
ABD görünüþte, Ürdün ve diðer Arap devletlerinin, Irak'ý destekleme konusunda sahte baðlýlýk göstermelerine izin veriyor.
Askeri geliþmeler hakkýndaki haberler ile ABD'nin Ürdün'ü yakýn ekonomik baðlarý olduðu Irak'tan koparma çabalarý ayný zamana rasladý. Bazý gözlemciler ülkede askeriyenin rolünün Haþemilerin Ürdün Krallýðý'nýn yönetimine geçmesinden beri geliþtiðini söylüyorlar.
Ürdünlü bir analist, "Ürdün'ün rolü, ABD-Taliban savaþýnda Pakistan'ýn üstlendiði rol olacak" dedi. Ürdün'ün ekonomisi ile Irak ekonomisi birbiriyle karýþmýþ durumda; Krallýk ayný zamanda ABD ile askeri ve ekonomik yakýn baðlara sahip.
Bazýlarý Ürdün'ün Irak'a düzenlenecek saldýrýya katýlmasýnýn karþýlýðý olarak çok aðýr bir bedel ödeyeceðini söylüyorlar. Eski Baþbakan Tahir Al-Masri, "ABD'nin Irak'a düzenleyeceði saldýrý Ürdün'deki radikallerin etkisini artýracak. ABD'nin düþman olduðu düþüncesi yaygýnlaþacak" dedi.
Ürdün Dýþiþleri Bakaný Marvan Moasher'in ülkede herhangi bir Amerikan askeri varlýðýnýn bulunduðunu inkar etmesine raðmen, hükümet kaynaklarý Mart ayýnda Amerikan ve Ürdünlü güçleri içeren askeri tatbikatýn yapýldýðýný teyit ettiler. Moasher'ýn bu açýklamasý, Lübnan As Safir gazetesinin 2000 Amerikan askeri birliðinin Irak'a karþý operasyon düzenlenmesi için Ürdün'de bulunduðunu yazmasýndan sonra geldi.
Gözlemciler, ABD Baþkaný George W. Bush'un yönetime geldiðinden bu yana Ürdün Kralý Abdullah ile en az beþ kez görüþtüðünü vurguladýlar. ABD'nin Ürdün'e yaptýðý ekonomik yardýmý gelecek yýl ikiye katlayarak 500 milyon dolara çýkarmasý bekleniyor ve þu an Kongre, hükümetin yardýmý 100 milyon dolar daha yükseltme talebini ele alýyor.
Amerikalý yetkililer, Saddam'ýn sadece askeri bir operasyon ile devrilebileceðine inanýyorlar. Bu yýlýn baþýnda Amerikan istihbarat görevlileri Irak savunmasý hakkýnda bilgi toplamak ve Kürt militanlarýn savaþma kabiliyetlerini ölçmek için Kuzey Irak'a gönderildiler. Amerikalýlar Irak cephe pozisyonlarýný incelediler ve bölgeyi mayýnlardan temizleyen kuruluþlardan mayýn haritalarýný istediler; Kürtlerin Cumhuriyet Muhafýzlarý'yla boy ölçüþemeyeceklerine karar verdiler.
ABD yönetimindeki bazý unsurlar, hala bazý Iraklý askeri yetkililerin darbe düzenleyebileceklerini umuyor. Haftaya 70 kadar eski Iraklý asker, Saddam'ý devirme planlarýný tartýþmak üzere þimdiye kadarki en büyük muhalif toplantýsýný Londra'da düzenleyecek.
ABD bu askerlerden bazýlarýnýn Irak'ta görevde bulunan askerlerle baðlarýný koruduðunu umuyor. Konferans, Körfez Savaþý'nýn sonunda Baðdat'ýn güneyindeki Babil bölgesindeki baþkaldýrýda yer almýþ olan eski tugay komutaný Tevfik El-Yassiri tarafýndan düzenleniyor. Bir diðer düzenleyici ise Irak'ýn psikolojik operasyonlarýnýn baþýndaki eski general Saad Ubeidi.
Üç günlük konferansta Saddam'a karþý siyasi muhalefetin askeri olarak harekete geçirilme yollarý tartýþýlacak.
DER
SPIEGEL:
SADDAM'A HAVADAN MI SALDIRILACAK?
BERLÝN, 08/07(BYE)--- Tirajý haftada 1 milyon 57 bin olan Der Spiegel dergisinin 08 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan yazýnýn çevirisi þöyledir:
Beyaz Saray'da, Irak'a karþý etkin savaþýn nasýl gerçekleþeceðine iliþkin tartýþmalarda karar aþamasýna gelinmiþ bulunuyor. Afganistan savaþýnda askeri üst komutayý yürütmüþ olan General Tommy Franks, daha Mayýs ayýnda saldýrýnýn kara kuvvetleri yoluyla gerçekleþtirilmesini öngörmüþ ve Saddam'ý düþürmek için, en azýndan 200 bin askere ihtiyaç olacaðýný belirtmiþti. ABD Baþkaný George W. Bush'un danýþmaný General Wayne Downing ise, bunun aksine, teröre karþý savaþýn öncelikle Amerikan özel komando birlikleri ve üstün silahlarla donantýlmýþ muhalefet gruplarý aracýlýðý ile gerçekleþmesini ve sözü geçen güçlerin hava saldýrýlarýyla da yoðun bir þekilde desteklenmesini önermiþti. Downing'in kýsa bir süre önce görevinden ayrýlmasýnýn ardýndan, askerler ve Amerikan hükümetinin sivil strateji uzmanlarý, ortak bir strateji üzerinde anlaþmaya varmýþ görünüyorlar. En azýndan ABD baþkentinde geçtiðimiz hafta somut saldýrý planlarý ortaya çýkmýþ bulunuyor: Tampa'daki komuta merkezinin komutaný Franks'ýn Baþkan Bush'u en az iki kez saldýrý senaryolarý hakkýnda bilgilendirdiði söyleniyor. Buna göre, ABD muhtemelen gelecek yýlýn baþýnda Irak'a üç yönden saldýracak. Uçak gemilerinden ve en az sekiz ülkenin açacaðý üslerden kalkacak yüzlerce savaþ uçaklarý, havadan gerçekleþtirecekleri yoðun saldýrý ile savaþý baþlatacaklar. Onbinlerce özel komando askeri, muhtemelen Kuveyt'teki üslerden, Irak'a girecekler. Özel birlikler ülkenin iç kesimlerindeki tesislere saldýracaklar. Baþkan Bush için, henüz onaylanmayan planda aþýlmasý gereken en zor engeli ise, saldýrýlarýn baþlatýlacaðý ülkelerden hiçbirinin ABD tarafýndan þimdiye dek haberdar edilmemesi sorunu oluþturuyor.
IRAN
DAILY:
ABD'NÝN IRAK GÜNDEMÝ
ANKARA, 08/07(BYE)--- Ýran'da Ýngilizce olarak yayýmlanan Iran Daily gazetesinin 06 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda ve S. Sadeghi imzasýyla yayýmlanan makalenin çevirisi þöyledir:
Bush yönetimi uzun süredir Irak karþýtý bir gündeme sahip ve önceliði, kitle imha silahlarýnýn yayýlmasýný önleme bahanesiyle yönetimdeki Baas rejimini ortadan kaldýrmaya veriyor. Fakat ABD yönetimi, þimdiye kadar ne detaylarla ne de olasýlýklarla ilgili herhangi bir açýklamada bulundu.
Amerika'nýn yüksek rütbeli subaylarý, kayýplarý en aza indirmek ve özellikle de Baþkan Saddam Hüseyin güçlerinin kimyasal ve diðer yasak silahlarý konuþlandýrmalarýný engellemek üzere "çabuk zafer" seçeneðinin de kartlar arasýnda olduðunu belirtiyorlar.
Halen Irak ikilemiyle ilgili olarak ABD'de iki teori tartýþýlýyor.
Ýlki, þahin kanatta yer alan Savunma Bakaný Donald Rumsfeld, Savunma Bakan Yardýmcýsý Paul Wolfowitz ve Terörle Mücadele Dairesi Baþkaný Emekli General Wayne Downing tarafýndan planlandý. Planda, güç kullanmanýn Irak krizi için tek çözüm olacaðý savunuluyor.
Ýkincisi ise, Dýþiþleri Bakaný Colin Powell, Yardýmcýsý Richard Armitage ve Baþkan Bush'un Orta Doðu Özel Temsilcisi Anthony Zinni tarafýndan destekleniyor. ABD'nin müttefiklerinin de desteðiyle Saddam'ý silahlarýný uluslararasý denetime açmaya zorlamak gerektiðini ileri sürüyor.
Askeri müdahale yanlýlarý, ABD'nin sözde terörizmle mücadele kampanyasý çerçevesinde müdahalenin gerekli olduðuna inanýyorlar.
ABD Harekat Merkezi Komutaný General Tommy Franks, Pentagon'a, saldýrý için gerek duyacaðý lojistik konularla ilgili olarak bilgi verdi.
Ancak Amerikalý düþünce kuruluþlarý, Irak'a olasý bir müdahalenin terörizmle mücadele koalisyonu içerisinde derin çatlaklar yaratacaðýný ve Saddam ile mücadele için farklý yollar ve araçlar olduðunu belirtip, müdahalenin bu seçeneklerden biri olduðu söylüyorlar.
Saddam'ýn muhalifleri, tek baþlarýna rejime karþý meydan okuyamazlar. 1991 olaylarý ve Saddam'ýn iþgalci güçlerinin Kuveyt'ten atýlmalarýnýn ardýndan yaþanan durum, bu görüþü destekliyor.
Irak Þiileri ve Kürtlere gelince, bunlar da iç tartýþmalara sürüklendiler.
Irak siyaseti içerisinde en aktif gruplar arasýnda, Kürtler, Þiiler ve Sünniler bulunuyor. Fakat bu gruplar arasýnda bir çeþit uyum saðlamak veya hepsinin de gerekli olduðunda takip edecekleri bir lider bulmak imkansýz gibi.
Bu durumda, Irak'ýn Arap komþularý için sorunlar gündeme gelecek. Bu ülkeler, Þii çoðunluðun Baðdat'ta yönetimi ele geçirdiðini görmekten hoþlanmayacak, zira ABD böyle bir hareket tarzýnýn kesinlikle Ýran'ýn etkisiyle gerçekleþeceðini söyledi.
Kaynaklar, Baþkan Bush'un Irak'a müdahale planlarý için bölgedeki birkaç askeri üssü kullanmaya yönelik araþtýrma içerisine girdiðini söylediler. Ancak Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan dahil olmak üzere bölgedeki güçler, Arap sokaklarýnda artmakta olan ABD karþýtý tepkilerin farkýndalar ve açýk bir þekilde Saddam'ý devirmeye yönelik herhangi bir askeri müdahaleye karþý çýkýyorlar.
Bush, CIA'e Saddam'a karþý gizli operasyonlar yürütmelerine onay vermesine raðmen, ABD'deki kamuoyu yoklamalarý, Irak'a karþý askeri bir müdahaleden pek de hoþnut olunmayacaðýný gösteriyor.
IRAN
DAILY:
ABD'NÝN KOZU
ANKARA, 08/07(BYE)--- Ýran'da Ýngilizce olarak yayýmlanan Iran Daily gazetesinin 08 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Mehdi Afshar-Nik imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan makalenin çevirisi þöyledir:
ABD birliklerinin Kuzey Irak'a konuþlanmasýyla, Amerikan ordusunun bu Arap ülkesine saldýracaðýna dair spekülasyonlarda yeni bir safhaya geçildi, hem de Irak Devlet Baþkaný Saddam Hüseyin'in rejimi için henüz bir deðiþikliðe karar verilmediði halde...
Irak'ta muhalif cepheyi oluþturan Kürtler, Þiiler ya da eski subaylar arasýnda, Saddam sonrasýnda ülkeyi tek baþlarýna yönetecek yeteneðe sahip hiçbir grup yok. Zira herbirinin kendi içinde bir dizi sorunu var. Örneðin, Irak Ýslami Devrim Yüksek Konseyi ve Irak Ulusal Kongresi uluslararasý destekten yoksun ve Kürtler, Türkiye ve Suriye gibi ülkelerden korkuyorlar.
Ayrýca, teröre karþý mücadelenin bir parçasý olmanýn ötesindeki Amerika'nýn planlý saldýrýsý, dünya kamuoyunun dikkatini, gitgide kötüleþen Orta Doðu krizinden Basra Körfezi'ne yöneltmeyi amaçlýyor. Aslýnda ABD, askeri yeteneklerini sýnýrlarýnýn ötesine taþýmaya çalýþýyor ve çýðýrýndan çýkmadan önce tehditlerle karþý karþýya gelmeye kararlý.
Þimdi, ABD'yi ilgilendiren en önemli þey, terörle mücadele olacak gibi görünüyor. Bu gerçeði göz önünde tutarak, 11 Eylül olayýnýn birçok þüphelisinin Orta Doðu ülkelerinden olmasý ve þu anda terör eylemlerini geliþtirmek için çeþitli yollara sahip olmalarý nedeniyle Bush yönetimi bölgede yeni bir üs arýyor. Afganistan ve Irak gibi ülkeler en iyi adaylar olarak görünüyor.
Baþkan George W. Bush'un son Avrupa turu, Irak'a karþý düzenlenecek askeri operasyonlar için Avrupa'nýn daha fazla desteðini almaya yönelikti. Diðer ABD müttefiki ülkeler, Türkiye ve Suudi Arabistan, zaten istikrarsýz olan bölgede askeri operasyonlarýn yapýlmasýna karþý çýkýnca, görev baþarýsýzlýkla sonuçlandý.
Ancak ABD otoritesini kabul ettiriyor. ABD, kozunu oynamak ve gezegenin bu bölümünde üstünlüðünü daha fazla artýrmak istiyor.
Siyasi uzmanlar, teröre karþý düzenlenecek herhangi bir kampanyada bu kötü olayýn temel nedenlerinin düþünülmesi gerektiði fikrini savundular. Bu ilke, anlaþýlabilir nedenlerden dolayý, en azýndan þimdilik, Washington'un savaþ gündeminde bulunmuyor.
EL
KUDS EL ARABÝ:
ABD IRAK'I KARADAN ÝÞGAL ETMEYE YÖNELÝK PLANINI
BELÝRGÝNLEÞTÝRÝYOR
ANKARA, 08/07(BYE)--- Londra'da yayýmlanan günlük el Kuds el Arabi gazetesinin 08 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Ýsrail Maarev gazetesinin 07 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýndan alýnmýþ Ýzak Ben Hovrin imzalý habere atfen, yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yer alan haberin özet çevirisi þöyledir:
ABD, Irak'ý karadan iþgale yönelik geniþ çaplý bir planý belirginleþtiriyor. Planýn amacý, konvansiyonel olmayan silah depolarýný imha edip Saddam Hüseyin'i devirmek. Savunma Bakanlýðý uzmanlarý, Afganistan'da sergilenen yeni teknolojinin, Scud füzlerinin hareketli bataryalarýný belirleme ve imha etmede katký saðlamasýný umarken, ABD'nin Körfez'deki Amerikan güçlerine kimyasal ya da biyolojik baþlýklý füze fýrlatýlmasýna engel olmak için, Irak'ýn füze aðýnýn felce uðratýlmasý ABD'nin öncelikler listesinin baþýnda yer alýyor.
Amerikan savaþ planý, 250 bin askerden oluþan bir gücün konuþlandýrýlmasý ve özellikle Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan yönünden harekete geçecek sahil komandolarýnýn öncülüðünde büyük bir karadan iþgal harekatýný kapsýyor. Sekiz körfez ülkesinin yaný sýra Türkiye'de ve uçak gemilerinde bulunan yüzlerce Amerikan uçaðý, aralarýnda havaalanlarý, caddeler ve elektronik medya merkezlerinin de bulunduðu binlerce hedefe saldýracak.
Özel güçler ya da CIA ajanlarý, Irak'ýn içine sýzarak, Iraklýlarýn kitle imha silahlarý ve füzeleri üretip depoladýklarý fabrika ve depolara saldýracak. Bu arada Amerikan ordusu, Irak'ýn kimyasal ve biyolojik silahlarý geniþ çapta kullanmasýna iliþkin senaryolarý deðerlendiriliyor.
Washington'da planýn ayrýntýlarýný öðrenmiþ biri olarak nitelenen ileri gelen bir emniyet yetkilisinin "Eðer Saddam Hüseyin savaþta arkasýnda duvardan baþka bir þey kalmadýðýný ve kaybedecek bir þeyi olmadýðýný anlarsa, bu silah rezervini kullanacak. Bu arada Ýsrail'i de hedef alabilir" dediði bildirildi.
ABD, birçok körfez ülkesinde üs kurarken Katar'da büyük bir havaalaný inþa ediyor. Bölgeye binlerce asker gönderildiði de belirtiliyor. Buna baðlý olarak Afganistan savaþýnda rezervleri azalan, ABD lazer güdümlü füze üretimine hýz verdi.
Amerikan planýnda, körfezdeki depolara taþýnacak tonlarca silahla ilgili ayrýntýlar da yer alýyor. ABD'nin doðu ve batý sahillerinden gönderilecek güçlerin gönderilme takvimini de içeren plan, körfeze gönderilecek kara ve hava kuvvetlerinin yaný sýra uçak gemilerinin durumu ile ilgili bilgiler yer alýyor.
Amerikalýlarýn elinde uydular aracýlýðýyla yönlendirilen ileri lazer füze teknolojisi bulunuyor. ABD'nin teknolojik ilerlemesine karþýlýk Irak'ýn güçlerinde bir gerileme gözleniyor. Çünkü Irak, Körfez Savaþý'ndan bu yana denemek amacýyla tek bir Scud füzesi fýrlatmýþ deðil.
Körfez Savaþý'ndan bu yana lazer güdümlü füzelerde büyük geliþme oldu. Bu arada her türlü hava koþullarýnda iþleyen ve uydu aracýlýðýyla yönlendirilen yeni akýllý bombalar piyasaya çýktý. Pilotsuz uçan casus uçaklar savaþ planlayýcýlarýna muharebe alanýna iliþkin tam bir görüntü sundu. Oysa 1991'de böyle bir þey söz konusu deðildi. Ayrýca bir baþka cihaz ise komutanlara, Scud füze bataryalarýný depolardan çýkarken imha etmeye yetecek bir sürede casusu uçaklardan birkaç dakika içerisinde veri alýp deðerlendirme olanaðý veriyor. Bu yeni iletiþim cihazý ayrýca, F-15 uçaklarýna, casus uçaklardan yüzlerce kilometrelik bir alanda onlarca hareketli hedefin radar görüntüsünü sunarak hedef konusunda doðrudan veri alma olanaðý sunuyor.
DER
TAGESSPIEGEL:
TÜRK HÜKÜMETÝ, ALMANLARIN BAÞÖRTÜSÜYLE ÝLGÝLÝ KARARINI OLUMLU
KARÞILADI
BERLÝN, 08/07(BYE)--- Tirajý günde 149 bin olan Der Tagesspiegel gazetesinin 06 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Thomas Seibert imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan Ýstanbul çýkýþlý yazýnýn çevirisi þöyledir:
Türkiye'deki hükümet koalisyonu, Berlin'deki Federal Temyiz Mahkemesi'nin verdiði baþörtüsüyle ilgili kararla, haklýlýðýnýn kanýtlandýðý görüþünde. Suat Çaðlayan, mahkemeden çýkan hükmün tamamen Türkiye'deki laik devlet eðitim sistemiyle örtüþür nitelikte olduðunu söyledi. Meclis Dýþiþleri Komisyonu Baþkan Yardýmcýsý olan Çaðlayan, Federal Almanya'yý þimdiye dek baþörtüsüyle ilgili hoþgörülü tutumundan dolayý "kötü örnek" olduðu gerekçesiyle suçlayarak, bu þekilde Ýslamcýlarýn güçlendirildiðini belirtti. Baþörtüsünü Ýslamcýlarýn sembolü olarak gören Türk devleti, bu yüzden tüm kamu kuruluþlarýnda baþörtüsünü yasakladý. Türk okullarýnda ne öðretmenlerin ne de öðrencilerin baþörtüsü takmasýna izin veriliyor.
Baþbakan Bülent Ecevit'in Demokratik Sol Partisi'nden olan Çaðlayan, "Öðretmen bir örnek teþkil eder, öðrencilerine mesaj verir" diyor. "Bir öðretmen derste baþörtüsü takarsa, öðrencilerinden de ayný þekilde davranmalarýný istemiþ olur" diyen Çaðlayan, Almanya'nýn, Metin Kaplan'ýn "Hilafet Devleti" gibi Ýslamcý hareketlere gösterdiði müsamahakar tutumunun Türkiye'ye sürekli olarak sorun yarattýðýný söyleyerek, "Berlin'den çýkan son karar çok olumlu" diye ekliyor.
Baþörtüsü, Türkiye'de devlet ile Ýslamcýlar arasýndaki ihtilafta en önemli sembol haline gelmiþ durumda. Üç yýl önce, baþörtüsüyle Meclis'e gelen Ýslamcý bir milletvekili Meclis'ten atýldýðý gibi, vatandaþlýktan da çýkarýldý. Ülkedeki üniversitelerin önlerinde sürekli olarak polis ile baþörtüsüyle okula girmek isteyen kýz öðrenciler arasýnda þiddet olaylarý yaþanýyor. Ýslam toplum düzeninde kadýnýn ezildiðini simgelediði görüþünü savunan kamu kuruluþlarýnda, baþörtüsüne karþý alerjik bir tepki gösteriliyor. Baþörtüsü yasaðýnýn karþýtlarý ise temel haklara iþaret ederek, gerekçe olarak kiþiliklerini özgürce yansýtabileceklerini öne sürüyorlar.
WASHINGTON
POST:
TÜRKÝYE'DE TEK BAÞINA MI? ÝMKANSIZ
WASHINGTON, 08/07(BYE)--- Pazar günleri tirajý 1.2 milyon olan Washington Post gazetesinin 07 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda Steve Hendrix imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan yazýnýn çevirisi þöyledir:
Atatürk Uluslararasý Havaalaný'ndan dýþarý çýkmýþtým, saat farkýnýn getirdiði yorgunluk içindeydim, yalnýzdým, þehir merkezinden uzaktaydým. Kimseyi tanýmýyordum. Yanýmda sadece bir el çantasý vardý. Bir hafta kalacaktým, bir gecelik rezervasyonum vardý. Otelim, adýný bile telaffuz edemediðim, benim alfabemde bulunmayan harflerle yazýlmýþ bir sokaktaydý. Döviz bozdurup karþýlýðýnda aldýðým yerel paralar üzerinde o kadar çok sýfýr vardý ki, bahþiþ vermekle fidye vermek arasýndaki farký dahi anlayamayacak durumdaydým. Yabancý dil bilmiyordum. Ne bir seyahat programým vardý, ne de gelecek yedi gün içinde ne yapacaðým hakkýnda bir fikir sahibiydim. Ancak, çok sakindim. Neden mi? Bir fikrim olmasýna gerek yoktu. Çünkü, bir akþam yemeðine davetliydim. Öyle olunca, bu, arkadaþým olduðu anlamýna gelir. O zaman o sizin de arkadaþýnýz olur.
Benim gibi düþünmeyebilirsiniz. O zaman tanýdýðýnýz 25 kiþiye sorun. Ýçlerinden birinin bir Türkle bir þekilde irtibatý olmuþ olacaktýr. Bir arkadaþýn arkadaþý olabilir bu Türk. Ya da trenle bir yere giderken tanýdýðýnýz birinin kardeþinin bir arkadaþý Türk olabilir. Türkiye gibi bir yerde, karþýlanmanýz ve oranýn yerlisi gibi aðýrlanmanýz için bu kadar irtibat yeterlidir.
Türkiye gibi konukseverliðin bu derece kökleþtiði bir ülkede, elinizdeki bir tek Türkün adý bile yeterli olur. Buna bir de Türklerin sokaktaki her türlü yabancýyla arkadaþ olma arzusunu ekleyebilirsiniz.
Benim durumumda, sözkonusu olan, eþimin amcasýnýn çok eskiden cereyan etmiþ bir meslektaþýyla tanýþýklýðý idi. ABD'den ayrýlmamdan birkaç gün önce telefon ettim ve mesele halolmuþtu. Ýstanbul'a vardýðým akþam için beni yemeðe davet ettiler. Bu yemek, diðer tanýþmalara ve bu tanýþmalar da süratle Türkiye'nin batýsýndaki otelleri, lokantalarý, turistik yerleri ve buralarda temas edilecek insanlarýn isimlerini de içerecek þekilde bir seyahat programýna dönüþecekti.
Rastgele bir taksiye bindim ve eski Bizans'a doðru yol almaya baþladýk. Her yerde camilerin minareleri gökyüzüne doðru uzanýyordu. Burasý, Doðu ve Batý'nýn buluþtuðu, Ýpek Yolu'nun dört yapraklý yoncasý ve hayallerimin þehri Ýstanbul'du.
Sahil yolundan gidiyorduk. Marmara Denizi'nin vapurlarý iskeleye halatlanmýþlardý. Karþý yakada Asya net olarak görülebiliyordu. Ege Denizi tarafýndan gelip Boðaz'dan geçen yük gemileri kuzeye doðru yol alýyorlardý. Eski Ýstanbul sokaklarýna girdik. Burada yollar daralýyordu. Pastel renkli evlerin balkonlarýnýn altýndan geçiyorduk.
Sultanahmet semtindeki Ayasofya Pansiyonlarý isimli otel gezimin ilk duraðýydý. Ne bir tur kitabýna bakmýþ, ne de bir Ýnternet sitesine girip Türkiye hakkýnda araþtýrma yapmýþtým. Bu oteli ise, þimdi sýký durun, Cambridge (Maryland)'den tanýdýðým bir adamýn amcasýnýn arkadaþý olan Türkiye'deki eski bir Ýngiliz diplomatýnýn eþi vasýtasýyla buldum. Londra'ya telefon açtým ve bu bayanla konuþtum. O da bana bu oteli tavsiye etti.
Odamdaki pencere, Ayasofya'nýn dört minaresinden birine bakýyordu. (Sabah ezaný okunduðu zaman beni yerimden oynatmýþtý.)
Bulunduðum semt þöyleydi: Yanýmda Ayasofya, meydanýn karþýsýnda Sultanahmet Camii, az bir yürüyüþ mesafesinde çok renkli labirentleriyle Kapalý Çarþý ve arada da sonu gelmez sayýda halýcý ve antikacý dükkanlarý. Orada yürüyüþ zevkli idi ve bir an yalnýz kalýnmýyordu. Müþteri avýndaki halýcý dükkanlarýnda çalýþan genç Türkler, sürekli olarak yaklaþarak konuþma tavrý içindeydiler. Ama bunu kesinlikle tehdit edici bir þekilde deðil, tam bir zerafet içinde yapýyorlardý. Halý almayacaðýmýn kesin olarak anlaþýlmasýndan sonra, içlerinden biri olan Ahmet'le çay içtim. Bana, kolumu tutarak ve samimiyetle, "11 Eylül'den sonra Türkiye'deki herkesin sevgisi ve dualarý sizinledir" dedi
Sonunda, bir zamanlar yaþadýðý Wilmington (Delaware)'da eþimin amcasýný tanýmýþ olan doktor Mustafa Öz'ün evinin önünde taksiden indim. Mustafa Öz ve eþi Suna'nýn evleri Boðaz'daydý. Bir konuklarý daha vardý: Leyla Umar. Umar, 73 yaþýndaki bir televizyon gazetecisi olup, inanýlmaz bir enerjiye sahipti. Dönüþte ayný arabayý paylaþtýk. Umar, sonradan öðrendim ki, Türkiye'de iyi bilinen, tanýdýk çevresi çok geniþ olan sol eðilimli bir gazeteciydi. Özellikle Fidel Castro'nun yakýn dostuydu. "Ona balýk piþirmek için gelecek hafta Havana'ya gidiyorum" dedi.
Umar, Türkiye'de nereleri görmem gerektiði konusunda tavsiyeye ihtiyacým olduðunu anladýðý zaman önümdeki bir haftanýn programýný üstlendi. (Londra'daki muhbirimin tavsiyesiyle) güneye yönelip, Akdeniz sahilindeki herhangi bir yere gitmeyi planladýðýmý söylediðimde cümlemi keserek beni susturdu.
Sakin bir gülümsemeyle "Kesinlikle olmaz caným" dedi. "Türkiye'ye gelip de Kapadokya'yý görmemek olmaz. Kesinlikle olmaz. Antalya'yý görmek için de en iyi zaman deðildir. Bodrum daha iyidir. Ýzmir ve Ege de öyle. Bak caným, þunu yapacaksýn..."
Ertesi gün yine taksiye binip havaalanýna geldim ve 90 dolara Ankara'ya bilet aldým. Ankara, tabii, Türkiye'nin baþkentiydi ama benim için Kapadokya'ya geçiþ noktasý oldu. Bizanslý Hýristiyanlarýn þehirleþtirdiði maðaralarýn çoðu bugün hala ya mesken olarak kullanýlmaktadýr ya da kafe olarak. Ankara havaalanýndaki bir seyahat þirketi, Kapadokya'nýn turizm merkezi Ürgüp için bana bir araba ve þoför ayarladý, bir otelde de yer ayýrttý.
Anadolu düzlüklerinden geçen yol uzundu, ama yine de hava kararmadan ilk þaþýrtýcý özelliklerini gördüðüm Ürgüp'e vardýk. Azametli damlataþ yapýlar, uzun taþ helezonlar, kat kat olmuþ hissini veren tuhaf vadilerden oluþan bir diyardý. Maðaralarýn içine yapýlmýþ bir otelde kalmayý umut ederken -ki öyle talep ettiðimi sanmýþtým- Ürgüp'ün, cazibesi olmayan çok katlý bir kutu þeklindeki en modern otelinde kalmak beni hayal kýrýklýðýna uðrattý. Ankara'daki turizm acentasý ile aramýzda bir yanlýþ anlama olmuþtu. Tek baþýna seyahat eden biri olarak þu hatýrlatmayý yapabilirim: Görmeden rezervasyon yaptýrmayýn.
Otelin lobisinde, yemeðimi, konuþmayý seven, gri býyýklý, o yöreden olan bir adamýn oturduðu yerin yanýndaki bir masada yemekteydim ki, kendini Abdurrahman Yüksel olarak tanýtan bu adam sonunda masama gelerek, geleneksel bir Anadolu gece kulübüne gelmek isteyip istemediðimi sordu.
Yüksel ve öðretmen olan eþi, beni arabalarýyla, kayalýklar içindeki Yaþar Baba adýnda bir yere götürdüler. Ýçeride hem yöre halkýndan insanlar hem de turistler vardý. Dans pistinin hemen yanýndaki bir masaya oturduk. Bir yandan sürahi ile gelen yerel þarabý içerken, bir yandan portakal dilimleri ve çerez yemeye baþladýk. Genç dansözü büyülenmiþ olarak seyrediyorum ki, dansözün kabus gibi komplosunu son anda anladým: Seyirciler arasýndan seçtiði erkekleri kendisiyle dansa çaðýrýyordu. Bileziklerle kaplý kolunu benim bulunduðum tarafa doðru uzattýðý zaman tam bir dehþet içinde düþtüm. Allah'a çok þükür, kendine mahkum olarak yakýnda oturan bir Japon erkeðini seçti. Adamýn gömleðini bile çýkarttýrdý; Zavallý adam.
Bu yerdeki herkesi tanýdýðý anlaþýlan Yüksel, bardaðýmý yeniden doldurarak, zurna çalan siyah yelekli bir adamý iþaret etti. Biraz sonra, Karadeniz bölgesinden bir folklor ekibi piste çýkarak çok hareketli bir dansý icra ettiler.
Sabahýn 01.00'inde oradan çýktýðýmýz zaman þarabýn da etkisiyle oldukça yorulmuþtum. Ancak Yüksel, "Merak etme, baþka bir yer daha biliyorum" dedi. Sabahý, daha küçük, daha sigara dumanlý bir maðara olan, yine bir þarap sürahisinin geldiði ve yine zeytin ve meyve yediðimiz Baccus adýnda bir baþka yerde ettik.
Yüksel, ertesi gün, Aslan adýnda Ýngilizceyi yeni öðrenen bir arkadaþýndan bana etrafý göstermesini istedi. Mükemmel bir açýk hava müzesi olan Göreme'de saatler geçirdik. Kapadokya'nýn en iyi onarýlmýþ ve korunmuþ maðaralarý buradaydý. Dördüncü yüzyýldan kalma gizli bir manastýrýn etrafýnda yedi yeraltý kilisesi vardý. Aslan'la sadece birkaç düzine kelimeyle anlaþabilmemizin hiçbir önemi yoktu. Böyle birþeye ihtiyacýmýz da yoktu. Çünkü her ikimiz de kafalarýmýzý kaldýrmýþ, aðýzlarýmýz açýk, hala canlýlýklarýný koruyan fresklere bakýyorduk.
Ayný akþam Ankara'ya döndüm, genelde iþ çevrelerinin tercih ettiði bir otelde kaldým ve ertesi günün erken saatlerinde havaalanýna gittim. Yine 90 dolar vererek, denizkenarýnda sýcak günler anlamýna gelen Ege'ye yönelmek üzere Ýzmir'e uçtum.
Umar'ýn çizdiði plan gereðince, Ýzmir havaalanýndan önce Efes harabelerine, sonra da sayfiye þehri Bodrum'a gitmek üzere 70 dolara (þoförüyle birlikte) bir araba kiraladým. Muhteþem ve çok kalabalýk bir yer olan Efes'ten sonra, Ýzmir'de konuþtuðum biri tarafýndan tavsiye edilen ve bir dað köyü olan Þirince'ye uðradým. Tam güneþin battýðý zamanda Bodrum'a geldik. Bu kez otel ararken çok daha dikkatli davrandým, Bulduðum Antique Theater Hotel 19 odasýyla tam bir mücevherdi. Ýnsan saatlerce sunduðu manzaraya bakabilirdi.
Soðuk Kapadokya'dan sonra Bodrum tam bir dinlenme oldu. Bir iki gün deniz kenarýnda yürüdüm, rýhtýmda balýk yedim, harabeleri gezdim. Kendime geldim. Sonunda yine havaalanýna giderek Ýstanbul'a dödüm.
Umar, Marmara oteli'nin lobisinde beni iki yanaðýmdan öperek, "Nasýl buldun Türkiye'yi caným?" diye sordu. Bir arkadaþýnýn evindeki davete götürmek için beni almaya gelmiþti otele. Davette, bankacýlýk yapan, kýzý New York'ta okuyan ve bana Taksim'deki gece kulüplerini gezdiren Sema ile tanýþtým. Üçüncü gece kulübündeyken -ki saat sabahýn 03.00'ü olmuþtu- Türkiye'de son günüm olacak olan ertesi günü düþündüm. Sultanahmet Camii'ne ve Topkapý Sarayý'na götürülecektim. Dr. Öz'ün kýzý ile öðle yemeði yiyecektim. Akþam yemeðinde ise iþ münasebetiyle e-postalaþtýðým bir kadýnla beraber olacaktým.
Herþey iyi güzeldi de, Türkiye'ye tek baþýma yaptýðým bu seyahat hakkýnda kafamda birtakým sorular vardý. Ne zaman tek baþýma olabilirdim ki?
KLEINE
ZEITUNG GRAZ:
YUNANÝSTAN BAÞI ÇEKÝYOR, TÜRKÝYE ARAYI KAPATIYOR
VÝYANA, 08/07(BYE)--- Tirajý günde 282 bin olan Kleine Zeitung Graz'ýn 06 Temmuz 2002 tarihli sayýsýnda, Wolfgang Simonitsch imzasýyla ve yukarýdaki baþlýk altýnda yayýmlanan yazýnýn Türkiye ile ilgili bölümünün çevirisi þöyledir:
Turizm konusunda söz sahibi olan seyahat bürosu, ülke çapýndaki 113 seyahat acentasýyla en büyük turizm kuruluþu.
Tatil seçeneklerine iliþkin yeni eðilimleri tespit eden bu seyahat bürosunun müdürleri, bu yüzden bu konuda iyi bir genel bakýþa sahip olduklarýný söylüyorlar: Gerçi Ýtalya'yý geride býrakan Yunanistan, hala Avusturyalýlarýn en çok raðbet ettiði tatil ülkesi konumunda. Ama geçen yýl dördüncü sýrada olan Türkiye de arayý giderek kapatýyor. Türkiye bu yýl, Mayorka'daki vergi ve grevlerden zarar gören Ýspanya'nýn üçüncü sýradaki yerini alabilir.
New York Times U.S. Considers Wary Jordan as Base for an Attack on Iraq
By ERIC SCHMITT
ASHINGTON,
July 9 — American military planners are considering using bases in Jordan to
stage air and commando operations against Iraq in the event the United States
decides to attack Iraq, senior defense officials said today.
But Jordan has not yet been consulted specifically about the possible use of its bases, and Jordanian officials have criticized such a plan.
An American military planning document prepared at the Central Command calls for air-, land- and sea-based forces to attack Iraq from three directions, but the details of which countries might be involved are just coming to light.
Using Jordanian bases would enable the Pentagon to attack Iraq from the west, as well as from the north via Turkey and the south via several Persian Gulf states.
Such an arrangement would also introduce American forces between Iraq and Israel to help detect, track and destroy Scud missiles that Baghdad might shoot at Israeli targets, as it did during the Persian Gulf war in 1991, the officials said.
A final military plan for attacking Iraq has not yet been prepared, but "every country in the region, from Turkey to Jordan to the gulf states, was being considered when you're talking about mounting an operation," a senior defense official said.
President Bush has discussed with King Abdullah of Jordan the administration's goal of toppling President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the political landscape without Mr. Hussein, officials said.
But in a telephone interview from Amman today, Jordan's foreign minister, Marwan J. Muasher, said: "Our public position is the same as our private position. Jordan will not be used as a launching pad, and we do not have any U.S. forces in Jordan."
The reason for Jordan's anxiety is clear. King Abdullah, who presides over a poor country in need of aid and good will from the United States, is trying to be a friend to Washington. He has met with President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney at the White House four times in the past two years, most recently on May 8.
The king is to meet privately with Mr. Bush here later this month, officials said.
At the same time, most of Jordan's population is of Palestinian descent, and Palestinians have been ardent supporters of President Hussein.
Jordanian sensitivities regarding Iraq have a long history. During the gulf war, the current king's father, King Hussein, essentially sat on the fence as Palestinians in the West Bank and in Jordan repeatedly held boisterous and sometimes violent demonstrations in support of Iraq.
Now Iraq sends large cash payments to families of Palestinian suicide bombers, further cementing the Iraqi leader's popularity among Palestinians.
King Abdullah would risk alienating many Palestinians in his kingdom, destabilizing the fragile balance that maintains Jordan as a viable state, if he allowed American troops to mount an attack from Jordanian territory.
Indeed, when Mr. Cheney visited the king in Amman in March, the Jordanian authorities issued a statement expressing the monarch's concern about "the repercussions of any possible strike on Iraq and the dangers of that on the stability and security of the region."
American military planners, operating without the political filters that their superiors would impose if an attack were imminent, say Jordan's role could be similar to that of Pakistan in the war in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has allowed American Special Operations forces and search and rescue crews to work out of bases in the country, but neither nation publicly acknowledges the arrangement.
A spokesman for the National Security Council, Sean McCormack, said the administration would not comment on war planning, but noted that "Jordan is a close friend and ally."
There are several signs that military cooperation between Washington and Jordan is increasing. The administration has requested $25 million from Congress as part of a larger emergency spending bill to provide Jordan with military equipment and "upgrades for land and air base defense," as well as border security, said a congressional aide.
The military's Central Command, which is responsible for planning military operations in 25 countries from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, has rated the construction projects in Jordan among its highest priorities, one official said. Some of the American aid could go toward lengthening runways at two Jordanian air bases to accommodate larger planes, the official said.
Two weeks ago, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the head of American forces in the Middle East, met in Amman with King Abdullah and with the defense minister and the senior military officer. Col. Ray Shepherd, a spokesman for General Franks, said the meeting was a "routine" visit.
American forces have conducted joint operations in Jordan. A year ago, 2,200 marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit from Camp Pendleton, Calif., took part in an exercise in Aqaba. In the late 1990's, American warplanes flew missions to enforce the no-flight zone over southern Iraq from Jordanian air bases.
The United States and Jordan have also carried out intelligence cooperation for many years.
Internal military planning over how to use Jordanian bases comes as the outlines of a plan to attack Iraq are evolving and apparently working their way through military channels.
Once a consensus is reached on the concept, the steps toward assembling a final war plan and the element of timing for ground deployments and launching an air war represent the final decisions for President Bush to make.
The existence of the military planning document was first reported in an op-ed article in The Los Angeles Times last month. The New York Times published details of the document last Friday.
Senate Panel to Ask Bush Aides to Give Details on His Iraq Policy
By JAMES DAO
ASHINGTON,
July 9 — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee plans to hold hearings later
this summer to question senior administration officials on their Iraq policy,
Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., the committee chairman, said today.
With some in the administration saying that an invasion could begin early next year, Mr. Biden said the time had come for a full public airing of how the goal of removing Saddam Hussein from power might be accomplished.
"I want them to define their objectives in Iraq," Mr. Biden said. "I want to know what scenarios there are for eliminating the chemical and biological weapons that Iraq may use if we attack. I'd like to know how important our allies are in this."
Perhaps most important, Mr. Biden said, is who would replace Mr. Hussein if the United States succeeded in ousting him — a question that has caused much debate between Washington and its allies and within the administration itself.
Mr. Biden asserted that the reason President Bush's father declined to invade Baghdad during the gulf war in the early 90's was the lack of a clear Hussein successor, without whom he was concerned that the country would collapse into anarchy.
Relating a recent conversation with President Bush, Mr. Biden said: "He always kids me, he says: `Well you agree with me on Saddam, why don't you agree with my methods?' I always kid him and say: `Mr. President, there's a reason why your father stopped and didn't go to Baghdad. He didn't want to stay five years.' "
Mr. Biden said he hoped to hold hearings before Labor Day, but his aides said they would more likely occur in late September.
A spokesman for Senator Richard G. Lugar, an Indiana Republican who is the second-ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, said Mr. Lugar would support holding hearings as a way of building public support for potential military action — particularly because it might involve heavy casualties.
Though the administration has said that it has no formal plans for invading Iraq, the Pentagon has been developing proposals that call for deploying as many as 250,000 troops in a combined air, land and sea assault from the north, south and west.
Editorial The Corporate Scandals: Cleaning Up
eacting
belatedly to the continual reports of malfeasance undermining investor
confidence and threatening the economic recovery, President Bush came to Wall
Street yesterday to deliver his "clean up your act or else" message to corporate
America. He sounded at times like a sheriff, warning of jail time for crooks,
and at other times like a preacher admonishing business executives to look deep
into their souls before issuing their next quarterly reports. At its core,
however, the president's address was disappointingly devoid of tough proposals
to remedy underlying problems in accounting, corporate governance and the safety
net of federal laws and regulations that is supposed to prevent abuses.
It was one of those speeches that promise more than they can deliver, which is probably why expectant markets found no reason to rally after Mr. Bush left the lectern. For instance, his call to strengthen enforcement resources at the Securities and Exchange Commission by $100 million sounded good at first blush, but it falls far short of what is needed to revive a critical agency — one that his administration was merrily weakening until the business scandals hit the headlines.
Mr. Bush rightly condemned the glaring conflicts of interest at Wall Street firms whose ostensibly independent research analysts have touted stocks solely because they were investment-banking clients. But it was New York State's attorney general, Eliot Spitzer, not the Bush administration, who cracked down on these conflicts.
Mr. Bush missed an ideal opportunity yesterday to vault ahead of the pack and seize command of the reform campaign. He embraced sensible proposals that have already been introduced by others, such as the New York Stock Exchange, and that have already gained traction in response to the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom and elsewhere. Mr. Bush's endorsement of the stock exchange's new guidelines calling for independent directors and shareholder approval of stock-option plans allowed him to appear bold while actually remaining on the sidelines in the fight to restore the integrity of financial markets and public trust in them.
The president was right in urging companies to ban outrageous loans to executives — an easy call. But he should also have pushed for re-examining the more complicated issue of how corporations handle executive stock-option grants and finding ways to reflect them realistically as an expense.
The biggest disappointment was Mr. Bush's failure to insist on a forceful reform of the accounting industry. Auditors are the primary guardians of business integrity, and in the recent boom they lost sight of their mandate to serve the public, not company officers. The House passed a weak reform bill in the spring. But the president at best appeared to be equating it with the more meaningful proposal the Senate is currently considering. The Senate bill, proposed by Paul Sarbanes, would establish an independent oversight board for the industry, and place limits on the consulting work auditors can perform for companies. Mr. Bush would have best served the interests of the tens of millions of Americans who want to continue entrusting their retirement savings to the stock market if he had transcended partisanship on this one issue and directed his party's leadership in the House to adopt the Senate's version of accounting reform.
Establishing a Justice Department task force on corporate fraud is a fine idea, as is Mr. Bush's effort to make corporate insiders personally liable for their misrepresentations, and to make them return ill-gotten gains. Americans no doubt appreciated the president's tough talk about punishing executives who commit crimes. But what they really wanted to hear from Mr. Bush was how he intended to prevent corporate fraud from occurring in the first place. He had little to offer on that score.
The Corporate Scandals: Coming Clean
hen
George W. Bush speaks about corporate misbehavior and self-dealing by business
insiders, he perches on a platform much weaker than the one from which he
launched the war on terrorism. Instead of the sense of resolve and determination
he showed after Sept. 11, the president is still struggling to prove that his
past business dealings have not made him a product of the very system he now
denounces. The president dismisses criticism of his record as political. But if
he expects to restore confidence in corporate America, he needs to get his own
house in order first.
On Monday the president attempted to explain why the methods he employed as an oil company executive years ago are different from the insider trading and creative accounting now undermining the credibility of corporate America. He made the disastrous mistake of arguing that in his case, accounting rules were "not always black and white." For a president whose foreign policy, and entire political outlook, is based on the idea that the world can indeed be divided into good and bad, black and white, nothing could have sounded worse.
The president needs to speak much more frankly about the money he made in selling his faltering oil company to Harken Energy of Texas — and later selling Harken shares shortly before the company's stock price collapsed. Harken also engaged in questionable bookkeeping practices while Mr. Bush served on its board. While the S.E.C. has found no illegalities, he would be a more persuasive advocate of reform if he found a way to acknowledge that this deal, the foundation of his personal fortune, is not a shining example of the stern code of responsibility he now demands that executives follow.
The most sensitive spot in Mr. Bush's résumé has always been the strong suspicion that his success as a businessman was due in the main to his family connections. That becomes relevant if it means that the president places too much emphasis on personal loyalty and team spirit. It is not enough for Mr. Bush to declare that someone in his administration is a good man. He needs to show that he understands that good men sometimes do bad things when they are entrusted with power, and that it is the government's job to keep them accountable.
Mr. Bush has repeatedly failed to make tough personnel decisions about people he regards as part of the team. It is inexcusable that Tom White, a former Enron executive, is still holding his job as Army secretary. And any clear-sighted administration would realize that Harvey Pitt, a former lawyer for the accounting industry, is not the right advocate as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission for tough new accounting standards long opposed by the industry.
The administration was overly permissive when it came to demanding that cabinet members follow the rules for divesting themselves of their personal stock holdings. And Mr. Bush sees nothing wrong with the fact that Vice President Dick Cheney's energy task force still refuses to release the names of the businessmen who advised the administration on its energy policy. Now Mr. Cheney's former company, Halliburton, is being investigated by the S.E.C. for practices carried out while he was in charge. The public needs some frank explanations, but Mr. Cheney has declined to comment.
It's far too late for Mr. Bush to go back and demonstrate that he could have been a successful businessman even if his name were George Walker. What we need is a president who sets an example of the standards he wants corporate America to adopt. If he can't do that, his critics will have grounds to poke at that tender spot in his personal history again and again.
Another Attempt to Legislate Corporate Honesty
By DAVID SKEEL and WILLIAM
STUNTZ
OSTON
How
should we respond to the wave of scandals that have hit corporate America?
Everyone in Washington seems to agree on the answer: more law. In particular,
more criminal law.
Congressional Democrats promise to add new federal fraud provisions to a bill that may be considered as early as this week. And in his speech on Wall Street yesterday, President Bush endorsed a similar approach — proposing a doubling of prison terms for mail and wire fraud and a broader notion of obstruction of justice as well as beefed-up oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The push for new criminal laws is understandable. Although securities laws already include stiff criminal penalties, those laws sometimes make prosecution difficult (usually because under their provisions intent is hard to prove). It isn't even clear whether the actions of, say, Enron or WorldCom executives violated these laws. Toughening existing criminal laws and adding new ones might seem the best way to make sure that future Enrons and WorldComs won't happen — and to send a clear message that America will not tolerate dishonesty in corporate boardrooms.
But it won't work. We have gone down this path many times before, and if experience is any guide, new criminal laws are as likely to make things worse as to make them better. The reason is both simple and all too easily ignored: Criminal laws lead people to focus on what is legal instead of what is right.
A look at history illustrates the problem. A century ago, the federal criminal law of fraud consisted of a handful of statutes, and it covered amazingly little. For instance, concealment and self-dealing — pursuing your own interests instead of your shareholders' or employees' — were not crimes. No wonder the one legal proposition many ordinary citizens knew was "let the buyer beware."
Fast-forward to today, and the picture looks quite different. The federal criminal code includes more than 300 fraud and misrepresentation statutes; most go far beyond anything our law used to cover. With all this criminal law, we ought to have achieved a high level of corporate honesty by now. Needless to say, current events suggest otherwise. Perhaps that's because we've turned what used to be moral questions into legal technicalities. In today's world, executives are more likely to ask what they can get away with legally than to worry about what's fair and honest.
The result is that corporate wrongdoers escape punishment because they invest in creative ways to skirt the law. And honest executives, instead of focusing on doing their jobs honorably, wind up playing the same legal games dishonest executives play. That is the natural consequence of relying too much on criminal law and too little on civil regulation and, especially, moral norms.
There is another, related, problem. White-collar criminal cases that go to trial almost always focus on behavior that is right on the line between legal and illegal. (Defendants usually plead guilty before trial when they have clearly violated the law, and prosecutors generally do not charge defendants they cannot convict.) As more criminal laws cover technical violations, more of those white-collar criminal trials will deal with technicalities. The result may be to trivialize corporate crime and undermine the public's respect for law generally. We risk robbing "wrong" of its bite.
We do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to legislate morality in the business world and elsewhere; that happens all the time and sometimes works very well. The point is that it is possible to overlegislate, frantically criminalizing more behavior with each new corporate scandal. Better to leave criminal law alone (it's too broad already) and to use some of the civil reform measures (such as a more independent accounting regulator) endorsed by both the president and Congressional Democrats.
Expanding the criminal fraud laws may be an easy political sell, but it is not a solution. We may wind up with tougher penalties. But we won't get more honest corporate behavior.
David Skeel teaches business law at the University of Pennsylvania. William Stuntz teaches criminal law at Harvard.
Washington Post
Editorial Capitalism and Conscience
Wednesday, July 10, 2002; Page A16
THE CENTRAL conceit of President Bush's Wall Street speech yesterday was that the run of corporate scandals is primarily a moral issue. "There's no capitalism without conscience; there is no wealth without character," Mr. Bush lectured. "We need men and women of character, who know the difference between ambition and destructive greed."
There is no harm in this rhetoric, but it is naive to suppose that business can be regulated by some kind of national honor code. The United States, however much Mr. Bush may deplore it, is a land of moral relativism, leading the political scientist Alan Wolfe of Boston College to conclude that the Ten Commandments have become the Ten Suggestions, and that Americans have added an 11th to the old list: Thou shalt be tolerant. In a nation as dynamic and diverse as this one, it is hard to define a moral consensus, let alone enforce one. And this is especially true in business. When an American firm raises capital from Japanese pension funds and Belgian dentists, when it operates subsidiaries in China and Chile, when it employs people of all faiths and cultures, and when it competes globally, it will be hard-pressed to reflect "the values of our country," as Mr. Bush proposed.
There is one objective that companies can unite around, and that is to make money. This is not a criticism: The basis of our market system is that, by maximizing profits, firms also maximize the collective good. There are some boundaries that should not be crossed in the pursuit of revenue, but these are defined by law, not personal morality. Ethicists have little to say about what constitutes monopolistic behavior or whether off-balance-sheet partnerships should be consolidated. This is what lawyers do.
The real test of Mr. Bush's speech, therefore, is what he said about changing the rules that drive business behavior. And what he said was limited. He focused mainly on tougher penalties for white-collar criminals plus extra resources to pursue them. But he offered less on both scores than reformers in the Senate. Mr. Bush proposed doubling the penalty for mail and wire fraud; Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee have voted unanimously to create a new crime of securities fraud. Mr. Bush proposed increasing the budget of the Securities and Exchange Commission by $100 million. But the Senate reformers -- again, coming from both parties -- want three times that increase, so that the SEC can expand its enforcement division and bring salaries up to parity with other financial regulators at the Federal Reserve and Treasury.
In other areas, the president's proposals were still weaker. He exhorted shareholders to do a better job of overseeing companies but said nothing about lowering the legal barriers to shareholders who seek to make their voices heard. He asked company boards to do a better job of overseeing managers but did not endorse protections for whistleblowers who might give board members information. He offered one vague reference to auditors' conflicts of interests but said nothing substantial. He said virtually nothing about the need for a new audit oversight board.
Mr. Bush's advisers have read the polls, which show much greater enthusiasm for holding bigwigs accountable than for obscure audit overhaul. They remain reluctant to back the tough reforms that are inevitably unpopular with the accounting lobby. Despite Mr. Bush's exhortation yesterday to clean up corporate America, the administration has put out a statement critical of the best vehicle for achieving this objective, which is the Senate's reform package. The administration needs to close this gap between rhetoric and policy.
Bush Urges Crackdown On Business
Corruption
More Resources for Regulators, Increased Jail Terms
Proposed
By Mike Allen
Washington Post Staff
Writer
Wednesday, July 10, 2002; Page A01
NEW YORK, July 9 -- President Bush today called for prison terms for executives who falsify financial statements, appealing to capitalists' self-interest as well as their consciences as he tries to curtail accounting fraud.
With bookkeeping scandals roiling markets and prompting the collapse of major companies, Bush said during a visit to Wall Street that he wants to enforce "a new ethic of responsibility" in boardrooms by giving more money and power to regulators and by doubling the maximum prison term for some types of fraud, from five to 10 years.
"My administration will do everything in our power to end the days of cooking the books, shading the truth and breaking our laws," Bush told an audience of 600 business, academic and religious leaders at a former customs house next to the New York Stock Exchange. "In the long run, there's no capitalism without conscience. There is no wealth without character."
The accounting crisis hit when the economic recovery already was looking sickly, handing Bush a new political challenge because he and his aides have longtime corporate connections and are champions of deregulation. He delivered the speech amid questions about his own conduct when he was an oil company director before running for Texas governor.
His proposals, which Democrats condemned as much weaker than measures they have long had in the works, beefed up a 10-point plan Bush issued in March when he was under fire for his political connections to Enron Corp. after its financial collapse.
"Self-regulation is important, but it's not enough," Bush said. "Government can do more to promote transparency and ensure that risks are honest."
The president signed an executive order creating a Corporate Fraud Work Force, which he called "a financial crimes SWAT team, overseeing the investigation of corporate abusers and bringing them to account." It will be headed by Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson and will include about a dozen other executive branch officials.
Bush called on the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent agency in the judicial branch, to enhance prison time for fraud when committed by corporate officers and directors. And he proposed making it easier to charge an executive with obstruction of justice for shredding documents, even if they were not subject to a subpoena.
Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) said Bush "spoke loudly, but he offered a very, very small stick." Daschle vowed to push ahead with tougher measures that have gained momentum in recent weeks as more companies have reported problems. "The president fell short on a number of the very specific criteria that I think are required if we're going to do this job right," Daschle said.
Several administration officials said the measures Bush outlined today were watered down as they were debated within the White House over the past few weeks. These officials said Bush and Vice President Cheney were adamant that they not hurt the economy by imposing too much regulation.
"We don't want to overreact and create an entire new set of problems," a senior administration official said. "The goal is to restore confidence in the markets and confidence in the system."
One official said that as some of the harsher proposals were examined, it was decided that they would be ineffective or have unintended consequences. Officials also said they felt pressure to respond speedily to the unfolding scandals, particularly the disclosure last month of massive accounting irregularities by WorldCom Inc., the nation's second-largest long-distance carrier.
Bush's new plan is weaker than several measures advancing in Congress. He said he favors $100 million in additional funding next year for the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates public companies. Senate Democrats want to add $296 million.
The Bush proposal for 10-year prison terms applies to mail fraud and wire fraud, which prosecutors contend can be hard to prove. One leading Democratic proposal would create a felony for securities fraud, defined as scheming to defraud shareholders. Lawyers said that frauds affecting financial institutions already carry a penalty of up to 30 years.
Another Democratic measure is sponsored by Senate banking committee Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.), who praised Bush's rhetoric but said there needs to be "underlying substance as well if we're really going to address this problem."
Bush said at a news conference Monday that his plan and the Sarbanes bill "share the same goals," but stark differences remain. The Sarbanes plan would seek to prevent conflicts of interest for accounting firms by banning them from providing consulting services to their auditing clients. Sarbanes also proposed a full-time, independent board to oversee accounting firms. Bush endorsed an SEC proposal for a less powerful board.
Even as Bush proposed stiffer penalties for dishonest executives, he said the ethics of business depend on the consciences of its leaders. "High-profile acts of deception have shaken people's trust," he said. "Too many corporations seem disconnected from the values of our country."
The president criticized huge salaries that have become common for top executives, asserting that chief executives set an ethical tone with their compensation packages. "It tells you whether his principal goal is the creation of wealth for shareholders, or the accumulation of wealth for himself," Bush said.
Democratic officials worked to keep public attention on Bush's brushes with the SEC when he was a director of Texas-based Harken Energy Corp. He filed several late disclosure forms and was investigated, then cleared, of accusations of illegal insider trading. Democrats said Bush was reflecting his past when he said this week that in the corporate world, "things aren't exactly black and white when it comes to accounting procedures."
"Mr. President," said House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.), "with all due respect, accounting should be black and white."
Several business groups praised Bush's plan. The National Association of Manufacturers called it "tough but sensible." The speech was greeted with sparse applause from the luncheon audience assembled by the Association for a Better New York, formed during the city's fiscal crisis of the 1970s.
Bush aides had hoped for a stock market rally after his 27-minute speech at the Regent Wall Street hotel. The Dow Jones industrial average, however, fell sharply and finished the day off 178.81 points.
Pray for Gridlock
By Robert J. Samuelson
Wednesday, July
10, 2002; Page A17
Among right-thinking people, political gridlock -- that is, partisan paralysis -- is considered a deplorable obstacle to progressive government. To those more skeptical of Washington politics, gridlock is often a godsend. It frequently derails bad legislation. This principle should now be applied to the wildly popular Medicare drug benefit.
In late June the Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed its proposal by a 221-208 vote, largely along party lines. Beginning in 2005, the plan would subsidize drug purchases for the 65-and-over population at an estimated cost of $320 billion for the first eight years. Democrats say the Republican plan is unworkable and too stingy. The Democratic-controlled Senate is expected to consider a more expensive plan, whose projected costs exceed $400 billion for seven years. If this passes, the best outcome would be deadlock. A House-Senate conference to fashion a single bill would dissolve in hopeless bickering.
Let it be said that, in an ideal world, a drug benefit makes sense. When Congress created Medicare -- federal health insurance for those 65 and over -- in 1965, coverage was modeled after private insurance plans. Typically, they didn't pay for drugs. Since then a pharmacological revolution has enlarged drugs' importance. Private insurance has expanded.
As a result, Medicare is outdated. In 1999 about 38 percent of people over 65 had no insurance coverage for drugs, reports the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. The remaining 62 percent had some coverage through company-sponsored retiree insurance, Medigap (private insurance bought by retirees) and a hodgepodge of government programs. For most retirees, out-of-pocket drug costs are affordable. By one survey, they averaged $584 in 1999 for those without insurance. Another estimate puts out-of-pocket costs much higher, $1,052 in 2002. Even by these figures, 68 percent of recipients have costs of less than $1,000 and only 9 percent have costs exceeding $3,000.
Viewed in isolation, a Medicare drug benefit would relieve some hardship. The trouble is that it shouldn't be viewed in isolation. The bipartisan enthusiasm for a drug benefit reflects a shameless prospecting, by both parties, for votes among the elderly and near elderly. They vote more than the young and the lately young. Consider: Sixty-four percent of those 45 to 64 voted in 2000, as did 68 percent of those 65 and over. Among those 21 to 24, only 24 percent voted, and among those 25 to 34, only 44 percent did. In 2000 about 55 percent of all voters were 45 and older.
Both parties are sacrificing the country's long-term interests for short-term political advantage. The country's interests are to curb the burgeoning costs of retirement benefits, which, given the aging of the baby boom generation, threaten to overburden the budget. From 2000 to 2030, these benefits -- mainly Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid -- will roughly double as a share of national income. They're now almost 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In three decades they'll reach 14 percent or more of GDP, projects the Congressional Budget Office. A drug benefit would bloat costs further.
In practice, workers -- the main taxpayers -- will have to pay rising subsidies for retirees. Social Security and Medicare are pay-as-you-go programs supported by current taxes and will probably stay that way. Federal spending is now nearly 20 percent of GDP. Paying for future retirement costs, even without a drug benefit, will require some combination of the following: steep tax increases; deep cuts in other spending, from defense to schools; larger budget deficits. Too much of any of these items would be unfair to future workers (today's children) and might damage the economy.
In an ideal world, Congress and the White House would long ago have begun to mute the collision between retirees and workers. Reflecting longer life expectancies, eligibility ages would have been gradually raised. Reflecting people's ability to save for their own retirement, benefit levels would have been slightly trimmed for wealthier retirees. If these things had been done, a Medicare drug benefit for the poor and for catastrophic costs would be justified.
But except for a modest increase in Social Security's normal eligibility age, these things haven't been done. Moreover, Congress and the president won't even talk about them. In the House debate, the subject of who was going to pay for this expensive new benefit barely came up. There's an indifference that probably reflects public opinion. It surely reflects the attitude in the press, which was recently captured by a headline in the New York Times: "Why the Elderly Wait . . . and Wait."
A drug benefit is viewed as a worthy entitlement. Hardly anyone wants to think about long-term costs. This is a politically radioactive subject that right-thinking people refuse to touch. Given the indifference, and yes, stupidity, the best that can be hoped for is that Congress and the president won't make the country's future problems worse -- aka gridlock.
By David Makovsky
Wednesday, July 10,
2002; Page A17
President Bush's recent address on the Middle East was a seminal moment for that region. It strengthened the idea that resolution of the long-running conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is not likely any time soon under the current Palestinian leadership -- and that successful peacemaking will thus depend on new leadership and better security.
And the fact is that the cause of Palestinian reform has great resonance among Palestinians. Now it is important for Israel to encourage this interest by sending an unmistakable political signal that it will not try to exploit the situation as Palestinians sort out their internal matters. The appropriate signal would be this: Halt settlement expansion in the West Bank and Gaza.
The general approach to peacemaking since the Oslo accords in 1993 has been that Palestinian internal affairs were irrelevant to diplomacy. Since Yasser Arafat was considered the source of Palestinian legitimacy, his authoritarianism was not only inherent in the deal but even welcomed, in the belief that an unrestricted Arafat would do the most for Israeli security.
This division between foreign and domestic issues did not work. As a leading Palestinian political analyst and pollster, Khalil Shikaki, makes clear in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, the Palestinian violence since September 2000 has been linked to dissatisfaction with Arafat's domestic performance no less than to dissatisfaction over peacemaking. Ultimately, Arafat sought to deflect attention from his domestic nonperformance by blaming Israel for all Palestinian woes.
That is why Bush is correct in focusing on Palestinian reform. To do so is not an imposition of American values: Reform is driven from within. In Shikaki's latest poll in May, no less than 91 percent want reform.
Reform is above all a Palestinian interest, of course, but Israel has much to gain from it. Unlike the peace with Egypt, separated from Israel by a desert buffer, this one must be between people living cheek by jowl with one another. The sheer proximity between Israelis and Palestinians makes it imperative that there not be an economically thriving democracy existing alongside a poverty-ridden autocracy.
There will undoubtedly be an Israeli reluctance to "pay" for reforms with land concessions, especially because of the justified skepticism about whether Arafat will ever allow the needed reforms. But Bush's policy sharply changes the terms of the debate, because he now requires benchmarks for performance. This performance-based -- rather than deadline-based -- approach is more arduous, but it is also far more likely to be enduring in providing stability.
It would be disastrous, in these circumstances, if Palestinians and other Arabs were to see reform as too time-consuming and difficult or, worse, as a ruse for Israel to use this indeterminate period to expand settlements. It is therefore imperative to give political cover to the reformers and ensure that they are not vulnerable to such allegations. It is also important to give political cover to Bush in the Arab world. It must be made clear that only the prospects of reform -- not suicide bombers -- succeeded in prompting Israel to halt settlement activity.
Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer has started taking down a few outposts -- including trailer homes abandoned since the start of the Sharon government. But more is needed. For the initiative to be meaningful, it should come from Jerusalem, not Washington. Last Friday's Maariv poll showed that 59 percent of Israelis support halting expansion. Developments can be monitored to ensure that no offsetting Palestinian expansion occurs in areas near the old 1967 border, where almost 80 percent of settlers live -- areas that Israel could swap with a future Palestine. The guiding principle should be that no outward settlement expansion be done in a way that complicates final partition of the West Bank.
Arafat's leadership makes statehood dangerous for Israel now, but if the ultimate goal is not partition, Israel's very identity is at stake. Jews now make up about 53 percent of the population in the lands between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River; Arabs -- including Israeli Arab citizens -- are about 47 percent. These figures come even after Israel has added about a million Jews from the former Soviet Union in the past decade and the ultra-Orthodox birthrate has skyrocketed. A leading Israeli demographer, Sergio Della Pergola, says the Jews will be a minority within a decade.
Ironically, many of the settlers cite biblical patrimony as the reason for settlement, though control over these areas makes Israel less Jewish as it becomes a de facto binational state. For Israel to remain Jewish and democratic, it needs partition.
It was not the settlements that led to the torpedoing of Camp David at the end of the Clinton presidency. Ehud Barak made clear that Israel was willing to take down close to 100, mostly remote, settlements, and the Israeli public continues to support dismantling of most settlements in return for real peace. But their role cannot be ignored. While the settlements are on only a fraction of the land, the number of settlers virtually doubled during the Oslo period, creating a sense among Palestinians that Israel wanted to prejudge the outcome of final negotiations.
Reform places new obligations on the Palestinians. Halting settlement expansion should be Israel's contribution. As we stand on the threshold of the post-Oslo period, it is important to get it right this time.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author of "Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord."
After 21 months of intifada, a wall is born
Israeli fortifications along the West Bank recall other historic barriers.
By Cameron W. Barr | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
SALIT, WEST
BANK
- It may be the most definitive "fact on the ground" in the 35-year history of
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories – miles and miles of wire
fences and concrete walls dividing Israel from the West
Bank.
Most of the structure
has yet to be built, but some Israelis are already imagining its
destruction.
"I hope the day will
come when they tear up the wall," says Miriam Gepner, sitting in her comfortable
home on top of a hill in the West Bank. "But," she adds, "maybe it will reduce
terrorism."
Ms. Gepner's ambivalence sums up Israel's as a whole. Although many Israelis don't like the
fence, most see no alternative.
The Palestinian
position is more unified. Because the fence is not the product of negotiations
and because it will encroach into the West Bank, Palestinians see it as a
unilateral imposition. "It's a method to take our land," says Ghassan Kabha,
whose West Bank village will be fenced into Israel.
In light of 21 months
of open conflict, the fence constitutes another symbol of the inability to
resolve the Israeli- Palestinian dispute.
Just outside the
Palestinian city of Kalkiliya, project manager Erez Rubenstein is supervising
the construction of a 1.2-mile wall intended to prevent Palestinians from
shooting at cars on a soon-to-be-opened Israeli highway that skirts the
city.
It seems a structure
of staggering permanence – 25-foot-high concrete slabs rising into the sky. Mr.
Rubenstein says Palestinian farmers have complained to him that they will no
longer be able to see the sunset.
But the idea of
walling off the West Bank, says Rubenstein, "is not long-term thinking. It's
short-term thinking."
Even so, what worries
people on both sides of the conflict is that short-term measures have a way of
becoming long-term realities. For many Israelis and Palestinians, at times for
very different reasons, the most troubling aspect of the fence is that they see
a border in the making.
Construction begins
Israeli leaders have
been discussing the idea since at least the mid-1990s, but it has taken the
violence of the past 21 months to make it happen. In mid-June, Israel's
government officially began construction of an initial, 66-mile section of the
fence that will divide the northern West Bank from Israel. Set to take a year
and cost nearly $1.7 million per mile, the initial phase will cover about a
third of what Israelis call the "seam line" along the West Bank. Israel has
already fenced off the Gaza Strip.
For the most part, the
fence will be less of a barrier and more of a means for detecting any person or
vehicle that crosses it – through the use of radar and other electronic sensors.
Conceived in conjunction with the new highway, construction of the wall around
Kalkiliya began earlier, but it will be linked up with the
fence.
The building of the
barrier is based on the notion that Israelis and Palestinians, at least for now,
must be separated. On a more practical level, most Israelis insist that a fence
constitutes the best available means of keeping out Palestinian suicide bombers
and other attackers.
Defense Minister
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who initially opposed the idea and then embraced it,
insists it is a "security fence" – not a political or diplomatic
one.
But at either end of
the Israeli political spectrum, there is opposition. Right-wing Israelis object
because they believe that they have a biblical and strategic mandate to retain
control of at least parts of the West Bank. Building the fence, they argue, will
cut off tens of thousands of Israelis who inhabit Jewish settlements and create
a distinction between "true" Israelis who live inside the fence and those who
don't.
From a security
standpoint, critics argue that the fence won't keep out determined attackers or
stop missiles or mortars.
Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, the political patron of Israel's settler movement, has gone along with
the plan, but with evident misgivings. What he and Mr. Ben-Eliezer cannot
overlook is the popularity of the idea as a stopgap
measure.
Israeli support for a
barrier
Public opinion polls
show that a majority of Israelis support the fence, even if it doesn't
constitute a real answer to the conflict. "I don't think ... there's another
solution," says Rubenstein, the project manager. Referring to the Palestinians,
he adds: "There's no intention to stop the terror for the time
being."
Many left-wing
Israelis see some long-term merit in the fence, in that it may represent the
emergence of a de facto Palestinian state, but others insist that the
demarcation of borders should be the product of a peace
agreement.
Many leftists would
also like to see the settlements evacuated, a step that is virtually impossible
to imagine under a Sharon government. Indeed, the government is extending the
fence into parts of the West Bank in order to put some settlements on the
Israeli side.
'Not a border'
So in several areas
the fence will deviate from the "green line" that marked Israel's border on the
eve of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The Palestinians increasingly insist on
Israel's full withdrawal from areas across the green line as a condition for
peace.
Subtleties abound,
however. The green line divides a Palestinian village called Bartaa, cutting it
into a section administered by Israel and one under the civil control of the
Palestinian Authority.
The head of the
municipal council on the Israeli side of Bartaa, Ahmed Ibrahim Kabha, says
Israeli authorities initially told him they would put the fence through the
town, along the unmarked but unmissable green line.
He says he refused,
petitioning the Israelis to include the entire town on the Israeli side and to
provide Bartaa's Palestinian residents with permits that will allow them to work
and travel inside Israel. Israel's Defense Ministry supports his
account.
"This wall will not be
a border between a Palestinian state and Israel," Mr. Kabha says, nicely articulating Israel's position. "It's just to protect against suicide
bombers."
Asked whether he
worries about being accused of being a traitor to the Palestinian cause, he
says: "The question of borders and land doesn't matter to us. What we are
looking for is peace and reconciliation between the two
sides."
Across the green line,
Ghassan Kabha, who heads the village on the Palestinian side, rejects the idea
that Israeli authorities take their cues from their citizens of Palestinian
origin. "The Israelis act as if they are God," he says. "I don't think Ahmed
Ibrahim or I could influence Israeli opinion."
He rejects the idea
that being included in the fence might improve living conditions for all the
residents of Bartaa. "As a Palestinian, it is not important to have money or an
easy life," he says. "The most important thing for us is to have freedom and
democracy and dignity.... The only thing that can do that is the end of Israeli
occupation."
Salit, where Miriam
Gepner lives, is one of the Jewish settlements that Israel will include on its
side of the fence. But Gepner says it never made much difference to her whether
she would have to cross the fence to get home or not.
For one thing, she
says, "we don't know how permanent it's going to be." For another, she
continues, alluding to friendships she has tried to maintain with her
Palestinian neighbors, it is not the physical barriers that worry her so much.
"I'm concerned about the fences in the heart."
The Berlin Wall
Built:
1961
To Keep In:
East
Germans
Length: 103 miles
(surrounding West Berlin)
The Berlin Wall was
far more than a physical barrier separating East and West Germany. As the
physical embodiment of the Iron Curtain, the wall quickly became the central
symbol of the ongoing cold war.
Erected almost
overnight by the Soviets and East Germans, the Wall was meant to stem a tide of
migration from the East to the West. Its concrete barriers, guards, electric
fences, and armed checkpoints slowed the flow, but almost 200 people were killed
while attempting to defect; thousands more made it across, or were stopped in
the process.
As a touchstone for
Western political rhetoric and the icon of a divided Europe, the symbolic wall
took on epic proportions. But the legacy of the physical wall, finally torn down
in 1990, is far from trivial in its own right; German leaders are still working
today to fully reunite a country once divided by guns and barbed
wire.
The Korean DMZ
Built:
1953
To Keep
Out:
Troops from each side
Length:
151
miles
Described by former US
President Bill Clinton as "the scariest place on earth," the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) that divides the two Koreas is a cold-war legacy that has yet to thaw.
Established under the 1953 armistice that put the Korean War on hold, the DMZ
bristles with land mines, towers, razor wire and nearly two million soliders
from the two Koreas. More than 37,000 US troops are stationed in South
Korea.
While effectively
chilling the armed conflict that once threatened to provoke a world war, the
barrier has kept the hermit nation of North Korea almost totally isolated from
its southern neighbor. If the peninsula reunites, the cost of decades of North
Korean isolation will weigh heavily on its southern neighbor and the
international community. In the meantime, the frontier is one of the world's
touchiest; if North Korean troops cross the DMZ in force, the United States is,
under a 1954 agreement, automatically committed to war.
The US/Mexico Border
Fortified: The 20th
century
To Keep Out: Illegal immigrants and
workers from Latin America
Length: 2,000
miles
An extension of the
natural barrier created by the Rio Grande River, the border between the United
States and Mexico is the front line of a massive economic and cultural struggle.
Mexican workers and families, seeking the relatively plentiful and rewarding
jobs inside the United States, risk confrontation with US Border Patrol agents
and the INS as they cross the border by the hundreds of
thousands.
A greatly beefed-up US
security presence along the border has decreased the numbers of immigrants
trying to make the increasingly difficult crossing, and fatalities, while still
numerous, have decreased in recent years.
But the crossing still
takes a harsh human toll; every year, hundreds of immigrants die in the
scorching desert or drown while crossing the river. On July 4, the Mexican
Foreign Department released a statement saying 167 migrants of all nationalities
(117 of them Mexican) died trying to cross the US border in the first half of
the year. A total of 210 Mexicans died in the same period in 2001, and 283
during the first half of 2002.
The Great Wall of China
Built:
Around 220
BC
To Keep Out: Invaders from the
north
Length:
roughly 4,500
miles
Knitted together from
a rugged patchwork of far smaller improvised barriers and built over the course
of a millennium, the Great Wall of China remains one of humanity's most
ambitious feats of engineering.
Historians estimate
that building the Great Wall cost over a million lives, and the equivalent of
hundreds of billions of US dollars. While pricey, the wall kept northern invaders at bay with varying and still-debated amounts of success until the
Mongol conquests in the 13th and 14th centuries.
For many, the Great
Wall embodies China's relationship with the outside world. Its strength and
sweep are seen as the achievements of a powerful, mature civilization. But to
much of the outside world, the Great Wall is the icon of a fortress
mentality.
Wall profiles by James
Norton
Central Asia: the next
front in the terror war?
After fighting alongside the Taliban last fall, Uzbek insurgents on Bush's terrorist list are now regrouping.
By Scott Peterson | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
TASHKENT,
UZBEKISTAN - Central Asian
Islamic militants with ties to Al Qaeda, who survived the war in neighboring
Afghanistan, are beginning to regroup, and analysts are warning of a shift from
insurgency to terror.
"They are going to
move towards assassinations and terrorism, possibly against US forces," says
Ahmed Rashid, author of "Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia,"
reached by telephone in Lahore, Pakistan. "Their underground network in Central
Asia hasn't been touched."
As part of the US war
on terror, American troops are now stationed at bases in two nations in Central
Asia – the first Western troops to deploy there since Alexander the Great's
armies in the fourth century BC.
Analysts say those
troops and other US installations are likely to be high on the target list of
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – a group of battle-hardened veterans
who fought and were pummeled alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda last
fall.
The IMU has been on
the Bush administration's list of terrorist organizations since shortly after
Sept. 11.
Western intelligence
sources detected a surge of radio traffic last month from Afghanistan to Central
Asia, in which frequent references to Juma Namangani – the IMU's charismatic
leader, declared dead by US commanders – appear to indicate that the leader is
alive.
"The subject is:
'We're here,' in terms of regrouping," says Tamara Makarenko, an expert on
Central Asian militant groups at Glamorgan University in
Wales.
Despite the IMU's loss
of rear bases, arms supplies, and funding with the collapse of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan and the dispersion of Al Qaeda, experts and some Central
Asian officials are warning that the question is no longer if the IMU will
strike, but when.
Symbolic of the
concern is a 12-foot concrete wall now being erected around the US embassy in
Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, where six bombs aimed at the fiercely secular
regime of President Islam Karimov in February 1999 sparked a massive and continuing government crackdown on anyone suspected of sympathizing with Islamic
extremists.
The embassy-wall
project was approved before Sept. 11, but work on it – as with all US security
measures regionwide – has been stepped up since then.
Some 1,800 American
troops now conduct Afghanistan operations from a former Soviet air base in
southern Uzbekistan. US troops are also creating a substantial base next door in
Kyrgyzstan.
The IMU calls for the
violent overthrow of the Uzbek regime, and establishment of a noncorrupt Islamic
government based on sharia (Islamic law). It has maintained bases in
lawless regions of Tajikistan and traveled through and sometimes attacked
neighboring Kyrgyz territory.
Splits within the
group, however – between military chief Namangani and Tohir Yuldashev, the
ideological leader with strong ties to Islamic militant groups around the world
– were evident long before Sept. 11.
IMU numbers and strength
unclear
While most sources
suggest that IMU remnants are gathering only by the handful, the chief of
Kyrgyzstan's Security Council, Misir Ashirkulov, declared last week that 300 IMU
fighters, led by Mr. Yuldashev, are planning to launch new
raids.
"This campaign will be
much crueler toward us than previous ones," Mr. Ashirkulov said. "Yuldashev
intends to commit terrorist attacks, take hostages, assassinate government
officials."
Even if Namangani were
dead, Ms. Makarenko says, Mr. Yuldashev would be able to lead an IMU renewal
that would be more ideologically driven, and could attract "leftover" Al Qaeda
Arabs who were defeated in Afghanistan.
After years of
demonizing the group, Uzbek officials today say the IMU is less dangerous.
Analysts attribute that confidence partly to a US-Uzbek deal signed in March, in
which the US would view with "grave concern any external threat" to Uzbekistan.
"Terror is not an abstract word," says Deputy Foreign Minister Sadiq Safaev. "It
is a source of funding, of training bases, a supply of equipment. All of those
are destroyed by the US."
Lying low now is part
of the strategy, though US plans could affect the timing of new strikes, says
Mr. Rashid.
"At the moment, it is
not in anyone's interest to raise their heads, with the US presence so strong,"
Rashid says. "But as soon as there is a decline of the American presence, you
will see a revival [of militants]. If the US is diverted to Iraq or elsewhere in
the months ahead, then we would see [terror attacks.]"
IMU networks were
first developed during the Tajik civil war in the mid-1990s, in which Islamists
fought for control of the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The
IMU filled its ranks by tapping into deep unhappiness with the Uzbek
government's repression of Islamic groups. Financing has come from narcotics
smuggling and from Saudi and other Islamic supporters.
The IMU has taken
advantage of the fragile grip the post-Soviet Central Asian regimes often have
on their own territory. But Uzbek sources say that before Sept. 11, popular
support for the IMU started to wane. Current levels of support are difficult to
gauge.
IMU leaders also
worked hand in hand with Al Qaeda, and militants and their families lived for a
time along three long streets packed with houses in the northern Afghan city of
Mazar-e Sharif. The fact that IMU militants took substantial casualties during
the fighting there last fall may determine the new
tactics.
"Their capacity to
launch organized armed groups across borders is pretty limited now," says
another Western diplomat here. "So if you wanted to draw attention to yourself
without a military incursion, the sensible thing would be to have some terrorist
activity in Uzbekistan."
Uzbekistan opening up
Any IMU action would
come at a critical moment in Uzbekistan. President Karimov's authoritarian
regime – subject to strong US pressure – is beginning to open up, easing rampant
human rights abuses and lifting censorship.
"It would be an
enormous shock for the Uzbek government," says David Lewis, head of the Central
Asia Project for the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, reached in the
Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek.
"They have relaxed
somewhat, and some people are moving to ease the regime. Hard-line elements
would use any [IMU attack] as a pretext to crack down
again."
Los
Angeles Times U.S. Seeks 29 Who Gained Visas in Scheme
Manhunt: Officials say two men who roomed with Sept. 11 hijacking suspects are among 71 people who received permits in Qatar.
By ROBIN WRIGHT and JOSH MEYER
July
10 2002
WASHINGTON -- The United States has launched a nationwide manhunt
for 29 people from the Middle East who were issued fraudulent visas as part of
an illegal scheme run out of the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, according to State
Department officials.
Two men who roomed with suspected hijackers in the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks are among the 71 people who obtained the illicit
visas, officials said.
As a result of a secret investigation, code-named
Operation Eagle Strike, 31 of the 71 are in custody, State Department officials
said. One of the suspected hijackers' roommates is among those held.
Two
of those in custody were arrested during the last week in Baltimore and near
Detroit on suspicion of illegally obtaining visas. It was unclear Tuesday
evening whether any of the others in custody had been formally
charged.
"Thirty-one people have been taken into custody, 29 are actively
being sought, six persons have departed the United States," State Department
spokesman Frederick Jones said. The others were spouses and minors.
The
FBI and State Department are trying to determine whether any of those issued the
fraudulent visas are terrorists or whether they are simply people who wanted to
pay their way into the country for other reasons. So far, U.S. officials say it
is premature to make a connection between the visa scheme and terrorism, although each case is being investigated for any possible ties to Al Qaeda or
other extremist groups.
"In the post-9/11 world, we look at everything as
a potential danger," said a senior law enforcement official who requested
anonymity.
Added a State Department official: "In this environment, this
is a train wreck."
The FBI is particularly concerned about Rasmi Subhi
Salah al Shannaq and a man whose name is either Ahmed Ahmad or Ahmed Ahmed. They
lived near Washington, in northern Virginia, with two of the Sept. 11 hijacking
suspects, according to the law enforcement official.
Investigators are
trying to determine whether a third man who obtained an illegal visa was also a
roommate of alleged hijackers Hani Hanjour, one of the suspected plot leaders,
and Nawaf Alhazmi. Both were on American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into
the Pentagon on Sept. 11.
Hanjour is believed to have been the
pilot.
Al Shannaq, a 27-year-old Jordanian, was arrested in Baltimore on
June 24 and indicted by a grand jury last week, charged with unlawfully
obtaining a nonimmigrant U.S. visa, an offense that carries a penalty of up to
10 years in jail and up to $250,000 in fines, according to court
papers.
On Monday, U.S. Magistrate Susan Gauvey ordered Al Shannaq held
without bail.
Al Shannaq may be most valuable for what he knows about
those involved with the Sept. 11 attacks. U.S. officials hope that he can
provide information on the hijackers' contacts in the U.S. and abroad, their
financial sources and their means of communication. Al Shannaq is reportedly
cooperating with U.S. authorities.
Al Shannaq allegedly obtained his
fraudulent visa on Oct. 1, 2000, and entered the country at the end of that
month.
Al Shannaq and his fiancee have lived in recent months at his
father's home in Baltimore, according to media reports in that city. He recently
worked at a pizza restaurant, although he reportedly was fired for being unreliable.
Ahmed or Ahmad has not been charged but is under
investigation, the law enforcement official said.
The other person known
to have been arrested is Majed Ghazi Yousef Sarhan, a 34-year-old Jordanian who
was detained last week in Troy, Mich., on charges of illegally obtaining a visa
in Qatar.
Among the other recipients of fraudulent visas are several
Jordanians and Saudis, according to the Justice Department. Fifteen of the 19
hijackers on Sept. 11 were from Saudi Arabia.
The investigation began in
January following a tip from an informant last November that an employee of the
U.S. Embassy in Qatar was granting fraudulent visas for payment of $10,000,
according to an affidavit from Edward Seitz, a special agent with the State
Department's Diplomatic Security Service. The probe was so secret that not even
senior members of the State Department were aware of it.
Both local and
American employees at the embassy in Qatar, a petroleum-rich sheikdom on the
Persian Gulf, are under investigation. But the primary focus is on a Virginia
man who is believed to have sold the visas for between $10,000 and $20,000 in
cash while working in the embassy, according to a federal law enforcement
official who also asked to remain anonymous.
He is currently under
24-hour surveillance, according to law enforcement officials.
Described
as a State Department employee, he is one of only a handful of workers who
processed visa applications in Qatar over the past several years. He is a U.S.
citizen who had returned from Qatar to the Washington area for training when he
was confronted by agents from the Diplomatic Security Service.
The
employee reportedly refused to talk and has hired a lawyer. Authorities are
reviewing his financial transactions for evidence of ill-gotten
gains.
"They are tracking down the money trail too," said the federal law
enforcement official.
The official said "a bunch" of the visa purchasers
were Saudis. But, he added, "there are all sorts of people" who bought
them.
"People probably found out about this guy and that if you have 10
grand, he'll help you," the official said. "So it appears they came from all
over the place."
A former consular affairs official at the State
Department speculated that Al Shannaq may have sought a visa illegally because
his father lives in the U.S. and it is difficult for offspring older than 21 to
obtain visas to join their parents. The huge backlog can mean a wait of five
years or longer, he said.
Al Shannaq would probably also be ineligible
for a tourist visa, because U.S. authorities would be concerned that he would
try to stay illegally.
"Having a relative already in the United States
can be both a boon and a bane," the ex-official said.
Palestinians Must Accept Accountability
The key to reform is oversight and U.S. involvement.
By DENNIS ROSS
July 9 2002
Palestinian reform
is now on everyone's mind. President Bush has made it the litmus test for
Palestinian statehood and for U.S. diplomatic engagement between Israelis and
Palestinians. Europeans strongly favor reform. Arab leaders who have little
interest in reforming themselves are enthusiastic about Palestinian
transformation. And, perhaps most important, the Palestinian public not only
favors reform but is insisting on it.
That is the good news. Now the bad:
Reform is still a longshot for several reasons. First, if the terror does not
stop, the Israelis--notwithstanding initial moves now to ease curfews and
restrictions on Palestinian movement--will see little choice but to keep the
Palestinian public under siege. Reform, elections and the creation of a new
Palestinian order will not take place in an environment in which the Israeli
military is in every Palestinian city. Second, Yasser Arafat, the quintessential
survivor, is trying to seize the mantle of reform to avoid losing power. But as
long as those trying to implement reform are accountable to him, there will be
no prospect of real change. Third, the international community--especially the
key donors--needs to stand united on reform, its requirements and the
Palestinians we will be working with to ensure its implementation. Already we
see disagreements over dealing with Arafat. Does this mean the reform battle is
lost before it begins? No, but it will take a concerted and integrated strategy
to succeed.
To begin, we must address the security issue. Security won't
come from simply calling for it. The rolling process of security performance and
Israeli withdrawals will require working with the remnants of the Palestinian
security organizations because they are the only ones with the capacity to act.
We should not kid ourselves: Initially, they are likely to act only if Arafat
says to do so. But that is not the end of the story. We should make it clear
that there are specific steps to be taken in terms of acting against Hamas,
Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyr's Brigade elements first in Gaza and then in
different parts of the West Bank.
The U.S. should set the standards of
performance and evaluate whether Palestinian forces are meeting those standards.
Clearly, since this involves the prevention of terrorist attacks against Israelis, we will need to coordinate closely with the Israelis, and they will
need to resume coordination with Palestinians on security matters.
Such
an approach should not be limited to security. It should be applied to all
areas, with accountability flowing to the outside, not the inside, in at least
the early stages of the reform process. If Palestinians who are acting in the
areas of finances, rule of law, separation of powers, civil society, education
and security are accountable to Arafat, little will change. Certainly, until new
institutions governed by professional standards are truly functioning,
accountability must come from the outside. The donor community has a right to
demand such accountability, particularly given the money that will be required
for reconstruction and given the Palestinian track record on fulfillment of
promises.
Who should lead the accountability effort? While the effort
will need to be multilateral, the United States does need to organize and lead
it. Otherwise it is simply unlikely to happen. We should chair an oversight
board. It can have subcommittees with different chairs related to areas of
different expertise. But the overriding purpose is to provide oversight, evaluation and accountability. And it must be understood that donor money will
stop flowing should performance stop.
The board and the subcommittees
would deal with those Palestinians who had technical responsibilities for
carrying out reform. Again, even if appointed by Arafat, these individuals would
be answerable to the oversight board, not to him.
By dealing with them,
one avoids the issue of dealing with Arafat. Moreover, should he seek to block
steps taken by Palestinians trying to fulfill their responsibilities, the
oversight board could announce that Arafat was seeking to undermine the reform
process.
The oversight board would work with Palestinians on the timing
of elections. While Arafat has called for elections for his office in January,
it makes more sense to build institutions for a Palestinian state before electing the head of the Palestinian Authority. But municipal and legislative
elections should be held no later than January and in any case should occur
first. These elections make sense not only because they can be tied to
institution-building but also because they will begin to create a legitimate
political leadership. There is one other general point to keep in mind if reform
is to work: Palestinians have to believe that the reform process will actually
lead to a credible Palestinian state. In this sense, reform has to have a
destination. It is commonplace to talk about the importance of giving
Palestinians hope or a clear political horizon. In truth, the president did
that. But, having spent time with a number of Palestinian reformers over the
last week, it is fair to say that they were not persuaded by Bush's speech. It
is not simply that they would have liked more content about what might emerge in
a Palestinian state. Rather, it is that they want to see some indication that
the U.S. has staying power.
It would also help them to see some signal of
hope about the future from the Israeli leadership. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has always argued that the problem has been Arafat, and without Arafat, peaceful
coexistence with the Palestinians would be possible. Palestinians doubt he has
any such intention. If there was ever a time for Sharon to address his
understanding of Palestinian needs and aspirations, this is
it.
*
Dennis Ross, director of the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, is a former U.S. envoy to the Middle East.
Don't Dither as Hussein Builds Nuclear Devices
By RANAN R. LURIE
July 9
2002
Contemporary historians are already assessing the 1991 Gulf War as a
logistic miscalculation that overestimated the number of troops and equipment
needed to achieve the U.S.-led coalition goals. We could have achieved the same
results with a third, some say a quarter, of that firepower and numeric
superiority.
Get this: We used 4.5 times more troops than the number that
invaded Normandy (130,000) on D-day, against what was then probably the most
efficient and best entrenched forces in the world--the German army.
Our
wrong, overcautious assessment of our requirements for the Gulf War cost us a
fortune and, worse, valuable time. We should not repeat the same mistake now,
especially considering that the Iraqi army--not an efficient fighting force back
then--is only one-third what it was in 1991. Allow me to recommend the shape and
character of our first wave of attack on Iraq: No more than one squadron of
fighter bombers will take off and drop hundreds of thousands of leaflets on all
front-line Iraqi units. Every leaflet will be signed by the U.S. secretary of
the Treasury and will contain a printed commitment guaranteeing "the bearer of
this note will receive $100 in cash and safe passage to a decent prisoner of war
camp, on the condition that it be presented to U.S. soldiers within 48 hours of
the date and time of the drop." I predict that the only casualties we will have
will be some of our GIs being overrun during the stampede to redeem the coupons.
Saddam Hussein will lose most of his army and be left with a few of his closest
first and second cousins.
Now we send in the Marine band to celebrate,
and then the engineers to clean up the Iraqi laboratories once and for all. We
also may start free elections in the prisoner of war camps and continue them in
the new, democratic Republic of Iraq.
There is, of course, a grave risk
here. There's a chance that Hussein already has operative, unconventional
weaponry, maybe even one or two nuclear devices. This risk, however, should
serve to accentuate the need for almost immediate action and not taking any
chances by waiting too long.
We can take a lesson from the Iraqi anecdote
that describes an uneducated Shiite (Hussein hates that Muslim minority) who was
walking on the tracks while a train was catching up with him. The locomotive
whistles and whistles, but to no avail because the Shiite doesn't realize it is
meant for him. Eventually the train catches up with him, knocking the poor man
off the tracks. The government compensates him after his hospital days with a
new kettle. The proud Shiite puts the kettle on the stove. The kettle whistles
at him. The man grabs an ax and hits the kettle with fury, shouting, "These have
to be killed while they're still small!"
The Iraqi nuclear locomotive is
coming closer and closer. We have no time for war games.
*
Ranan
R. Lurie is a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington and a syndicated columnist and cartoonist.
|
An
unreal peace process | |
|
|
Carl
Bildt
IHT |
The
Balkans
STOCKHOLM
As we struggle with the effects of collapse of the Oslo peace process in the
Middle East, it is easy to overlook the challenges building up in the Balkans.
The core issue of Kosovo was left open. It was too difficult to tackle.
.
NATO forces entered
Kosovo three years ago and the province was put under a UN interim
administration, but the war ended without a peace agreement. The UN Security
Council, in Resolution 1244, reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia over the province, but indirectly left the future status of it
open.
.
The UN Interim
Administration has had its successes and its failures. Close to a million Kosovo
Albanians have come back; close to a quarter of a million of the minority
population, mainly Serbs, left or were driven away. Elections have been held,
and a nominal government for Kosovo is in place. But at the end of the day this
is no more than a holding operation.
.
There was, three
years ago, a belief that time would be a healing factor, that small steps would
pave the way for the big jump to a peace agreement. Implicitly, one hoped for an
Oslo-like process to start working. If there was democracy in Serbia, and some
sort of self-government in Kosovo, the agreement that eluded us at Rambouillet
would be possible, and the issue would go away. That was the belief.
.
But this simply
hasn't happened. As long as the core issues are open, we see how expectations
concerning a final settlement on one side fuel fear on the other. There is no
issue too small not to be seen, by both parties, in this perspective, and to be
fought over with this is mind.
.
The overwhelming
majority of Kosovo Albanians want independence. An overwhelming majority in the
minorities adamantly oppose it. And in the wider region the issue is equally
contentious. Not infrequently, the open wound of Kosovo spreads its infection
across its borders. But the issue of Kosovo's final status, and thus the structure of the region, cannot be avoided for long. The international community
missed a window of opportunity after the fall of Slobodan Milosevic to deal with
the issue. Now it must recognize the risk of an Oslo-like failure in the region.
.
In the Middle East,
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 provide a general framework for a
solution that, with different degrees of enthusiasm, is accepted by all sides.
In the Balkans, the gulf separating the different positions is far wider, and
the interpretation gradually given to Resolution 1244 has prevented a closing of
the gap. It is accepted that the region must move toward integration with the
rest of Europe, and that this will be a step-by-step process over a long period.
But as things stand now this process can hardly even be started. States simply
cannot be integrated if there is conflict over which states there are, which
areas they cover and how they relate to each other.
.
Already the EU is in
difficulty over its plans to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement
with Serbia and Montenegro. Will this, in accordance with 1244, cover Kosovo as
well? Or will Kosovo just be left out of the entire process? Or, perhaps, have
its very own agreement?
.
More issues of this
nature are coming up. To put the conflict in hibernation will not work, and
would risk making everything far worse the day those will have to be tackled.
.
Essentially, the
choice is between an attempt at integration or an acceptance of disintegration
in the region.
.
The Balkans remain a
bad place for good options. But we should have learned that the worst of options
is to ignore the need to face the situation as it is. We should no longer
believe that an Oslo-type avoidance of the final issues solves the problems. It
could lead to tensions building up, and new explosions suddenly ripping
everything apart.
.
Washington and
increasingly also Moscow have turned their attention away from the Balkans and
are starting to look at the European Union to give policy leadership in the
region. But the EU still shies away from any serious attempt to tackle the core
issues of the region. It clings to the illusion that an Oslo formula that didn't
work in the Middle East for some reason will work in the Balkans.
.
I don't think it
will. Instead of the wound healing, there is a serious risk of the infection
spreading. Three years after the end of the Kosovo war, it is thus high time
that we dare to address the issue of the Kosovo peace. We can't have another
peace failure. The writer, a former prime minister of Sweden, was EU special
representative in the Balkans from 1995 to 1997 and special UN envoy there from
1999 to 2001. He contributed this comment to the International Herald
Tribune.
|
The
welcome is going sour | |
|
|
|
Afghanistan
WASHINGTON
Mounting anger over civilian casualties inflicted by U.S. forces is not the
only reason why anti-American sentiment is growing in Afghanistan. More than 120
Afghan villagers were inadvertently killed or wounded by a C-130 gunship on June
30 in Oruzgan Province, a stronghold of the 10 million Pashtun tribesmen who are
Afghanistan's largest ethnic group. But even before the Oruzgan tragedy, the
Pashtun goodwill earned by the United States for sweeping away the Taliban had
been replaced by resentment after U.S. pressure to block the re-emergence of a
Pashtun-dominated regime at the recent loya jirga, or grand council, held in
Kabul.
.
Pashtun domination
has been the historical norm in Afghanistan. A Pashtun monarchy ruled from the
birth of the nation in 1747 until a palace coup in 1973 in which the popular
king, Zahir Shah, was deposed by a cousin.
.
When it hastily
launched Operation Enduring Freedom last October, the United States cast its lot
with a triumvirate of generals from the Tajik ethnic minority who helped to
dislodge the Taliban and now dominate the government of Hamid Karzai, a largely
powerless front man. This Tajik triumvirate controls not only the armed forces
and police but also three hated secret police agencies. In Pashtun eyes, the
secret police are dedicated to curbing Pashtun influence and were automatically
suspect in last week's murder of Vice President Haji Abdul Qadir, although there
is no evidence yet to support this suspicion. To counter Tajik control of the
security apparatus and also Karzai's cabinet, Pashtun leaders wanted Zahir Shah
to run for president of the new Transitional Authority at the loya jirga. He was
to have critical but clearly limited powers, with Karzai as prime minister
running the government. At 87, the ex-monarch is too old to wield day-to-day
authority, but his presidential powers, it was argued, plus his commanding
popularity among Pashtuns, would have enabled Karzai to bring the secret police
under control.
.
In the weeks before
the loya jirga, Pashtun tribal delegations totaling 70,000 streamed into Kabul
to pay homage to the king. This alarmed U.S. diplomats and generals, who have
found Karzai a compliant partner and get along well with the Tajik military and
secret police barons.
.
On the eve of the
loya jirga, the White House special envoy in Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, openly
demanded that Zahir Shah renounce his presidential candidacy to avoid a
"divisive" situation. Khalilzad confronted the king in a well-publicized meeting
that one of the royal advisers described to me as "unpleasant."
.
Khalilzad is now
reviled as "the viceroy" by many Pashtuns, who refer to the once welcomed U.S.
forces in Afghanistan as an "army of occupation."
.
The need to break the
Tajik grip on the Afghan armed forces and intelligence services was one of the
major conclusions of a recent conference of 38 diplomats, aid officials and
nongovernment experts on Afghanistan from 20 countries convened by Francesc
Vendrell of Spain, a former UN special representative for Afghanistan and now
the European Union's special envoy for Afghan affairs.
.
Spain had organized
the closed-door "brainstorming" meeting at Cordoba, Vendrell said, "in the hope
that the international community will remain focused on Afghanistan and not
repeat the mistakes of the past by disengaging prematurely." Participants
attended as individuals, not as representatives of their governments, and
authorized Vendrell to sum up the discussions.
.
In diplomatic
language that avoided the use of the word "Tajik," the conference concluded that
"it is necessary to overhaul the Afghan security services in order to
depoliticize them, ensure that they are not dominated by any single ethnic
group, bring them under civilian control and make them accountable to the
central government as a whole."
.
"Many participants
expressed awareness," Vendrell reported in his summary, "that a segment of the
loya jirga had left with a feeling of disappointment at what they perceived as
their exclusion from the decision-making process leading to the selection of the
head of state, but it is too early to assess whether this will have a negative
impact on the functioning of the Transitional Administration."
.
Among its 26
recommendations, the conference urged accelerated efforts to develop a new
national army, emphasizing that it should be multiethnic in character.
.
At present, the
United States plans to maintain a military presence until the projected new army
is in the field. But building a new army from scratch could take many years. The
recent debacle at Oruzgan, which is only the latest of many similar incidents,
underlines the urgent need to redefine the mission of U.S. forces.
.
There is no definitive cumulative estimate of Afghan civilian casualties, but a credible
University of New Hampshire study suggests a figure of 3,742.
.
A redefined U.S.
mission should focus on Al Qaeda remnants and phase out operations against what
is left of the Pashtun Taliban guerrillas, like the raid at Oruzgan, in which it
is impossible to distinguish the enemy from innocent tribesmen and their families.
.
Zahir Shah spoke out
bluntly in a private Rome meeting in March with Italian aid agencies operating
in Afghanistan. He thought the meeting was off the record, but a La Stampa
reporter was present. As the war drags on, he said, it is becoming "stupid and
useless - it causes me great pain, and the sooner it is ended the better." The
writer is director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy
and author of "Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal."
He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
The ICC Can Serve the U.S.
By SAMANTHA
POWER
U.S. officials and United Nations diplomats this week resumed their high-stakes game of chicken over the future of the newly-minted International Criminal Court. With a July 15 deadline fast approaching for extending the U.N. mission in Bosnia, the Bush administration is threatening to yank U.S. support from this and all peacekeeping operations around the world if U.S. soldiers are not granted immunity from the ICC. The administration fears that, absent such immunity, anti-American judges will haul our soldiers into the dock.
Court supporters argue these worries are unfounded. For an American to be tried, a panel of eminent international judges would have to charge that he or she had carried out genocide, "systematic and widespread" crimes against humanity or war crimes. Only if the U.S. justice system itself then refused to investigate these alleged attacks would the ICC be able to proceed.
Until the court becomes functional and proves itself, neither side will be able to prove its point. But while the Bush administration focuses on the risks posed by the court, it has devoted virtually no time considering the ways the ICC could benefit the U.S.
Important Tool
In fact, as is illustrated by two recent cases of genocide -- Iraq's brutal campaign against the Kurds in 1988 and the Serb assault against the Bosnian Muslims in 1992-1995 -- U.S. interests are greatly undermined by policies antithetical to American values. And U.S. security will best be advanced if genocide and crimes against humanity are suppressed and their perpetrators punished. The ICC can be an important tool in achieving that end.
In a six-month campaign in 1988, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein systematically gassed and machine-gunned Kurds in northern Iraq, killing 100,000 Kurds and bulldozing some 1,000 villages. The first Bush administration viewed Iraq as a bulwark against Iran, and reasoned that the way Saddam acted inside his own borders was his own business. In 1988, while Saddam was carrying out the gas attacks, the U.S. provided Baghdad some $500 million in credits to buy American farm products. The year after the genocidal campaign, the U.S. doubled its contribution to Saddam's coffers, offering $1 billion in credits.
"Human rights and chemical weapons use aside," one shockingly misguided secret State Department assessment said, "in many respects our political and economic interests run parallel with those of Iraq." Chemical weapons use aside?
In 1990, emboldened by his ability to get away with literal murder, Saddam invaded Kuwait. Because the occupation threatened U.S. oil supplies, the Bush administration of course changed course. Mr. Bush detailed the horrors that he had previously ignored and threatened Nuremberg-style trials. "Saddam Hussein must know the stakes are high, the cause is just, and today more than ever, the determination is real," the president declared.
There was just one problem: No such court existed. But suppose the ICC had already been established. Saddam's genocide against the Kurds would certainly have earned him and his top officials indictments. If U.S. forces had ventured to Baghdad in 1991 -- or if they were to reach the Iraqi capital this year -- they would carry a list of indictees prepared by a panel of independent judges. The arrests and the subsequent ICC trials would have far greater credibility internationally than any that might be carried out at U.S. bidding. The trials would also rid postwar Iraq of many of its most ruthless officials, a purge that would spur the development of the rule of law. The U.S. role in law enforcement would have all the more standing because the U.S., too, had accepted court jurisdiction.
In the case of Bosnia, while militant Serbs ethnically cleansed and murdered their way through 70% of the country in 1992, the Bush administration concluded it had "no dog" in the fight. But eventually editorial and elite pressure at home convinced George H.W. Bush that he could not do nothing. In December 1992 Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger named leading war crimes suspects in the Balkans, and publicly warned that a "second Nuremberg" awaited them.
But again there was a catch: No court existed. Thus, the most noxious, bloodthirsty thugs in the region continued to prosper, hijacking the negotiation process, murdering U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers, and dragging on the bloody war.
President Clinton proved no more willing than his predecessor to confront the Serbs. Walking away from his campaign pledge to bomb the Serbs and lift an arms embargo against the outgunned Bosnian Muslims, Mr. Clinton instead pressed for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal.
But when the ad hoc UN court came into existence in 1994, two years into the Bosnian war, it deterred no one. How could it? Ad hoc tribunals are slapdash creations that have to raise money, hire staff, establish rules, and earn credibility. All of his takes time -- time that murderers exploit. While the court issued indictments during the war, the Serbs knew that Western troops were unwilling to risk casualties by making arrests. The massacres continued, the war criminals were feted at peace talks in Western capitals, and the toothless U.N. court came to symbolize Western apathy.
As in Iraq, however, allowing genocide in the Balkans proved costly to the U.S. As the clock ticked, some of the desperate Bosnian Muslims began to radicalize, as they deduced that their only hope of rescue lay with Islamic extremists. For the last two years of the Bosnian war, while the indicted war criminals roamed free, Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda and other radical Islamic groups used Bosnia as a training base. While the U.S. and its allies were bystanders to genocide, bin Laden traveled on a Bosnian passport.
The U.N. court gradually earned its keep. Once NATO troops proved themselves willing to stage daring arrest raids, beginning in 1997, panicked indictees began turning themselves in. Forty-seven of the most dangerous men in southeastern Europe are currently behind U.N. bars. Hundreds, perhaps even thousands, who have blood on their hands have been driven underground, afraid that they may have been secretly indicted. If the U.N. tribunal did not exist, these killers and bandits would otherwise be spending their days tormenting NATO peacekeepers and threatening returning refugees.
Supply Advice
With the permanent International Criminal Court no more than a week old, it is far too early to assume it will become the virulently anti-American institution that administration officials fear. The best way for the U.S. to guard against this is to reserve self-fulfilling judgment and work with the court to supply advice on personnel and procedures.
What one can say with certainty is that genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes will abound in the next decade. And the ICC -- because it is permanent and not ad hoc -- can play an indispensable role punishing and incapacitating war criminals and thus deterring future atrocities -- atrocities that typically come back to haunt the U.S.
Ms. Power is author of "A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide" (Basic Books, 2002).
Al-Qaeda member says bin Laden, Omar alive and well: report
The satellite television network Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) broadcast an audiotape from what it says is a top al-Qaeda official reaffirming that Osama bin Laden and deposed Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar are "in good health."
"I want to reassure those impassioned with the jihad that ... Sheikh Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar and the symbols of jihad, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Sheikh Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, are in good health," said Abu Laith Allibi in the broadcast, which MBC said was made several weeks ago.
Ayman al-Zawahiri is considered the number two in the al-Qaeda network, whose spokesman is Sulaiman Abu Ghaith.
"I want also to reassure the Mujahedin about the fact that Mullah Omar has been able to assemble the Mujahedin who have been scattered and who are in the process of regrouping," the broadcast said.
Abu Laith Allibi also gives details of a battle several weeks ago in Afghanistan between US troops and al-Qaeda fighters.
The entire recording is also carried by Islamist Internet sites, MBC said.
Abu Laith Allibi is a Libyan Islamist who joined the Afghan Mujahedin, or holy warriors, in the 1980s to fight the Soviet occupation. He is known for his expertise in bomb making and in guerrilla warfare.
On the situation en Afghanistan, Abu Laith Allibi said members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda have launched "a new phase in the war against the Americans, founded on a guerrilla war and a war of assassinations.
"Thank God, we have been able to destroy the bases, the munitions depots," he said, adding that he had also "seen with my own eyes between 150 and 200 American soldiers killed" in the battle which took place several weeks ago in the Shah Kut region in Afghanistan.
Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah said in Kabul last week he believed bin Laden, the suspected mastermind behind the September 11 attacks on the US, and Mullah Omar are alive, but their whereabouts are a mystery,
Omar, the elusive one-eyed leader of the vanquished Taliban zealots, is rumoured to be hiding in the mountainous regions of central Uruzgan province.
CNN
Newspaper says Iraq will defend
Persian Gulf
Editorial follows reports of planned
U.S. attack on country
From Rym
Brahimi
CNN
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN)
--Iraq is prepared to defend the Persian Gulf region against any attack by the
United States, according to a Sunday newspaper editorial believed to have been
written by the eldest son of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
The lengthy editorial
published in Babil newspaper -- owned by the Iraqi leader's eldest son, Uday --
said the United States is planning not only to attack Iraq but also to
destabilize Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries.
The author said the
United States wants to strike Iraq "despite objections raised by the European
Union, China, Russia and many other world countries."
The United States
wants to do this "because striking Iraq is directly related to the Palestinian
cause," the editorial states.
"As for the Gulf," the
author writes, "there are movements now inside Saudi Arabia to unsettle the
regime because everybody understands and realizes the nature of the rule in
Iraq" -- an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia's recent public rejection of U.S.
military action against Iraq.
The editorial went on
to state that Iraq would defend Saudi Arabia with or without arms but noted that
it could send tanks to the border to support the Saudi
government.
"A single phone call
or a simple signal to Baghdad, and they would find us ready to throw all our
weight to back the Saudi government and people against anyone who tried to
disband that country," the editorial said.
The show of support
for Saudi Arabia comes at a time when Iraq has increased trade with the Riyadh
government and plans to open a border crossing point with its southern neighbor
within coming weeks.
According to an
article in Friday's New York Times, the American military has put together a
preliminary planning document that calls for air, land and sea-based forces to
attack Iraq, an assault the newspaper said would involve tens of thousands of
U.S. Marines and soldiers.
The Bush
administration refused to comment on the report.
"We don't comment on
military plans or military planning," a senior administration official
said.
World
Tribune.com
|
Arafat told U.S. will never deal with him again |
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Tuesday, July 9, 2002
AMMAN — Arab leaders have
told Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat that neither the United States
nor Israel will agree to deal with him again.
[On Monday, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said Secretary of State Colin Powell has
ended communications with Arafat. "He has no plans to talk to chairman Arafat,"
Boucher said. "I think we made that quite clear."]
Arab diplomatic sources
said Arafat's allies in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have, in recent weeks,
come to terms with the prospect that Arafat will probably be replaced. They said
Arafat has rejected several offers to go into exile, Middle East Newsline
reported.
How to Work From Home and Be Your Own Boss: Special
offer
Israeli sources said the
decline in Arab support for Arafat has been dramatic over the last two weeks in
the wake of President George Bush's call for a new democratic Palestinian
leadership. They said Arafat's former allies are now searching to support a
replacement for the Palestinian leader who will be most understanding of their
interests.
"The
idea is to make it clear to the Palestinians that Arafat is the sole obstacle to
the goal of achieving a Palestinian state," an Arab diplomatic source said.
"This has placed unprecedented pressure on Arafat."
The
sources said both Washington and Jerusalem would resume efforts to discuss a
Palestinian state once Arafat steps down.
Arafat,
increasingly isolated from his people and under pressure from his former Arab
allies, is expected to step down by the end of the year.
Arab
and Israeli diplomatic sources said Arafat has been dismayed that his authority
and freedom of movement have been whittled down to the point where he could be
removed in a bloodless coup. The sources said Arafat is considering a proposal
by such Arab countries as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to accept a ceremonial post,
such as president, in any new Palestinian government.
Under
the proposal, Arafat would be able to remain in the Palestinian areas but lose
his administrative authority. On Monday, the Jordanian opposition Al Majd weekly
quoted senior Palestinian sources as saying that Palestinian Legislative Council
speaker Ahmed Qurei is Arafat's most likely successor.
The
sources said Arafat has been firing and rehiring his security chiefs in a series
of moves that have demoralized his remaining supporters. They said his decisions
have been erratic and are being ignored by such security veterans as Preventive
Security Apparatus chief Jibril Rajoub and intelligence chief Tawfik Tirawi.
The
Bush administration has dismissed Arafat's appointments, including his 100-day
reform plan. "While it offers promising elements of change, the plan is only
likely to strengthen the unacceptable status quo," Robert Satloff, policy
planning and strategic director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
said.
Hadayat met al-Qaida's No. 2 man twice
Airport terrorist linked to al-Zawahiri,
Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Posted: July 9,
2002
2:00 p.m. Eastern
© 2002 WorldNetDaily.com
While the FBI is still debating
whether Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, the Egyptian who shot up an El Al ticket counter
at Los Angeles International Airport, was a terrorist, an Arabic newspaper in
London reports he met twice with Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's top
lieutenant and a leader of the Egyptian Jihad Islami terror group.
The Arabic London-based Al Hayat
reported Sunday that Hadayat was a member of the Egyptian Jihad Islami and met
al-Zawahiri twice in California – once in 1995 and again in 1998.
The Al Hayat report places
al-Zawahiri in California less than three years before the Sept. 11 hijacking
attacks and a year and a half before the EgyptAir disaster.
Meanwhile, Hadayet's wife tells the
Associated Press her husband is innocent of gunning down five people July 4 –
two of them fatally.
"My husband didn't do such a thing.
This is nonsense," 41-year-old Hala Mohammed Sadeq El-Awadly told the Associated
Press in Cairo.
"Hesham called on July 4, it was
his birthday. His voice was very beautiful," she said. "He asked about the boys,
asked me to take them out a lot and to review their lessons with them in order
to be ready for next year."
According to the FBI, Hadayet went
to the airport ticket counter of El Al, Israel's national airline, carrying two
handguns and a hunting knife and opened fire. He killed two people and wounded
three before he was killed by an El Al security guard.
El-Awadly said she did not believe
her husband was responsible for the July 4 shooting. She offered no explanation
for how he could be innocent when so many people saw him open fire, but said he
was being blamed because he was Arab and Muslim.
"He is a victim of injustice," she
said three times. "In America, they hate Islam and Arabs after Sept. 11."
The FBI said it could not rule out
terrorism but also was investigating the possibility it was a hate crime.
Authorities also were investigating whether Hadayet was despondent over his
personal or business affairs.
His wife said he was not a violent
man and had never expressed anger at Israel or at the recent Israeli-Palestinian
violence that has sparked anti-Israeli protests across the Arab world.
"No, this wasn't an issue,"
El-Awadly said without elaborating.
Hadayet, 41, emigrated from Egypt
to California 10 years ago with his family. His wife said the family had been
happy in the United States, had good relations with their American neighbors and
planned to settle there permanently. But she said the atmosphere had been tense
since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, which were carried out by 19 Arabs.
"We became very cautious, and
sometimes scared. Every Muslim became a suspect," El-Awadly said.
A spokesman for the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service had said Saturday that Hadayet's first
petition for permanent residency, in 1996, had been denied for reasons that were
unclear. The INS began deportation procedures, but in 1997 Hadayet was granted
permanent residency through his wife, who received an immigration visa through
the Department of States' Diversity Lottery Program.
El-Awadly and her sons have
reservations to fly back to California on Aug. 20 and an appointment later that
month to be interviewed by immigration authorities considering their citizenship
request.
UPI
Palestinians plan for post-Arafat
regime
From the International
Desk
Published 7/9/2002 7:37
PM
View
printer-friendly version
AMMAN, Jordan, July 9 (UPI)
-- A group of prominent Palestinians disillusioned with Yasser Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority have formed a new political movement to offer an
alternative to West Bank and Gaza voters in the coming elections.
Jihad Bargouti, one of the
movement's founders, said Tuesday the fledgling Palestinian National Solidarity
Movement is led by Edward Said, an American academic of Palestinian origin who
has been prominent in Palestinian affairs.
Marwan Bargouti, Jihad's
brother and head of Tanzim, the armed wing of Arafat's own Fatah organization
and currently in an Israeli jail, was also a leading member.
The PNSM was formed late
last year by a group of leading Palestinians who are critical of the way the
Palestinian Authority has administered the West Bank and Gaza under Arafat's
leadership.
Jihad Barghouti, a
Palestinian surgeon with Jordanian nationality, gave no indication of the extent
of the new movement's grassroots following among Palestinians. But he said the
PNSM plans to hold a meeting in the West Bank shortly that would test public
reaction.
Marwan Barghouti, seen by
some as a possible successor to Arafat, was arrested and has been held by the
Israelis since April when they swept into the West Bank in response to a campaign of Palestinian suicide bombings.
Said, a professor of
literature at Columbia University, New York, brought up in Egypt the child of
Christian Palestinian Arabs, was a member of the Palestinian National Council
before the Israeli hand-over of West Bank towns and Gaza following the Oslo
peace agreement. Said broke with Arafat when the Palestinian leader signed the
Oslo agreement.
He has been criticized in
academic circles for what is seen as his militant pro-Palestinian stand. In
2000, Said drew sharp criticism from his university's newspaper, the Columbia
Daily Spectator, after being photographed throwing rocks at Israelis from the
Lebanese side of the common border.
The paper called Said's
behavior "alien to this or any other institution of higher
learning."
Last month, U.S. President
Bush called for Arafat's removal as chairman of the Palestinian Authority and
for reforms that would make the organization democratic and free of
corruption.
Jihad Barghouti said 20
leading PNSM members held a series of meetings beginning in Zurich, Switzerland,
in November, to drew up a strategy for the post-Arafat era.
The PNSM proposes that once
Arafat is marginalized in Palestinian politics, there be a 15-member interim
government for two years to be followed by elections for a Palestinian
president.
Western officials,
including Americans, who were at the meeting welcomed the PNSM plan, Barghouti
said. He refused to identify the officials.
A number of names were
proposed for president, Barghouti said, including political, academic and
cultural personalities.
Barghouti runs a hospital
in Amman and is known as a harsh critic of Arafat, who he blames for the difficult conditions the Palestinians find themselves in. His one regret is that
so far at least Arab governments have distanced themselves from the PNSM,
Barghouti said.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Slate Harken
Hypocrisy
Bush's corporate ethics: Do
as I say, not as I do.
By
William Saletan
Posted Tuesday, July 9, 2002, at
4:11 PM PT
On Monday, President Bush defended his stewardship of Harken Energy, a company on whose
board of directors he served more than a decade ago. On Tuesday, Bush called for corporate responsibility in a speech on Wall
Street. There are standards and assumptions under which the explanations Bush
gave Monday can be defended, and there are company directors whose conduct can
be defended under the standards and assumptions Bush outlined Tuesday. But
there's no way to square the rules Bush applied to himself on Monday with the
rules he applied to others on Tuesday.
The key facts in the Harken case
are these: In June 1990, Bush sold more than $800,000 worth of stock in Harken.
The SEC later disputed Harken's accounting of the sale of its subsidiary, Aloha
Petroleum, which had taken place before Bush sold his stock. In January 1991,
Harken revised its accounting accordingly, nearly quadrupling the net loss it
had reported. Harken's stock, which had already declined, fell far below the
price at which Bush had sold his shares. A form on which Bush was supposed to
report his stock sale wasn't filed until eight months after it was due. However,
he did file on time a form reporting his intent to sell the stock.
Let's
compare Bush's Monday and Tuesday remarks on four issues.
1.
Personal responsibility. Years ago, Bush said his form was filed late
because the SEC had lost it. Last week, Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer retracted
that claim and blamed Bush's lawyers: "The President believed at the time that
he had filled out all the paperwork that was required, and it was filed, and
that the lawyers did as they were required to do." Monday, Bush was asked why,
as a member of Harken's audit committee, he didn't know at the time of his stock
sale that the company's books were inaccurate. He replied that the inaccuracy
"came up after I sold the stock." In other words, he wasn't responsible for
knowing about inaccuracies until the SEC caught them.
Tuesday, Bush
called for "a new ethic of personal responsibility in the business community."
Specifically, he asserted, "Those who sit on corporate boards have
responsibilities. I urge board members to check the quality of their company's
financial statements; to ask tough questions about accounting methods." He added
that shareholders "should demand an attentive and active board of
directors."
2. Exploiting ambiguity. Monday, Bush called
Harken's initial accounting of the Aloha sale "an honest difference of opinion
as to how to account for a complicated transaction. … Sometimes the rules aren't
as specific as one would expect." He explained to reporters that "in the corporate world, sometimes things aren't exactly black and white when it comes
to accounting procedures. ... Sometimes there's differences—an ability to
interpret one way or the other."
Tuesday, Bush demanded "higher ethical
standards—standards enforced by strict laws … Our schools of business must be
principled teachers of right and wrong, and not surrender to moral confusion and
relativism. Our leaders of business must set high and clear expectations of
conduct." Bush pledged to "end the days" of "shading the truth," and he declared
that honest businessmen "do not cut ethical corners."
3. Adequacy
of oversight. Monday, Bush brushed aside all questions about Harken by
noting that the SEC had found no proof of wrongdoing. Why had Bush filed his
form late? "This has been fully vetted. It has been looked at by the SEC," he
replied. Why hadn't he known the books were inaccurate? "All these questions
that you're asking were looked into by the SEC," he said. What was his role in
the Aloha sale, and was that sale a ruse to conceal losses? "This and all
matters that related to Harken were fully looked into by the SEC," said the
president.
Bush assured the press that the SEC probe of Harken was "full"
and "very thorough." When he was asked whether he would instruct the SEC to
release all records related to the probe, he replied that the SEC had already
demonstrated that "there's no 'there' there." As evidence for this conclusion,
he touted an SEC "document" that declared, "[I]t appears that Bush did not
engage in illegal insider trading because it does not appear that he possessed
material nonpublic information." The "document" wasn't evidence; it was the
conclusion for which reporters were requesting documentation. In short, Bush was
asking reporters to take at face value the SEC's assertion of the adequacy of
its oversight.
Tuesday, Bush bemoaned the SEC's inadequacy. He chastised
Congress for failing to fund "100 new enforcement personnel in the SEC" in order
"to expose corporate corruption." He pleaded "for an additional $100 million in
the coming year to give the SEC the officers and the technology it needs to
enforce the law." He outlined "a 10-point Accountability Plan" aimed at
"ensuring that the SEC takes aggressive and affirmative action," and he urged
the SEC "to adopt new rules to ensure that auditors will be independent and not
compromised by conflicts of interest."
4. Late
corrections. Monday, Bush argued that the SEC's eventual correction of
Harken's books—a correction that wasn't made until after Bush had sold his
stock—proved that "the system worked." The SEC "made the decision that Harken
ought to restate some earnings, which Harken did," said the president. "And
that's how the system is supposed to work."
Tuesday, Bush demanded that
ordinary investors receive the same timely information available to insiders.
While government could punish wrongdoing after the fact, he argued, it could
also "do more to promote transparency and ensure that risks are honest." He
stressed the importance of "moving corporate accounting out of the shadows, so
the investing public will have a true and fair and timely picture of assets and
liabilities."
Bush was elected on a promise to end the contradiction
between presidential rhetoric and presidential rationalization. So far, all he's
done is change the subject from sex to money
The Man Who Wasn't
There
How Louis Freeh escaped
responsibility for 9/11.
By Joshua
Micah Marshall
Posted Tuesday, July 9, 2002, at
9:26 AM PT
For more than a month, congressional committees have been investigating America's recent track record on intelligence and counterterrorism. Members of Congress have heard from Robert Mueller, the current chief of the FBI, and George Tenet, the current chief of the CIA. They've heard from former heads of these agencies, such as William Webster. They've taken testimony from a star-studded array of other intelligence and counterterrorism worthies. But along the way, it somehow hasn't occurred to any of the committees doing post-9/11 investigations to call up Louis J. Freeh, the man who headed the FBI—the country's primary domestic intelligence and counterterrorism agency—from 1993 to June 2001, the most critical eight years in question.
Freeh ran the bureau from the rise of al-Qaida in the early 1990s until just two months before Bin Laden landed his roundhouse blow on the United States. Under his leadership, the FBI made many mistakes and missed many opportunities that paved the way for 9/11. He presided over a bureau that fell almost laughably behind in information technology. On his watch, the counterterrorism division languished as a career-killing backwater. As David Plotz noted in Slate more than a year ago, Freeh's chief accomplishment as FBI director was to oversee an almost endless litany of fiascos while successfully ducking responsibility for all of them.
True, some of Freeh's failures were rooted in problems that long predated his tenure. But even if you subscribe to the unlikely notion that Freeh did a bang-up job under the most difficult of circumstances, why not bring him up to the Hill and hear what he has to say?
Simple. It's not in anyone's political interest to have him there. Freeh's feckless and unfortunate tenure was a bipartisan blunder of immense and perhaps tragic proportions. The normal rules say that politics is a zero-sum game and that even if both parties have egg on their face, one must have more than the other. The party with two eggs on its face should be trying to stick it to the party with three. But in this case, it's pretty much just eggs all around.
Democrats don't want to talk about Freeh. Yes, Freeh—a Republican—never got along with the Clinton White House, outspokenly pushed for independent counsels and investigations of various Clintonites, and bickered with his nominal boss, Attorney General Janet Reno. But much as Clintonites and Democrats might loathe Freeh, at the end of the day, Bill Clinton appointed him, and whatever mistakes Freeh might be responsible for happened on Bill Clinton's watch. True, a president can fire an FBI director only for cause, not just because he wants to. But that doesn't make it impossible. Clinton dismissed Freeh's predecessor, William Sessions, in July 1993 for abusing the perquisites of his office. Firing Freeh, however, was never politically possible because of the FBI's involvement in the various investigations of the Clinton White House. If you're a Democrat or a Clintonite, that's the sort of defense that makes you not want to get the argument started in the first place.
Given the Republicans' eagerness to pin pre-9/11 failures on the Clinton administration, you would think they would be clamoring to bring Freeh to the Hill. But congressional Republicans are even more to blame for Freeh's fecklessness than Clinton. If the White House found Freeh obstreperous and unmanageable, it was largely because he had so much support from Republicans on Capitol Hill. Whether it was the Richard Jewell disaster, or the Wen Ho Lee debacle, or the cover-ups of Waco and Ruby Ridge, whenever a new problem at the FBI would come to light, a senatorial Freeh-booster like Orrin Hatch or Arlen Specter would use the occasion to give a tongue-lashing to Janet Reno or Bill Clinton. If congressional Republicans started attacking Freeh today, they would have to admit that they shortchanged their oversight responsibilities while he was in office because they were such fans of his endless Clinton-bashing.
Freeh became a key player in the long-standing war between the Clinton White House and the Republican Congress. And he, unlike the country, profited from it immensely. He carved out a pocket of freedom for his agency and himself in which he was accountable to pretty much no one. Both parties bear responsibility for that. Now they are both conspiring to sweep the truth under the rug.
And once again, Louis Freeh gets to skate away scot-free.
American press review (previous day)
Bush but no bottle
The problem is the barrel not the apples
Leader
Wednesday July 10, 2002
The Guardian
The podium backdrop carried the slogan
"corporate responsibility". But the speech that George Bush delivered to Wall
Street yesterday ducked more of the obligations of leadership than it
shouldered. Admittedly, the US president faced a tough task. He had to satisfy
the conflicting demands of at least three very different audiences - big business, middle-class investors and swing voters - all anxious for some restoration of stability and confidence after corporate America's recent wild
ride. In the short term, the president may have flourished enough quotable
phrases about new eras of integrity to secure his "Bush acts tough" headlines.
In the longer term, almost all the important questions about the regulation of
modern business practice remain unanswered.
Mr Bush's basic
credibility problem is that he is the leader of a laissez faire political
movement. He was nominated and elected by people who want fewer constraints on
business, not more. Since he took office, Mr Bush has delivered for those
backers on issues from tax, labour and energy, to healthcare, government contracts and the environment. The corporations for which Mr Bush and his most
senior colleagues all worked, and which lavishly financed his election, believe
in self-regulation, if they believe in any sort of regulation at all. Mr Bush
tried to finesse that weakness yesterday. But it left his speech long on vague
urgings, callings-on and challenges and short on controls, powers and specific
actions. Mr Bush's prescription for America's crisis is the soft option of
strengthened policing measures, not the tough option of preventive measures with
teeth, of the kind being proposed in the US senate by Paul Sarbanes of Maryland.
As a Boston Globe commentator put it yesterday, Mr Bush offered "a rotten apple
solution for a rotten barrel problem".
The senate bill acknowledges the key point that Mr Bush evades - that new frameworks are needed to ensure proper accountancy standards and controls over executive greed. But even Mr Sarbanes stops short on issues such as excessive stock options and tax havens, which have increasingly become part of a spiralling debate in the US. Mr Bush, of course, had nothing firm to say about any of that - no Teddy Roosevelt Republican he. Yesterday was not the first time that Mr Bush has promised more than he delivered in getting a grip on corporate America. It is unlikely to be the last.
Firing on our
friends
Sacking two translators because they are Israeli is
not just morally wrong, it is tactically absurd
Jonathan
Freedland
Wednesday July 10, 2002
The
Guardian
We've had smart sanctions; now make way for dumb boycotts. And they
don't come much dumber than this: a campaign to exclude Israel from the world
community of scholars. The idea is wrong in principle, doomed in practice and
even a little cruel. But it has done us all a favour. Along with the row about
British arms sales to Israel, it serves as a useful reminder of just how tricky
these attempts at collective action against other states can be. Whether government-imposed sanctions or petition-inspired boycotts, whether against
Israel or any other country, these are tactics which look appealingly
straightforward but turn out to be perilously complex - often hurting the people
they are meant to help.
Start with the academic
campaign, first floated in a letter to this newspaper in April and brought
before a wider gaze this week by Manchester professor Mona Baker's removal of
two Israeli colleagues from the boards of two journals she edits. Dr Baker wrote
to the pair, insisting she still regarded them as "friends" but no longer wanted
"an official association with any Israeli". Note that wording: she was not
severing ties with an institution but with two individuals whose offence was to
be Israeli.
The principled objection
to this should hardly need stating. It is a blow to academic freedom, but one
not even made on academic grounds. When the Oxford don and critic Tom Paulin was
quoted suggesting that Jewish settlers on the West Bank were Nazis who should
all be shot, there were calls for him to be removed from his post. Rightly, the
cry of academic freedom went up in his defence: thinkers should not be fired for
their thoughts, no matter how difficult to stomach. But the Manchester move goes
a crucial step further. Translators Gideon Toury and Miriam Shlesinger have not
been handed their P45s because of their views, but because of who they are. This
is rather more serious than a restriction on scholarly liberty; it is
discrimination on the basis of national identity.
Those untroubled by that
moral problem may be more disquieted by a practical consideration: if this
tactic is aimed at nudging along the cause of peace in the Middle East and
justice for the Palestinians, it can only fail. For who exactly is hit by an
educational boycott, now backed by more than 700 academics including Richard
Dawkins and Colin Blakemore? The target is the academy, one of the few Israeli
communities where peace-minded voices still have a commanding presence. These
are the very people who are trying to persuade their fellow Israelis back
towards compromise. They need a leg-up from progressives abroad, especially in
desperate times like these, when the Israeli cabinet has just approved a racist
ban on Arabs living in Jewish areas; what they have got instead is a turned
back.
The sacking of Ms
Shlesinger is the embodiment of this backwards thinking. Is she some fierce
advocate for Ariel Sharon, relentlessly translating anti-Palestinian texts into
a variety of tongues? Is she a champion of the Israeli occupation? No, she is
the former head of Israel's branch of Amnesty International, a brave member of a
joint Jewish-Arab group which dodges Israeli army roadblocks to deliver food to
Palestinian cities. Well done, Dr Baker! Sacking Miriam Shlesinger will
certainly keep Ariel Sharon up at night.
But this error is still
not the heart of the matter. That lies in the realm of psychology and memory,
buried deep. It's been stirred most recently by another British boycott
campaign, aimed at all Israeli products. For what Israel and its supporters
cannot help but hear in such a move is a painful echo of past experience: the
boycott of Jewish shops and goods that was one of the Nazis' first steps towards
the Final Solution. Dr Toury made this point to Dr Baker, telling her that the
only reason he was alive in the first place was that his parents fled Hitler's
Germany for Palestine. "These dismissals may easily become the beginning of
something much bigger," he wrote fearfully. "We've been here before."
In other words, a tactic
that may have worked in one place can have an entirely different meaning somewhere else. Sanctions and boycotts appear to have worked wonders in South
Africa - though it's easy to forget how contested they were at the time, even
within the anti-apartheid movement - but they have a different resonance in the
Israeli and specifically Jewish context.
Arms sales should be a
separate matter entirely. Few even on the Israeli left would go to the wall for
Jerusalem's right to buy British cockpit display units for F16s. Indeed, the
backbench Labour argument against sales - that they violate European guidelines
barring the export of weapons to countries where they might inflame tension, be
used for internal repression or to assert a territorial claim - should be pretty
persuasive.
The trouble is, this
outrage is inconsistent. Why do Labour rebels shout so loud when the rules are
broken for Israel - and yet only mumble or stay silent when Britain keeps up
arms sales to India, even when it is about to go to nuclear war with Pakistan,
or to repressive regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar?
What we're all crying out
for is a set of principles that might guide us through each new situation,
telling us when to sanction, when to boycott and when to hold our fire. For it's
never simple. Sanctions against Iraq used to look like a clever alternative to
war - until the evidence grew that the embargo was hitting the people it was
meant to save: the civilian population of Iraq. The lesson from Baghdad seems
clear: sanctions don't work when the target is a dictatorship, where the regime
is quite happy to pass the pain on to its people and where public opinion, even
if it shifts, cannot express itself.
But a second rule applies,
especially when sanctions are aimed at a democracy. They need to hurt your
enemies, not your friends. Afrikaner devotees of the Springboks may have been
firm backers of apartheid: depriving them of international rugby had a logic.
Hitting a bastion of the Israeli opposition makes no sense. Fine judgments like
that are essential. A boycott of goods produced in Israeli settlements on the
West Bank or Gaza would be hard to oppose - indeed there is a domestic Israeli
campaign on these very lines. But it brings new problems, even besides the
unfortunate connotations of a boycott of Jewish goods. There is plenty of false
labelling of settlers' produce as Israeli and, when an item is honestly
identified, there's always a chance it was made in the West Bank by a
Palestinian company. So right-thinking Islington shoppers could be depriving the
very people they want to help.
In other words, sanctions
and boycotts are a messy, contradictory business. Far better, in all but the
most extreme cases, to deal with those nations we disagree with through dialogue
and engagement, rather than ostracism and chilly exile. That's what we said to
George Bush when he shunned the trio of states he branded an "axis of evil". We
should take our own advice, and offer a hand - not a cold shoulder.
Dissident blueprint gathers support
Rebel Kurds at heart of plan to split country into two regions
Michael Howard in
Irbil, northern Iraq
Guardian
Wednesday July 10, 2002
A significant attempt is
being made by Iraq's notoriously fractious opposition groups to agree on a model
for a post-Saddam state that would guarantee the Kurds their own federal region
and the rights of the country's ethnic and religious groups.
One of the two main
Kurdish groups controlling the self-rule area in northern Iraq has drawn up a
draft constitution which has gained wide currency among the four main Iraqi
opposition groups and is being treated seriously in Washington.
The plan, detailed in a
document seen by the Guardian, would divide Iraq into two federal regions - an
Arab region covering the centre and south of Iraq, and an Iraqi Kurdistan region
to the north. Each region would have its own assembly and president, but Baghdad
would maintain control of internal security and a federal army.
The document is being seen
as an attempt by opposition forces in Iraq to forge a local solution to the
problem of governing the country should the current regime fall or be removed.
Until now, opposition
groups within Iraq have been wary of taking part in any US-backed campaign to
remove Saddam without clear guarantees for their safety and future status.
The constitution's
commitment to a "a republican, democratic, parliamentary, pluralistic system"
for Iraq also represents a desire to head off any US thoughts about replacing
the current dictator in Baghdad with another one.
The draft constitution was
drawn up by the Kurdistan Democratic party, led by Massoud Barzani, one of the
two main Kurdish groups controlling the self-rule area in northern Iraq.
Hoshyar Zebari, the KDP's
head of international relations, said: "Given the country's complex ethnic and
religious make-up, Kurds believe it is vital for there to be an agreement among
the Iraqi people about what sort of country they want. Otherwise there could be
chaos following any regime change."
The draft constitution
describes in detail the character of the federal Kurdish entity and its
relationship with the central government in Baghdad, but does not prescribe a
structure for the Arab federal region. "That is up to the Arab communities to
work out for themselves," Mr Zebari said.
Under the plan, each
region would have its own constitution and president, and would establish a
parliament, freely elected in a secret ballot.
A federal assembly would
sit in Baghdad, where a president, elected for a five-year term (and able to
serve a maximum of two terms), would preside over a council of ministers accountable to parliament.
In Baghdad, the federal
authorities would have the power to declare war and make peace, decide foreign
policy and diplomatic representation, sign international treaties and
agreements, set general economic strategy, preside over the country's oil wealth
and its nuclear energy programme, and issue federal legislation.
But the regional administration in Kurdistan, which would have the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as its
capital, would also have wide-ranging powers at its disposal, including taxation
and initiating international relations.
The most influential
anti-Saddam alliance, the KDP, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan , the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (representing the majority Shia
community ) and the Iraqi National Accord are to discuss the plan when they meet
US officials in Europe later this summer.
But the plans for a
federal Iraq face huge difficulties among Iraq's anxious neighbours.
Turkey is alarmed about
the establishment of a Kurdish entity on its borders, fearful that it will stir
up its own harried Kurdish population. Ankara is also opposed to the city of
Kirkuk becoming the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan region.
A US state department
official who follows Iraqi affairs closely said on condition of anonymity: "It
is an elegant and equitable solution to the puzzle of how to maintain Iraqi
territorial and political unity after a regime change. And we don't have anything else on the table."
Rebel groups reject
CIA overtures down on the farm
Julian Borger in
Washington
Wednesday July 10, 2002
The Guardian
Deep in the bowels of the US state
department, not far from the cafeteria, there is a small office identified only
by a handwritten sign on the door reading: The Future of Iraq Project.
Such is the ramshackle
reality lying beneath the Bush administration's pronouncements on regime change
in Baghdad. There is little doubt that the Pentagon is devising invasion plans
in deadly earnest, but the parallel effort to build a political alternative has
been half-hearted to say the least. In fact it is in retreat on several fronts.
The secret side of this
"unconventional war" has not been going any more convincingly. Recent
administration leaks have confirmed that there was a presidential directive to
the CIA in February, ordering the agency to topple Saddam Hussein, with extreme
prejudice if neces sary. But here again, the reality seems to be falling far
short of the hype.
Already stretched and
humiliated in the hunt for al-Qaida, CIA agents have been approaching would-be
allies among the Iraqi opposition who have little reason to trust them, having
been let down by Washington twice before.
Morale is so poor in the
CIA that, in recent testimony to Congress, its director, George Tenet, admitted
the agency had no more than a 15% prospect of carrying out its presidential
order.
The CIA was taught a
sobering lesson on its lowly standing among Iraqi rebel groups on its own home
ground in April.
The agency runs a boot
camp near Williamsburg in Virginia for its paramilitary units, which played an
important role in Afghanistan. It is officially called Camp Perry, but inside
the CIA it known simply as The Farm. Alongside the training camp it has a
"black" area which serves as a venue for the secret side of US diplomacy.
Foreign leaders, rebels or agents can be flown in without the complications of
visas and customs, for meetings that officially never happen.
In late April, The Farm
was the site of delicate talks with Kurdish leaders, aimed at persuading them to
cooperate in the effort to topple President Saddam. The guests of honour were
Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal
Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - the only opposition
with significant troop numbers and territory under their control.
The KDP and PUK confirm
the meeting took place but officially insist it took place in Germany. Privately
Kurdish opposition officials confirm they flew to Virginia.
A US intelligence source
also told the Guardian that the encounter took place at The Farm and that the US
was represented by CIA officials and General Wayne Downing, the president's
military adviser on counter-terrorism and the author of a 1998 plan to unseat
Saddam relying heavily on local opposition and US air power.
"The idea was to see what
the Kurds would be prepared to do in a war on Baghdad," the US source said.
Specifically, the Kurds
were asked to agree to the establishment of CIA stations at their headquarters
in Irbil and Suleimaniyah, but they demurred. According to one account, Mr
Barzani and Mr Talabani asked for more money than the CIA was prepared to offer.
However, according to a
Kurdish source, the meeting failed for a more fundamental reason: lack of trust.
The Kurds had been encouraged to rise up against Saddam twice, in 1991 and 1995,
and both times Washington had abandoned them to the Iraqi army. In 1995, the CIA
pulled the plug on the insurrection 48 hours before it was due to begin.
"We wanted to know if that
was going to happen again. If Saddam struck at us, would we be protected?" the
Kurdish opposition activist said.
At one point, the Kurds
reportedly asked whether the US officials at The Farm really represented the
entire administration, and so Ryan Crocker, a state department official who had
visited Kurdistan a few months earlier, was hastily called in from Washington.
No senior Pentagon officials attended.
It was hardly a convincing
demonstration of US resolve, and the American representatives were unable to
provide the assurances the Kurds were seeking.
Denounced
Last week, Mr Barzani
denounced the secret war, telling the Guardian: "We cannot stop the US [from
taking covert action], but we would like there to be transparency and clarity,
and for there to be no covers or curtains to hide behind."
The White House announced
Gen Downing's resignation after less than a year as counter-terrorism adviser.
But a spokesman denied that his departure had anything to do with the fact that
he lost his battle to persuade the administration to support a guerrilla campaign by Iraqi rebel groups against Baghdad.
Meanwhile, the
understaffed and underfunded Future of Iraq Project has been spending more
effort struggling with other government departments than plotting Saddam's
downfall. Two US-sponsored meetings aimed at bringing members of the Iraqi
opposition together have been put off indefinitely. One was to have been a
seminar in Washington for Iraqi ex-officers in exile. It was to have taken place
under the auspices of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), with the backing of the
Pentagon and members of Congress who view the INC, a London-based umbrella
organisation, as the rightful vanguard of the opposition.
However, the state
department, convinced that the INC is corrupt and unreliable, dragged its feet
on issuing visas to the Iraqi generals in Europe, who were themselves sceptical
about the role of the INC and its leading figure, Ahmed Chalabi. Ultimately
Congress grew impatient and suspended the funding.
The state department has
simultaneously been trying to organise another Iraqi opposition conference in
Europe, to talk about life after Saddam. Mr Chalabi lobbied against the meeting
among his friends at the defence department and in Congress, and the conference
has consequently been put on hold.
The state department has
also cut off funds to the INC's intelligence gathering effort, which smuggled
defectors and information about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction out of
Iraq.
The shambles of the
political struggle might suggest that the Bush administration is not serious
about getting rid of the Iraqi dictator. But Many analysts believe that the lack
of effort invested in building political alliances simply reflects the fact that
the Bush administration does not attach much importance to them.
"My theory is that the US
government is going to want to do this on its own, on the basis that if you work
with the Kurds and the Shi'ites you're going to end up with three Iraqs rather
than one," said John Pike, who runs a Washington security thinktank,
GlobalSecurity.org.
In a forthcoming paper for
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman, a strategic analyst, argues: "The US has shown in the past that it can execute
military operations without any clear plan for conflict termination and nation
building.
"The American military
culture seems to feel its responsibility ends with strategy and grand strategy
is the province of politicians and God."
Jordan refuses to allow launchpad
for invasion
Ewen MacAskill,
diplomatic editor
Guardian
Wednesday July 10, 2002
Jordan vowed yesterday
that it will not allow US troops to be stationed on its territory to mount an
attack on Iraq.
Responding to press
reports that Washington has secret plans to use Jordan as one of its
launch-pads, the Jordanian information minister, Mohammad al-Adwan, said:
"Jordan rejects the principle of interfering in the internal affairs of its
brothers under any justification. We refuse to be a launching pad or arena for
any act against our brotherly state Iraq or to use our soil and airspace to
attain this objective."
Speculation about a US
invasion of Iraq next year has increased since the breakdown of talks between
the UN and Iraq in Vienna on Friday and the leaking to the New York Times of
Pentagon plans for an attack.
The US has been building
up its forces in Qatar and has a strong presence in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
Turkey would also be a vital staging post for an attack. A report in the Observer adding Jordan to the list prompted the Jordanian foreign minister,
Marwan al-Muasher, to call in the Iraqi ambassador, Sabah Yassin, on Sunday to
assure him the kingdom respected Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz, said yesterday the US could not remove the Iraqi
president, Saddam Hussein, and his country was ready to defend itself against
American aggression.
The US state department
says no decision has been made on military action against Iraq. Mr Bush said on
Monday night the US will use all the tools at its disposal to remove Saddam.
Iraq yesterday blamed the US for scuppering the Vienna talks. The UN has been trying to get Iraq to accept the return of UN weapons inspectors to check whether Saddam has been rebuilding his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
Paper tigers
Labour politicians shudder when rightwing newspapers
attack. But press barons wield less power than they think
Geoffrey Wheatcroft
Wednesday July 10, 2002
The Guardian
Relations between Downing Street
and sections of the Tory press, not warm anyway, have turned colder still since
the story about the Blair children's extramural cramming. This comes on top of
the bitter if wonderfully inconsequential Black Rod row, and the seemingly more
important announcement by Rupert Murdoch that he would be telling all his
newspapers to oppose entry into the euro.
That enraged supporters of
the single currency. And yet, whatever it said about Murdoch's concept of
editorial independence, and although Murdoch obviously deserves his position at
the top of the latest Guardian Media 100 as the most commercially powerful
player in the vast "infotainment" industry, it does not mean that he wields the
political influence that he might like to suppose - or that his critics on the
left fearfully attribute to him and the other Tory press magnates.
We have recently been told
on these pages that the British press has warped the course of events of the
past century, notably by hounding Labour: "They brought down Attlee, reduced
Harold Wilson to extreme paranoia and kept Kinnock out." This might be
comforting for Labour, but is it true? Even if we have a predominantly
rightwing, often partisan and brutal press, that doesn't make it all-powerful.
All historical evidence suggests the opposite, that newspapers have remarkably
little real power to instruct the electorate or dictate policy.
Like Murdoch and Lord
Black today, earlier generations of press moguls, Lords Beaverbrook and
Rothermere, flattered themselves that they wielded great influence. The reality
was that every single cause they took up was a failure. Rothermere's tenderness
towards Hitler happily made no difference, and nor did his championing of the
more quixotic cause of Hungarian "revisionism" in the 1930s (where he even had
justice on his side: the 1920 "Trianon" borders were grossly unfair to Hungary).
In his notorious evidence
to the royal commission on the press, Beaverbrook said that he ran his papers
purely for the purposes of propaganda. In that case his career was strikingly
unsuccessful. In the 1930s he campaigned for Empire Free Trade; in the 1940s he
tried to block the postwar American loan; in the 1960s, with his last gasp, he
fought against British entry into the Common Market. It was a hat-trick of
failures. Again, he may well have been right about the loan, a landmark of
financial servitude, but he was still powerless to stop it.
Twice Beaverbrook directly
challenged party leaders. In 1930, he and Rothermere formed the United Empire
party and one of its candidates defeated the official Tory at a byelection.
Baldwin's leadership of the party suddenly seemed shaky. By way of response, as
AJP Taylor put it, Baldwin "appealed to the general prejudice against the press
lords", denouncing in a famous phrase (supplied by his cousin, Kipling) "power
without responsibility - the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages".
The harlots were routed
and Baldwin's position was never again challenged. Taylor was an historian with
some experience of journalism himself, and he added shrewdly that "the popular
newspapers supplied news and, more often, entertainment; they did not direct
opinion". Those words are just as valid today. Then, as now, the popular press
in a capitalist society exists to sell newspapers, not ideas.
At the 1945 election,
Attlee and Labour were harried with venomous unfairness by Beaverbrook in his
papers. He also egged on Churchill to give a most unwise broadcast claiming that
"socialism is inseparably intertwined with totalitarianism". The next day,
Attlee calmly replied, "The voice we heard last night was that of Mr Churchill,
but the mind was that of Lord Beaverbrook" - and Labour went on to win its
historic landslide.
A little more than six
years later Attlee was out of office, but I defy anyone to find a serious
historian who thinks that the press brought down his government. It was beset by
many, largely self-inflicted, difficulties and internal quarrels, though even so
Attlee narrowly won the election in 1950, and then unnecessarily called an
election the following year, when Labour could claim that they were robbed (the
Tories won the most seats, but Labour won a quarter- million more popular
votes).
Nor did a predominantly
hostile press stop Labour winning in 1964 and 1966. If Wilson was subsequently
reduced to paranoia, that was his problem, in every sense. And it would be
paranoid also to think that Labour's failures in the four elections from 1979
could be be attributed to the press. It was the Sun wot won it in 1992? No it
wasn't. Admittedly it was quite a feat to lose to John Major in the depths of a
recession, but Labour's real problem was John Smith's tax plans - or so Tony
Blair has always been convinced.
The idea that the press
wields great power has been given colour by Blair's obsequious courtship of
rightwing proprietors, editors and commentators but, as with Wilson, that says
more about him than about them. Even now it is open to the prime minister to
attack irresponsible harlotry, or, come the referendum, to say, "The voice we
heard was Mr Duncan Smith's but the mind was Mr Murdoch's."
That doesn't seem very
likely, but it's not actually impossible to stand up to media moguls. The
Australian prime minister, John Howard (a Liberal, meaning conservative, be it
noted), has publicly told Rupert Murdoch what to do in a colloquial phrase, the
second of whose two words is "off". It might lack Kipling's orotund grandeur,
but it's eloquent enough. What's to stop Tony Blair saying as much? And, if all
the evidence of the political influence of the press over the past century is
anything to go by, mightn't Murdoch's intervention be the best news the pro-euro
lobby could wish for?
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Independent George Bush's past makes him the ideal person to clean up corporate
America
Change must come from the top; it is in the self-interest of the fat cats to leave more of the cream for the rest of society
Hamish McRae
10 July 2002
Somehow, George Bush has to remoralise American business. At the moment it is profoundly demoralised – in both possible senses of the word. Both its morale and its morals are shot. The rapid rebuilding is essential not just to America, but to the rest of us, too. If the US cannot sustain a strong and sustained economic recovery, the world economic recovery will falter. It is profoundly in our self-interest to try to understand rather than jeer. (Members of our present Government should certainly not jeer, particularly those who were close to Robert Maxwell.)
Yesterday the President made his first serious effort to push through a new corporate code, with tougher penalties for chief executives who break the law. But of course the tainted nature of his own dealings in the energy business in Texas at the beginning of the 1990s has diverted attention from the wider problem and made it harder for him to catch the right tone.
In a sense, this is principally an American party political issue, giving the Democrats their first effective weapon against the President since 11 September. In theory, this should not really be a party issue. The business dealings of the previous incumbent and his wife were less than edifying and most of the excesses of corporate America took place before George W took office. But the reality of the situation is that the person who has to put things back together is damaged by his own past – and by the past of some senior members of his team. This is not ideal.
Looking ahead, three things need to happen. If they do, all will be more or less well. If they don't, we should worry.
The first is for the flow of bad news about US corporate accounting standards to cease. Misstatements of company profits, in the eyes of financial markets the most serious of the scandals now unfolding, cut into the very bedrock of market capitalism. Investors can make their own judgements about the competence of company managers, the quality of their products and services, the opportunities in their line of business and so on. What they cannot cope with is accounts that lie. That is what auditors are for – and why, incidentally, in the UK the appointment of auditors has each year to be approved directly by shareholders, not by the management. Now, as more and more US companies reveal that their previously published profits were wrong, the raw material with which investors work is suspect. And until you know the size of the pile of rubbish you tend to assume it is bigger than it is. Only a tiny proportion of US companies is in the dock, but the whole system is contaminated.
By its very nature, getting the rubbish into the open will take some more months. The faster companies can assure their shareholders – by, for example, getting separate teams from their auditors to check the results – the faster their shares will recover. So it is profoundly in the self-interest of corporate America to demonstrate that its hands are clean.
The second thing that has to happen is an orderly examination of the regulatory, accounting and legal framework for companies. Shooting a few miscreants and making heroes of the whistle-blowers is fine. Nothing like seeing your peers punished to sharpen up discipline. But the much harder task is to figure out whether there has been a failure in the system or merely failure by a number of individuals. Actually it is both. But tackling white-collar crime effectively is like tackling other forms of crime: there is little point in changing the law if the problem is not the law but the enforcement thereof.
Fortunately, the US will now carry through a root-and-branch examination not just of company law, but also of financial market practice. America has to figure out why hitherto respected financial institutions allowed themselves to become the cheerleaders for companies that were being run into the ground. Here, I don't think we are dealing with a handful of dishonest individuals. Rather a very large number of fundamentally honest and extremely bright people allowed the huge personal rewards they were receiving to, well, slightly corrupt them. Niggling doubts about the shares they were puffing were suppressed – far easier to go with the herd than be the lone warning voice. Besides, if you warned too loudly, you would probably be sacked, as, let's remember, was the UK analyst who memorably headed a paper on Robert Maxwell's empire with the words "Can't Recommend A Purchase". (Don't worry about him – he has been extremely successful since.)
But even when the rubbish is out in the open and the necessary changes in US legal and accounting practice are in place, there will have to be a culture change if the US is really to rebuild its faith in itself.
If you look back in history, there have been a string of financial disasters, some the result of incompetence, some fraud. We have all had them. If you want a proxy for Robert Maxwell, read Anthony Trollope's The Way We Live Now. Look at the way the French press, controlled by the financial services industry, puffed tsarist bonds in the run-up to the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Look at the excesses in the Twenties in the States that led to the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
But each wave of scandals has also led to a change of attitude towards what behaviour is acceptable and what is not. Increasing the penalties for some fraud from, say, five years to 10 years is much less effective than kicking someone out of the golf club. The really interesting thing to look for in America will be the way in which social attitudes to wealth change. Victorians in Britain sought to distinguish between the deserving poor and the undeserving poor. I suspect Americans will increasingly distinguish between the deserving rich (those who do a good job and get rewarded for it) and the undeserving rich (those who manipulate the system to enrich themselves while ripping other people off).
This has to happen. It has to happen partly because Middle America is deeply angry at the antics of the financial elite but also because, without a change in morality, the capitalist system cannot rebuild the trust of investors. Without trust, markets and, indeed, the economy will languish, and in the first instance it will be the financial service industry that will be hardest hit. So change has to come from the top; it is in the self-interest of the fat cats to leave more of the cream for the rest of society.
But is George W the best person to capture this mood for change and articulate the need for financial morality? Of course not; but he will have to do. Remember that sometimes poachers make good gamekeepers. Joe Kennedy, Jack's father and the notorious US ambassador to Britain, made his fortune by pretty dubious financial dealing in the 1920s. He was then made the founder head of the SEC and oversaw the outlawing of many of the practices he had used to enrich himself. The SEC was crucial in rebuilding trust in US capitalism in the second half of the 1930s. Sometimes it takes one to catch one.
Leader Europe's farmers should not be allowed to go on harvesting subsidies
10 July 2002
Franz Fischler, the European Union's Agriculture Commissioner, must wonder what he ever did to deserve such punishment, for his is the worst job in the EU. Every commissioner likes to think that it is his destiny to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); one by one they bite the dust. Today it is Mr Fischler's turn to publish his proposals.
Unlike with previous efforts, which were never really backed by the political will for reform, this time round there is – or, rather, should be – no alternative. Reform must happen. The accession of 10 new member states in 2004, due to be agreed at the Copenhag